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Letter of the Secretary of the Interior, communicating, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, information touching the origin and progress of Indian hostilities on the frontier.

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LETTER
OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
COMMUNICATING,
In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, information touching the origin and progress of Indian hostilities on the frontier.

JULY 13, 1867.—Read, referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., July 13, 1867.

Sir: In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, calling for reports made to this department by commissioners heretofore appointed, or by superintendents or agents of Indian tribes, together with any other authentic and reliable information in its possession touching the origin and progress of existing Indian hostilities on the frontier, &c., I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated the 12th instant, with accompanying printed reports:

Reports of Generals Buford and Sanborn, marked A and B, and copies of reports, letters, and telegrams, numbered 1 to 45, inclusive, referred to in said report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. OTTO, Acting Secretary.

Hon. Benj. F. Wade,
President of the United States Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, July 12, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, by reference from your department, of Senate resolution of the 8th instant, calling upon the Secretary of the Interior to communicate to the Senate any reports made to his department by commissioners heretofore appointed, or by superintendents or agents of Indian tribes, together with any other authentic and reliable information in his possession touching the origin and progress of the existing Indian hostilities on the frontier; also to communicate, as far as he can, the extent of the disaffection among the Indian tribes, whether they are waging war as tribes or as individuals, and if as individuals, what disposition has been or is likely to be made of the friendly Indians formerly belonging to the hostile bands; and that he make such suggestions as in his judgment will lead to the most speedy termination of pending hostilities and prevent Indian wars in the future.
IN INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

In compliance with your instructions to report all the facts in regard to the difficulties now in possession of this office, with such suggestions and views as I may deem necessary and proper in the premises, I would respectfully invite your attention to the enclosed printed copy of the reports of the Secretaries of War and Interior relative to the Fort Phil. Kearney massacre, which, I think, will show the cause of the commencement of the present hostilities at least of those at or near said fort, where hostile demonstrations by any considerable force was first made by the Indians. The views in regard to the views of the Indians who made these demonstrations which resulted in the massacre of our troops, expressed by my predecessor in his report of the 4th of February last, are not correct, as will be seen from the report of General Buford, one of the commissioners appointed by the President to visit the Indian country (see copy herewith marked A,) and from General Sanborn's report, also here with, B.

I also enclose copies of reports, letters, and telegrams received at this office since the reports of late Commissioner Bogy were made, as contained in said printed copy of reports. These papers, numbered from 1 to 45, inclusive, in the order of their dates, contain all the reliable information I have in regard to the matter since the 21st of February last.

A careful examination of these papers has led me to the following conclusions:

1st. That the tribes and parts of tribes involved in the war are the following, namely: As tribes, the Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, numbering about one hundred and eighty lodges—say 300 warriors; the Minneconjou band of the Teton Sioux nation, 300 lodges, about 500 warriors; those of the Ogallallas band of Sioux, who would not consent to cede the right of way for the Montana road, via Powder river, and the right to plant military posts in their country, 130 lodges, about 250 warriors; those of the Brulé band of Sioux, who coincided with these Ogallallas in opposing the cession of the road and post privileges, some 150 lodges, about 300 warriors; those of the Two Kettle band of Sioux, entertaining the same views, about 150 lodges, and some 300 warriors, making, in all, about 1,600 to 1,800 effective warriors.

These were the Indians who perpetrated the Phil. Kearney massacre and who have been carrying on the war in the north.

On the plains further south the only Indians known to be making hostile demonstrations are the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, numbering some 200 lodges, and about 500 warriors, with possibly a few individuals from other tribes.

I am led to the conclusion, secondly, that the causes of the war are easily traced and readily understood when a few facts are known. These facts I proceed to cull from the official records.

In December, 1864, occurred the horrible Sand Creek massacre of friendly Cheyennes and Arapahoes in Colorado Territory. Exasperated and maddened by this cold-blooded butchery of their women and children, disarmed warriors and old men, the remnant of these Indians sought the aid and protection of the Comanches and Kiowas, and obtained both. The combination which followed embraced all the tribes of the plains from the Red River of the South to the Red River of the North, and resulted in the general Indian war of 1865, which cost our people many valuable lives and $40,000,000 in money. Peace was concluded with all the southern Indians in October, 1865. Peace was likewise made with the Missouri river Indians late in the same autumn, and the Indians engaged in the recent hostilities gave notice that they also were willing to bury the tomahawk.

Commissioners were accordingly sent to treat with these Indians at Laramie in June, 1866. Unfortunately a new complication arose. The commissioners insisted that the Indians grant the United States the right of establishing milit
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Military posts at the base of the Big Horn mountain, (now Fort Phil. Kearney,) and on the headwaters of the Yellowstone river, (now Fort C. F. Smith,) the only remaining reliable hunting grounds of these Indians. The Indians occupying the country in the vicinity of the proposed military posts refused to grant the required rights. While this matter was still under consideration a military command arrived on its way to plant these forts, and the Indians being informed that the posts were to be immediately established and garrisoned by these troops, with or without their consent, at once withdrew from the council, refusing to accept presents, and very soon went to war upon all the troops who attempted to pass over this road. Such was the origin of the war on the Montana road.

In April of the current year the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes were peacefully occupying their village on the grounds assigned to them as hunting grounds by the treaty of October, 1865, when a military command under Major General Hancock, without any known provocation, burned down their homes of 300 lodges, (including, perhaps, 100 lodges of friendly Sioux,) and all their provisions, clothing, utensils, and property of every description. In view of these facts, it is scarcely deemed necessary to seek further for reasons for the hostility of the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes.

While searching for the origin of our existing Indian war, I beg leave to insert here an extract from a letter of Lieutenant General Sherman, dated Fort Lyon, Colorado, September 30, 1866, forwarded to the Secretary of War by General Grant, and referred to this office:

"Craig (formerly a colonel or captain in the army, and owner of a large ranche on the Huerfano) may be taken as the best sample of the class of men who are settling along the east base of the mountains. He has thoroughly proven the ability to produce, but then comes the more difficult problem of consumption. Who is to buy his corn? The miners of Colorado, in the mountains, two hundred miles distant, will take some; but the cost of hauling is enormous. The few travellers and stage companies will buy a little, but he, and all situated like him, look to our military for a market, and that is the real pressure for garrisons and an Indian war. The Utes are harmless and peaceable, and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes are off after the buffaloes, God only knows where, and I don't see how we can make a decent excuse for an Indian war. I have travelled all the way from Laramie without a single soldier or escort. I meet single men, unarmed, travelling along the road, as in Missouri. Cattle and horses graze loose, far from their owners, most tempting to a starving Indian, and though the Indians might easily make a descent on these scattered ranches, yet they have not done so, and I see no external signs of a fear of such an event, though all the people are clamorous for military protection. I received at Puebla a petition to that effect, signed by so many names that I could not help answering that the names to the petition exceeded in number the strength of any of our small garrisons. Still, I do think that the efforts of these people to transform the desert into productive farms is worthy of encouragement of the general government, and I will treat of the subject again at length.

"After spending part of a day and the night at Craig's, I resumed the journey down the Huerfano twenty miles, to its mouth, there forded the Arkansas, and turned up five miles to the house of Colonel Boone, a man of note in this quarter. He has a good two-story frame house, with his family, embracing the wife of Colonel Elmer Otis, but she happened to be away on a visit to some neighbor, and I did not see her. Colonel Boone was at home, and I talked with him freely on the above and all other points of interest. He is an old Indian man, was on the plains with General Ashley as early as 1824, and has been more or less connected with the Indians ever since. He also made the treaty with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in 1860. He cultivates a farm and lives, seemingly, as little apprehensive of danger from Indians as the rest of the people. After camping a night near his house, we turned down the Arkansas and
travelled, in three days, one hundred miles to this post, Fort Lyon. I did not see or hear of an Indian the whole distance, though we passed through the whole length of the Cheyenne and Arapaho reservation."

The above letter is dated September 30, 1866. I learn from the papers with, particularly from General Sanborn's report of the 8th instant, that a portion of our commission met representatives of all or nearly all hostile bands of the north at Fort Laramie, as late as the 12th of June last, and went into council with them; that they professed a willingness to make peace, agreed to cease offensive war until autumn, with a view of making satisfactory treaty in the interim, and I am informed by one of the commission now in Washington, namely, General Sanborn, that they are willing to stipulate, that the Montana road, with necessary military posts to protect it, may go through their country west of the Big Horn mountain, which would meet their choice hunting-grounds. He is satisfied, also, that they will give a reasonable compensation agree, by treaty, to the present location of the road and posts.

I conclude, fourth, that while the hostile bands are willing to make a lasting peace upon anything like equitable terms, and while the friendly Indians are exceedingly reluctant to go into war with the United States, yet further and persistent disregard and violation of the natural rights of the Indians, and of the treaty obligations of the government towards them, such as have characterized our military operations among them for the past twelve months, will soon result in an Indian war of gigantic proportions, and of prolonged and indefinite duration, at an appalling expense of life and property, and at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. If we desire this result, if we want the war we have provoked enlarged and intensified till our whole frontier is in a blaze, till our infant Territories are isolated and besieged, and Pacific overland communication cut off, we have only to press a little further the policy we are now pursuing and we will get all we desire. From the facts before me I conclude, fifth, that we can have all we want from the Indians, and peace without war, if we so will, with entire security on all our frontiers, and in all our territorial domain, at a cost of less than two days' expenses of the existing war, to wit, a quarter of a million dollars, and in less than one hundred days. But how shall peace be so easily and so soon made? Simply by retracing our wrong steps and by doing right.

Pay the northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes and the hostile Sioux for the trespass we have committed upon their recognized rights, and negotiate with them by fair treaty for the privileges of way and of military posts on their lands so far as we may need them. This is only doing them justice, as our established policy requires, and this makes them our friends at once, renders travel and transportation safe, and garrisons almost useless. Restore to the southern Cheyennes their village and their property we so wantonly and foolishly burned and destroyed, or pay them a fair price for them, and they will come back to the war path and resume the avocations of peace.

It is believed that the destruction by our forces of the Cheyenne village and property, valued at $100,000, in April last, has already cost the government more than $5,000,000 in money, one hundred lives of citizens and soldiers, and jeopardized all our material interests on the plains and along hundreds of miles of our frontier.

It will be seen among the papers herewith that Lieutenant General Sherman, in a despatch to the Secretary of War, dated Fort McPherson, Nebraska, June 17, 1867, among other things, says: "My opinion is if fifty Indians are allowed to remain between the Arkansas and Platte, we will have to guard every stage station, every train and all railroad working parties. In other words, fifty hostile Indians will checkmate three thousand soldiers." Now if this be true between the Arkansas and the Platte, of which region he is speaking, what a tremendous army will be required in the field if we conclude to precipitate a general Indian war, and to prosecute it to a successful result!
In my judgment we have war, general, prolonged, bloody and ruinous, with all its accompanying barbarities and atrocities, and peace, speedy and durable, its concomitant, and consequent blessings, in our own hands and at our own option.

To make peace, it is (in my opinion) necessary, 1st. That that part of an act approved March 29, 1867, repealing “all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to enter into treaties with any Indian tribe,” shall be repealed, otherwise there can be no binding agreement for peace made with the hostile Indians. 2d. That an appropriation should be made to defray all the necessary expenses to be incurred in making the desired treaties. 3d. That all military operations within the Indian country shall be subject to the direction and control of the Indian department. Supply these essential prerequisites, and I am firmly of the opinion that peace can be restored in a very short time.

In regard to the best means to secure and perpetuate peace between the Indians and our people, I beg leave to suggest, that it is essential to the perpetuation of peace with the Indians, 1st. That the government respect religiously, and protect by all means, their natural rights, as ascertained by our own highest judicial tribunal; and, 2d. That it observe strictly, and carry out faithfully, all its treaty obligations to them.

We have reached a point in our national history when, it seems to me, there are but two alternatives left us as to what shall be the future of the Indian, namely, swift extermination by the sword, and famine, or preservation by gradual concentration on territorial reserves, and civilization. Our present policy, or rather want of a policy, in this regard, is working out, and must result, if persisted in, in extermination. As now situated, the Indian tribes are in the way of our toiling and enterprising population, and unprotected they will soon be inevitably submerged and buried beneath its confluent surges. Possessing originally the continent, they roamed at will among its mountains, valleys, and broad plains, free and untrammelled, the proprietors and lords of them all. But rapidly our race has relieved them of their vast domain, and the remnants of the ancient red nations, encircled by the pressing millions of our people, maintain a precarious foothold on their last hunting-grounds. These millions will soon crush them out from the face of the earth, unless the humanity and Christian philanthropy of our enlightened statesmen shall interfere and rescue them. The sentiment of our people will not for a moment tolerate the idea of extermination.

In my judgment, the Indians can only be saved from extinction by consolidating them as rapidly as it can be peacefully done, on large reservations, from which all whites except government employés shall be excluded, and educating them intellectually and morally, and training them in the arts of civilization, so as to render them at the earliest practicable moment self-supporting; and at the proper time to clothe them with the rights and immunities of citizenship.

The path by which humanity has emerged from a condition of savage barbarity to its largest development has been through pastoral pursuits into agriculture and the arts, up to the highest sphere of mental refinement in the learned professions.

Entertaining these ideas, I beg leave to recommend that the government take such steps as may be deemed proper to set apart a territory, somewhere north of the northern line of Nebraska, and west of the Missouri river, of liberal dimensions, for the exclusive occupation and ultimate home of all the Indians north of the Platte, and of Iowa, and east of the summit of the Rocky mountains, and make appropriations at once to enable this department to make suitable preparations for such Indians as are now ready to enter upon pastoral and agricultural pursuits in said territory. To initiate this policy, if adopted, I ask an appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars.

That the policy indicated may be of universal application, I would respect-
fully recommend that a large territory be set apart south of the southern line of Kansas, and west of Arkansas, including the present Indian territory, and the country known as the Stake Plains of Texas, and so much of New Mexico as may be necessary, for the exclusive occupation and ultimate home of all the Indians south of the Platte and east of Arizona. And for the inauguration of this plan in reference to said territory, and said Indians, I respectfully ask that an appropriation be made of one hundred thousand dollars.

I recommend that all necessary provisions be made by Congress to proceed at once that portion of Texas, or so much thereof as may be necessary, lying between the western boundary of the Indian territory and the eastern boundary of New Mexico.

I would recommend that a commission be appointed to proceed to the Pacific coast and Arizona, to select one or more reservations of ample size, upon which to concentrate all the Indians west of the Rocky mountains, and for this object I ask an appropriation of twenty thousand dollars.

There are now concentrated on the Niobrara river, near the Platte river, under the chief's Spotted Tail, Swift Bear, Two Strike, Big Mouth, and others, about 1,500 friendly Sioux, who have separated from the hostile bands. To this number will soon be added some 2,000 to 2,500 friendly Indians, now on their way from the hostile country. Pending hostilities, or until placed on reservations, and until they shall have raised a crop or two, these Indians will have to be subsisted by the government, or permitted to join their hostile kindred. To give them three-quarter rations will cost $300,000 per annum, and I recommend that this sum be appropriated by Congress at its present session, for their subsistence for the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1868.

The friendly Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches, of the south, forced by General Hancock's command to abandon their hunting-grounds, set apart to them by the treaty of October, 1865, are now at or near Fort Cobb, in the Indian country, in a destitute condition, and numbering (with the Kiowas and Comanches) from 5,000 to 7,000 souls. These Indians, if not permitted to return to their own hunting-grounds, must either be fed by the government, or be driven to plundering the border inhabitants and war. I therefore ask an appropriation of $500,000, for the purpose of supplying these Indians, if found necessary.

I ask, also, an appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars to enable the department, if found expedient, to reimburse the southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and friendly Sioux, for their village and property destroyed by our troops in April last, with a view of restoring peaceful relations to them, and safety and security to life and property on the plains.

In conclusion, I take the liberty of stating to the honorable Secretary, for the information of the country, that the total cost of the Indian Bureau, in its extended field of operations, including all its expenditures, does not exceed $3,000,000 per annum.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner.

Hon. W. T. Otto,
Acting Secretary of the Interior.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

MASSACRE AT FORT PHIL. KEARNEY.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, communicating, in obedience to a resolution of the Senate of the 30th of January, information in relation to the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at or near Fort Phil. Kearney, in Dakota Territory.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., February 5, 1867.

SIR: In obedience to a resolution of the Senate of the 30th ultimo, requesting the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Interior "to furnish to the Senate all official reports, papers, and other facts in possession of their respective departments which may tend to explain the origin, causes, and extent of the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at or near Fort Phil. Kearney, in Dakota Territory," I have the honor herewith to transmit a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated the 4th instant, with accompanying papers—twelve in number—containing all the information now in possession of this department on the subject.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary.

Hon. L. S. Foster,
President of the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, February 4, 1867.

SIR: I have received from you the resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives in relation to the recent outbreak at Fort Phil. Kearney. These resolutions contain three distinct propositions, to each of which a separate answer is necessary. It requires this department to furnish all the information in its possession in relation to the late massacre at Fort Phil. Kearney; secondly, the causes which produced the same; and thirdly, the causes which have led to the present alarming condition of our relations with the Indian tribes of the interior.

In answer to the first question, I will say that we had, prior to the occurrence of this disaster, very reliable information of the temper of the Indians in that section of the country; and although this temper did not amount to a positive hostility, yet I know from the various sources of information at the command of this bureau that there was a feeling of dissatisfaction growing out of the treaty of Fort Laramie of last summer. That the tribes occupying the Powder River country had great cause of dissatisfaction with the provisions of this treaty is not singular. From the extracts which I here furnish from the special report of Agent Chandler, (marked No. 1,) it will be easily understood why this dissatisfaction existed. Knowing that this feeling existed among these Indians, it was my intention to recommend the appointment, at an early day, of a commission of good men to visit their country and consult with the leading chiefs and headmen of these tribes and ascertain what their condition really and justly required. It seems to me to be unreasonable to require these people to abandon their hunting-grounds, while the chase is their only means of support, until some other means of existence is provided for them. That another means of support can be provided is beyond any doubt. The country is extensive enough to give them a home, and at the same time remove them from
the highway of the travel of the whites. It is due, however, to the
can-
truth to say that, however injudicious the provisions of this treaty are, most
the bands of Sioux Indians occupying that country were determined to
by it, and I have positive information that these well-disposed Indians have
faithfully adhered to this determination. Hence many of the chiefs of differ-
ent bands, such as Spotted Tail, Swift Bear, One That Walks Under the Gr
and many others, have actually moved to the south side of the Platte, when
they are at this time, to keep out of the way of any trouble. They are friendly. Another leading chief, by the name of Iron Shell, is with his band
in the Sand Hills north of the Platte, and friendly. With proper manage-
ment these friendly-disposed bands can be used to the best advantage by the govern-
ment, and I am anxious that nothing should occur to drive them from us.
Through these bands are friendly, it is nevertheless but too true that it is more
policy than anything else that makes them so. They feel as if they were un-
justly treated, and this feeling is universal among them. From all the inform-
ation I can get—and it is, I think, pretty reliable—none of these chiefs had an-
thing to do with the affair at Fort Phil. Kearney. An order issued by General
Cooke, at Omaha, on the 31st day of July last, (herewith sent, marked No. 32
in relation to arms and ammunition, has had a very bad effect. I am satisfied
that such orders are not only unwise, but really cruel, and therefore cal-
culated to produce the very worst effect. Indians are men, and when hun-
gry will, like us, resort to any means to obtain food; and as the chase is their only means
of subsistence, if you deprive them of the power of procuring it, you certainly pro-
duce great dissatisfaction. If it were true that arms and ammunition could
be accumulated by them to war against us, it certainly would be unwise to give
them to them; but this is not the fact. No Indian will buy two guns. One has
absolutely needs; and as he has no means of taking care of powder, he necessarily
will take, when offered to him, but a very limited quantity. It is true that
formerly they hunted with bows and arrows, killing buffalo, antelope, and deer
with the same; but to hunt successfully with bow and arrows requires horses,
and as the valleys of that country are now more or less filled with white men
prospecting for gold and silver, their means of subsisting their horses have
passed away, and they now have but few horses. I mention these facts so as
to place before the country, as briefly as possible, the condition as well as the wants of the Indians.

I herewith send copies of two letters (marked 3 and 4) and my report on
same (marked 4 5 ) from the surgeon at the post of Phil. Kearney, giving an ac-
count of the first difficulty on the 6th of December, and of the last one, on
the 21st of the same month. Although these letters are written by an officer
at the post, with all his sympathies for his comrades, it is very evident, from a
careful perusal and a just understanding of them, that these Indians did not
come to that fort in any very great force, nor with a view of making war. To
say that a wagon train was attacked by three hundred Indians, and yet no one
killed, is simply ridiculous. There were, perhaps, some five or six men with
this train, and if three hundred Indians had really attacked them, it is not
doubted that one or more of them would have been killed. But the report
was made of an attack by three hundred Indians; this led to a sortie from the fort;
and even then, it appears, the Indians did not wish to fight, as they retreated,
and no soldier was killed until several Indians had been dispatched by our sol-
diers. It seems that then some Indians hovered around the fort till the 21st,
the day of the fatal disaster. To say that they came to the fort to challenge
the force at that point to a fight is simply absurd. Nevertheless a fight did
take place, and the facts are all set forth in the letter marked No. 4, dated 1st
of January, of this year.

Now, I understand this was the fact: These Indians being in absolute want
of guns and ammunition to make their winter hunt, were on a friendly visit
to the fort, desiring to communicate with the commander, to get the order refusing them guns and ammunition rescinded, so that they might be enabled to procure their winter supply of buffalo. It has been currently reported that some 3,000 to 5,000 warriors were assembled to invest this fort. This is not, and cannot by any possibility be true, as this would presuppose a population of 21,000 to 35,000 Indians in that section of country, (being one warrior in seven.) This number of Indians is not there, nor could that number of warriors feed themselves and their horses at this season of the year in that latitude. The whole is an exaggeration; and although I regret the unfortunate death of so many brave soldiers, yet there can be no doubt that it is owing to the foolish and rash management of the officer in command at that post. Nevertheless, there is a band of Sioux Indians in that country, of the Ogallallas tribe, headed by a chief of the name of Red Cloud, that are badly disposed. This is the only band, so far as I am informed, that is hostile as a band; but I have no doubt that around him and under his banner are gathered all the badly disposed Indians of the country. They flock to his standard as individuals, not as tribes, and I think this band, with its adherents, should be severely chastised by the military. With this view, I have recommended to you the appointment of the commissioners whose names you have presented to the President, to proceed to that country at as early a day as possible, with the view of finding all the facts which have led to the affair, and of separating, if possible, the friendly from the unfriendly tribes. By doing so we would be doing justice to those who are innocent, and also avoid a general Indian war, which, if once started, will extend over the entire country, from the Missouri river to the Rocky mountains, and from the mouth of the Yellowstone to the Mexican line. This war should be avoided, if possible, as it would cost millions of dollars, and last for many years.

I submit to you a letter from the War Department, (No. 5,) enclosing the extract from the report of General Sherman, (No. 6.) Such an order, in my opinion, would lead to the very result it is designed to obviate. I submit to you the copy of my report on this subject on the 23d of January, being document No. 7 herewith sent.

It cannot be doubted that the Indians have many just causes of complaint. The policy heretofore pursued, I think has been a bad one; and bad as it was, it has not been justly carried out. Homes should be provided for them, and we have territory enough to give them; their annuities should be greatly increased, and goods of a good quality and adapted to their wants should be furnished them, and also at the proper season of the year. It is a notorious fact that very inferior goods have for some years been given to them, and also at a period too late.

In conclusion, permit me to say that I know of but one remedy for all the evils now existing in our Indian relations. It is the appointment of commissioners, without regard to the politics or religion of the persons appointed, to be composed of men of high character, to proceed to all the States and Territories containing an Indian population; one commission, say of five persons, for each one, viz: to ascertain the number of Indians, their present status, and how many can be aggregated on one or two reservations, and to select these reservations, which should be ample, and report to this department next fall. These commissions should take all the time necessary to master the subject, and, if necessary, spend months in mastering it. The Indians should be then made to go on these reservations, and when there, furnished with stocks of cattle and sheep to raise. At first the cattle and sheep would be eaten by them; but it would not be long before they would find out that the milk of the cow, and the wool of the sheep, and the meat of the beef, as well as the hide and tallow, are all very good things; and in place of giving them large quantities of light and useless goods, paints and beads, give them a reasonable allowance of heavy goods until they can make them themselves, and furnish them with spinning
and weaving machines. Near this reservation, but not on it, I would place the location of a military garrison; not too near, for well-known reasons. Within a distance which would secure to the garrison all power to suppress any control the occupants of the reservation, with a resident agent on the reservation, and in the midst of them. After they are thus localized and made to depend on their own care in raising their flocks of sheep and herds of cattle, I would then introduce the schoolmaster and the missionary, and not before, for it is worse than useless to attempt to educate and Christianize a few members of a tribe of barbarians. Elevate the whole tribe together; it is slower, but every step taken is maintained.

I have, perhaps, gone beyond the requirements of the resolution submitted to me; nevertheless, I think the views herein suggested are germane to the subject. The question is of the greatest importance, and well worthy the attention of statesmen.

