Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

Publication Title

Villanova Law Review

Abstract

When interpreting state constitutional provisions, state courts frequently take a "lockstep" approach by adopting the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of analogous federal constitutional provisions. Critics often portray lockstep interpretation as misguided and have identified varieties of lockstepping, including unreflective, reflective, prospective, and methodological lockstep interpretation. This Article contributes to these discussions by identifying several additional forms of lockstep interpretation that have thus far gone undiscussed: lazy, mandatory, atextual, and sticky lockstepping.

Several of these variations highlight distinct failures of state courts to independently interpret state constitutions. This includes lazy lockstepping, where state courts tend to engage in repeated, thoughtless invocations of precedent to reach a conclusion in line with federal doctrine, despite the basis of the precedent being inapplicable, under-supported, or even nonexistent. State courts also engage in atextual lockstep interpretation, applying the interpretation of federal constitutional provisions to state constitutional provisions that are textually distinct from those in the Federal Constitution.

Identifying and calling out variations of lockstep interpretation is preferable to broader condemnations oflockstepping generally. Acknowledging multiple forms of lockstep interpretation enables critics to bring additional arguments to bear in support of independent state constitutional interpretation and the reform of existing doctrine. Additionally, not all lockstepping may be worthy of condemnation, as some instances of uniform interpretation may be textually, structurally, or historically warranted, and others may end up being more protective of individual rights. Careful attention to lockstep interpretation and its variations is crucial as state constitutional law takes on an increasingly important role in the definition and protection of individual rights.

Volume

71

Issue

1

First Page

111

Last Page

166

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