Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2022
Publication Title
Yale Law and Policy Review
Abstract
While the American civic religion is to be distrustful of government, feelings of discontent regarding our systems of criminal investigation and adjudication feel historic. And while those systems are capable of great carnage en route, the endgame is, ultimately, criminal punishment. Yet before punishment can be imposed, every prosecution—and therefore every defendant—is meant to encounter a potential “circuit breaker”: the jury. I propose that we re-inject this democratic voice into our criminal adjudications, but through an entirely novel structure: the defendant (and perhaps the prosecutor) would have the choice of invoking a jury empowered to ‘veto’ any judicial sentence. By carefully designing the ex-post system, including to discourage over-invocation, we could provide more democratic results in individual cases, hold prosecutors to their charging threats, and obtain a meaningful sense of whether—as many of us believe—our institutions of criminal justice are dangerously out of touch with popular conceptions of what ought to be.
Volume
40
First Page
488
Recommended Citation
Stephen E. Henderson, The Jury Veto, 40 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 488 (2022).
Included in
Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges Commons, Law and Society Commons