Since writing the above my attention has been called to one of the city papers of to-day, containing what purports to be the action of the military in relation to the question of furnishing, in limited quantities, to friendly Indians, arms and ammunition. I enclose a slip from one of these papers, and if it be true that the military has interfered in the way there stated, it accounts very well for most of our Indian troubles, and this strengthens my previous views, that it is owing to the unwarranted interference of the military that we have the numerous conflicts with these people. How anybody, military or civil, could possibly object to the order given by special agents Irwin and Bogy to the trader Butterfield, is indeed surprising. The law authorizes traders to deal in arms and ammunition with tribes at peace, and this is all that these special agents say. Their order is correct according to law and reason, and the military should not be allowed to interfere. In this case, as in all other cases coming under my observation, this interference has been imperious, and unless it is checked it will lead to the most disastrous consequences; nothing less than the destruction of our entire western settlements, including Nebraska, Kansas, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Dakota, Nevada, and Arizona, and the entire column of western emigration. This I wish to avoid.

I enclose you copies of the letter of Governor Edmunds of the 26th September last, enclosing report of Agent Hanson of the 15th of the same month, being document No. 8; also copy of letter of Governor Faulk of the 9th January last, enclosing report of the 31st December, being document No. 9.

Permit me to call particular attention to these reports. The reading of them will satisfy any one of the cause of our present difficulties. All can be traced to the order of General Cooke, of the 31st of July, forbidding the traders from dealing in arms and ammunition; and if we have any trouble with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, now or very recently perfectly quiet, all newspaper reports to the contrary notwithstanding, it can be traced to the action of Major Douglass, sustained by his superior officer. The special commissioners who visited those Indians last fall were discreet and prudent men, and I am satisfied if their action had not been interfered with that no trouble whatever would exist there. As it is I look for an outbreak every day. The newspaper reports daily seen are generally false; one of them yesterday, concerning a man named Comstock, who is known to be one of the meanest and most worthless fellows on the frontier, although reported to be an interpreter, scout, and guide, all of which is false; he is neither one of these things, but a gambler and thief.

I also enclose you extracts from a letter of General Hancock to Agent Lear- enworth, as an evidence of the animus actuating these military commanders, being document No. 10.

It is due to me, in final conclusion, to say, that I entertain for these distinguished military officers the very highest regard, and no one would go further to defend and protect them in the discharge of their proper duties, but
I honestly believe that in relation to our Indian affairs and in their tremendous efforts to get possession of this branch of business they are wrong; and, so believing, I am willing to declare it unhesitatingly.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

LEWIS V. BOGY, Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.

Extracts from the report of Special Agent E. B. Chandler to Superintendent H. B. Denman.

FORT LARAMIE, January 13, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to report my arrival at the Upper Platte agency on the 29th ultimo.

I find in the immediate vicinity of Fort Laramie three hundred and twenty Indians of various tribes and bands, of whom the greater part are squaws and children. Of the latter many of them are half-breeds.

Ten miles from this place is an encampment of one hundred and sixty-five Ogallallas, of the Bad Face band, whose chief is known by the name of Big Mouth. Other small bands of the same Indians, said to number one hundred and thirty persons in the aggregate, are encamped at various places within a distance of fifteen miles from the fort, who, together with those referred to above, receive subsistence from the government. I have been unable to visit all the camps of these small bands; therefore, of my own knowledge, cannot definitely state their numbers; but from observation and from information received from Agent Patrick and Mr. Scott, the government interpreter for this agency, I have no doubt that the whole number of professedly friendly Indians here of all ages amounts to six hundred persons.

Of the other friendly bands of Sioux who participated in the late treaty, made at this place in June last, are those led by Spotted Tail, Standing Elk, Swift Bear, The Man Who Walks Under the Ground, and perhaps others of less reputation. I have been informed by the traders, who have been recently among them, that they are encamped on the Republican river, at a point about one hundred and forty miles from Fort Sedgwick, in Colorado Territory, and that their numbers do not exceed eight hundred persons of all ages, old men, women, and children largely predominating. Their conduct is represented to be good, and the game in that vicinity being abundant, they live comfortably without present need of aid from the government.

In compliance with your instructions to report upon the terms and character of the treaty concluded by the late peace commissioners at this place with the Sioux Indians, I have to say that I have been unable to find a copy of that instrument at this post. A treaty prepared and signed by said commissioners for the Arapaho Indians is in possession of Agent Patrick, and said to be identical in terms with the Sioux and Cheyenne treaties, with the only variance of different amounts of annuities to each. The amount stipulated in the treaty with the Sioux tribe (as I have been told by Mr. Patrick and others who heard the original treaty read) is seventy thousand dollars annually for twenty years; the Cheyennes fifteen thousand dollars for the same length of time annually. This large amount was paid in consideration of the provisions of article 3 of that instrument, which, if my information is correct, is as follows:

"The said tribe represented in council shall withdraw from the routes overland already established, or hereafter to be established, through their country, and in consideration thereof the government of the United States
agree to pay to the said tribe the sum of seventy thousand dollars annual for twenty years, payable in such articles as the Secretary of the Interior may direct: Provided, That the said tribe shall faithfully conform to the provisions of this treaty."

The "routes overland" spoken of in said article 3 referred really to the Powder River road to Montana, the Indians, as I am informed, being willing to concede the use of all others now open through their country without menacement. This they claimed led through their best hunting-ground, and they believed the use of the same by the whites would result in driving out the game, leaving them without the means of future subsistence, and for a long time seemed indisposed to comply with this, the main and most important condition of the treaty, upon any terms. At the opening of the convention, however, Colonel E. B. Taylor, in a speech, promised the Indians that travel on said road should be confined strictly to the line thereof, and that emigrants and travellers generally should not be allowed to molest or disturb the game in the country through which they passed. With this promise, impossible of performance, well calculated, and, as I believed, designed to deceive them, the distribution of a large amount of presents, and the obligation of the government to pay an extravagant annuity, the treaty was at length concluded with parties holding subordinate and irresponsible positions in the tribe, and representing inconsiderable numbers. That they were unable and did not control the action of the bands which they assumed to represent will be clearly proven by subsequent facts.

That Red Cloud, Red Leaf, and the Man Afraid of His Horses were the principal, leading, and most influential chiefs of the tribe, was well known and acknowledged by residents of the country generally; that the commissioners considered Red Cloud the most prominent chief of the Sioux tribe, was clearly proven by the pains taken to procure his attendance at the treaty, and the distinguished consideration shown to him more than to any other chief after his arrival, as well as by public acknowledgment of the fact by one of said commissioners; that these commissioners were determined to make a treaty upon some terms, either with or without the consent of the tribe, was clearly apparent from all their official acts; that Commissioner Taylor repeatedly asserted that he was sent here by the government for the purpose of making a treaty, and it should be accomplished if made with but two Indians, can be proved by numerous officers and citizens at and near this post who heard him.

Within two weeks after the conclusion of the so-called treaty, Spotted Tail, Standing Elk, (and all others of the professedly friendly Indians now on the Republican,) then on their way to that place, told ranchmen and traders of their acquaintance whom they met that many of their young men had determined to go to war, and had left them and gone to the Powder River country, and they advised all who had occasion to go far from home to "go prepared and look out for their hair."

At their crossing of the South Platte river, some days subsequently, parties who met and conversed with these Indians report their numbers to be less than one hundred lodges, and their party made up principally of old men, squaws, and children. The statement of their chiefs at this time, in explaining the absence of these young men, was substantially the same as given before.

I am informed by Captain Besbee (late of Fort Philip Kearney) that early in the month of July last the troops of that place, while pursuing hostile Indians who had stolen stock from that fort, captured from them a horse loaded entirely with Indian goods which had been distributed and brought from the Fort Laramie treaty. He further states that, from information obtained from scouts and mail-carriers, he believes there is a very large body of hostile Indians in Tongue River valley, many of whom are Sioux, and that for a long time past he considers the fort to have been in a state of siege by them.
From the foregoing facts and the statements of various parties who were present at the treaty, and were well acquainted with the facts and circumstances attending the same, giving to each the weight which I believe it is justly entitled to receive, I have arrived clearly to the opinion that the so-called treaty with the Sioux Indians, concluded at Fort Laramie in June last, was little better than a farce, entitled to no consideration from the government, and ought not to be ratified.

In relation to the treaty made with the Cheyennes, by order of Colonel E. B. Taylor, on the 11th day of October last, I am of the opinion that it ought not to be ratified by the government, it having been made with but an inconsiderable portion of the tribe, and signed by parties who were not then principal chiefs and headmen.

Respecting the tribes and bands of Indians now at war with the United States, I think all north of the North Platte river may be considered hostile. From information received by a friendly Indian sent from here to the Powder River country, (and who started home from the encampments of the hostile bands on the day of the massacre at Fort Philip Kearney,) I learn the names of the different tribes and bands then at war to be the Minneconjous, Brulés, Oglalallas, Crows, Uncapapas, Blackfeet, Sans Arcs, Arapahoes, a portion of the Cheyennes, and some others whose names I have now forgotten. His estimate of their strength at that time was eleven thousand six hundred warriors. Later estimates have been much higher, but I think his the most reliable up to the present time. Since he was there, however, it is probable that these Indians have been re-enforced. Red Cloud, Red Leaf, and The Man Afraid of His Horses, are supposed to be the principal instigators and leaders in the war.

Respecting the friendly Indians belonging to this agency, I would recommend, with a view to justice alone, that they receive protection and the necessary subsistence from the United States. Their situation is such that I deem it hardly possible for them to live upon their own resources for a considerable length of time without returning north of the Platte river, where they would not be permitted to maintain a neutrality, were they otherwise so disposed. The hostility to the whites has become so general among all the tribes in this portion of the country, and their warriors are so numerous, that no small body of friendly Indians will be tolerated within their reach. In my opinion, then, the alternative of feeding or fighting them must soon be chosen. As economy, as well as justice, would indicate the adoption of the former policy, I have no hesitation in recommending its adoption.

Besides the foregoing considerations in favor of liberal treatment to them, the precedent of kindness and liberality, as the reward of honesty and good faith shown to those now hostile to the government, would be eminently favorable to an early and satisfactory peace.

Although I am fully satisfied that an extensive Indian war is inevitable, and that severe chastisement must be inflicted before they will make or abide a treaty, the conditions of which would be acceptable to the government; yet, if a reservation should be provided affording protection and subsistence, I have no doubt that the comparatively small number who would now consent to be put upon it would be rapidly and largely increased.

From the information which I have been able to obtain upon this subject, I believe that two hundred lodges would come into this arrangement at once. I am equally certain that unless they are provided for in a manner satisfactory to themselves, all will soon be at war.

I would therefore earnestly recommend that a temporary reservation within the protection of a military post be chosen at an early day, and all Indians belonging to the Upper Platte agency then at peace with the United States be invited to come upon the same, subject to such rules, regulations, and instructions as the honorable Secretary of the Interior Department shall see fit to impose.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

[General Order No. 10.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska Territory, July 31, 1866.

On information received that unauthorized persons sell arms and ammunition to Indians, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs has instructed Indian agents to prohibit traders from selling these articles to the Indians, and all commanders of troops within the department will co-operate in the enforcement of these instructions, and will take vigilant and decisive measures for the prevention of sale, barter, or gift of arms or ammunition to Indians within reach of their power.

By order of Brigadier General Cooke.

FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, DAKOTA TERRITORY,
December 15, 1866.

DEAR JOHN: I am in the enjoyment of good health at this time. Lieutenant Wands and family are in good health. I mess with them.

A few days ago a wagon train had gone up to the mountains five or six miles from this post for the purpose of cutting pine timber for buildings. On their return they were attacked by about three hundred Indians. We have a mounted guard on post on top of a very high point near the fort, who telegraphed to us by means of a flag of the condition of the wood train. The mounted cavalry and infantry were immediately ordered out to relieve them. They started in two parties, Colonel Carrington and fourteen men going in one direction, and about thirty in another. The larger party, among whom was Captain Brown, Lieutenant Wands, (Lieutenant Grummond was with the colonel,) Captain Fetterman, and Lieutenant Bingham, who was a cavalry officer, came upon the Indians suddenly, and charged them. The fight continued for a distance of eight miles or more. Wands killed a horse and probably some Indians at one time while dismounted; and in the fight the cavalry broke and were brought back (some of them) by Captain Brown and Lieutenant Wands levelling their guns at them, and telling them that they would shoot them. Most of the men and officers had breech-loading guns. While the fight was going on, Lieutenant Bingham, of the cavalry, called out to the others, "Come on," beckoned, and went off with some of the men in the direction of the colonel, who was seen approaching at the distance of half a mile. This was just what the Indians wanted. Captains Brown and Fetterman, and Lieutenant Wands, with ten or eleven men, remained and fought the whole of them, and whipped them. Wands was slightly wounded in the finger. Lieutenant Grummond left the colonel's party, and meeting Lieutenant Bingham, they and three or four men started in the pursuit of about thirty Indians, who were apparently retreating; an Indian's horse had almost given out, and Lieutenant Bingham wounded the horse by a pistol shot. (Lieutenants Grummond and Bingham had nothing but pistols.) The Indian then took to his heels, they following him, cutting at him with their swords. Bingham lost one pistol, and after firing the other, so excited did he become that he threw it away. At this time they saw two large bodies of Indians flanking them, when they concluded to run through them: drawing their swords, they laid about them right and left. Lieutenant Bingham did not follow the rest and was killed, stripped, and scalped; two sergeants and one more were wounded. Lieutenant Grummond ran against the Indians, and cutting right and left with his sword, got through with the balance. After a while they were surrounded again by a large number of Indians, drawn in a circle around them with spears, at a charge, and firing upon them; they halted and Lieutenant Grummond then told the rest to follow him; they did, he using
his sword as before. All got through; but Sergeant Bowens no doubt turned around and fired upon his pursuers; they overtook and put an arrow in him and split his skull open above the eyes. They did not scalp him. Our people found him a short time afterwards; he was living and in great agony, but died in a short time. We buried Bingham with masonic honors so far as we could. There were seven masons, one an enlisted man, in the cavalry.

C. M. HINES

FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, D. T., January 1, 1867.

DEAR JOHN:

Matters in this part of the country do not suit me. I have written to you before that the treaty at Laramie did not amount to anything; the three posts, Reno, Kearney, and C. F. Smith, are really in a state of siege. All the Sioux, including those that committed the atrocities in Minnesota, are in our neighborhood. Fort Reno has a garrison of three companies of infantry, (not full,) one piece of artillery; Fort Phil. Kearney, four pieces of artillery, five companies of infantry, (one-half effective,) and a few mounted men—all together, soldiers and employees, about 400 men, (effective;) Fort C. F. Smith, two pieces of artillery, two companies of infantry, (not full,) and twenty-eight mounted men. So you can perceive that these forts are in a state of siege. The mass of the Indians are on Tongue river, about fifty miles from this post. Our communications with Fort Smith are entirely cut off. There are 1,500 lodges of Indians at that point, and their confederates, Blackfeet, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, &c. The whole number of warriors must amount to four or five thousand, well mounted and armed. They have several times attacked the wood trains of ours. Once we whipped them badly. For some time back they were in the habit of coming on the bluffs near this fort, calling out to us and challenging us to the fight. Colonel Carrington shelled them, at one time killing a pony. On Friday morning, 21st of December, they made their appearance in small numbers near the fort, challenging us in the usual manner. Colonel Carrington shelled them, killing the pony I have mentioned, and driving about thirty Indians from their covert. Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, Captain Brown, and Lieutenant Grummond were ordered out by the colonel to protect our wood train, which had been attacked. Captain Fetterman commanded the infantry, Lieutenant Grummond the cavalry, (twenty-seven men,) and Captain Brown some mounted teamsters and citizens, the whole amounting to eighty-one men, about fifty of whom were armed with the Spencer carbine and pistols, one or two with Henry rifles, and the balance with the Springfield musket. No men were better armed. Instead of obeying orders, these officers (than whom there were none better or braver in the service) allowed themselves to be decoyed from the position ordered to be taken, and the whole command were butchered, (eighty-one officers and men.) I was ordered by Colonel Carrington, with one man, to go out to the wood train, (five miles off,) and if I found them safe to join the other command. I went out about three miles, when I saw that the wood train was in no danger. I then, obeying orders, attempted to reach the party under fire, and found it impossible. At that time I had four men with me; sent to the fort for re-enforcements; forty men, under the captain, were sent out, and we reached the field just in time to see the last man killed. If I had obeyed my instructions I would have been killed. These poor fellows when killed, the greater number, were in one heap. We brought in about fifty in wagons, like you see hogs brought to market. I have no more to write at present. I will write more in detail by next mail.

I remain, your brother,

C. M. HINES,

Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. Army.
SIR: Referring to a recent report from this office, dated 23d instant, the subject of the existing disturbances in western Dakota, I have the honor to submit herewith, as confirming the views therein set forth, a copy of a letter under date of the 1st instant, from Acting Assistant Surgeon C. M. Hines, on duty at Fort Phil. Kearney, giving an account of the reported massacre of United States soldiers on the 21st ultimo. A previous letter of Dr. Hines, written, like this, to his brother in this city, had given an account of a slight skirmish with the Indians on the 6th of December. It is proper to state that the letter herewith is by the writer authorized to be given to the public, so that its statements, being those of an officer present at the time and familiar with the circumstances, but written to a friend and unofficially, and without any coloring beyond that which appears to have affected the minds of the writer and command, may be fairly taken as representing the true state of feeling at the time and place. If I am correct in this view of the case, then I feel justified in commenting freely upon the facts presented.

And first, I notice that the military authorities appear to have had very little idea of their real condition. With a respectable force in garrison, well armed and well supplied, and with the “mass of the Indians on Tongue river, fifty miles from” the post, the garrison felt itself besieged. The tribes of Indians at hand are described as the Sioux and “their confederates, Blackfeet, Cheyennes, Arapahoes,” &c., while, from the information obtained from parties familiar with the tribes, their habits, and ordinary ranges, I do not hesitate to express the opinion that not a single warrior from the Blackfeet bands is or has been among the Sioux; and as to the Arapahoes and Cheyennes, if there are any of them in that quarter, they are isolated individuals only. Further, as to the tribes represented, the writer says that the “Sioux that committed the atrocities in Minnesota” are in the neighborhood of the post; while, if truth is ever known, it will be found that not one of those bands of Sioux was at the time less than about 500 miles distant.

As to the numbers of the Indians thus holding the posts under siege, the 1,500 lodges mentioned by the writer would represent a population of some 9,000, while the “4,000 or 5,000 well-mounted and armed warriors” would represent a population of 24,000 to 30,000 Indians; an enormous exaggeration of the number which could by any possibility be in that country, showing the terrible state of demoralization into which the minds of the most intelligent men must have fallen. If we note other items of the account, as the alleged attack upon the wood train, which, after all, as would appear from another portion of the letter, was not attacked, or, if attacked, nobody was hurt, the challenge to the Indians, and the result of the shelling by Colonel Carrington, being the dislodging of some thirty Indians from their covert, and other circumstances, the whole affair seems incredible, but for the sad certainty of the bringing back to the post of the bodies of officers and men killed in the conflict, and I find it difficult to account for the tragedy upon any other theory than that heretofore advanced by this office, to wit: that the Indians, almost in a state of starvation, having made repeated attempts at a conference, that they might make peace and obtain supplies for their families, and the rescinding of the order prohibiting them from obtaining arms and ammunition, were rendered desperate, and resorted to the stratagem which proved too successful. It seems as if the officer commanding could have avoided the catastrophe; and it seems also that men thus armed could have repelled an attack by all the Indians in Western Dakota. I do not wish to justify the Indians in their hostilities; but they are but with the necessities of life for themselves and their families staring them in the face; and if their overtures for peace are continually and wantonly repelled, they go to war, and they wage war after their own savage fashion.
I have felt it my duty to express frankly my opinions in transmitting the within letter; and having done so, I have only to say that I see no surer or better way of preventing such occurrences in the future than by such measures as I have already recommended—a commission of judicious men to visit the region in question, with proper powers and instructions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS V. BOGY,
Commissioner.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 18, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a report from General Grant, in relation to an official communication made by Lieutenant General Sherman, having in view the restriction of the Sioux Indians to districts lying north of the Platte, west of the Missouri, and east of the new road to Montana; of the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Navajoes to the region south of the Arkansas and east of Fort Union.

This recommendation, as the Lieutenant General states, is made with a view to keep open the great routes to the mountain Territories, to render safe the prosecution of work on the Pacific railroads, and to prevent apprehension of Indian depredations. General Grant approves the proposition, if it does not conflict with treaty obligations.

I will thank you for an expression of your views upon the subject, in order that if the course proposed shall be determined upon, the necessary measures may at once be commenced.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of War.

Secretary of the Interior.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., January 15, 1867.

Sir: In a report by General Sherman, forwarded with my annual report, dated November 21, 1866, the following passage occurs:

"I propose the coming year (with your consent, and with that of the Secretary of the Interior, in whose control these Indians are supposed to be) to restrict the Sioux north of the Platte, west of the Missouri river, and east of the new road to Montana, which starts from Laramie to Virginia City by way of Forts Reno, Philip Kearney, C. F. Smith, &c.

"All Sioux found outside of these limits without a written pass from some military commander, defining clearly their object, should be dealt with summarily. In like manner I would restrict the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Navajoes, south of the Arkansas and east of Fort Union. This will leave for our people exclusively the use of the wide belt east and west, between the Platte and the Arkansas, in which lie the two great railroads, and over which passes the bulk of travel to the mountain Territories. As long as these Indians can hunt the buffalo and antelope within the described limits, we will have the depredations of last summer, and, worse yet, the exaggerations of danger raised by our own people, often for a very base purpose. It is our duty, and it shall be my study, to make the progress of construction of the great
Pacific railways that lie in this belt of country as safe as possible, as also to protect the stage and telegraph lines against any hostile bands; but they are long that to guard them perfectly is an impossibility, unless we can restrict the Indians as herein stated. I beg you will submit this proposition to the honorable Secretary of the Interior, that we may know that we do not violate one of the solemn treaties made with these Indians, who are very capable of claim to the very letter the execution on our part of those treaties, the obligation of which they seem to comprehend perfectly."

I approve this proposition of General Sherman, provided it does not conflict with our treaty obligations with the Indians now between the Platte and Arkansas rivers. The protection of the Pacific railway, so that not only the portion already completed shall be entirely safe, but that the portion yet to be constructed shall in no way be delayed either by actual or apprehended danger is indispensable.

Aside from the great value of this road to the country benefited by it, it is the strongest claims upon the military service, as it will be one of its most efficient aids in the control of the Indians in the vast regions through which it passes.

I respectfully request that I may be informed at an early day whether this proposition is approved by you and the Secretary of the Interior, that measures may be taken to carry it into effect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.

Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs,
January 23, 1867.

Sir: The letter of the Secretary of War of the 18th instant, containing extracts from the report of General Sherman to General Grant, with the approval of the same by General Grant, having been referred to me for a report thereon, I beg leave to say:

General Sherman says, "that he proposes to restrict the Sioux Indians to the district of country between the Platte, the Missouri river, and the road to Montana which starts from Laramie for Virginia City, by the way of Forts Reno, Phil. Kearney, and C. F. Smith, and that any Indian found outside of these limits without a written pass shall be summarily dealt with." He proposes also to restrict the Arapahoes and Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Navajoes south of the Arkansas and east of Fort Union; the object of this arrangement being to leave open the wide belt of country between the Platte and the Arkansas.

That the belt of country lying between the Platte river on the north and the Arkansas river on the south should be opened to the whites by the removal of the Indians now occupying it, is a necessity which cannot be doubted. The fact that railroads are now being built through this country, and that it is the highway for the thousands of emigrants going to our western Territories, imposes on the government the necessity of affording to them complete protection. To effect this object, the removal of the Indians from this strip of country is, therefore, an absolute necessity. On this subject I agree with the view expressed by General Sherman, but I entirely dissent from the position he assumes in his report as to the mode of accomplishing this object. As already said, the time has come when these Indians must abandon this portion of country, and if they will not do so willingly, when other homes are provided for them, force...
will have to be used. The spread of our white settlements throughout this vast section of country cannot and should not be checked, as it cannot be prevented. The question now presenting itself is, how is this to be accomplished? Will the order to be issued by the commanding officer of the western department have this magical effect? On the contrary, will it not lead to resistance on the part of the Indians whom you thus undertake to remove from the hunting grounds over which they and their forefathers have roamed for generations? And will not this resistance lead to trouble and war with them, in which the lives of thousands of persons will be sacrificed, the railroads now already being far advanced in the country destroyed, the profitable trade of the prairies, even with these very Indians themselves, annihilated, and the government involved in millions of dollars of expense? This country yet belongs to these Indians; it has not been ceded by them. Now cannot a policy be adopted which will effect the same object without involving the disasters above enumerated? I think such a policy could be devised. There is one fact which cannot be denied by any one acquainted with Indians: it is, that their chiefs are all superior men; they are always their best men. No one becomes a chief until he has proven his valor in war and wisdom in council. These chiefs control their different tribes, with the exception of a few bad men found among them, as among us. With proper means, I am satisfied that these chiefs can all be made to see and fully understand their position, and the necessity imposed upon the government of securing this belt of country to the whites. Admitting you can satisfy them of this fact, the next question is, can you induce them to remove to another locality? I have no doubt that if proper steps are taken this can be done. It is true they may not entirely abandon this country this season, but they can be kept quiet; which is all that is wanted for the present, and their minds directed to the new home which you will provide for them. That this new home may be in the district of country described by General Sherman is very possible. In my opinion it is too late to abandon the system of treaties with Indians. With judicious management, I think they can all be made to abandon the country needed by our people, and to settle down on reservations, which should be larger than formerly made. Annuities ought to be increased, and stock, cattle, sheep, and horses, given to them to raise. It is of little consequence to this government if a few hundred thousand dollars, more or less, per annum be expended, provided these people are kept quiet, and, at the same time, means of subsistence be furnished to them to support themselves for the few years which, in all probability, they will yet exist.

