Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

Publication Title

University of Massachusetts Law Review

Abstract

What does generative artificial intelligence mean for the future of legal scholarship? The topic has been the talk of the town around academic watercoolers. Some legal scholars have tried their hand at producing legal scholarship using generative Al. The accompanying commentary is varied, but advocates for the technology suggest that generative Al may become a common tool for legal scholars, leaving those who refuse to adapt at a severe disadvantage.

In this article, I contemplate a world in which legal scholars routinely use generative Al to produce academic writing. I argue that an instrumental view of legal scholarship's value-a view dominated by an obsession with quantity, citations, and prestige hierarchies-obscures the detrimental effects that generative Al may have on the intrinsic values of writing and publishing. A deeper look at the fundamental purposes of legal scholarship reveals that generative Al poses far more of a danger than a purely instrumental perspective suggests. Intrinsic benefits derived from the tedious, time-intensive task of academic legal writing include developing knowledge, collaborating with colleagues, improving one's writing and communication, and having fun. Generative Al threatens to reduce or eliminate these valuable aspects of legal scholarship in favor of speed, efficiency, and quantity. I illustrate this point using typical law-review-style argumentation supplemented by speculative fiction, narrative, ChatGPT parody, and the occasional footnote joke.

Volume

21

Issue

1

First Page

29

Last Page

74

Download

Share

COinS