I would therefore suggest that you, as the officer of the government having the Indians in charge, inform the military authorities of your disapproval of this contemplated order. I would also suggest that one of the greatest difficulties, and, indeed, I think the greatest difficulty, I encounter, in administering the affairs of this bureau, is the constant interference on the part of the military with all Indian affairs.

That there is a misapprehension on their part in relation to this matter is beyond doubt, otherwise such constant interference by them would not occur. The commanders of the different forts throughout the whole Indian country claim and exercise the right of controlling the Indian agents, and of issuing orders in relation to the trade with the Indians by the licensed traders. From observation, both in this bureau and as a citizen of the west, I am, and have been for years, satisfied that this was the cause of most of our Indian wars. The military should be made to understand that they are in that country merely as a police, to aid the agent in the discharge of his duties, and not to control him. The law regulates the trade with Indians, and no military commander should be allowed to interfere. I am satisfied that the recent troubles at Forts Laramie and Phil. Kearney grew out of injudicious military interference. I am informed that General Cooke, commandant at Omaha, issued an order prohibiting the
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

traders to sell to the Indians arms and ammunition. Such prohibitions I believe to be unwise, as the Indian has to depend upon the chase for his subsistence, that of his wife and children. Arms and ammunition are of absolute necessity; he will, therefore, if possible, and no matter at what cost, procure them. It again is perfectly idle to say that he will accumulate them to make the whites. No Indian will buy two guns; one he will and ought to have, and he will lay up any large quantity of powder, as he has no means of keeping it. He needs one gun and a little powder, and this is his only means of subsistence.

In conclusion, I will take this occasion to say that in my opinion the time has come when all the Indians throughout the country should be taken on the reservations, with fair annuities honestly paid them, and stock of cattle and sheep furnished them to raise. In this way the country needed by the whites can be relieved from their occupation, Indian wars prevented, vast expenditures to the government thereby saved, and a future, although limited, provided for these poor people.

If this system is not adopted, I see nothing for them but total and speedy destruction; and if this be the policy it should be avowed openly and carried out with energy. Either destroy them at once, or do for them that which necessities plainly require.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS V. BOGY,
Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.

Extract from letter of ex-Governor Edmunds, of Dakota, dated September 26, 1866, transmitting Agent Hanson’s report of September 15, 1866.

I also have the honor to enclose a letter from Agent Hanson, in relation to the military order prohibiting the sale of ammunition, &c., to the Indians under his charge, and beg leave to recommend that you give this matter early attention, as it is one of great importance to those Indians. I am clearly of the opinion that those Indians ought not to be included as among those to whom arms and ammunition are prohibited, and am fearful that it will have a tendency to complicate and embarrass their management.

Your obedient servant,

NEWTON EDMUNDS,
Ex officio Superintendent Indian Affairs.

CROW CREEK AGENCY,
Dakota Territory, September 15, 1866.

SIR: My attention has recently been called to military General Order No. 10, dated Headquarters Department of the Platte, Omaha, Nebraska, July 31, 1866, being, in brief, an order prohibiting traders and others selling or disposing of, in any manner, arms of all description and ammunition to Indians.

It has been only a few days since I was made aware that the sale of ammunition to these Indians had been prohibited. My instructions from the superintendent, received 22d ultimo, in relation to this subject, did not include ammunition, but only mentioned “arms of all descriptions.”

I have now the honor to object to the enforcement of such an order within this agency. There never has been a time, to my knowledge, when the Indians of this agency have given more satisfactory evidence of friendship and complete acquiescence in the authority of the government than since I have been their
Indian Hostilities.

The sincerity of their cause has been tested by the most trying of all ordeals—actual starvation. The history of the white race scarcely furnishes a parallel instance of such a body of people enduring such an amount of misery with such forbearance. What better evidence does the government ask before it is willing to cease treating these Indians as alien enemies, and deal with them as with a people in amity with its authority? Since the formation of the new treaties have they committed any overt act of hostility? If not, is it right to treat these often abused people as enemies purely upon speculation as to their further intentions? That the order is well enough when applied to some sections of the military district, where war still exists, is apparent, but that the Indians of this agency should be held responsible or made to pay any share of the penalty for the continued hostility of the Indians of the Platte, or elsewhere, is not just.

The government has furnished many of these Indians with double-barrel shotguns. This spring I distributed eighteen, and the commission about as many more. These went into the hands of the Indians who have always been friendly to the government, and to now refuse to permit them to purchase ammunition for these same guns is, under existing circumstances, without any sufficient reason that I am able to observe.

A large delegation of the Lower Brule, Lower Yanctonais, and Two Kettle bands called on me yesterday, and asked me to have this matter changed; I have therefore to request that the order above referred to may be so far modified as to place the sale of ammunition in this agency to Indians within my control. In this way none but reliable ones will get such, and only in such quantities as in my judgment they may need for their hunting purposes.

I desire to draw your attention to one other military order, now being enforced at Forts Sully and Rice, which prohibits Indians and traders stopping in these reservations. This order I have not yet been able to see; but the Indians have counseled with me concerning it, and they complain that it does not allow them to camp within eight or ten miles of Fort Sully, and thus excludes them from the timber along the Missouri, where they have been for many years accustomed to seek shelter from the freezing winter blasts of this region.

While I am of the opinion that the military forces within this agency should be as far separated as possible from the Indians, for reasons of a moral nature, if no other, I see no necessity, and but gross injustice, in this military order. Surely, a military reservation extending from fifteen to twenty miles along both sides of the Missouri river, embracing all the best timbered lands between Forts Sully and Rice, is large enough to spare to these Indians a wintering place, and I trust your department of the government is generous enough to accord to them this right.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. R. Hanson,
United States Indian Agent.

Extract of report of Governor Foulk, of January 9, 1867, transmitting monthly report of Agent Hanson of December 31, 1866.

The question of supplying the friendly Sioux Indians with the small amount of ammunition necessary to procure their subsistence is also worthy of your attention. My own experience in the Indian country leads me to favor such a course. When they have the arms and ammunition necessary for ordinary hunting purposes, they are more contented and friendly, and are more self-sustaining. I have no doubt that the order referred to by Major Hanson prohibit-
ing the sale of arms and ammunition should be revoked or in some way modified so as to relieve friendly tribes from the danger of starvation on the reserve, and from the necessity of carrying their peltry to British traders for change for such purposes. The whole subject seems to be worthy of your attention.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

A. J. FOULK,
Governor and ex officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Hon. LEWIS V. Bogy,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Extract from monthly report of Agent Hanson of December 31, 1866

During my recent trip to Fort Sully and Fort Rice, I found the universal complaint of friendly Indians to be regarding the prohibition of the sale of ammunition. Under the date of 15th September last, I wrote the Hon. Commissioner of Indian Affairs upon the subject. I have the honor to again draw attention of the Commissioner to that communication. I have advised with all the military officers within this agency from Crow creek to Fort Rice, and I have not yet found one not in favor of setting this order aside. The Indians who gather at these different points are friendly to the government and enemies to the hostile Indians, and fear them as enemies. They say they are willing to help protect the whites if they can only be permitted to purchase the means with which to do it. The Indians inimical to the government procure all the ammunition they desire from traffic with the Red river half-breeds. This the friendly Indians understand, and tell me this prohibition has driven many of their young men into the hostile camp; and again, it is now approaching the season of the year when the Indians, settled along the Missouri river, must subsist to a great extent upon such small game as cannot be successfully hunted with bows and arrows. Justice to these Indians requires that the order be immediately abrogated. I think it a very dangerous order to enforce among these Indians. At this place, Fort Sully and Fort Rice the Indians of known friendship should be permitted to purchase ammunition in small quantities, sufficient for hunting purposes. An arrangement as to the quantity and manner of purchase can easily be made between the commander of the district, with whom I have conferred upon this subject, and the agent. I trust this subject may be regarded of sufficient importance to command immediate attention.

J. R. HANSON,
United States Indian Agent of Upper Missouri Sioux.

Extract of a letter to Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian agent, from Winfield S. Hancock, major general commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 17, 1867.

It is not unlikely that a demand will be made before long upon the Cheyennes to redress some grievances. When that time arrives you will be notified of the fact. They will be allowed some time to consider and talk over the matter. If you have any fear of the result leading to hostilities, you had better place yourself at Fort Larned or Fort Dodge, as you may think best.
If you can get any evidence concerning the reported murder of the Kaw by Bent's band of Cheyennes, please furnish the same to me, as I am collecting all the evidence I can in relation to the outrages committed by that tribe.

Your remark that Indians should not be allowed to visit military posts save on business is perfectly correct as a rule, and I will call attention to that matter.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

[From the Washington Chronicle, February 4, 1867.]

Sale of arms under authority of the Indian Bureau.—Interesting correspondence.—Opinions of Generals Grant and Sherman.—Necessity of transferring the bureau to the War Department.

The Secretary of War has addressed a communication to Representative Schenck, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, enclosing, for the information of the committee, a copy of a letter from Major Douglass, commanding Fort Dodge, dated January 13, in relation to the issue of large numbers of arms, with ammunition, to the Kiowas and other Indians, and expressing his apprehension of Indian hostilities in consequence thereof. The anxiety of the Indians for such articles is not caused by the lack of supply, because they have plenty to last for some time, but everything tends to show that the Indians are laying in large supplies preparatory to an outbreak.

Major Douglass represents the Indians to be in an unsettled condition, with much dissatisfaction on account of the unequal distribution of presents.

General Grant on the 1st instant enclosed a letter from Lieutenant General Sherman to the Secretary of War. General Grant says the letter shows the urgent necessity for an immediate transfer of the Indian bureau to the War Department, and the abolition of the civil Indian agents and licensed traders. “If,” he says, “the present practice is to be continued, I do not see that any course is left open to us but to withdraw our troops to the settlements, and call upon Congress to provide means and troops to carry on formidable hostilities against the Indians until all the Indians or all the whites on the great plains and between the settlements on the Missouri and the Pacific slope are exterminated. The course General Sherman has pursued in this matter, in disregarding the permit of Mr. Bogey and others, is just and right. I will instruct him to enforce his order until it is countermanded by the President or yourself. I would also respectfully ask that this matter be placed before the President, and his disapproval of licensing the sale of arms to Indians be asked. We have treaties with all tribes from time to time. If the rule is to be followed that all tribes with which we have treaties and to which we pay annuities can procure such articles without stint or limit, it will not be long before the matter becomes perfectly understood by the Indians, and they avail themselves of it to equip perfectly for war. They will get arms either by making treaties themselves or through tribes who have such treaties.”

General Sherman’s letter is dated January 21 last, and addressed to General Hancock, commanding the military division of the Missouri, in which he says: “We, the military, are held responsible for the peace of the frontier, and it is an absurdity to attempt it if Indian agents and traders can legalize and encourage so dangerous a traffic.” He says he regards the paper enclosed, addressed to Mr. D. A. Butterfield, and signed by Charles Bogey, W. R. Irwin, J. H. Leavenworth, and others, as “an outrage upon our rights and supervision of the matters,” and authorizes General Hancock to disregard that paper, and at once stop the practice.
This paper, addressed to Mr. Butterfield, is as follows:

"Sir: You having requested verbally to be informed in regard to your right to sell arms and ammunition to Indians, we have to state as follows: You, an Indian trader, licensed for that purpose by the United States government, are authorized to trade or sell arms and ammunition to any Indians that are at peace with and receiving annuities from the United States government. This rule, of course, applies to any other regularly licensed trader as well as yourself."

Letter of the Secretary of War, communicating, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 30th ultimo, the official reports, papers, and other facts in relation to the causes and extent of the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at Fort Phil. Kearney.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, February 2, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a communication of this date from General Grant, covering all official reports, papers, and other facts bearing on the subject of the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at Fort Phil. Kearney, called for by the Senate's resolution of January 30, 1867.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. L. F. S. FOSTER,
President of the Senate.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, February 2, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to return Senate resolution calling for information "which may tend to explain the origin, causes, and extent of the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at or near Fort Phil. Kearney, in Dakota Territory," and referred by you to me for report. I send herewith "all official reports, papers, and other facts" in possession of these headquarters bearing upon the subject.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, December 26, 1866.

General: On the 21st instant three (3) officers and ninety (90) men, cavalry and infantry, were massacred by Indians very near Fort Philip Kearney. Indians reported near three thousand, (3,000,) probable, from the completeness of the massacre.

I ordered up four (4) companies of infantry and two (2) of cavalry from Laramie.

I order Colonel Carrington to Casper, headquarters of the new eighteenth; if not approved, I request the assignment of General Wessels at Reno to his brevet rank, to command district.
INdIAN HOSTILITIES.

Just received at least five "leaves of absence" of officers of these troops. It is important that all these officers be ordered to join.
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, Captain Brown, and Lieutenant Grammond are the officers killed; not a man was left alive.
Sent direct in General Sherman's absence.
Shall report by mail.

P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,
Brevet Major General Commanding.

Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Brevet Major General Commanding.

Chief of Staff.

Official copy:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS Armies of the United States,
Washington, December 26, 1866.

General Grant desires me to say that your despatch of to-day is received.
Your action in Colonel Carrington's case is approved; and if you deem it still necessary, you are authorized to assign General Wessells as proposed. Suspend all leaves of absence until you think they can be safely granted.

C. B. COMSTOCK,
Brevet Brig. Gen. and A. D. C.

General P. ST. GEORGE COOKE, Omaha.

Official copy:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Received at office United States military telegraph, War Department, Washington, D. C., December 26, 1866.]

FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, December 21, 1866,
By courier to Fort Laramie, December 26.

GENERAL: I send copy of despatch to General Cooke simply as a case when in uncertain communication I think you should know the facts at once. I want all my officers. I want men. Depend upon it, as I wrote in July, no treaty but hard fighting is to assure this line. I have had no reason to think otherwise. I will operate all winter, whatever the season, if supported; but to redeem my pledge to open and guarantee this line I must have re-enforcements and the best of arms up to my full estimate.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY B. CARRINGTON.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

Copy forwarded to Secretary 27th.
[Copy of telegram to General Cooke.—Received at office of United States military telegraph. War Department, Washington, D. C., December 26, 1866—3.15 p. m.]

FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, D. T., December 21, 1866,
By courier to Fort Laramie, December 26.

Do send me re-enforcements forthwith. Expedition now with my force impossible. I risk everything but the post and its store. I venture as much as any one can, but I have had to-day a fight unexampled in Indian warfare. My loss is ninety-four (94) killed. I have recovered forty-nine bodies, and thirty-five more are to be brought in in the morning that have been found. Among the killed are Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, Captain F. H. Brown, and Lieutenant Grummond. The Indians engaged were nearly three thousand, (3,000,) being apparently the force reported as on Tongue River in my despatches of the 5th of November and subsequent thereto. This line is so important, can and must be held. It will take four times the force in the spring to reopen if it be broken up this winter. I hear nothing of my arms that left Leavenworth September 15. Additional cavalry ordered to join have not reported their arrival. Would have saved us much loss to-day. The Indians lost beyond all precedent. I need prompt re-enforcements and repeating arms. I am sure to have, as before reported, an active winter, and must have men and arms. Every officer of this battalion should join it to-day. I have every teamster on duty, and, at best, one hundred and nineteen left at post. I hardly need urge this matter; it speaks for itself. Give me two companies of cavalry, at least, forthwith, well armed, or four companies of infantry, exclusive of what I need at Reno and Fort Smith. I did not overestimate my early application; a single company, promptly, will save the line; but our killed show that any remissness will result in mutilation and butchery beyond precedent. No such mutilation as that to-day is on record. Depend on it that this post will be held so long as a round or man is left. Promptness is the vital thing. Give me officers and men. Only the new Spencer arms should be sent. The Indians desperate, and they spare none.

HENRY B. CARRINGTON,
Colonel Eighteenth Infantry, Commanding.

Copy forwarded to Secretary 27th of December.

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, December 27, 1866.

General Grant desires me to forward the accompanying telegram from General Cooke, and to say that General Cooke’s action in Colonel Carrington’s case has been approved; that General Cooke has been authorized to assign General Wessels as proposed, if he still deems it necessary; and also to suspend all leaves of absence.

C. B. COMSTOCK,
Brevet Brigadier General, A. D. C.

General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.

Official copy:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

[Received at office United States military telegraph, War Department, Washington, D. C., December 26, 1866.]

FROM OMAHA, December 26, 1866.

On the 21st instant, three (3) officers and ninety (90) men, cavalry and infantry, were massacred by Indians very near Fort Philip Kearney. Indians reported near three thousand, probably, from the completeness of the massacre. I order up four (4) companies of infantry and two (2) of cavalry from Laramie. I order Colonel Carrington to Caspar, headquarters of the new eighteenth. If not approved, I request the assignment of General Wessels at Reno, at his rank, to command the district. Just received at least five leaves of absence of officers of these troops. It is important that all these officers be ordered to join. Send direct in General Sherman's absence. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, Captain Brown, and Lieutenant Grammond are the officers killed. Not a man was left alive. Shall report by mail.

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brevet Major General Commanding.

General J. A. Rawlins, Chief of Staff.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, December 28, 1866.

General Grant requests that you will furnish him with any additional information you may receive in reference to the Fort Philip Kearney massacre, and if there has been fault in the matter, that you will have it strictly investigated.

C. B. COMSTOCK,
Brevet Brigadier General, A. D. C.

General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Received at office United States military telegraph, War Department, Washington, D. C., December 28, 1866—4.45 p. m.]

ST. LOUIS, December 28, 1866.

GENERAL: Just arrived in time to attend the funeral of my adjutant general, Sawyer. I have given general instructions to General Cooke about the Sioux. I do not yet understand how the massacre of Colonel Fetterman's party could have been so complete. We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children. Nothing less will reach the root of this case.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

U. S. GRANT.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

[Received at office United States military telegraph, War Department, Washington, D.C., December 29, 1866—3 p.m.]

ST LOUIS, December 29, 1866.

GENERAL: Your despatch of yesterday is received. I have another despatch from General Cooke, but nothing more definite as to the Fort Phil. Kearny massacre. A heavy snow storm is prevailing west of Omaha, and cuts off communication. I will have the matter fully investigated. In the mean time the Indians must be pursued and punished. General Cooke asks for a regiment of cavalry and one of infantry. I will see if the two new colored regiments, now organizing in General Hancock’s department, can be made available by April; if not, I may have to ask some help from General Grant. Please ascertain him if he has any troops he could spare this spring, as we must not overlook this case, but must pursue and punish at all hazards. The posts in that quarter are strong and well supplied; but it is reported the Sioux have three thousand (3,000) warriors, well armed, and their country is very difficult to operate in.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

General C. B. COMSTOCK, Aide-de-Camp.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Special Orders No. 126.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, December 26, 1866.

I. The following telegraphic orders of this date are hereby confirmed:

Brevet Brigadier General J. N. Palmer, commanding Fort Laramie, will send from the garrison of that post two companies of the second cavalry and four companies of the eighteenth infantry, to report to Brevet Brigadier General Wessels at Fort Reno.

II. Brevet Brigadier General Wessels will proceed with the reinforcements and assume command of Fort Philip Kearney, and will also have authority to order such movements of the troops at Forts Reno and C. F. Smith as he may find necessary. The commanding officers at Forts Reno and C. F. Smith will obey all orders they may receive from Brevet Brigadier General Wessels.

III. Colonel H. B. Carrington, eighteenth United States infantry, will be relieved from the command of Fort Philip Kearney by Brevet Brigadier General Wessels, and will proceed immediately to Fort Casper, to which post the headquarters of the new eighteenth regiment have been heretofore ordered, and assume command of the post and that regiment.

IV. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. K. Mizner, commanding Fort McPherson, will send promptly two of his companies to take post at Fort Laramie.

V. Brevet Major General John Gibbon, commanding Fort Kearney, will send immediately one company of his command to take post at Fort McPherson.

VI. Captain George O. Sokalski, second United States cavalry, will proceed to-day, taking railroad and mail conveyances (and without stop) to Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, reporting, on arrival, to the commanding officer of his regiment, with a view to joining his company, “C,” with the least practicable delay. The quartermaster’s department will furnish the necessary transportation.

By command of Brigadier and Brevet Major General Cooke:

H. G. LITCHEFIELD,
Brevet Major United States Army, A. D. C.

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.
[Telegram.]

FORT LARAMIE, December 27, 1866.

Orders to command at Fort Reno issued yesterday; the most violent, blinding storm now raging; there would be nothing gained by moving in such a snow storm; meantime all preparations which can be made in-doors are going on. One Indian messenger, just in to see the Indian agent, gives the following information: He says there is a grand coalition of Indian tribes north, to the number of ten thousand (10,000) to twelve thousand (12,000) fighting men; they are to make common cause against the whites; twelve (12) tribes are enumerated; story somewhat improbable, because tribes deadly hostile to each other are named, and such large numbers can’t live together; not enough for them to eat in the country.

J. N. PALMER, Commanding.

Major H. G. Litchfield,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, December 27, 1866.

GENERAL: I communicated yesterday by telegraph the disastrous news from Fort Philip Kearney. I enclose a copy of Colonel Carrington’s telegram. An officer’s letter states not one escaped. December 6, a severe skirmish occurred a few miles from that post, when Lieutenant Bingham, second cavalry, Sergeant Bowers, eighteenth infantry, were killed, and one sergeant and four privates were wounded, (and eight horses killed and wounded.) December 11, a private soldier was killed in sight of Fort Reno. I shall enclose several messages of instruction to Colonel Carrington as bearing on my subject-matter. Colonel C.’s statement that, with teamsters, he had December 21, “but one hundred and nineteen men left in the fort,” requires the statement that his December 10 report shows an aggregate present of four hundred and seventy-five.

My special orders to meet this occasion have been mailed to you, (as in usual course.) The six companies ordered forward will have the duties of re-enforcing, perhaps, Fort Reno—opening communication with C. F. Smith—re-enforcing that, besides Fort Philip Kearney. Deficiency of troops, the season, and amount of supplies at the upper posts, together, do not admit of more being sent. I hope they will do, and be able to carry out my telegraphic instructions to General Wessells, viz: “I expect you to make Reno safe, with power to forward mails, and to proceed with all other of the six companies ordered to you above. I hope regular communication can be kept with Fort C. F. Smith, and that we may be able to chastise Indians who may insult the posts; but with great caution. The officers are not equal to their stratagems in the broken ground they know so well; their numbers, it seems now certain, are also very superior.”

Colonel Carrington is very plausible—an energetic, industrious man in garrison; but it is too evident that he has not maintained discipline, and that his officers have no confidence in him. Some of his acts, officially reported, such as shelling woods when Indians had appeared on a previous day may have, by this time, settled his appreciation by Indians.

Major Van Voast volunteered to lead a short winter expedition of some five companies, which I approved in the abstract; but when he communicated his
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

information, plans, &c., I found it would be too far, (one hundred miles beyond Reno;) his force too small; all too uncertain for the risk and sufferings.

I have always understood that about the first grass the Indian ponies are serviceable. I think it will be practicable to attack them about the 1st of Ap. that an additional regiment, both of cavalry and infantry, will be the needed, and that they can be placed at Fort Laramie about the 1st of Ap. At that time they will be able to go by steam within about one hundred fifty miles.

I think it will be practicable, as well as very important, that the immigration to Montana, our best new Territory, of arable land as well as precious metals, should not be interrupted by this best route.

You will observe, Colonel Carrington asks for Spencer arms for infantry. Some of his men have used them mounted, and have since felt the inferiority of the muzzle-loading arms. In fact, I have had an official report of a cattleman excusing themselves for not firing on attacking Indians, that if they fired, the Indians having revolvers, they would be defenceless. They have revolvers and it comes to this, that the savages are better armed than the troops. I therefore earnestly recommend that breech-loading Springfield muskets be now furnished for all these troops. I found that even the cavalry were generally unfurnished with revolvers; and a telegraphic requisition for a supply for the companies, with an implied consent of General Dyer, of November 6, has not yet resulted in their being received or heard from.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brevet Major General Commanding.

General J. A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff of General Commanding, Washington.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY,
February 1, 1867.

Official copy:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram.]

FORT PHILIP KEARNEY, December 21, 1866.

Do send me re-enforcements forthwith. Expedition now with my force is impossible; I risk everything but the post and its stores; I venture as much as any one can, but I have had to-day a fight unexampled in Indian warfare; my loss is ninety-four killed.

I have recovered forty-nine bodies, and thirty-five more are to be brought in in the morning, that have been found. Among the killed are Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, Captain F. H. Brown, and Lieutenant Grammond. The Indians engaged were nearly three thousand, being apparently the force reported as on Tongue river, in my despatches of 5th November and subsequent thereto. This line, so important, can and must be held; it will take four times the force in the spring to reopen it, if it be broken up this winter. I hear nothing of my arms that left Leavenworth September 15. The additional cavalry ordered to join me has not reported; their arrival would have saved us much loss to-day.

The Indians lost beyond all precedent. I need prompt re-enforcements and repeating arms. I am sure to have, as before reported, an active winter, and must have men and arms. Every officer of this battalion should join. To-day I had every teamster on duty, and but one hundred and nineteen men left at
post. I hardly need urge this matter; it speaks for itself. Give me two companies of cavalry, at least, forthwith, well armed, or four companies of infantry, exclusive of what is needed at Reno and Fort Smith.

I did not overestimate my early application of a single company. Promptness will save the line; but one hundred killed shows that any remissness will result in mutilation and butchery beyond precedent. No such mutilation as that to-day is on record. Depend upon it that the post will be held so long as a round or a man is left. Promptness is the vital thing. Give me officers and men only; the new Spencer arms should be sent; the Indians are desperate; I spare none and they spare none.

HENRY B. CARRINGTON,
Colonel Eighteenth Infantry.

Brevet Maj. Gen. P. St. George Cooke,
Commanding Department.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
February 1, 1867.

Official copy:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, September 27, 1866.

Your long telegram and others of 17th instant received; also copy of Major Van Voast's letter of September 22, to you. You must have corn before this in plenty. It is impossible to take the offensive this season, except you can manage to surprise Red Cloud in winter camps by infantry.

Two or three hundred infantry, with much suffering, perhaps, might thus accomplish more than two thousand troops in summer.

I have reason to believe there are whites with the Indians—never spare them. You can only defend yourself and trains and emigrants the best you can. There are so many conditions and circumstances connected with Fort C. F. Smith I am ignorant of, I cannot order or advise; only at the worst you can recall its garrison, and in such case strengthen Reno.

Having one company of cavalry, you can probably dispense with your ninety-four horses, after mounting all the cavalrymen. They could be used for cavalry at Laramie. The same as to any useless horses at C. F. Smith and Reno.

General Myers telegraphs about Bailey's party and wages attended to.

P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,
Brevet Major General Commanding.

Colonel H. B. CARRINGTON,
Fort Philip Kearney, Dakota Territory.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, December 28, 1866.

General: By direction of the general commanding you will, upon arrival at Fort Philip Kearney, make a thorough investigation of the circumstances connected with the massacre on the 21st instant, near that post, and make full re-
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

port of the same to these headquarters. While this investigation is considered important, you are not to permit its prosecution to interrupt military duties of still greater moment.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. G. LITCHFIELD,
Brevet Major U. S. A., Aide-de-Camp
Brevet Brigadier General H. W. WESSELS,
United States Army, Commanding Mountain District.

Official:

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1867.

General Augur left last evening for Omaha, via St. Louis. Are you having an investigation into the Fort Phil. Kearney massacre? A report will probably be called for, and it is important that we should know all that can be learned about it as soon as possible.

U. S. GRANT, General.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,
St. Louis, Missouri.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, January 14, 1867.

GENERAL: I have received to-day Lieutenant General Sherman's dispatch of this date, which, after giving General Grant's, says to me: "General, I want a thorough investigation and report of the whole matter; and to fulfill General Grant's inquiries, I wish you to send me by mail, at once, your (my) version of the affair, based on the facts known, and your (my) judgment of the probabilities."

December 28, I ordered Brevet Brigadier General Wessels, then assigned to command of the district including Fort Phil. Kearney, to make a "thorough investigation," as now required. A copy I enclose. It was sent by telegraph to Fort Laramie, the nearest available office, 157 miles from Fort Reno, where General Wessels was in command, 66 miles this side of Fort Phil. Kearney. He could make no investigation before reaching Fort Phil. Kearney. His march there depended on the arrival of re-enforcements from Fort Laramie, ordered by telegraph December 26, but which, owing to "blinding snow-storms," &c., only marched January 3, and it is believed arrived at Fort Reno January 11th, instant. This recital shows the impossibility of obtaining from so remote a post, with communication temporarily suspended, reports so soon as desired and expected. The law forbids me to order a court of inquiry, and I am not aware of my power to order any other investigation than I have already done.

I have just received telegram from Fort Laramie, dated 12th, stating a mail carrier had arrived from Fort Philip Kearney; the first communication since the day of the massacre, which brought Colonel Carrington's report (which I mailed to you,) and it brings me nothing. I have telegraphed an inquiry for information to General Palmer. Thus uninformed, I have no "version" of the affair. It remains to me to comply with the call for my "judgment of the probabilities." The probabilities must be founded on my orders, Colonel Carrington's
reports, and my knowledge of the previous events, and the conduct of the com-
mmander and the troops.

First, I enclose copies (A and B) of instructions of September 27 and No-

Vember 12, 1866. Colonel Carrington has, before December 21, made no expedition
against Indians; all his skirmishes have been with war parties attacking his
supply trains, or appearing in sight of the fort. I am informed that on these
occasions it was the custom of officers and men to sally forth, mounted or afoot,
much at their discretion; and in confirmation of this, I enclose (C) a report of
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, of the affair of December 6. He says,
when his command of thirty men reached the wood party, surrounded by In-
dians four miles from the post, he was joined by Captain F. H. Brown, eighteenth
United States infantry, with a couple of mounted infantry, who had already
started for the relief of the train, and was overtaken by Second Lieutenant A.
H. Wands, eighteenth United States infantry.

I enclose, finally, an important account (D) which would be supposed to have
important bearing, a despatch from Colonel Carrington of December 19, two
days before the massacre, indicating a detachment and expedition, and proving
that he felt strong enough to take the offensive.
The size and composition of the party massacred indicate that they were all
mounted cavalry and infantry to just the number of horses in hands of infantry.
All my suggestions of the offensive in winter to Colonel Carrington laid stress
upon using infantry. Assuming, then, that Colonel Carrington did not disobey
in spirit [how about the infantry? ] and in letter my instructions as to expedi-
tions, my judgment of the probabilities is, that on the 21st December, hostile
Indians, in number between 1,500 and 3,000, formed an ambush within five or
six miles of Fort Phil. Kearney; that they sent a party to decoy the garrison;
that all the available horses (which I believe were kept saddled) were mounted,
and that hastily and irregularly they sallied out to engage or pursue; that the
Indians skilfully managed to lead the pursuit of the whole into ground selected
as forbidding escape; and that there, by so greatly superior numbers, the troops
were surrounded and massacred—no quarter asked or given.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,
Brevet Major General Commanding

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
A. A. Gen. Division of Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.

Official:

[Received at office United States military telegraph, War Department, Washington, D. C.,
January 17, 1867—4.30 p. m.]

General U. S. GRANT:
The subjoined telegram has this moment been received:

"Omaha, January 7, 1867.—Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman: Following
despatch just received: 'Fort Phil. Kearney, January 4.—To Adjutant
General, Department of the Platte: The mail takes full report of fight December
21. All bodies received. Severe cold and drifting snows, with mercury
once at twenty-two degrees below zero. Have so far prevented further Indian
depredations. Their losses may also explain this. The facts disclosed show
that the detachment was several miles from the wood train they were sent to re-

St. Louis, Mo., January 17, 1867.
times given not to cross that ridge. I found Lieutenant Grummond's body, Petttermann and Brown—evidently shot each other. Signed, H. B. Carri, Colonel eighteenth infantry. Respectfully, P. St. George Cooke, Brevet General."

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

Official copy:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, January 19, 1867.

Dear General: I now have the honor to send you General Cooke's letter of the 14th, with its enclosures, which is the nearest approach to accounting for the unhappy affair at Fort Phil. Kearney. I have already transmitted a copy of a telegraphic despatch from General Cooke, notifying me that a full report is on its way by the regular mail from Fort Laramie.

Until the reports of Colonel Carrington and General Wessels are on hand, I cannot advise either a formal court-martial or court of inquiry.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

General J. A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

Official copy:

Colonel and A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, January 22, 1867.

Dear General: Knowing your anxiety to hear something definite and comprehensible of the Fort Phil. Kearney matter, I have had a copy made of a letter from a sergeant there to a clerk in this office, which seems to explain the case fully. As soon as their official report comes I will send it also.

Yours, in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

General U. S. GRANT,
General United States Army.

Extract from a private letter received January 28, 1867.

FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, DAKOTA TERRITORY,
December 28, 1866.

Yours of November 28 came to hand. I was pleased to hear from a friend in the civilized world. We have passed through some trying and even heart-rending scenes within the last twenty days.

On the 6th instant we had an engagement with the Indians about three miles from the fort. Lieutenant Bingham, of the second cavalry, and Sergeant Bowers, of E company, second battalion eighteenth infantry, were killed and
ON the 21st instant, the timber train, while on its daily trip to the
mountains, under Corporal Legrow, of E company, was attacked by Indians.
Detachments from the different companies of the garrison, some mounted and
some on foot, the whole being under the command of Captain and Brevet Lieu-
tenant Colonel Fetterman, assisted by Captain Brown and Lieutenant Grum-
mond, proceeded from the fort to protect the train. The command amounted to
three officers, eight sergeants, ten corporals, and sixty-three privates. Those from
E company were Sergeant Morgan, Corporal Quinn, and four privates. Upon
their leaving the fort the colonel gave orders for the detachment to protect the
train, but to remain in supporting distance of the garrison; but, contrary to
these orders, they pursued the Indians (who immediately left the train without
inflicting any damage) for some six miles, to the main force of the enemy, which
lay in ambush. The Indians perceiving, as I suppose, that they had the ad-
 advantage in numbers, immediately rushed from their places of concealment, and
succeeded in cutting our men off from any communication with the post, and the
scene which followed you and all others may imagine; but I cannot describe
it, as not a man was left to tell the tale. All were butchered and scalped, their
bodies gashed, chopped with knives and tomahawks, stripped of every article
of clothing, and then (perhaps while in the agonies of death) shot through and
through with arrows. Poor Sergeant Morgan was shot through the breast and
scalped; his body was full of arrows. The wood train returned without further
trouble, and the colonel, becoming alarmed at the absence of the command,
ordered a second detachment, under Captain Powell, to their relief. Captain
Powell followed their trail across a high bluff, into a valley, where, to the sur-
prise and mortification of his command, he found, not those brave and noble
hearts who a few hours previous had left the fort with buoyant spirits, thirsting
for revenge, but eighty-four mangled and disfigured corpses, lying naked on the
ground. The Indians, on the completion of their hellish work, departed, taking
clothing, arms, and accoutrements, with their dead and wounded, for it is not
to be supposed that eighty-four armed soldiers could be killed, not one escaping,
and that, too, in daylight and open ground, without some loss to the enemy.
Captain Powell sent a messenger to the garrison, informing the colonel,
brating he would await the arrival of wagons to bring on the bodies. The
report went like a death-knell to the heart of every soldier. We could hardly
believe it, until the arrival of Captain Powell's detachment and return of the
wagons, bringing forty-five dead bodies. The remaining thirty-six were not
brought in until the next morning.

The severity of the weather, and probability of an immediate attack upon
the fort, compelled us to bury our dead in trenches, without ceremony or military
honors. The same evening Colonel Carrington sent citizen couriers to Laramie
with despatches to department headquarters for re-enforcements; the mail
has arrived since forwarding the despatch, but no re-enforcements. We have
been compelled to stop all work. The snow is deep, and the weather so in-
tensely cold that the guards have to be relieved every half hour.

There are six companies here, and but five officers. Lieutenant Bisbee has
been detached to department headquarters. Lieutenant Grummond, who was
in command of the company, was killed. I have had to receipt temporarily to
the quartermaster for clothing and other necessary stores, some of which had
been previously invoiced to the company, but not receipted for by the company
commander. This looks rather bad on the part of the government, when first
sergeants have to be responsible for duties pertaining only to commissioned
officers; but such are the chances of war in times of peace. Corporal Legrow
has been made sergeant, vice Morgan deceased; Legrow is a faithful and de-
serving soldier. A few days before the massacre I was released from confine-
ment, there being no one that could do anything with the company. I was
just in time to have my hands full, as usual.
It is now past tattoo; the night is cold; the men are sleeping in their clothes and accoutrements on. Indian signals have been seen, and we don’t know what hour the post may be attacked. Self and two soldiers are keeping up so as to wake the men in case of alarm. At midnight I shall have Sergt. Clark and three others to relieve us. So you can imagine the state of things here.

I have seen an article in a Chicago paper stating that the commissioners on Indian affairs had received intelligence that reports of hostilities on the frontier were without foundation and were exaggerated. The Indian commissioners are furnishing Indians with arms and ammunition to hunt with, and they are using them to murder white men. Those commissioners are a nuisance to the government. We want men and arms on these plains to exterminate this accursed race of savages. We are fighting a foe that is the devil. In your last you spoke about some newspapers which you had sent me. I did not get them. Please write soon, and pray God to hasten the day when I shall get out of this horrible place.

Good-bye; this may be my last letter; should it reach you, don’t forget your friend.

Headquarters United States Army,
February 2, 1867.

E. S. Parker,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram.]

Headquarters Department of the Platte,
Omaha, Nebraska, August 11, 1866.

Two companies second cavalry have been ordered to assist in the protection of the road. You are authorized to enlist not to exceed fifty Indian scouts—and allowances of cavalry soldiers; let them use the ponies if you can do better. Be very cautious; don’t undertake unnecessary, risky detachments.

P. St. George Cooke,
Brigadier General Commanding.

Colonel H. B. Carrington,
Commanding Fort C. F. Smith, (via Laramie.)

E. S. Parker,
Colonel and A. D. C.

[Telegram.]

Headquarters Department of the Platte,
Omaha, Nebraska, September 27, 1866.

Your long telegram and others of the 17th instant received. Also major Van Voast’s letter of September 22, to you. You must have corn this, in plenty. It is impossible to take the offensive this season, except you can manage to surprise Red Cloud’s bands in winter camps, by infantry—or three hundred infantry, with much suffering, perhaps, might thus accomplish more than two thousand troops in summer.

I have reason to believe there are whites with the Indians; them. You can only defend yourself and trains and emigrants the can. There are so many conditions and circumstances connected with F. Smith I am ignorant of, I cannot order or advise, only at
you can recall its garrison, and in such case strengthen Reno. Having one company of cavalry, you can probably dispense with your ninety-four horses, after mounting all the cavalrymen. They could be used for cavalry at Laramie. The same as to any useless horses at C. F. Smith and Reno.

General Myers telegraphs about Bailey's party and wages. Cartridges attended to.

P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,
Brevet Major General Commanding.

Colonel H. B. CARRINGTON,
Fort Phil. Kearney, Dakota Territory.

Official:

Colonel and A. D. C.

B.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska, November 12, 1866.

COLONEL: You are hereby instructed, so soon as the troops and stores are covered from the weather, to turn your attention to the possibility of striking the hostile bands of Indians by surprise in their winter camps, as intimated in telegram of September 27, ultimo, from these headquarters. An extraordinary effort in winter, when the Indian horses are unserviceable, it is believed, should be followed by more success than can be accomplished by very large expeditions in summer, when the Indians can so easily scatter into deserts and mountain hiding places, almost beyond pursuit.

Four companies of infantry will be available, besides some cavalry; you have a large arrear of murderous and insulting attacks by the savages upon emigrants, trains, and troops to settle; and you are ordered, if there prove to be any promise of success, to conduct, or to send under another officer, such an expedition. Major Van Voast has volunteered, and has been instructed to make such a one in December, from Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory.

By command of Brevet Major General Cooke:

H. G. LITTLEFIELD,
Brevet Major U. S. Army, A. D. C.

Colonel H. B. CARRINGTON, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry,
Commanding Fort Phil. Kearney, Dakota Ter.

Official:

Colonel and A. D. C.

FORT PHILIP KEARNEY, DAKOTA TERRITORY,
December 7, 1866.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with your communication of to-day I have the honor to submit to the colonel commanding the post the following report of the operations of my party on the 6th instant, while in pursuit of Indians who had attacked the wood party:

In obedience to the instructions of the colonel commanding, I took command of the cavalry, numbering about thirty men, under the immediate command of Second Lieutenant H. S. Bingham, second United States cavalry, and proceeded to the wood train, about four miles from the post, which I found corralled and surrounded by Indians. There I was joined by Captain Fred. H. Brown, eighteenth United States infantry, and a couple of mounted infantry, who had already
started for the relief of the train, and was overtaken by Second Lieutenant A. Wands, eighteenth United States infantry, and started in pursuit of the Indians, who retired before us for five miles, when, arriving in a valley through which passed the Big Horn road, the Indians offered us battle. In the most unaccountable manner the cavalry turned and commenced a retreat, which I assisted by Captain Brown and Lieutenant Wands, used every exertion to check. The Indians, corralling and closing around us, it was plain the retreat, if continued, would be a rout and massacre. We, therefore, with the two mounted infantrymen who were with us, dismounted from our horses, and, continuing our exertions, succeeded in calling back a few of the cavalry, which swelled our number to about fourteen men, with which we turned and fought the enemy, who numbered about one hundred, surrounding us on both sides. While thus engaged, the mounted infantry which had started out on the Big Horn road, under the command of Colonel Carrington, came in sight, and passed along the road about half a mile to our right, with the purpose, I hoped, of getting to the rear of the enemy, who had a low ridge at their back. The Indians, seeing the approach of the mounted infantry, retired, we following; but finding that their rear was not attacked, a large number of them returned. After fighting about twenty minutes longer, they again retired, we in pursuit. Not being able to overtake them, I concluded to take the road and join Colonel Carrington's party, which we soon found on the road a short distance in advance. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Captain Brown and Lieutenant Wands, without whose assistance I fear we must have suffered serious disaster. Lieutenant Bingham, while retiring with the major part of the cavalry, encountered the mounted infantry as they were descending the road, and joined them, leaving my party of about fourteen men to oppose a hundred Indians. I cannot account for this movement on the part of an officer of such unquestionable gallantry as Lieutenant Bingham; but it is presumed that being unable to check the retreat of his men, he deemed it most prudent to hold his men in hand as much as possible, and fall back on the mounted infantry who were expected down the road.

Our casualties at this time were one man wounded, two horses wounded, and one killed.

Three Indian ponies were shot, and two men were seen carried from the field.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. J. FETTERMAN,
Brevet Captain WM. H. BISBIE,
Eighteenth Infantry, Post Adjutant Fort Philip Kearney, D. T.

[Telegram.]

PHIL. KEARNEY, D. T., December 19, 1866.

A. A. A. General, Department of the Platte:

No special news since last report. Indians appeared to-day and fired on wood train, but were repulsed. They are accomplishing nothing, while I am perfecting all details of the post and preparing for active movements.

HENRY B. CARRINGTON,
Col. 18th U. S. Infantry, Commanding Post.
I will submit to you, as briefly as possible consistent with the importance of the subject, my views of the policy which should be pursued to effect a peaceable and reasonably speedy settlement of the Indian question.

That great trouble exists at this time between the whites and Indians beyond any doubt; and it would indeed be surprising if this were not so, owing to the sudden overflowing of the whites throughout the Indian country, caused by the discovery of gold and silver and the rapid settlement of all the western Territories. The Indian's home and his hunting-grounds have been invaded, and the result is that he is brought face to face and in daily contact with the whites. It is very evident that as the wants of the Indians and the whites are entirely different, this leads to conflict. The question presented now is, how can this be avoided? It is very plain that there are but two ways to effect this. One is to destroy these people as speedily as possible, and the other to drive them out of the way of white settlements and the routes of travel. To effect the former, besides its inhumanity, will cost millions of dollars, thousands of lives of our people, and a general Indian war throughout the country between the Missouri river and the Rocky mountains, which would stop the settlement of all our western Territories, and, to a great extent, destroy Kansas and Nebraska. I desire to avoid the latter result, and this has been my policy since I have assumed the duties of this office. I believe this entire population can be withdrawn on reservations out of the way of whites, where, in a few years, they could be made, to a great extent, self-sustaining. To accomplish this object in a speedy and proper manner more definite information is needed by this bureau than is now in its possession. To obtain this information my idea is to appoint separate commissioners of first-rate men to visit each State and Territory having an Indian population, with instructions to these commissioners to master the Indian subject in the State or Territory they are sent to; that is, ascertain the number of Indians, their status socially, and in every other way, find out if they can be aggregated on one or two reservations, select the section of country where this reservation should be, how much should be paid annually to them in the way of annuity until they can support themselves, what kind of goods should be furnished, if any, how much stock of cattle and sheep, and indeed to master the subject fully and thoroughly, and report the result of their labors, say next fall, for final action.

It cannot be doubted that a commission of good men, properly selected, could go, for instance, to Arizona or New Mexico, and on the ground study this question and report a plan by which the Indian question in that locality would be forever settled. The same thing can be done with all the other States and Territories having this population.

I have thought a great deal on this subject, and I am confident it can be made to succeed. To carry out this plan an appropriation is necessary. It will take some eight or ten different commissions, and the persons going out should be reasonably well paid, and ample time allowed them to investigate into the subject. I would, therefore, ask for an appropriation of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Some $20,000 of this money, however, to be used for holding an Indian council with the Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Lipans, Mescaleros, and other Indians roaming in the southern and western part of Kansas, the northern extremity of Texas, the eastern line of New Mexico, and the 98th parallel of longitude. I have no doubt that by holding a council with these people at an early day, say in the month of May, they can be withdrawn from the settled portions of Kansas and the great routes of travel leading to New Mexico,
and the proposed line of railroad now being built known as the Atlantic
Pacific railroad.

This council should be held this spring, as it is of absolute necessity, if
desire to withdraw these Indians from this line of road.

If it did not render this communication too lengthy, I think I could de-
strate that all our Indian tribes could easily be withdrawn on to reserva-
There is certainly country enough for them and for us. I would pro-
make the reservations quite large, for the reason, first, that it costs nothing
make them large, as the title is only possessory, and these lands will revert
to our posterity as these Indians pass away, and as the present generation
more land than it can possibly use. I repeat, it will cost nothing to make them
large, yet by making them large you keep away from the people these white
population, and you obtain ample territory to raise their herds of cattle and
sheep, also sufficient grounds for cultivation.

Permit me, therefore, to request you to lay this communication before the two
houses of Congress at as early a day as possible, so as to obtain action during
this session, if the views herein expressed are favorably considered by this body.

The appropriation of $150,000 is necessary to carry out these views.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

L. V. BOGY,
Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior, Washington City.

Letter from the Secretary of War, directed to the Chairman of the Committee
on Military Affairs, transmitting a communication from General Grant on
Indian Affairs.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, February 1, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the com-
mittee, a copy of a communication on Indian affairs received this day from Gen-
eral Grant.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. R. C. SCHENCK,
Chairman of the Military Committee,
House of Representatives.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., February 1, 1867.

SIR: The enclosed papers, just received from General Sherman, are respect-
fully forwarded and your special attention invited. They show the urgent ne-
cessity for an immediate transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Depart-
and the abolition of the civil Indian agents and licensed traders. If the pre-
ent practice is to be continued, I do not see that any course is left open to us but to
withdraw our troops to the settlements and call upon Congress to provide means
and troops to carry on formidable hostilities against the Indians until all the
Indians or all the whites on the great plains and between the settlements on the
Missouri and the Pacific slope are exterminated.

The course General Sherman has pursued in this matter, in disregarding
the permits of Mr. Bogy and others, is just right. I will instruct him to enforce his order until it is countermanded by the President or yourself.

I would also respectfully ask that this matter be placed before the President, and his disapproval of licensing the sale of arms to Indians asked.

We have treaties with all tribes of Indians from time to time. If the rule is to be followed that all tribes with which we have treaties and pay annuities can procure such articles without stint or limit, it will not be long before the matter becomes perfectly understood by the Indians, and they avail themselves of it to equip perfectly for war. They will get the arms either by making treaties themselves or through tribes who have such treaties.

I would respectfully recommend that copies of the enclosed communications be furnished to the military committee of each house of Congress.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, January 26, 1867.

GENERAL: I have this moment received your letter of January 22, about the sale of arms and ammunition to Indians by traders and agents.

We, the military, are held responsible for the peace of the frontier, and it is an absurdity to attempt it if Indian agents and traders can legalize and encourage so dangerous a traffic. I regard the paper enclosed, addressed to Mr. D. A. Butterfield, and signed by Charles Bogy, W. R. Irwin, J. H. Leavenworth, and others, as an outrage upon our rights and supervision of the matter, and I now authorize you to disregard that paper and at once stop the practice, keeping the issues and sales of arms and ammunition under the rigid control and supervision of the commanding officers of the posts and districts near which the Indians are. If the Indian agents may, without limit, supply the Indians with arms, I would not expose our troops and trains to them at all, but would withdraw our soldiers, who already have a herculean task on their hands.

This order is made for this immediate time, but I will, with all expedition, send these papers, with a copy of this, to General Grant, in the hope he will lay it before the President, who alone can control both the War and Indian Departments, under whom, at present, this mixed control of the Indian question now rests in law and practice.

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

General W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding Department of the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

FORT ZARA, KANSAS,
November 15, 1866.

SIR: You having requested verbally to be informed in regard to your right to sell arms and ammunition to Indians, we have to state as follows:

You, as an Indian trader, licensed for that purpose by the United States government, are authorized to trade or sell arms and ammunition to any Indians
that are at peace with, and receiving annuities from, the United States government.

This rule, of course, applies to any other regularly licensed Indian trader as well as yourself.

CHAS. BOGY,
W. R. IRWIN,
Special United States Indian Agents,
J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
Agent for Kiowas and Comanche Indians of Upper Arkansas;
WM. H. BRENT,
E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agents, Upper Arkansas Agency

A true copy:
HENRY ASBURY,
Mr. D. A. BUTTERFIELD, Present.

Letter from the Secretary of War, addressed to Mr. Schenck, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, transmitting a report by Colonel Parker on Indian affairs.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 25, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on Indian affairs, prepared by Colonel Parker, aide-de-camp, for the information of your committee.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. R. C. SCHENCK,
Chairman of Military Committee, House of Representatives.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., January 24, 1867.

General: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following proposed plan for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual peace, and for settling all matters of differences between the United States and the various Indian tribes.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

General U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the United States.

First. The transfer of the Indian bureau from the Interior Department back to the War Department, or military branch of the government, where it originally belonged, until within the last few years.

The condition and disposition of all the Indians west of the Mississippi, as developed in consequence of the great and rapid influx of immigration by reason of the discovery of the precious metals throughout the entire west, renders it of the utmost importance that military supervision should be extended over the Indians. Treaties have been made with a very large number of the tribes, and generally reservations have been provided as homes for them. Agents ap-
indian hostilities.

pointed from civil life have generally been provided to protect their lives and
property, and to attend to the prompt and faithful observance of treaty stipula-
tions. But as the hardy pioneer and adventurous miner advanced into the in-
hospitable regions occupied by the Indians in search of the precious metals,
they found no rights possessed by the Indians that they were bound to respect.
The faith of treaties solemnly entered into were totally disregarded, and Indian
territory wantonly violated. If any tribe remonstrated against the violation of
their natural and treaty rights, members of the tribe were inhumanly shot down
and the whole treated as mere dogs. Retaliation generally followed, and bloody
Indian wars have been the consequence, costing many lives and much treasure.
In all troubles arising in this manner the civil agents have been totally power-
less to avert the consequences, and when too late the military have been called
in to protect the whites and punish the Indians; when it, in the beginning, the
military had had the supervision of the Indians, their rights would not have been
improperly molested, or if disturbed in their quietude by any lawless whites, a
prompt and summary check to any further aggressions could have been given.
In cases where the government promises the Indians the quiet and peaceable
possession of a reservation, and precious metals are discovered or found to exist
upon it, the military alone can give the Indians the needed protection and keep
the adventurous miner from encroaching upon the Indians until the government
has come to some understanding with them. In such cases the civil agent is
absolutely powerless.

Most of Indian treaties contain stipulations for the payment annually to Indians
of annuities, either in money or goods, or both, and agents are appointed to make
these payments whenever government furnishes them the means. I know of no
reason why officers of the army could not make all these payments as well as
civilians. The expense of agencies would be saved, and, I think, the Indians
would be more honestly dealt by. An officer's honor and interest is at stake,
which impels him to discharge his duty honestly and faithfully, while civil agents
have none of those incentives, the ruling passion with them being generally to
avoid all trouble and responsibility, and to make as much money as possible out
of their offices.

In the retransfer of this bureau I would provide for the complete abolishment
of the system of Indian traders, which, in my opinion, is a great evil to Indian
communities. I would make government the purchaser of all articles usually
brought in by Indians, giving them a fair equivalent for the same in money or
goods at cost prices. In this way it would be an easy matter to regulate the sale
or issue of arms and ammunition to Indians, a question which of late has agi-
tated the minds of the civil and military authorities. If the entry of large num-
bers of Indians to any military post is objectionable, it can easily be arranged
that only limited numbers shall be admitted daily.

By an act approved March 16, 1802, it was made the duty of military agents
"to purchase, receive, and forward to their proper destination all military stores
and other articles for the troops in their respective departments, and all goods
and annuities for the Indians which they may be directed to purchase or which
shall be ordered into their care by the Department of War." In the retransfer
of the Indian bureau this act, so far as it relates to the Indians, could be revived,
as well as the act of June 30, 1834, which authorizes "the President to require
any military officer of the United States to execute the duties of Indian agent."

With reference to the discontinuance of the present Indian trading system,
the arguments set forth in President Jefferson's confidential message, dated
January 18, 1803, seem more cogent now than at that time. He says: "The
Indian tribes residing within the limits of the United States have, for a consider-
able time, been growing more and more uneasy at the constant diminution of
the territory they occupy, although effected by their own voluntary sales; and
the policy has long been gaining strength with them of refusing absolutely all
further sales on any conditions; insomuch that at this time it hazards their friendship and excites dangerous jealousies and perturbations in their minds. It is impossible to make any overture for the purchase of the smallest portions of their land, especially as very few tribes only are not yet obstinately in these dispositions. In order to peaceably counteract this policy of theirs, and to provide an extension of territory which the rapid increase of our numbers will call for, two measures were deemed expedient: first, to encourage them to abandon hunting, to apply to the raising stock, to agriculture, and domestic manufactures, and thereby prove to themselves that less land and labor will maintain them in this better than in their former mode of living. The extensive forests necessary in the meantime will then become useless, and they will see the advantage in exchanging them for the means of improving their farms and of increasing their domestic comforts.

Secondly, to multiply trading-houses among them, and to place within their reach those things which will contribute more to their domestic comfort than the possession of extensive but uncultivated wilds. Experience and reflection will develop to them the wisdom of exchanging what they can spare and we want for what we can spare and they want. In leading them thus to agriculture, manufactures, and civilization, in bringing together their and our settlements, and in preparing them ultimately to participate in the benefits of our government, I trust and believe we are acting for their greatest good. At these trading-houses we have pursued the principles of the act of Congress which directs that the commerce shall be carried on liberally, and requires only that the capital stock shall not be diminished. We consequently undersell private traders, foreign and domestic; drive them from the competition, and thus, with the good will of the Indians, rid ourselves of a description of men who are constantly endeavoring to excite in the Indian mind suspicions, fears, and irritations towards us. A letter now enclosed shows the effect of our competition on the operations of the traders; while the Indians, perceiving the advantage of purchasing from us, are soliciting generally our establishment of trading-houses among them."

The Indian department has increased to such magnitude since this was written that every argument advanced has a tenfold more force than at that date. And had the policy then advocated been adopted and steadily pursued to this day, there is no doubt that great good would have resulted, bloody war averted, and many valuable lives saved. It is believed that a return now to the wise and humane measures advocated by the fathers of the republic would still result beneficially to the government and the Indian races. Some definite and permanent policy should be adopted, and circumstances made to bend to its establishment.

In 1793 General Washington, then President, remarks, in a special message to Congress, that "next to a vigorous execution of justice on the violators of peace, the establishment of commerce with the Indian nations, on behalf of the United States, is most likely to conciliate their attachment. But it ought to be conducted without fraud, without extortion, with constant and plentiful supplies; with a ready market for the commodities of the Indians, and a stated price for what they give in payment and receive in exchange. Individuals will not pursue such a traffic unless they be allured by the hope of profit; but it will be enough for the United States to be reimbursed only."

It is greatly to be regretted that this beneficent and humane policy had not been adhered to, for it is a fact not to be denied that at this day Indian trading licenses are very much sought after, and when once obtained, although it may be for a limited period, the lucky possessor is considered as having already made his fortune. The eagerness also with which Indian agencies are sought after, and large fortunes made by the agents in a few years, notwithstanding the inadequate salary given, is presumptive evidence of frauds against the Indians and the government.
Many other reasons might be suggested why the Indian department should altogether be under military control, but a familiar knowledge of the practical workings of the present system would seem to be the most convincing proofs of the propriety of the measure. It is pretty generally advocated by those most familiar with our Indian relations, and so far as I know the Indians themselves desire it. Civil officers are not usually respected by the tribes, but they fear and regard the military, and will submit to their counsels, advice, and dictation when they would not listen to a civil agent.

Second. The next measure I would suggest is the passage by Congress of a plan of territorial government for the Indians, as was submitted last winter, or a similar one. When once passed it should remain upon the statute-books as the permanent and settled policy of the government. The boundaries of the Indian territory or territories should be well defined by metes and bounds, and should remain inviolate from settlement by any except Indians and government employes.

The subject of the improvement and civilization of the Indians, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with them, has engaged the serious consideration of every administration since the birth of the American republic; and, if I recollect aright, President Jefferson was the first to inaugurate the policy of the removal of the Indians from the States to the country west of the Mississippi; and President Monroe, in furtherance of this policy, recommended that the Indians be concentrated, as far as was practicable, and civil governments established for them, with schools for every branch of instruction in literature and the arts of civilized life. The plan of removal was adopted as the policy of the government, and, by treaty stipulations, affirmed by Congress; lands were set apart for tribes removing into the western wilds, and the faith of a great nation pledged that the homes selected by the Indians should be and remain their homes forever, un molested by the hand of the grasping and avaricious white man; and, in some cases, the government promised that the Indian homes and lands should never be incorporated within the limits of any new State that might be organized. How the pledges so solemnly given and the promises made were kept, the history of the western country can tell. It is presumed that humanity dictated the original policy of the removal and concentration of the Indians in the west to save them from threatened extermination. But to-day, by reason of the immense augmentation of the American population, and the extension of their settlements throughout the entire west, covering both slopes of the Rocky mountains, the Indian races are more seriously threatened with a speedy extermination than ever before in the history of the country. And, however much such a deplorable result might be wished for by some, it seems to me that the honor of a Christian nation and every sentiment of humanity dictate that no pains should be spared to avert such an appalling calamity befalling a portion of the human race. The establishment of the Indians upon any one territory is perhaps impracticable, but numbers of them can, without doubt, be consolidated in separate districts of country, and the same system of government made to apply to each. By the concentration of tribes, although in several and separate districts, government can more readily control them and more economically press and carry out plans for their improvement and civilization, and a better field be offered for philanthropic aid and Christian instruction. Some system of this kind has, at different periods in the history of our government, been put forward, but never successfully put into execution. A renewal of the attempt, with proper aids, it seems to me cannot fail of success.

Third. The passage by Congress of an act authorizing the appointment of an inspection board, or commission, to hold office during good behavior, or until the necessity for their services is terminated by the completion of the retransfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department. It shall be the duty of this board to examine the accounts of the several agencies, see that every cent due the
Indians is paid to them promptly as may be promised in treaties, and the proper and suitable goods and implements of agriculture are delivered when such articles are due; to make semi-annual reports, with such suggestions as, in their judgment, might seem necessary to the perfect establishment of permanent and friendly feeling between the people of the United States and the Indians.

This commission could undoubtedly be dispensed with in a few years, if the results of their labors might be very important and beneficial, not only in supervising and promptly checking the delinquencies of incompetent and dishonest agents, but it would be a most convincing proof to the Indians and the government was disposed to deal honestly and fairly by them. Such a commission might, indeed, be rendered wholly unnecessary if Congress would consent to the next and fourth proposition which I submit in this plan.

Fourth. The passage of an act authorizing the appointment of a permanent Indian commission, to be a mixed commission, composed of such white men as possessed in a large degree the confidence of their country, and a number of the most reputable educated Indians, selected from different tribes. The entire commission might be composed of ten members, and, if deemed advisable, might be divided so that five could operate north and five south of a given line, but both to be governed by the same general instructions, and impressing upon the Indians the same line of governmental policy. It shall be made their duty to visit all the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States, whether to do this, it requires three, five, or ten years. They shall hold talks with them, setting forth the great benefits that would result to them from a permanent peace with the whites, from their abandonment of their nomadic mode of life and adopting agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and the habits and modes of civilized communities. Under the directions of the President the commission shall explain to the various tribes the advantages of their consolidation upon some common territory, over which Congress shall have extended theegis of good, wise, and wholesome laws for their protection and perpetuation. It would be wise to convince the Indians of the great power and number of the whites; that they cover the whole land, to the north, south, east, and west of them. I believe they could easily understand that although this country was once wholly inhabited by Indians, the tribes, and many of them once powerful, who occupied the countries now constituting the States east of the Mississippi, have, one by one, been exterminated in their abortive attempts to stem the western march of civilization.

They could probably be made to comprehend that the waves of population and civilization are upon every side of them; that it is too strong for them to resist; and that, unless they fall in with the current of destiny as it rolls and surges around them, they must succumb and be annihilated by its overwhelming force. In consequence of the gradual extinction of the Indian race, and the failure of almost every plan heretofore attempted for the amelioration of their condition, and the prolongation of their national existence, and also because they will not abandon their savage tastes and propensities, it has of late years become somewhat common, not only for the press, but in the speeches of men of intelligence, and some occupying high and responsible positions, to advocate the policy of their immediate and absolute extermination. Such a proposition, so revolting to every sense of humanity and Christianity, it seems to me could not for one moment be entertained by any enlightened nation. On the contrary, the honor of the national character and the dictates of a sound policy, guided by the principles of religion and philanthropy, would urge the adoption of a system to avert the extinction of a people, however unenlightened they may be. The American government can never adopt the policy of extermination of the Indian race within her limits, numbering, perhaps, less than four hundred thousand, without a cost of untold treasure and lives of
ple, besides exposing herself to the abhorrence and censure of the entire civilized world.

The commission shall assure the tribes that the white man does not want the Indian exterminated from the face of the earth, but will live with him as good neighbors, in peace and quiet. The value of maintaining friendly and brotherly relations among themselves is to be urged upon the tribes, and its continual discussion to be made one of the permanent duties of the commission. They are also to urge constantly the propriety, necessity, and benefit to result from their concentration in certain districts of the country, there to live peaceably as members of the same family, as brothers and friends, having the same interests and the same destiny. I am free to admit that the most difficult task for the commission would be to obtain the consent of the Indians to consolidate, by removing into certain defined districts. But by constantly keeping the subject before them, and by yearly visitations, the wisdom and humanity of the policy would gradually develop in the Indian mind, and one by one the tribes would come into the measure, and the whole policy be adopted. There would be very many prejudices to combat and overcome. As members of the great human family, they know and feel that they are endowed with certain rights. They possess fair intellectual faculties. They entertain the most ardent love for the largest liberty and independence. Originally their greatest desire was to be left undisturbed by the overflowing white population that was quietly but surely pressing to overwhelm them, but they have been powerless to divert or stem the current of events. They saw their hunting grounds and fisheries disappear before them. They have been reduced to limits too narrow for the hunter state, and naturally many of them at times have sought by violence the redress of what they conceived to be great and heinous wrongs against their natural rights. Though ignorant in the common acceptation of the term, they are a proud people, and quickly resent the least suspicion of dictation in the government of their actions, come from what quarter it may. Most of the tribes are eminently subject to the influence and control of interested, unprincipled, and crafty individuals, who, to retain their influence and power, would oppose the idea of a consolidation of the tribes, because now they are something, while under the new order of things they might be nothing. They will pander to the prejudices of their people by preaching the sanctity of their separate creation, nationality, and customs, and claim that as their Creator made them, so they must ever remain. They flatter the pride of the Indian mind. Their reasoning is specious, but yet it is all sophistry.

To combat and overcome such influences the commission would have much labor to perform. It may be imagined that a serious obstacle would be presented to the removal of the Indians from their homes on account of the love they bear for the graves of their ancestors. This, indeed, would be the least and last objection that would be raised by any tribe. Much is said in the books about the reverence paid by Indians to the dead, and their antipathy to deserting their ancestral graves. Whatever may have been the customs for the dead in ages gone by, and whatever pilgrimages may have been made to the graves of their loved and distinguished dead, none of any consequence exists at the present day. They leave their dead without any painful regrets or the shedding of tears. And how could it be otherwise with a people who have such indefinite and vague ideas of a future state of existence; and to my mind it is unnatural to assume or suppose that the wild and untutored Indian can have more attachment for his home, or love for the graves of his ancestors, than the civilized and enlightened Christian.

The appointment of a number of reputable educated Indians upon this commission is suggested because they are familiar with the best modes of communicating with the tribes, whether friendly or unfriendly; they are familiar with the peculiarities of the Indian mind, and know how to make the desired impression
upon it, and it would add greatly to the confidence of the tribes in the
sincerity, and humanity of the government.

The commission shall be required to invite and hear all complaints from
Indians, transmit them verbatim to Washington, and communicate to the
answers thereto. If the complaints be against any agent or citizen of
the United States, such agent or citizen shall be furnished with a correct copy
of the complaint, an answer thereto obtained, when all the papers in the case
be sent to Washington, a prompt decision given upon the same, and returned to the
commission for promulgation to the parties interested. In my opinion nothing
could occur that would tend more strongly to advance the happiness of the
Indians, and attach them firmly to the United States government, than the realiza-
tion of the benefits of an impartial dispensation of justice among themselves
and between them and the whites. It has been lately suggested that Indian agents
be vested with magisterial powers to administer and dispense justice among
Indians, and between Indians and the whites. Such a plan does not seem
practicable, because the agent would be absolutely powerless to enforce his judg-
ments, not only against the Indians, but against the whites. If, however, the
Indian business is retransferred to the military branch of the government, officers
acting as Indian agents could act efficiently as magisterial officers, because they
could always have troops to enforce their decrees, and such a measure I should
deam very desirable, and I think would result in the greatest good in checking
mischief, by summarily punishing lawlessness and crime, whether committed by
whites or Indians.

Most of the tribes would have to be visited several times by the commission
before the Indian mind would come to a conclusion upon the matters and things
that might from time to time be submitted to them, and the government and
people of the United States would be compelled to exercise the Christian virtue
of patience until the aboriginal mind was fully prepared and ripened to adopt
the plans of the government, when general councils of tribes could be called and
a permanent union or confederation of peace formed among themselves and with the
United States, and they be made to settle down upon lands within certain de-

dined and permanent limits and bounds, where ample aid and protection could
be easily and economically afforded them.

No suggestions have been made regarding the disposition of lands at present
held or occupied by the tribes, or their annuities, or the amount and kind of aid
they ought to receive when concentrated within defined districts, it being deemed
premature to discuss such questions now, as circumstances and future legislation
will probably better determine them.

This project, at first blush, may seem to be devised on too extensive a scale,
and involving too much expense for an experiment. I cannot so regard it. On
the contrary, I believe it to be more economical than any other plan that could
be suggested. A whole army of Indian agents, traders, contractors, jobbers, and
hangers-on would be dispensed with, and from them would come the strongest
opposition to the adoption of this plan, as it would effectually close to them the
corrupt sources of their wealth.

In 1865 the Secretary of the Interior estimated the cost to the government
of maintaining each regiment of troops operating against the Indians on the
frontier at two millions of dollars per annum, and that only a few hundred In-
dians had been killed. By a recent publication in the newspapers (but whether
true or not I cannot say) it was stated that the cost of operations against the
Indians during the past year was thirty millions of dollars; that a certain num-
ber only of Indians had been killed, each life costing the government sixty
thousand dollars. Though the cost of carrying on a war is now pretty well
understood in this country, the expense of an Indian war extending along a
frontier of thousands of miles cannot be safely estimated. The expense of the
Florida Indian war, against a few Indians, who long refused to leave a country
hardly inhabitable by civilized man, it is known, was millions of treasure and
many valuable lives.

The expense of this entire plan for establishing peace, saving lives, making
every route of travel across the continent entirely safe, civilizing and perpetuating
the Indian race, and developing immense tracts of country now held by
hostile bands of Indians, would be but a mere tithe to the amount now annually
paid by the government for these purposes. There are plenty of troops already
in the Indian country, and after the commission has commenced its labors hos-
tilities would very soon cease. Yet the military would have to be maintained in
the country until the labors of the commission were fairly and fully developed,
and, if successful, the troops could be moved into or contiguous to the Indian
districts, to protect them from frauds and impositions, to maintain them in their
just and legal rights, and to act as the magisterial agents of the government.
The benefits to result from even a partial success of this plan would, to my
mind, justify the government in attempting it, especially as it seems so much
more economical than the prosecution of the present Indian policy.

E. S. PARKER.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 28, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the com-
mittee, a report on Indian affairs, of January 25, prepared by General John
Pope, United States army.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. R. C. SCHENCK,
Chairman of Military Committee, House of Representatives.

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WASHINGTON, D. C., January 25, 1867.

GENERAL: In compliance with your suggestions, I have the honor to submit
the following leading reasons why the Indian Bureau should be retransferred to
the War Department. The views which I shall submit are by no means
original, but are well settled opinions of every officer of the army who has had
experience of the subject, and are and have been entertained for years by nearly
every citizen of the Territories not directly or indirectly connected with the
present system of Indian management.

1. Under present circumstances there is a divided jurisdiction over Indian
affairs. While the Indians are officially at peace, according to treaties nego-
tiated with them by the civil officers of the Indian Bureau, the military forces
stationed in the Indian country have no jurisdiction over the Indians, and, of
consequence, no certain knowledge of their feelings or purposes, and no power
to take any action, either of a precautionary or aggressive character.

The first that is known of Indian hostilities is a sudden report that the In-
dians have commenced a war, and have devastated many miles of settlements, or
massacred parties of emigrants or travellers. By the time such information
reaches the military commander the worst has been accomplished, and the In-
dians have escaped from the scene of outrage. Nothing is left to the military
except pursuit, and generally unavailing pursuit. The Indian agents are care-
ful never to locate their agencies at the military posts, for reasons very well
understood. It is not in human nature that two sets of officials, responsible to

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different heads, and not in accord either in opinion or purpose, should act together harmoniously; and instead of combined, there is very certain to be conflicting action. The results are what might be expected. It would be far better to devote the whole management of Indians upon one or the other department, so as to secure at least consistent and uniform policy. At war, the Indians are under the control of the military; at peace, under the control of the civil officer. Exactly what constitutes Indian hostilities is not agreed on; and besides this, as soon as the military forces, after a hard campaign, conducted with great hardship and at large expense, have succeeded in forcing the Indians into such a position that punishment is possible, the Indian, seeing the result and the impossibility of avoiding it, immediately proclaims his wish to make peace. The Indian agent, anxious, for manifest reasons, to negotiate a treaty, at once interferes "to protect" (as he expresses it) the Indians from the troops, and arrests the further prosecution of the military expedition, just at the moment when results are to be obtained by it, and the whole labor and cost of the campaign are lost. The Indian makes a treaty to avoid immediate danger by the troops, without the slightest purpose of keeping it, and the agent knows very well that the Indian does not intend to observe it. While the army is fighting the Indians at one end of the line, Indian agents are making treaties and furnishing supplies at the other end, which supplies are at once used to keep up the conflict. With this divided jurisdiction and responsibility it is impossible to avoid these unfortunate transactions. If the Indian department, as at present constituted, were given sole jurisdiction of the Indians and the troops removed, it is certain that a better condition of things would be obtained than now exists, since the whole responsibility of Indian wars and their results to unprotected citizens would belong to the Indian Bureau alone, without the power of shifting the responsibility for consequences upon others. The military officer is the representative of force, a logic which the Indian understands, and with which he does not invest the Indian agent. It is a fact which can be easily authenticated that the Indians in mass prefer to deal entirely with military commandes, and would unanimously vote for the transfer of the Indian department to the War Department. In this they are mainly influenced by the knowledge that they can rely upon what the military commander tells or promises them, as they see he has power to fulfill his promise.

2. The first and great interest of the army officer is to preserve peace with the Indians. His home during his life is to be at some military post in the Indian country, and aside from the obligations of duty, his own comfort and quiet, and the possibility of escaping arduous and harassing field service against Indians at all seasons of the year, accompanied by frequent changes of station, which render it impossible for him to have his family with him, render a state of peace with Indians the most desirable of all things to him. He therefore omits no proper precautions, and does not fail to use all proper means, by just treatment, honest distribution of annuities, and fair dealing, to secure quiet and friendly relations with the Indian tribes in his neighborhood. His honest distribution of the annuities appropriated to the Indians is further secured by his life commission in the army, and the odium which would blast his life and character by any dishonest act. If dismissed from the service for such malfeasance, he would be publicly branded by his own profession, and would be powerless to attribute his removal from office to any but the true cause. The Indian agent, on the other hand, accepts his office for a limited time and for a specific purpose, and he finds it easy when he has secured his ends (the rapid acquisition of money) to account for his removal from office on political grounds, or the personal enmity of some other official of his department superior in rank to himself. The eagerness to secure an appointment as Indian agent, on a small salary, manifested by many persons of superior ability, ought of itself to be a warning to Congress as to the objects sought by it. It is a common saying in the west that next to, if not indeed before, the consulship to Liverpool, an In-
Indian agency is the most desirable office in the gift of the government. Of course the more treaties an Indian agent can negotiate the larger the appropriations of money and goods which pass through his hands and the more valuable his office. An Indian war every other day, with treaty-making on intermediate days, would be, therefore, the condition of affairs most satisfactory to such Indian agents. I by no means mean to say that all Indian agents are dishonest. In truth I know some who are very sincere and honorable men, who try to administer their offices with fidelity to the government; but that the mass of Indian agents on the frontier are true only to their personal and pecuniary interests, I am very sure no one familiar with the subject will dispute.

I repeat, then, that a condition of peace with Indians is above all things desirable to the military officer stationed in their country; something very like the reverse to the Indian agent.

The transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department would at once eliminate from our Indian system the formidable army of Indian superintendents, agents, sub-agents, special agents, jobbers, contractors, and hangers-on who now infest the frontier States and Territories, and save to the government annually a sum of money which I will not venture to estimate. The army officers detailed to perform duty in their places would receive no compensation in addition to their army pay. Previous to the creation of the Interior Department and the transfer of the Indian Bureau to that department, army officers performed well and honestly the duties of Indian agents, and it is only necessary to refer to our past history to demonstrate that our relations at that time with the Indians were far more friendly and satisfactory than they have been since.

In conclusion, it is hardly necessary to repeat that no business was ever successfully conducted where there was a joint jurisdiction and a divided responsibility; nor can harmony under such circumstances ever be looked for, so long as human nature remains what it is. The military are absolutely necessary in the Indian country to protect the lives and property of our citizens. Indian agents and superintendents are not necessary, since their duties have been and can still be faithfully and efficiently performed by the army officers stationed with the troops. Harmonious and concerted action can never be secured while both parties are retained.

The military are necessary—the civil officers are not; and, as it is essential that the one or the other be displaced, I cannot see what doubt can exist as to which party must give way.

These are only the general reasons for the retransfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department—reasons which are well understood by every one familiar with the subject. Many others equally valid, much more in detail, might be given, but perhaps those already set forth, and which command the general concurrence of everybody concerned, would seem to be sufficient.

Concerning the general policy to be pursued toward the Indian tribes, their restriction to reservations, the locations of such reservations and their management, together with the regulation of trade with them, I have so fully set forth my views in various communications to the Secretary of War and to yourself, which have from time to time been published by Congress, that I do not deem it necessary to repeat them here. In order that any policy whatever may be consistently and efficiently pursued, a change in our present administration of Indian affairs is absolutely essential. The retransfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department is believed to be the first step toward a reformation, and until that step is taken it is useless to expect any improvement in the present condition of our Indian relations.

A reference to my communications on this subject for the past twelve months will exhibit the fact that I have repeatedly warned the government that the Indian war now upon us was inevitable, and that no reliance whatever could be placed upon treaties of peace such as had been negotiated. The peace commis-
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

Commissioners promise the Indian, in the first place, that the whites shall not go into the Indian country, knowing well that it is impossible to fulfill such a promise. This is the first and most persistent demand of the Indian, a demand readily conceded but never executed. Other provisions are inserted in the treaty equally certain to remain unfulfilled. The Indian has lost all confidence in such promises, and only makes a treaty to secure the money and supplies which accompany it. In this unscrupulous manner treaties are made and violated on both sides, and in this manner they will continue to be made unless some change in our Indian system is effected.

While the policy of the government toward the Indian tribes is humane and liberal, so far as legal enactments are concerned, the mode of administering that policy has not only frustrated all the kind and benevolent intentions of the government, but has absolutely worked wrong and injustice, both to whites and Indians, which could not have occurred had there been no laws whatever on the subject.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Brevet Major General U. S. Army.

General U. S. GRANT,

General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.

Official:

E. S. PARKER,

Colonel and A. D. C.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War, with the request that these copies be sent to the military committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and the Hon. Secretary of the Interior.

U. S. GRANT, General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 27, 1867.

Letter from the Secretary of War, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, relative to the issue of a large number of arms to the Kiowas and other Indians.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, February 1, 1867.

Sir: I transmit herewith, for the information of the military committee, a communication from Major H. Douglass, third infantry, commanding at Fort Dodge, Kansas, dated January 13, 1867, in relation to the issue of large numbers of arms with ammunition to the Kiowas and other Indians, and expressing his apprehension of serious Indian hostilities in consequence thereof.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

Hon. R. C. SCHENCK,

Chairman Military Committee.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS,

January 13, 1867.

General: I consider it my duty to report what I have observed with reference to Indian affairs in this country, so that such representations may be made to the Department of the Interior by the commanding general of division, which may think proper; also other items of information which may be useful.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

The issue and sale of arms and ammunition—such as breech-loading carbines and revolvers, powder and lead, (loose and in cartridges,) and percussion caps—continues without intermission. The issue of revolvers and ammunition is made by Indian agents, as being authorized by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the sale of them in the greatest abundance is made by traders. Butterfield, an Indian trader, formerly of the overland express, has the largest investment in Indian goods of all traders. He has sold several cases of arms to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. Charley Rath, a trader, who lives at Zarah, has armed several bands of Kiowas with revolvers, and has completely overstocked them with powder.

Between the authorized issue of agents and the sales of the traders, the Indians were never better armed than at the present time. Several hundred Indians have visited this post, all of whom had revolvers in their possession. A large majority had two revolvers, and many of them three.

The Indians openly boast that they have plenty of arms and ammunition, in case of trouble in the spring.

The Interior Department does not seem to appreciate the danger of thus arming these Indians. The evil of presenting a revolver to each of the chiefs of bands would hardly be appreciable, but when the whole rank and file are thus armed, it not only gives them greater courage to murder and plunder, but renders them formidable enemies.

The agents have no real control over the traders; in fact, they are accused by many, both Indians and white men, of being in league with them, and of drawing a large profit from the trade. Should such be the case, (and I think it highly probable,) it is a natural consequence that the agent does not wish to control the trader.

The anxiety of Indians at the present time to obtain arms and ammunition is a great temptation to the trader. For a revolver an Indian will give ten, even twenty times its value, in horses and furs; powder and lead are sold to them at almost the same rate, and as the bulk is small, large quantities can be transported at comparatively little expense. This anxiety cannot be caused by a lack of such articles, because they have plenty to last for some time, but everything tends to show that the Indians are laying in large supplies, preparatory to an outbreak. When the outbreak occurs, we will see too late that we have provided our enemies with the means of our destruction.

A great deal of dissatisfaction seems to have been created among the Indians by the unequal distribution of presents.

The Kiowas complain bitterly of Colonel Leavenworth, their agent, stationed at Port Zarah. Kicking Bird, a chief of the Kiowas, states that only a few small bands of Kiowas got any presents, the balance last year got nothing; that it had been represented to Colonel Leavenworth that most of the bands were bad in their hearts, and would not go in to get their presents; that he, Kicking Bird, sent runners to tell Colonel Leavenworth that his stock was poor, and he could not move in there, but he would in the spring, if the agent would keep his share of the goods, but Colonel Leavenworth would not listen, and either gave all the goods to the bands then in, or sold them to other Indians, and told them they would get no goods that year.

How much of this is true I know not, but from all I can learn there seems to be at least some foundation for the story. Bad management, bad faith, and injustice are sure to produce the worst results. Kicking Bird says that all bad feeling in his tribe is owing to the injustice of their agent; that it required all his influence to prevent an outbreak, and he is afraid that they will commence hostilities in the spring.

The Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and a large band of Sioux, under the leadership of Big Bear, are now en route for the purpose of crossing the Arkansas into the Kiowa country. They move ostensibly to graze and hunt buffalo. A portion
of the Arapahoes, under the general leadership of Little Raven, crossed the river about four miles below this post.

The Sioux and Cheyennes are encamped about 160 miles north of this post on the Republican, and are said to be hostile. They are to cross about seven miles below here. They are all well mounted and well armed with carbines and revolvers, and supplied with plenty of ammunition.

Kicking Bird says the Sioux and Cheyennes asked his permission to cross the river, and that he refused it for fear of trouble, but that his men wish to cross, and he believes that they will all cross the river, and that in the spring when the grass comes up, there will be war. He had been treated kindly at Fort Dodge, or he would not tell us so, but we must look out for our lives, and for our stock in the spring. He says, as they talk now, all the tribes north and south of the Arkansas will be in the outbreak, his own tribe among them.

He also states that Satante, or "White Bear," a principal chief of the Kiowas, is always talking of war; that they have already had a council at the Kiowa camp, in which the Cheyennes, Sioux, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches were represented, and it was agreed that as soon as the grass was old enough they would commence war; that he (Kicking Bird) had been kindly treated at Fort Dodge, and he wished to put us on our guard; that before spring the Indians might change their minds, but at present their intention was war. He said he would be backwards and forwards frequently to give us the news.

The chief (Kicking Bird) is known to General Sherman, who talked with him last fall, and is believed at this post to be the most reliable of all the Indians.

I would respectfully state that it is my purpose to keep the district and department informed of all movements of Indians in large bodies, as far as it is possible.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLASS,
Major Third Infantry, Commanding Post.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Division of Missouri.

[Indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 22, 1867.

Respectfully forwarded to headquarters military division of the Missouri. This communication should have been sent through the district commander, but on account of its importance I forward it at once, in connection with the sale of arms to Indians and other matters. I have furnished the district commander (upper Kansas) with a copy of it.

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

It may be well to state (although it is probably well known to the Lieutenant General) that Kicking Bird was one of the chiefs who killed Box and captured the Box family last summer, as stated to me by the elder daughter.

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, January 25, 1867.

Respectfully forwarded to headquarters armies of the United States, with request that it be laid before the Committee on Indian Affairs.

I know Kicking Bird very well; he is intelligent, and I consider full faith can be given to his statements.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., January 30, 1867.

Respectfully submitted to General Grant, commanding army of the United States.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Respectfully returned, with request that this communication be laid before the military committees of Congress.

By command of General Grant:

E. S. PARKER,
Colonel and Aide-de-camp.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
January 31, 1867.

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., February 18, 1867.

GENTLEMEN: The President of the United States having appointed you special commissioners to visit the Indian country in the neighborhood of Fort Phil. Kearney, for the purpose of ascertaining all the facts, in an authentic shape, that led to the unfortunate affair at or near said fort, resulting in the death of several officers and soldiers of the army, on the 21st of December last, it becomes proper that this department should give you such instructions as are deemed necessary to carry out the object aimed to be accomplished by the President, and also to give you all the information in possession of the Indian Bureau as to the temper and disposition of the different tribes occupying the country you are expected to visit.

It is well to inform you that the great object aimed to be accomplished, in sending you on this mission, is to prevent, if possible, a general Indian war. To accomplish this main object of your mission, it will be necessary for you to ascertain, first, if any of the tribes or bands of Indians occupying the country, say in a circuit of two hundred and fifty to three hundred miles or more around Fort Laramie, are friendly; and secondly, what tribe or band was engaged in the affair at said Fort Phil. Kearney. It has been reported to the Indian office that the Indians who were engaged in this affair were at the time on a friendly visit to the fort. This report is not known to be true; you will, consequently, inquire into its truthfulness. It has also been reported that the great cause of dissatisfaction among the Indians of that section of the country generally grows out of an order, dated 31st July last, issued by General Crook, at Omaha, in relation to arms and ammunition. There being great diversity of opinion between the Indian Bureau and the military, as to the policy of furnishing arms and ammunition to Indians when friendly, you are particularly requested to investigate the question, and report the result of that investigation to this department.

From information obtained from sources believed to be reliable, the Indian Bureau is informed that large numbers of the Sioux Indians are friendly. This portion is led by Spotted Tail, Swift Bear, One that Walks under the Ground, and several other chiefs and headmen; and they are to be found south of the Platte, on the Republican fork, having gone there to avoid being classed with the hostile bands in the Powder River country.
It is also reported that Iron Shell and his band are in the Sand Hills, north of the Platte, and has gone there to avoid being included with the hostile band in the said country of the Powder river. It will, therefore, be your particular duty to ascertain how this is, so as to separate the friendly tribes. That Red Cloud and his band and his adherents may deserve chastisement is more than probable.

I hand you a copy of a report made to the two houses of Congress, in response to resolutions passed by each house. This report will put you in full possession of the views of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. These views I fully indorse, and earnestly recommend them to your consideration. I believe if they are faithfully carried out by the government, and if the military department will faithfully co-operate with this department in doing so, which I have no reason whatever to doubt it will do, our Indian troubles will in a great measure disappear.

It is not intended that you should make any treaties with any Indian tribe. You will, nevertheless, hold friendly talks with them, and ascertain if any tribe or tribes, or any portion of a tribe or tribes, are disposed to go on to reservations; and if so, the number willing to do so. You will also ascertain, from the best information within your reach, where a reservation for the Indians now roaming on the headwaters of the Yellowstone and the Powder River and Tongue River country, as well as the Indians roaming around Fort Laramie, can be provided for, adapted to their condition, and where in time they could be made self-sustaining by raising stock, and gradually become an agricultural people. This department is informed that several of the leading chiefs among the Sioux are willing to go on reservations.

The Sioux, divided into various bands, is the leading Indian tribe of that section of country, and if it were possible to get them on a reservation (which should be large) it would at once clear that section of country of the most powerful tribe which now occupies it. See what can be done to effect this object.

In selecting the section of country for the reservation, be careful that it is adapted to the object which it is intended to meet, viz: that it has soil, water and timber, and adapted to stock-raising.

Instructions will be given by the President to the various military commanders to afford you all the aid and assistance in their power, to facilitate and make successful your mission. They will be instructed to afford you all escorts and protection you may require, and extend every facility in their power.

You are directed to meet at Omaha on the 23d instant, and proceed on to Fort Laramie as soon as possible. It is very probable that you will not be required to go beyond Fort Laramie; but if you cannot accomplish the object of your mission without going to Fort Phil. Kearney, you will of course go on there.

It is intended, after this full explanation of the object contemplated in sending you on this mission, to give you great discretion and latitude to carry out this object, trusting to your good judgment and discretion. If in your power, you will, as you progress, keep this department fully advised of your doings, and of the temper and disposition of the Indians.

It may be necessary for you to make presents to Indians with whom you hold friendly talks, and also to give them rations. In this case you will buy such presents and obtain such rations from parties having them for sale in the Indian country, giving proper vouchers for the same, which will be paid here. These presents will necessarily be limited in amount.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. BROWNING, Secretary.

General ALFRED SULLY,  Colonel E. S. PARKER,
General J. B. SANDORN,  Judge J. F. KINNEY,
General N. B. BUFORD,  Mr. G. P. BEAUVAIS.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 6, 1867.

SIR: I have just returned from Fort Laramie, where I have been as special commissioner of Indian affairs. On arriving here I made a verbal report to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and by his written request called on you yesterday, in the afternoon, to repeat to you the statements I had just made to him. You at once desired that my communication to you should be in writing, which I now have the honor to submit.

The special commission consisted of six persons, of whom two were selected by the General commanding the army and four by the Secretary of the Interior. Our instructions were to inquire into the causes which led to the Phil. Kearney massacre, on the 21st of December last, and to prevent, if possible, a general Indian war. We were specially charged with separating, as far as practicable, the friendly from the hostile Indians.

The commission assembled at Omaha, and commenced taking testimony on the 4th day of March. From the documents furnished us, and personal testimony, we learned that the government had held a treaty, in June, 1866, at Fort Laramie, with the chiefs of the tribes of the Sioux who were in possession of the hunting grounds along the new route of travel from Fort Laramie to Virginia City, in Montana, called "Bozeman's route," which is along the base of the Big Horn mountains, to the valley of the Yellowstone river. During the progress of the attempts to make the treaty conceding the right to open this road and establish military posts on it, the principal and acknowledged chiefs, Red Cloud, The Man Afraid of his Horses, Iron Shell, and others, with the principal warriors of the tribes called The Bad Faces, who are Ogallallas, Brules, and Northern Cheyennes, utterly refused to agree to the occupation of their territory, which they represented as their last, best hunting grounds, refused to receive the presents offered by the commissioners, refused to sign the treaty, and left the council, avowing that the occupation of their country by the white man invariably led to the entire driving off or destruction of their game, which would lead to their becoming dependent paupers, or death, and they preferred the latter alternative, and would seek it bravely fighting for their rights. Notwithstanding this defection, the commissioners made and commissioned as chiefs, as it were by letters patent, Spotted Tail, a brave warrior, Swift Bear, a friend of the whites, whose humanity is his marked trait of character, with others, as chiefs of the Brules; The Man who Strikes Twice, The Man who Walks under the Ground, and others, Ogallallas; Big Mouth, Blue Nose, and others, of the mixed tribe of Sioux who for many years have lived near Fort Laramie, and now known as the "Laramie Loafers," and induced them with presents and promises of annuity for twenty-five years to sign a treaty giving the right of way over the new route.

As it was then unsafe for these chiefs and their followers, numbering about 2,500, to return north, they were induced to move to the south of the Platte, where they all wintered, except the "Laramie Loafers," numbering about 600, who have continued to live, and grow more and more demoralized, near the fort, sustained by the rations issued to them.

This treaty has never been ratified, but by military orders from the department of the Missouri, dated March 10, 1866, the new route has been occupied by troops, and Forts Reno, Phil. Kearney, and C. F. Smith have since been established upon it and garrisoned. Trains with merchandise and emigrants to Montana have passed over it. The first atrocity reported to us was the wanton shooting of a lone squaw by an emigrant or teamster, which was avenged by a large party of Indians surrounding the train and demanding the murderer, whom they compelled to be delivered to them, and whom they tortured and slew.

Colonel H. B. Carrington, the first commander of the mountain district, and
who established Fort Phil. Kearney, July 15, 1866, testified before us that in his first march he was met with hostile demonstrations, and reported the fact to his superiors. His fatigue parties were attacked every week, the contractors for hay had their stock driven off, and the hostilities for the season culminated on the 21st of December, when Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, sent out with a party of eighty-one men to protect the wood train, which had been attacked, was decoyed on to a distance of three and a half miles, where he was surrounded by more than 1,000 Indians, and all his party killed and mutilated. This was horrible. But was the invasion justifiable? Was it in accordance with the laws and established customs of our intercourse with the aborigines? Have they been treated as dependent nations? Have not their rights been defined by the solemn decisions of the Supreme Court?

At Omaha we caused messengers to be sent to the camps of the Ogallallas and Brulés, who had wintered on the Republican, where they had had successful buffalo hunts, to meet us at Fort McPherson, to which place we proceeded on the 19th of March. The snows were so deep that we got no replies from our messengers until the 1st of April, which were that the Indians were unwilling to meet us at a military post. We sent a new messenger, an interpreter, who induced them to meet us at Beauvais's ranch, on the 19th of April, to the number of 180 persons, of whom about 80 were warriors, led by Spotted Tail, Swift Bear, and The Man who Strikes Twice. Our council was entirely satisfactory. We distributed goods and provisions costing $4,000 among them; we delivered the whole to them on the prairie, and witnessed their equitable division to all who were present, which they did with an order, an accuracy, and a method in the highest degree creditable to them. We assigned them for the present, for their hunting grounds, all the country south of the Platte and north of the Smoky Hill route, bounded by the longitudinal lines passing the mouths of Plum and Lodge Pole creeks; appointed them two interpreters to reside with them and be their organs of communication with the commanders of the military posts; and as we knew that General Hancock was marching against the Cheyennes to the south of us, and on this very reservation, we provided that if the Cheyennes and our troops became engaged in war, they should go north of the Platte, and, by the agency of their interpreters, be supplied with rations until they could safely return to their hunting grounds. The emergency soon happened, and all the Indians with whose chiefs and warriors we had been in council faithfully separated themselves from the hostile bands, crossing the north side of the Platte on the 6th of May. This party consisted of 2,500 Indians, and have thus been kept from the war path.

On the 20th of April we had a meeting with 20 Brulés from the Black Hills, belonging to Iron Shell's band, one of whom had been in the battle of Fort Phil. Kearney. They informed us that rumors had been spread all over their country that the whites were making war upon the Indians south of the Platte; that many small war parties had been sent out to get information; that if war existed, they were commanded to steal horses and return. If the reports were not true, to go on and hold communication with Swift Bear, (one of the party was his brother,) and then return. These Indians were manly and truthful. They gave full details of the battle, and the conditions and feelings of their tribes, which we have since verified. The attack upon the Phil. Kearney party was planned for three months. All the confederated tribes had delegates. It was matured with their religious ceremonies and auguries. Their prophets foretold they would succeed and kill one hundred. The time of the new moon was fixed for the onslaught. It was designed, when the garrison was weakened by the absence of the wood party, the supporting party, and the reserves, who would be likely to follow, to seize the fort. In the battle, they lost three of their bravest captains, and no effort was made on the fort.

A short time previous to this meeting we had learned that 119 head of males
had been stampeded and driven off by a party of Indians in sight of Fort Mitchell, and sixteen of them recovered. This party had met that one, and gave the exact details, which were verified by us afterwards as true. The attacking party were only six Indians.

We sent two of this party back to Iron Shell, inviting him and his people to meet us at Fort Laramie, and the remainder went south to join Spotted Tail, and have continued with him since.

We arrived at Fort Laramie on the 4th of May, and held a council with the “Loafers” on the 6th. The Indian agent, Colonel M. T. Patrick, represented the entire number, including children, for whom he was drawing rations, at 605. The entire number of men was under seventy. The half-breed children exceeding one hundred in number.

The inferiority and demoralization of this party were painfully evident. We invited them to join their friends near the Platte, where they could kill game, and when necessary the government could feed them. They evinced a great indisposition to leaving, and when informed that the government would no longer supply them with rations unless they complied with our request, they exhibited no self reliance.

A few days later, we met twelve delegates from the tribes about the Black Hills, to the northeast, who returned with the messengers we had caused to be sent them. They said three of the chief instigators of the war feeling had been killed at Phil. Kearney, on the 21st of December; that Red Cloud was not in that battle; that he was now dissatisfied, and had left his tribe and gone to live with the Minneconjou. That the chief authority was now in the hands of four chiefs: “The Man who Carries a Sword,” “White Man’s Home,” “Good Thunder,” and “The Man Afraid of his Horses;” that they were meeting to decide whether they would meet us, and live at peace, or go to war; that but for the war south of the Platte, the peace party would predominate. We sent them back with messages, desiring all who were for peace to meet us at Fort Laramie, and as they usually fix the time of the full moon for their most important acts and ceremonials, we conjectured they would meet us before the 16th of this month.

With the approbation of the Secretary of the Interior, the commission was divided. Judge Kinney went to Phil. Kearney, to meet the Crows, who have always been friendly, and prevent them from forming an alliance with the hostile Sioux. Generals Sully and Parker have gone up the Missouri river, as far as Fort Buford, to assure the tribes of protection and justice from the United States, if they remain peaceable; and General Sanborn, Mr. Beauvais, and myself, remained at Fort Laramie to meet the chiefs we had sent for.

Two of us, General Sanborn and myself, were of the opinion that we should have made our joint report up to May the 10th, on which day the commission separated. We had long before finished taking testimony as to the massacre, and had succeeded in separating the friendly from the hostile Indians. We had written out our report, and agreed upon it, but could not induce Generals Sully and Parker, and Judge Kinney, to give the matter their attention.

Mr. Beauvais, in the main, agreed with us. We are of the opinion that there is no necessity for an Indian war. The aggressions that have been made since the massacre have not been of such moment as to require the invasion of a great army. For four months we have read, almost daily, the greatest exaggerations of the press. We have seen the glaring falsehoods of the massacre of Fort Buford and the burning of the steamer Miner reiterated all over the country. We have found the whole population who live on the routes of travel and transportation to the gold-producing territories spreading false reports and calling on the government to make war on the Indians.

The extension of the Union Pacific railroad is depriving all the ranch men of their previous custom and profits. The business of all the freighters, contract-
ors for army supplies, and speculators, is falling off. Nine-tenths of all the business that is being done on the route is paid for by the government. Wood has been contracted for at Fort Sedgwick for two months last winter at $85 per cord, and was paid for in the month of May at $65 per cord. Cotton has been contracted for at Fort Sedgwick for two months last winter at $3 per cord, and was paid for in the month of May at $65 per cord. On the Cache la Poudre at 50 cents per bushel, but are worth 84 per bushel at Fort Laramie. The Union Pacific railroad gets two cents per ton for its freight from Omaha to North Platte, 290 miles, and ten cents per mile for passengers, and at least two-thirds of its entire business is for carrying troops and army supplies. Its employés are all for war. For two years I have been acquainted with the business of the plains on the route to Colorado, during which time not one stage passenger has lost his life.

We, the three commissioners who were left at Fort Laramie, believe that, but for General Hancock's expedition, we would have secured peace with all tribes to whom we were sent. These being our views, and being debared from making a joint report, on the 21st of May my two colleagues joined in a written request that I should return to this city and communicate verbally to the Secretary of the Interior our joint opinion.

When we come to make up our joint report, we will recommend that all territory north of the State of Nebraska, and west and south of the Missouri, as far as the mouth of the Muscle Shell river, containing about 80,000 square miles, be set off as an exclusive Indian territory, in which there shall be no military posts, and no white persons except agents, teachers, and duly licensed traders, in which shall be gradually collected all the Indians north of the Platte and east of the Rocky mountains. Corn is grown successfully in the Missouri river bottom as far north as the mouth of the Yellowstone, and the reservation for each tribe or band may have ample boundaries on the river, where they may be taught agriculture and the arts of civilized life. The navigation of the river and the reservations for the military and trading posts along its borders should be reserved. No military posts should be within Indian territory. There is now an exclusive Indian territory south of Kansas containing many civilized Indians, and sufficiently large to contain all who are south of the Platte and east of the Rocky mountains. Those on the north should have like advantages. The sterile plains produce nothing but grass and wild game. The trade in furs and buffalo robes is of more value than all the products of the white man in the limbless regions.

The new route to Montana by Fort Phil. Kearney is unnecessary. All the supplies and emigration now going there is up the Missouri to Fort Benton, or by the southern or former route. When the Union Pacific railroad extends to the base of the Rocky mountains, which will be very soon, there can be no public good obtained by garrisoning Fort Laramie or the posts north of it.

Unless it is judged necessary to retaliate on the Indians for the barbaries and massacre at Fort Phil. Kearney, no war is necessary north of the Platte. Peace can be obtained by a more humane and cheaper means, than by an invading army, who never can bring the Indians to battle unless by celerity of march they can surprise the women and children in their villages.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

N. B. BUFORD,
Special Commissioner.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

B.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1867.

Sir: The undersigned, special commissioner appointed and commissioned by the President of the United States, "to visit the Indians in the neighborhood
of Fort Philip Kearney, and to counsel with them, under instructions from the Secretary of the Interior," begs leave to submit the following report:

The commission has examined many witnesses and made searching inquiry to ascertain what the disposition and conduct of those Indians who occupied the country for two hundred miles or more about Fort Phil. Kearney was, immediately after concluding the treaty of Laramie, in July, A. D. 1866, and what it has since been, and what causes and circumstances led to this disposition and conduct, and to the horrible massacre of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman's party, December 21, 1866, and what action is required on the part of the government to secure and preserve peace with the Indians of the northwest, save them from ruin and annihilation, and ultimately lead them to adopt so far the habits and customs of civilized life as to enable them to procure their subsistence and shelter without roaming over the country and without the buffalo, which has been their sole dependence for these comforts for all past generations, and which are now about to disappear from their lands.

Disposition and conduct of the Indians about Fort Philip Kearney and the causes of the same.

The main object sought to be secured by the treaty of Laramie of July, A. D. 1866, was the opening of a new route to Montana from Fort Laramie, via Bridger's Ferry and the headwaters of the Powder, Tongue, and Big Horn rivers. This country was occupied by the Ogallalla and Minneconjou bands of Sioux Indians and the northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe tribes and the mountain Crows.

The region through which the road was to pass and does pass is the most attractive and valuable to Indians. It abounds with game, flocks of mountain sheep, droves of elk and deer, and herds of buffalo range through and live in this country; and the Indians with propriety called it their last best hunting grounds. All these Indians were reluctant to allow the proposed road to pass through these hunting grounds, but all would reluctantly assent to this, for so liberal an equivalent as the government was ready to give. The Indians were required further to stipulate that the government should have the right to establish one or more military posts on this road in their country. All the Indians occupying it refused thus to stipulate, and through the chiefs, headmen, and soldiers protested against the establishment of any military post on their hunting grounds along that road north of Fort Reno.

While negotiations were going on with Red Cloud and their leading chiefs to induce them to yield to the government the right to peaceably establish these military posts, which right they persistently refused to yield, saying that it was asking too much of their people, asking all they had, for it would drive away all the game, Colonel H. B. Carrington, eighteenth United States infantry, with about seven hundred officers and men, arrived at Laramie en route to their country to establish and occupy military posts along the Montana road, pursuant to General Orders No. 33, Headquarters Department of the Missouri, March 10, 1866, Major General Pope, commanding. The destination and purpose of Colonel Carrington and his command were communicated to their chiefs. They seemed to construe this as a determination on the part of the government to occupy their country by military posts, even without their consent, or that of their people, and as soon as practicable withdrew from the council with their adherents, refusing to accept any presents from the commission, returned to their country, and with a strong force of warriors commenced a vigorous and relentless war against all whites who came into it, both citizens and soldiers.

Quite a large number of Indians, who did not occupy the country along this road, were anxious to make a treaty and remain at peace. Some of this class had for a long time resided near Fort Laramie. Others, Brulés, occupied the White Earth River valley, and the Sand Hills south of that river.
The commissioners created and appointed several of the leading warriors of these Indians, viz.: Big Mouth, Spotted Tail, Swift Bear, and Two Strikes. A portion of these Indians have remained near Fort Laramie, and a portion of them on the Republican fork of the Kansas river, and have strictly complied with their treaty stipulations.

The number of Sioux Indians who considered themselves bound by the treaty and have remained at peace is about two thousand, while the Minneconjou and a portion of the Ogallalla and Brulé bands, the northern Cheyennes and Apahoes, with a few Sans Arce, numbering in the aggregate about six hundred lodges, remained in their old country and went to war under the auspices of their old chiefs.

We therefore report that all the Sioux Indians occupying the country about Fort Phil. Kearney have been in a state of war against the whites since the 20th day of June, A.D. 1866, and that they have waged and carried on this war for the purpose of defending their ancient possessions and the possessions acquired by them from the Crow Indians by conquest after bloody wars, from invasion and occupation by the whites.

This war has been carried on by the Indians with most extraordinary vigor and unwonted success. During the time from July 26, the day on which Lieutenant Wand's train was attacked, to the 21st day of December, on which Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, with his command of eighty officers and men was overpowered and massacred, they killed ninety-one enlisted men and five officers of our army, and killed fifty-eight citizens and wounded twenty more, and captured and drove away three hundred and six oxen and cows, three hundred and four mules, and one hundred and sixty-one horses. During this time they appeared in front of Fort Phil. Kearney, making hostile demonstrations and committing hostile acts fifty-one different times, and attacked nearly every train and person that attempted to pass over the Montana road.

Massacre of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman's party, and the causes which led to it.

General Orders No. 33, Headquarters Department of the Missouri, dated March 10, 1866, directed that two new military posts should be established on this new route to Montana. One “near the base of the Big Horn mountain,” the other “on or near the Upper Yellowstone,” and designated the second battalion of the eighteenth infantry to garrison the three posts on this route, and created the mountain district, department of the Platte, and directed the colonel of the regiment (Colonel H. B. Carrington,) to take post at Fort Reno and command the district, which included all the troops and garrisons on this route.

General Orders No. 7, Headquarters Department of the Platte, June 23, 1866, directed that the second battalion eighteenth infantry should take post as follows: Two companies at Fort Reno, on Powder river, two companies about eighty miles nearly south of Reno, on the waters of Powder or Tongue river, which post should be known as Fort Philip Kearney, and two companies at the crossing of the Big Horn river on the same road, and about seventy miles beyond Fort Philip Kearney, to be known as Fort C. F. Smith, and directed that the colonel of the regiment should take post at Fort Philip Kearney and command the “mountain district.”

The orders above referred to were issued with the express understanding, apparently, that this road to Montana was to be opened through the Indian country by compact or treaty with the Indians occupying it, and not by conquest and the exercise of arbitrary power on the part of the government. Hence Colonel Carrington’s instructions looked mainly to the duty of selecting and building the two new forts, Philip Kearney and C. F. Smith, and the command assigned was only sufficient for this purpose and properly garrisoning the posts. This com-
mand numbered in all about seven hundred men, five hundred of whom were new recruits, and twelve officers, including district commander and staff. The commanding officer, Colonel Carrington, could not and did not fail to see at once that although his command was entirely sufficient to erect the new forts, build the barracks, warehouses and stables, and make preparations for winter, and properly garrison his posts, and could protect emigration from the small thieving parties of Indians, it was still entirely inadequate to carry on systematic and aggressive war against a most powerful tribe of Indians fighting to maintain possession and control of their own country, in addition to those other duties. This officer carried the orders above referred to into effect with promptness and zeal, organizing the mountain district, June 28, 1866, establishing Fort Philip Kearney on the 15th of July, and Fort C. F. Smith on the 3d day of August, and as early as the 31st day of July informed General P. St. George Cooke, the department commander, that the status of Indians in that country was one of war, and requested reinforcements sent to him, and two days previously had telegraphed the Adjutant General of the army for Indian auxiliaries, and additional—force of his own regiment.

On the 9th of August General Cooke, commanding department of the Platte, informed Colonel Carrington that Lieutenant General Sherman ordered the posts in his, Colonel Carrington's, district supported as much as possible, and announced a regiment coming from St. Louis.

No auxiliaries were assigned and no re-enforcements came until November, when company C, second United States cavalry, reached Fort Kearney, sixty strong, armed with Springfield rifles and Star carbines. In December about ninety recruits joined the battalion in the mountain district, a portion of whom were assigned to a company stationed at Fort Phil. Kearney. No other re-enforcements were sent to the district. Approved requisitions for ammunition were not answered. The command at Fort C. F. Smith was reduced to ten rounds per man; the command at Fort Phil. Kearney to forty-five rounds per man, and the command at Fort Reno to thirty rounds per man. Recruits could not practice any in firing. Little time could be allowed from fatigue duty for drill, and with but twelve officers and three posts little could have been done in drilling recruits, if time could have been allowed.

The result of all this was, that the troops were in no condition to fight successful battles with Indians or other foes, and this from no fault of Colonel Carrington, and I am astonished at the zeal with which they fought and the damage they inflicted December 21.

The numerous demonstrations and attacks made by Indians prior to the sixth of December seemed to have been made for the sole purpose of capturing stock, picket posts, and small parties of soldiers who might venture beyond the cover of the garrison, and of annoying and checking the wood train constantly drawing material for the new forts.

On the morning of December 6, the wood train was attacked, a common occurrence, about two miles from the fort, and forced to corral and defend itself. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, with a command of seventeen mounted infantry and thirty-five cavalry, moved out to relieve the wood train and drive off the Indians, and Colonel Carrington, with twenty-five mounted infantry, moved out for the purpose of cutting off the Indians from retreat, and destroying them. On this day, at a point on Peno creek, about five miles from the fort, the Indians, the second time after the fort was established, made a stand and strong resistance, and nearly surrounded Colonel Fetterman's party. The infantry obeyed orders and behaved well. The cavalry, with the exception of ten enlisted men, disobeyed the orders of Colonel Fetterman and fled with great precipitancy from this portion of the field. As the cavalry retreated, the Indians made a great display and every effort to create a panic with the infantry, but Colonel Fetterman, Lieutenant Wands, and Lieutenant Brown succeeded
in keeping this small body of infantry cool, and by reserving their fire for proper range, rescued it from annihilation, and made a junction with Colonel Carrington’s party, on the east side of Peno creek. Lieutenant Bingham, after leaving Colonel Fetterman’s party, with Lieutenant Grummond, a sergeant from Colonel Carrington’s command, and two men from his own, without the knowledge or orders of any of his superiors, pursued into an ambuscade, more than two miles from the main party, a single Indian who was on foot just in front of their horses, and Lieutenant Bingham and the sergeant were then killed. The results of this day’s fighting, although not of a decidedly successful character to the Indians, were such as naturally to induce the belief on their part that by proper management and effort they could overpower and destroy any force that could be sent out from the fort to fight them, and no doubt at this time resolved to make the effort the first auspicious day, and postponing their proceedings from the new to the full moon. In the mean time everything was quiet about the fort, although they often appeared on the surrounding hills.

On the morning of December 21st the picket at the signal station signalled to the fort that the wood train was attacked by Indians, and corralled, and the escort fighting. This was not far from eleven o’clock a.m., and the train was about two miles from the fort and moving towards the timber. Almost immediately a few Indian pickets appeared on one or two of the surrounding heights, and a party of about twenty near the Big Piney, where the Montana road crosses the same, within bowitzer range of the fort. Shells were thrown among them from the artillery in the fort and they fled.

The following detail, viz., fifty men and two officers from the four different infantry companies, and twenty-six cavalrymen and one officer, was made by Colonel Carrington. The entire force formed in good order and was placed under command of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, who received the following orders from Colonel Carrington: “Support the wood train, relieve it, and report to me. Do not engage or pursue Indians at its expense; under no circumstances pursue over Lodge Trail Ridge.” These instructions were repeated by Colonel Carrington, in a loud voice, to the command when in motion, and outside the fort, and again delivered in substance through Lieutenant Wands, officer of the day, to Lieutenant Grummond, commanding cavalry detachment, who was requested to communicate them again to Colonel Fetterman.

Colonel Fetterman moved out rapidly to the right of the wood road, for the purpose, no doubt, of cutting off the retreat of the Indians, then attacking the train. As he advanced across the Piney, a few Indians appeared in his front and on his flanks, and continued fitting about him, beyond rifle range, till he disappeared beyond Lodge Trail Ridge. When he was on Lodge Trail Ridge, the picket signalled the fort that the Indians had retreated from the train; the train had broken corral and moved on towards the timber.

The train made the round trip and was not again disturbed that day.

At about fifteen minutes before twelve o’clock Colonel Fetterman’s command had reached the crest of Lodge Trail Ridge, was deployed as skirmishers, and at a halt. Without regard to orders, for reasons that the silence of Colonel Fetterman now prevents us from giving, he, with the command, in a few moments disappeared, having cleared the ridge, still moving north. Firing at once commenced, and increased in rapidity till, in about fifteen minutes and twelve o’clock m., it was a continuous and rapid fire of musketry, plainly audible at the fort. Assistant Surgeon Hines, having been ordered to join Fetterman, found Indians on a part of Lodge Trail Ridge not visible from the fort, and could not reach the force there struggling to preserve its existence. As soon as the firing became rapid Colonel Carrington ordered Captain Ten Eyck, with about seventy-six men, being all the men for duty in the fort, and two wagons with ammunition, to join Colonel Fetterman immediately. He moved out and advanced rapidly towards the point from which the sound of firing proceeded, but
did not move by so short a route as he might have done. The sound of firing continued to be heard during his advance, diminishing in rapidity and number of shots till he reached a high summit overlooking the battle-field, at about a quarter before one o'clock, when one or two shots closed all sound of conflict.

Whether he could have reached the scene of action by marching over the shortest route and as rapidly as possible in time to have relieved Colonel Fetterman's command, I am unable to determine.

Immediately after Captain Ten Eyck moved out, and by orders of Colonel Carrington issued at the same time as the orders detailing that officer to join Colonel Fetterman, the quartermaster's employés, convalescents, and all others in garrison, were armed and provided with ammunition, and held in readiness to re-enforce the troops fighting, or defend the garrison.

Captain Ten Eyck reported, as soon as he reached a summit commanding a view of the battle-field, that the Peno valley was full of Indians; that he could see nothing of Colonel Fetterman's party, and requested that a howitzer should be sent to him. The howitzer was not sent. The Indians, who at first beckoned him to come down, now commenced retreating, and Captain Ten Eyck advancing to a point where the Indians had been standing in a circle, found the dead naked bodies of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman, Captain Brown, and about sixty-five of the soldiers of their command. At this point there were no indications of a severe struggle. All the bodies lay in a space not exceeding thirty-five feet in diameter. No empty cartridge shells were about, and there were some full cartridges. A few American horses lay dead a short distance off, all with their heads towards the fort. This spot was by the roadside and beyond the summit of a hill rising to the east of Peno creek. The road, after rising this hill, follows this ridge along for about half or three-quarters of a mile, and then descends abruptly to Peno creek. At about half the distance from where these bodies lay to the point where the road commences to descend to Peno creek was the dead body of Lieutenant Grummond, and still further on, at the point where the road commences to descend to Peno creek, were the dead bodies of the three citizens and four or five of the old, long-tried, and experienced soldiers. A great number of empty cartridge shells were on the ground at this point, more than fifty lying on the ground about one of the dead citizens, who used a Henry rifle. Within a few hundred yards in front of this position ten Indian ponies lay dead, and there were sixty-five pools of dark and clotted blood. No Indian ponies or pools of blood were found at any other point. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Indians were massed to resist Colonel Fetterman's advance along Peno creek, on both sides of the road; that Colonel Fetterman formed his advanced lines on the summit of the hill overlooking the creek and valley, with a reserve near where the large number of dead bodies lay; that the Indians, in force of from fifteen to eighteen hundred warriors, attacked him vigorously in this position, and were successfully resisted by him for a half an hour or more; that the command then being short of ammunition, and seized with panic at this event and the great numerical superiority of the Indians, attempted to retreat towards the fort; that the mountaineers and old soldiers, who had learned that a movement from Indians, in an engagement, was equivalent to death, remained in their first position and were killed there; that immediately upon the commencement of the retreat the Indians charged upon and surrounded the party, who could not now be formed by their officers, and were immediately killed. Only six men of the whole command were killed by balls, and two of these, Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman and Captain Brown, no doubt inflicted this death upon themselves, or each other, by their own hands, for both were shot through the left temple, and powder burnt into the skin and flesh about the wound. These officers had also oftentimes asserted that they would not be taken alive by Indians.

In the critical examination we have given this painful and horrible affair, we
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do not find of the immediate participants any officer living deserving of censure, and even if evidence justifies it, it would ill become us to speak evil of or censure those dead who sacrificed life struggling to maintain the authority and power of the government, and add new lustre to our arms and fame.

Of those who have been more remotely connected with the events that led to the massacre, we have endeavored to report so specifically as to enable you and the President, who have much official information that we cannot have, to determine where the censure must fall. The difficulty "in a nutshell" was that the commanding officer of the district was furnished no more troops or supplies for this state of war than had been provided and furnished him for a state of profound peace.

In regions where all was peace, as at Laramie in November, twelve companies were stationed, while in regions where all was war, as at Phil. Kearney, there were only five companies allowed.

The Minneconjou band of Sioux, under the direction of their head chief High Back Bone, originated and organized this expedition and attack against Fort Philip Kearney, with the view and avowed purpose of destroying the fort and its garrison. This band was joined by most of the young warriors of the Brulé, Ogallalla, Sans Arc, and Two Kettle bands of Sioux, and of the northern Arapahoe and Cheyenne tribes.

The Indians sustained a loss of four Minneconjou, three Brulés, three Ogallallas, one Cheyenne, and one Arapahoe, killed on the field, and of about sixty severely wounded, several of whom died, and many of the remaining are permanently maimed. They also lost twelve horses, killed on the field, and fifty-six others so severely wounded that they died within twenty-four hours.

The statements made to us by the chiefs who participated in the affair corroborate the foregoing conclusions to which we have been led by the circumstantial evidence.

Action required by the government to secure and preserve peace with the Indians of the northwest, and induce them to adopt so far the habits and customs of civilization as to enable them to provide their subsistence without roaming, &c.

To secure peace it is necessary for the government to abandon aggressive war; it is believed that the history of Indian wars furnishes no instance where the Indians have asked for mercy, or even for a cessation of hostilities. Hostilities are sometimes abandoned for a time to be renewed at a more convenient season, and sometimes they have repeated that they did not want to fight any more. War between different tribes is rarely terminated, but is carried on by successive generations. Such is the war between the Sioux and Chippewa nations, the Sioux and Pawnees, and others; so in all our wars with them, they continue to fight as long as we fight them. Hence, if the government is not ready and determined to prosecute a war against all the hostile Indians to their extermination, it is much better to abandon aggressive war now, and request the Indians to come in and make peace, than to stop it a year hence, when they have committed ten, twenty, or thirty fold more depredations, and taken the life of many more of our people.

I therefore recommend that all the troops in the Indian country be employed in garrisoning the military posts, protecting the working parties on the railroads and the railroad lines, and the emigration and travel across the plains, and in pursuing, and, if possible, punishing the small thieving parties of Indians that come upon our lines of travel. Commissioners should then be sent to the hostile Indians, and friendly relations be restored. It is believed that sound policy would demand this course under any circumstances; it is certain that it demands it under the present circumstances. For the government, by the law as established by its own Supreme Court, in 5th Peters, 48, is in the wrong in the
case of the Powder River Sioux, for it opened a road through, and established military posts in, the country of these Indians without their consent and against their protest. In the case of the Cheyennes of the Arkansas, a military expedition was sent to them, or to the country in which they had a right to range and hunt, while they were at peace. This military force marched towards their village, which they left; this was burnt by our military officers. These Indians, of course, at once became hostile, and have captured, drawn away, and destroyed a large amount of stock, and killed, up to this date, as stated by General Dodge, M. O., nearly fifty men. It is but natural that they should go to war and continue hostile until the property destroyed is restored to them by the government. It is of the utmost importance that the safety of travel and transportation across the plains should be at once secured; this can only be secured by peace, which will at once follow the course above indicated. There can be no safety to travel and transportation while the Indians are at war. Peace and security to all interests must go together, as well as war and insecurity. If war would be the better policy, with a sufficient force on the plains to protect all our interests and punish the Indians, it cannot now be a good policy, when the military force on the plains is not more than one-fifth as large as it was in the summer of 1865, when very little was accomplished, and at the close of which all the Indians were invited to come in and make peace.

To jeopard and sacrifice the lives of large numbers of our own people for the purpose of carrying on a fruitless war against a few Indians, who can be easily kept at peace, is deemed unwise.

To carry on a successful war against the combined Indians of the plains requires, it is thought by many men of military experience and great judgment, twenty-five thousand men, and it would probably require from five to ten years for this force to conquer a peace. The expense would probably be from three to four hundred millions of dollars. This would be needless, and our treasury at the present time would seem not to be in a condition to justify it, if it can be well avoided.

The nation cannot avoid, if it would, its moral obligations to these people, and its Christian duty to save them from destruction and elevate them from their degraded, barbarous state if possible. These obligations and this duty follow us ever, and we cannot fail to discharge them towards all people with whom we are brought in contact without punishment and evil results to ourselves.

In the case of the Indians this obligation is peculiarly strong and binding. They were the original occupants, and hence original owners, of the soil as long as they chose to occupy it. They have surrendered to us vast tracts of most valuable country for which they have received little or no remuneration. They have carried on trade and commerce with our people in a friendly manner, and for many years have allowed our emigration to pass through their country unmolested. They admit their inferiority to us in all respects, and seem now to have gone to war for the purpose of averting the death and destruction of their race by famine.

It was therefore deemed the better course to invite all in the region of country visited by us to come in. None refused, and all stated that they desired to live at peace with the whites; but they could not see how they were to live, if the whites took and occupied all their game country. They all were willing to settle the present difficulties in a manner that should satisfy the United States.

In each band that has been at war, excepting the Minneconjou, there is a strong peace party, numbering in the Ogalallas and Brulés about two thousand at the present time, who are under several chiefs near the forks of the Platte, and will require supplies of all kinds to be furnished them during the military operations. Properly protected and treated this party will soon become predominant in these two bands. It is, therefore, our opinion that the government
can make peace with all the Indians of the northwest now hostile whennt desires to do so.

The question of maintaining peace and securing the ultimate civilization of the Indians has been much considered and discussed by many wise men, and we approach it with hesitancy and distrust, for it has puzzled the wisdom of statesmen and driven our philanthropists from it in despair.

Is there anything in their natural organization and constitution that precludes them from civilization and existence under the habits and customs of civilized society? If so, placing them upon reservations is, in effect, but confining them in a prison-house to meet a fate from hunger and lingering disease that would with less suffering soon have overtaken them in their natural roaming condition. Seen in their native state, and before they have been brought into contact with civilized men, the Indians have many of the noblest traits. They have great love for fame and glory, contempt for suffering and death, and not one element in their nature that will lead them under any circumstances to submit to any former condition of slavery. They have quite correct and philosophical ideas of government and laws, all have belief in a future state, where the condition will depend upon conduct during earthly existence; they have good powers of thought and reason, and not a few of each tribe have the rare faculty of oratory.

Are there not sufficient traits and elements of character here by proper influence and training to develop into a noble civilized race? If there are not, it is impossible to see where the deficiency consists. They seem to be in no respect inferior to our European ancestors at and previous to the invasion by Caesar; they are savage and nomadic, so were the European races; they are warlike and brave, so were the European races, perhaps, less so; they are superstitious and religious, so were the European races; they are revengeful, and so were the European races; and there seems to be nothing in their nature or condition to preclude them from civilization that might not be found in the nature and disposition of our ancestors, except that our ancestors, when overrun and crushed by the Roman power, submitted to the condition of slavery, whereas this race will all die free rather than live slaves. We, therefore, conclude, when we compare this race with any of those who, from a state of barbarism have risen to civilization, that we find them in no respect inferior, and that there is nothing in the natural organization and condition of the Indians to preclude them from civilization and mental culture, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory and terrible result of a century of efforts to that end on the part of our government.

But if their natural organization and condition does not preclude them from civilization and general development, then we must be pursuing an erroneous policy, or failing to carry a policy sound in itself into effect. For the result has been to drive an independent and lordly race into the condition of dependants and beggars; to convert generous, grateful, and noble spirits into craven, bitter, and degraded souls; to degrade and destroy the man and cultivate the fiend.

The policy adopted towards Indians in the infancy of the republic was the result of much careful thought by our wisest and best statesmen and greatest philanthropists, and without stopping to compare it, and the reasons given for its support and adoption by such men as Washington, Adams, Chief Justice Marshall, and our Supreme Court by a uniform current of authority and decisions for three-quarters of a century, with the policy, opinions, and views of some of our public men and officers, we proceed to the consideration of our Indian policy as established by law and precedent, believing it to be in every way best adapted to the wants and condition of the Indians, and, at the same time, affording the greatest protection to our frontier settlements. It is not so important what policy is adopted and followed as that the government should have some policy. It is strange and anomalous that notwithstanding all the branches of our government, from its infancy until now, have dealt most liber-
ally with those members and nations of this race with whom they have come in contact, the result has been disastrous and must involve ruin.

What are the causes of this, and what remedies are proposed?

It was the early policy of our government, as it is the present, to keep the Indians as much as possible from mingling or coming in contact with the whites; for nothing is more clearly seen than that the mingling or contact of the races is destructive to the Indian. The elevating influences of our civilization are not found along our frontiers, near the borders of Indian reservations, and these people are made the objects of all its baneful influences with none of its virtues to counteract them. Under these circumstances and left to themselves they draw from the rose of civilization its virus only, and have no power to extract from it any healing balm.

Our public domain is now overrun by our own people; hence it is deemed unwise and impolitic to place tribes on small tracts or reservations, removed from other reservations and Indians, for no small reservations can be selected anywhere that will not soon be surrounded by the enterprising white settler, and all the evils of contact between the races are at once experienced by the Indian.

The only wise and prudent plan seems therefore to be to select a large and suitable section of country for the location ultimately of all the Indians east of the Rocky mountains and north of the Platte river and Iowa. This would be pursuing the same policy with the northern tribes that has been adopted and worked so favorably with the southern tribes; such action would soonest induce them to abandon nomadic habits and customs. The early Indian policy looked to this; but can it ever be satisfactorily accomplished by locating a tribe on a fine reservation for a time, and as soon as they have formed an attachment for it, and feel the excitements and attractions of home, move them off, by a compact made with a few chiefs led by various motives, to some other and distant land; but to have the same course repeated when civilization shall again overtake them.

Will such a course ever induce a people to abandon nomadic customs and habits? Apply such a course to a township or county of white people, and would it not within a few generations lead to the adoption of nomadic habits, feelings, and customs.

The original policy was to give them a reservation that they should hold, possess, and abide upon, far removed from contact with the whites. In carrying it into effect we give them a reservation where they may remain most of the time in contact with the whites, until the surrounding inhabitants demand their removal. This evil can only be remedied by reserving a large tract of country for the final home of all the northwestern Indians. Such an evil might not be the result under a different form of government; but no different result can be expected under ours, for all our public men depend upon the popular will for success, and are expected to act as its exponents.

When the advancing tide of our population has reached and passed any Indian reservation, the land rises in value from one dollar and a quarter, the government price, to five and ten dollars per acre; a demand is at once made upon the representatives and senators, by the surrounding inhabitants, to have the Indians removed; various reasons are given—the Indians steal, beg, &c.; and although the response "that you were not compelled to settle beside them," is a full answer to the demand, yet the demand must of course be at once made at Washington; courtesy requires compliance on the part of the Executive departments and the Senate; a few chiefs are induced to favor the proposition, and the Indians are removed against the will and protestations of nine-tenths of the tribe. The result to the Indian is decimation, starvation, and death. Thus, within four years, tribes have been removed against their most earnest
protestations, and have lost, by death, forty per cent. of their entire number in eighteen months afterwards, as a result.

This evil, the most stupendous connected with our Indian policy, originating in our form of government, can only be remedied by the selection of some country that shall be set apart for and devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of Indians.

There will be another great advantage derived from this course. The early policy and well-established principles of our government recognized the absolute right of possession and occupation by the red men of the country over which they roamed and hunted. Hunting grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites, and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment, in their own way and for their own purposes, were as much respected, until they abandoned them, made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals, (United States Supreme Court Reports, 8th Wheaton, 571,) and their right of occupancy was considered as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites, (5th Peters, 48.) This rule has been altogether departed from of late years. Appropriations have been made by Congress to adventurers to open wagon roads through their country, without consulting them; roads have been opened through and military posts established in their country without their consent. They would be false to their ancestors, their traditions, and to human nature itself, if, for these causes, they did not go to war. They have been to war and are now at war for these reasons, and our whole frontier population has lost all respect or thought even of Indian title or right to the soil. When entering the Indian country they feel as if they were on our own soil exclusively, and subject to our own laws and customs, whatever their conduct may be towards the inhabitants of the soil and occupants of the country.

The feelings of respect for Indian occupation and rights to the soil that were possessed by our ancestors will never be revived on the frontier, and it would be a most difficult task to enforce the laws in this respect. This evil, also, can only be remedied by the setting off of a sufficient tract and territory for the exclusive use and final home of the Indians of the northwest, and, by proper laws and regulations, protecting the territory and its inhabitants from all incursions of the whites.

Moved into one region of country, their rights could be secured by proper regulations and laws, while, under the present system, they have no rights, or, what is equivalent, they have no remedies for wrongs done and laws violated. The policy and laws of the government require that an agent be appointed for each tribe, with the view of securing to each their interests and perfect justice in all cases. The reports of the bureau and my own observation convince me that, in many instances, these men, appointed to secure and protect the interests of the Indians, have proved their worst enemies. The nations and tribes have no redress in these cases; there is no tribunal before whom they can bring their case and ask justice. Our Supreme Court, since the days of that wise jurist and statesman, Chief Justice Marshall, has considered and treated them as domestic dependent nations; and yet they have not the rights in that or any other court that a sovereign State has, which needs its protecting arm much less than these nations. If the tribes, nations, and bands of Indians could be allowed to appear before a United States tribunal, and seek their remedies and secure their rights, nearly all the causes that lead to war would be removed, and we should rarely have any serious trouble with them. It is confidently believed that such a just privilege granted to them would have prevented the massacres, atrocities, and destruction of life in both races on the frontier during the last five years.

It was supposed by many that this privilege was granted the Indians by Congress by the first section of the "Act to establish a court for the investigation of claims against the United States," approved February 24, 1855; but the act amending the foregoing act, approved March 3, 1863, took from them this
privilege, if it was granted, and this court has now no jurisdiction in any case or claim growing out of or dependent on any treaty or stipulation entered into with the Indian tribes. It has been feared by many of our patriotic men that, notwithstanding our generous action towards them, the portion of our history which records the dealings of our government with and its treatment of them would be its darkest and most disgraceful page. This page certainly will not be relieved or rendered more creditable by the record of the fact that we denied the Indians all right to be heard in our courts, all privilege to have their claims and complaints tested even by our own laws and judges; that we denied them the privilege granted to the inhabitants of every other land, and even to our slaves; and that in all cases of alleged grievances and faithless agents their only possible appeal was to arms.

This right to be heard in court should be granted them, whatever else is refused, and a tribunal designated, with power to take cognizance of all cases arising from wrongs and frauds for the last ten years. Rights without remedies, words without deeds, promises without performances, are properly appreciated by Indians.

I therefore recommend that the following section of country, or a similar section, be set apart for the exclusive use and final home of the Indians of the northwest, viz:

Commencing at the mouth of the Niobrara river, on the west bank of the Missouri; thence, along the west bank of the Missouri, at low-water mark, to the mouth of the Muscle Shell river; thence due south to the Yellowstone river; thence, in a southeasterly direction, and by a straight line, to the northwestern corner of the State of Nebraska; thence along the northern line of the State of Nebraska, to the place of beginning.

Many Indians of the northwest are now in the country above described, and nearly all will move there as soon as peace is restored with the whites. Much of the land on the river bottoms produces corn and cereals well, and stock can be raised with little difficulty.

Emigration and transportation would require few, if any, roads through this tract of country; none would be necessary if the travel by the northern route to Montana can be accommodated as well by a road running east and north of the Missouri river as far west as the mouth of the Muscle Shell river, and then west of that river to Montana.

If this cannot be done, one road through the country would be necessary, and could be opened no doubt by treaty.

There is little indication of mineral, and no talk, I think, of any, except in a small tract of country in the forks of the Cheyenne, and if a small amount of mineral should be left in the Indian country until it should be of some value to them, it would not be considered as any indication of an ungenerous and improper spirit on our part towards the Indians of this day by our posterity.

There is sufficient game in this country to supply many of the wants of the Indians for some years, and as it diminishes and they are brought to the necessity of making some provision for future wants, they will resort to agricultural or pasturial occupation naturally and by instinct, and learn to rely upon personal effort, instead of the favors and generosity of their old, kind, and loving mother—the sole dependence of their ancestors. Here time, most essential to the civilization of barbarous races, can be allowed them, and it is confidently believed that the third generation, with proper legal protection, would be a comparatively elevated and civilized race.

Assistance should be afforded them of course, as to other Indians, in stock, supplies, agricultural implements, teachers, &c. These matters to be attended to as the occasion should arise. A court should be established in which all cases arising between them and the whites could be tried and determined.
With a home and rights secured they would make rapid advancement in civilization.

The Indians have become dependent for many articles, considered by them of first importance, upon white traders. So dependent have they become that they will not long carry on war if all trade and intercourse is denied them. Locating in a specific country, when hostile all intercourse with them can be terminated, and in this way they can be soonerest and with least expense induced to abandon war and make peace.

It is important and essential that all just and main causes of war be early removed. We have endeavored to show some of them. The immediate causes of war with them are generally of the most trivial character. It is believed that in no war for the last twenty years, except the one now pending, has the immediate cause risen above the killing of a sore-footed Mormon ox by starving Indians to eat, the refusal by the overseer of some train to pay the accustomed five dollars per head to Indians for stampeded cattle driven back by them to the train, or the refusal of an Indian trader to give to Indians waiting for annuities something to eat when requested. But these things are not the real causes of Indian war. They are simply the sparks that ignite the magazine of pent-up passions made hot and fiery by repeated and accumulated wrongs.

To the Indians of the plains who have surrendered their possession to vast regions of the finest hunting grounds on earth, more liberal aid as a general rule should be given for some years, and more attention paid to providing them with everything necessary to physical comfort and mental culture, during the first year of their occupancy of reservations. Sub-agents, teachers, farmers, smiths, mills, and buildings, should be provided them, with full authority to remove from office or suspend the official functions of any public officer who fails to do his duty. Reliable inspectors should be sent them every season or periodically to see that all officials perform their duty. The short time afforded the Indians to adopt civilized habits demands that the government should make the greatest effort in their behalf. The comfort and prosperity of those who go upon a reservation and fixed home with abhorrence and as the gloomy burial place of all his aspirations and hopes.

It is therefore recommended that arrangements and appropriations be made to locate and provide with suitable implements and stock one thousand Ogalalla and Brulé Sioux Indians on White Earth river by the first day of April A. D. 1868. The Indians in Big Mouth's village and many in Spotted Tail's, Swift Bear's, and Two Strikes', have expressed a readiness and desire to go upon a reservation at once.

Whatever the government has agreed to pay them by treaty should be paid promptly, either in money or articles of prime necessity, and not in mosquito nets, umbrellas, and children's shawls, as has been done in some instances heretofore.

All goods and supplies should be delivered to the chiefs of the respective tribes, at the Indian villages, in bulk, and in unbroken packages. Selling the goods or giving them away to favorites by agents would thus be prevented, and the authority and power of the chiefs over their people much increased—a result most desirable; for when the chiefs have great influence the tribe is much more easily managed, as one man is more easily managed, than one hundred, one thousand, &c. The manner in which goods and presents have been distributed of late years has diminished and tended to destroy the influence of the chiefs.

The compensation of the officers of the bureau is inadequate for the business talent and integrity required for the faithful discharge of duty. It should be at once increased.

We have witnessed no case of fraud or wrong-doing on the part of any officer.
the present year, and it is believed that as ample authority and means exist in your department to correct all these evils as any department of the government, all the officers should be held to a more rigid accountability.

It is believed that no advantage can be derived from a change of the bureau from the present department to any other.

To transfer the duty of procuring and issuing Indian supplies to the quartermaster's department of the army, as it seems to have been conducted on the plains for a few years past, would undoubtedly be most detrimental to the public service, as the officers of that department seem to have conducted it most corruptly in many instances in that region and escaped punishment.

Moreover, the Indians seem to have lost all confidence in the officers of the military department now commanding some of our frontier posts. It is with great difficulty that they can be induced to come to a military post for a council. At the same time many officers of that department on the plains seemed to entertain and cherish the most bitter animosity and ill feeling towards the Indians. Officers of as high grade as captains and colonels openly proclaimed their purpose to kill all Indians with whom their commands came in contact, without regard to any conditions. Naturally enough, friendly Indians have ceased to consider military posts as places of security and protection to them, and all the friendly seem to approach some of these posts with fear. The Indians have not the proper feelings to be dealt with by the officers, and the officers have not the proper feelings to deal fairly with the Indians.

The want of complete harmony between the military and Indian department in the Indian country is exceedingly detrimental and leads to much of the existing trouble. The "whites" say, "the Indians seem to be divided into two parties—one party will not have peace at all, while the other is willing to have a good peace, and we don't know which party rules." The only remedy for this evil seems to be the change of the Indian Bureau into a department, with special military rank and authority vested in the Secretary over all troops stationed and doing duty in the Indian country, or a provision made by law that no movement should be made of any troops in the Indian country or near Indian reservations without the special request of the Secretary of the Interior, except along the regular roads passing through such country, unless in immediate pursuit of property stolen or criminals.

The small and weak garrisons in our Indian country are a great evil, and induce Indian wars as much as any one cause, for they neither inspire respect nor fear on the part of the Indians, and holding out the semblance of protection to emigrants lead them to travel in a most careless and unguarded manner, and thereby lay before the Indians temptations that, under the influence of his feeling of accumulated wrongs, he cannot or will not resist, and depredations and war follow.

Hence we see that the war of 1854, on the North Platte, commenced when there was but one company in garrison at Laramie, and the war of 1862, in Minnesota, commenced when there were not more than two hundred men on duty in three posts, covering four hundred miles of frontier.

Like children and all people in an uneducated and natural state, fear of speedy punishment exercises the largest influence upon them, and when they have no such fear and an opportunity presents itself to them to gratify revenge, passion or caprice, they are certain to yield, and then war follows. Hence all military garrisons in or adjacent to their country should be sufficiently large to punish at once any wrong or outrage committed by them. A few, perhaps a single instance of immediate punishment would stop all depredations and war. Tardy punishment with them has no practical lesson and no moral. If sufficiently large garrisons cannot be provided, it would be better to withdraw them altogether.

The garrisons for the past year at Forts Reno, Philip Kearney, and C. F. Smith, while they have put the government to great expense, have neither af-
forded protection to emigration, nor been able to punish properly Indians for outrages committed; and the Indians have thereby been inspired with no confidence in their ability to cope with the whites than they have ever before had. It would be far better to withdraw all troops from that country and line of travel at once, than to have the results of the small garrisons there last year repeated again this year.

Moreover, the government has already expended in opening this route, including the cost of the expedition under General Connor in 1865, not less probably, than twenty millions of dollars. From the best information we could obtain we conclude that very few emigrants or citizens have ever attempted to pass over the road, and it seems that the question of abandoning this route altogether deserves the serious consideration of the proper department of the government. Emigrants should not be deceived as to the advantages, security, or hazard of the route to the mountains.

It is also of the greatest importance that in the civil and military service in the Indian country experienced officers in Indian character and habits, and officers familiar with the tribes they are to come in contact with, be placed on duty. Tribes should be consulted as to the appointment of their agents, when practicable. Acts done and words spoken that would have a favorable effect on some tribes will lead to war with others. As an instance, while some tribes would feel honored by a friendly visit from soldiers, the Cheyenne tribe, since their women and children were killed and scalped and cut to pieces by soldiers that they supposed friendly, at Sand creek in 1864, would be drawn to war by the approach of soldiers.

My recommendations, then, are as follows, viz:

1st. That aggressive war by the government against the Indians at once cease, and that all our troops in the Indian country be used defensively for garrisoning our forts, protecting our railroad interests, lines of travel, and frontier settlements, and punishing the Indians, if possible, when committing depredations on our lines of travel or out of their own country; and that commissioners be sent at once to counsel with them.

2d. That the tract of country hereinbefore described be withdrawn from public survey and sale, and at once set apart by solemn enactment for the sole purpose of a final home and reservation for all the Indians of the northwest, and that Congress, by an act similar to the first section of the act of June 30, 1864, define the Indian country and reservations, or by law require the President to designate, and by proclamation make known on a day certain each year, the country and tracts of country in the United States in the exclusive possession and occupation of the Indian tribes, with such portions of our laws as affect the rights of the whites and Indians in this country.

3d. That a proper court or tribunal be organized or empowered to take cognizance and jurisdiction of cases and claims by Indians for wrongs and frauds alleged to have been done or committed against them by the government or whites, with the right of either party to appeal to the Supreme Court.

4th. That the Indian Bureau be organized into a department, with full authority to control and manage all troops in the Indian country; or, if this cannot be done, then that provision be made by law that no troops shall be moved into the Indian country except in the cases hereinbefore specified, unless specially requested by the Secretary of the Interior.

Recommendations as to inspectors, manner of distributing goods, accountableness of officers, preparations for agricultural pursuits, and all other minor points, are made under the proper heads in the foregoing report; all of which is respectfully submitted.

JOHN B. SANBORN.

Special Indian Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.
No. 1.

**Upper Arkansas Agency, Fort Larned, Kansas, February 21, 1867.**

*S*ir: I have the honor to report having seen various newspaper accounts of the depredations committed by Indians, and that as far as regards this section of country, or includes the Indians of my agency, they are entirely false. I can state positively that since the council held by Messrs. Bogy and Irwin with the Indians of my agency, not one single overt act has been committed by these Indians up to the present time. I have been among them constantly, and never knew them to feel better satisfied or exhibit such a pacific feeling. The only complaint that they now make is that the captive Indian children are not returned to them in accordance with promises made to that effect by the government; and in connection therewith, I would respectfully call the attention of the Commissioner to the fact that one of those children is known to be in Colorado, and can easily be procured, and also that, in reply to a communication from your office with reference to the same matter, I stated that the Indians still insist upon the government fulfilling its pledges to them by returning the children.

My experience teaches me that a source of much difficulty with the Indians arises from the fact of the government not being prompt in fulfilling its promises, particularly heretofore delaying the delivery of the annuity goods to a period far beyond the time that they should be received. I would earnestly recommend that the next issue be allowed to be made as early in the spring as possible. The Indians become very much scattered after grass comes, and are always better satisfied to receive their goods when they are congregated together.

In conclusion, I would respectfully state that the Indians have lately exhibited a slight feeling of apprehension in consequence of the order stopping the trading of arms and ammunition to them, imagining that the same bodes them no good. The small quantity of ammunition traded to them would be of no account to them in case of future hostilities. They also claim the right to trade for those articles in accordance with the provisions of their treaty, they being recognized as being at peace. A matter of this kind is calculated to do more harm than good.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. Lewis V. BOGY,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

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No. 2.

**Headquarters, Fort Larned, Kansas,**

March 6, 1867.

*S*ir: In compliance with General Orders No 3, headquarters district Upper Arkansas, I have the honor to make the following report:

On last Thursday, the 28th of February, a small party of Cheyennes went to a ranch about six miles below this post, kept by a man by the name of Parker, and ordered him to cook supper for them. He had to comply, and they, on finding that he had no sugar to give them, threatened his life, and would undoubtedly have killed one of his men if he had not concealed himself. At such a distance from the post I could, of course, know nothing of the occurrence when it happened. It was reported to me two days after.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

Roman Nose, a chief the Dog soldiers, came in a day or two ago to see the agent, Colonel Wynkoop; a half-breed interpreter came with him, and reports that everything in their camp is quiet, and very little is said, their attention being directed to the operations up on the Platte. The Dog soldiers are camped about seventy miles up the Pawnee fork, on one of its forks. They have runners and carriers in almost every day from the north.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY ASBURY,
Assistant Adjutant General,
District Upper Arkansas.

[Endorsements.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 16, 1867.

Official copy respectfully forwarded for the information of the honorable the Secretary of the Interior.

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, March 27, 1867.

Respectfully referred to the Indian Bureau.

JOHN C. COX, Chief Clerk.

No. 3.

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, March 9, 1867.

Sir: As you requested me to write you frequently to let you know how we prospered, I take this occasion to do so, in a semi-official manner, my letters forming no part of the official records of the commission.

The telegram from Secretary Browning was received yesterday, and we will move west in a few days, as soon as it is possible for us to do so, for, at present, a terrible snow-storm is raging which will block the roads, and for the past few days back it has been snowing out west harder than is usual in that section of country, thus stopping all travel at present. But the commission, while here, have not been idle, or unprofitably employed, and have succeeded in procuring a large amount of testimony from officers and citizens lately from Fort Phil. Kearney; the mystery of this terrible massacre begins to develop itself, but the commission are not yet prepared to pass final judgment on the case. One thing, however, I think we can say with certainty, and that is, that a considerable band of Indians, supposed to be all Sioux, or generally so, are in that section of country, who are hostile to the whites, and have been so for many years, and are determined to do all they can to make that country too hot for us to occupy or travel through. We see no other course for the government to adopt than to turn them over to the military for severe punishment, and follow this band up until they sue for peace, or are driven out of that section of country. We are not prepared, at present, to state the cause of this trouble, but, from all we can learn, it appears to date back to the late treaty at Laramie.

Red Cloud, the reported chief of the hostile band, and his principal Indians, refuse to sign the treaty, or allow a road through their country. The unusual success he and his band met with in all their conflicts with the whites, military and civil, has rendered them bolder than Indians generally are.

Thus troops will have to be sent to operate against these Indians. If they
attack these Indians only, and do not disturb those who are friendly and peaceable, it will be well; but there is always danger that this rule, through ignorance may not be strictly adhered to, or the effect of troops marching through certain sections of country may frighten off these friendly bands, and drive them north, where they may be forced to join the hostile party, and thus a general Indian war instituted.

It will require the greatest judgment and prudence on the part of military commanders to avoid causing so great a calamity. The commission will do all they can, by suggesting what localities should not be visited by the military: this is all we can do in the matter. It is not known, positively, how large a number compose this warlike band of Indians, but we think not as large as is generally represented. They, however, may succeed in gaining or driving more adherents into their ranks. The commission will do all in their power to prevent this. At the same time they request the co-operation of the military; in connection with this we would respectfully suggest the propriety of the department corresponding with the commanding officers of Forts Union, Berthold, Rice, and Sully, on the Missouri river, with a view of ascertaining what Indians were engaged in the late massacre, the feeling of the Indians there, and every exertion made to prevent, as far as possible, any of the young men of the band of Sioux on the Missouri from joining this hostile band. Perhaps it would be well for the commission, if they have time, to visit the Missouri river, with this object; at least, some one who has influence with this band should be sent.

I do not think it will be necessary for this commission to go further than Fort Laramie; that is our present opinion—circumstances may change it. General Augur has expressed a wish to accompany us as far as Fort McPherson, and we are glad to have him with us. There we are to meet the chiefs of some of the friendly bands of Sioux and Cheyenne Indians.

This letter has been submitted to the sanction of the commission, and meets their hearty approval.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,
Brevet Brigadier General, President of Commission.

Hon. L. V. Booy,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 4.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, February 7, 1867.

Hon. L. V. Booy, Commissioner of Indian Affairs:

We hear, unofficially, that General Hancock is to move with troops in a few days up the Republican, and in view of the fact we think it of great importance to the successful accomplishment of the object of our commission that we move as soon as possible, so as to be in the vicinity of the Indian camps near that river, said to be friendly, before the arrival of the troops destined to operate there, because the movement of troops into that section before our arrival may have the effect of driving these friendly Indians to the north, into the country now occupied by the hostile Indians, and on this account we would respectfully suggest that you send us orders immediately.

ALF. SULLY,
Brevet Brigadier General, President.
No. 5.

Upper Arkansas Agency.
Fort Larned, Kansas, March 22, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose to you copies of communications received from Major General Hancock, and from headquarters of the military district. I think that no trouble will arise in consequence of General Hancock's expedition, as the Indians of my agency are well satisfied and quiet, and aim to retain the peaceful relations now existing.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent, Upper Arkansas Agency.

Hon. Lewis V. BOGGS,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 5 A.

Headquarters Department of the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 11, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to address this letter to you for the purpose of informing you that I have about completed my arrangements for moving a force to the plains, and only await a proper condition of the roads to march.

My object in making an expedition at this time is, to show the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to chastise any tribe who molest people who are travelling across the plains. It is not our desire to bring on difficulties with the Indians, but to treat them with justice and according to our treaty stipulations, and I desire especially in my dealings with them to act through their agents as far as practicable.

In reference to the Cheyennes of your agency, in particular, I may say that we have just grounds of grievance. One is, that they have not delivered up the murderer of the New Mexican at Zarah. I also believe that I have evidence sufficient to fix upon different bands of that tribe, whose chiefs are known, several of the outrages committed on the Smoky Hill last summer. I request that you will inform them, in such a manner as you may think proper, that I expect shortly to visit their neighborhood, and that I will be glad to have an interview with their chiefs; and tell them, also, if you please, that I go fully prepared for peace or war, and that hereafter I will insist upon their keeping off the main lines of travel, where their presence is calculated to bring about collisions with the whites.

If you can prevail upon the Indians of your agency to abandon their habit of infesting the country traversed by our overland routes, threatening, robbing, and intimidating travellers, we will defer that matter to you. If not, I would be pleased by your presence with me when I visit the locality of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel E. W. WYNKOOP,
Agent for Cheyennes, Apaches, and Arapahoes.
Fort Larned, Kansas.
MAJOR: In answer to your communication, February 21, (just received,) relating to the names of the chiefs or bands of Indians who are or have been making threatening demonstrations, or sending insulting messages, I have the honor to state that I have received from Little Raven, head chief of the Arapahoes, a message to the effect that no more wood must be cut by this command on the Pawnee Forks, and that the troops must move out of the country by the time grass grows.

Mr. Jones, the interpreter at this post, brought me a message from Satanta, the principal chief of the Kiowas, to the effect that all white men must move east of Council Grove by the spring; that he gave me ten days to move from this post; that he wanted the mules and cavalry horses fattened, as he would have use for them, for he intended to appropriate them; that all the Indians had agreed to stop the railroads and roads at Council Grove; that no roads or railroads would be allowed west of that point.

Major J. H. Page, third infantry, brought me a message from the same chief: “Tell the chiefs on the road that they must gather their soldiers and leave; if they don’t, I will help them to leave. No wagons will be allowed on the road, except those that bring presents. If any are found, they will be taken.”

Subsequently, in council, Satanta stated, in substance, the same, but not in an insulting manner, which has already been reported to district headquarters.

It has been reported to me that eight Arapahoes, apparently friendly, stopped on the 10th instant at the camp of a Mr. Gilchrist, a wagon-master for a Mr. H. Wedello, of Mora, New Mexico, on the other side of Fort Aubrey, (120 miles from here,) shot at the herder, and ran off forty head of mules and one mare. The extreme severity of the weather, together with the refusal of the man who reported the fact to act as guide and put a party on their trail, prevented me from attempting their recovery.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLASS,
Major Third U. S. Infantry, Commanding Post.

Brevet Major Henry E. NOYES, A. A. A. G.,
Headquarters District Upper Arkansas.

A true copy:

C. McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Riley, Kansas, March 14, 1867.

Colonel: The brevet major general commanding directs me to inform you that Wilson Graham, the Cheyenne boy who was captured from that tribe some time since, is now en route to this post. As soon as he arrives he will be sent to you in order that he may be delivered to his nearest relatives.

Please inform this office of the name and band of his nearest relations.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY E. NOYES,
Capt. Second Cavalry, Brevet Major, U. S. Army, A. A. A. G.

Colonel E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent.
No. 6.

St. Louis, Mo., March 28, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions, dated this instant, I arrived here yesterday, called on General Sherman, who informed me the Cheyenne boy had been sent to General Hancock to be delivered to the friends of the boy in presence of their agent. Lieutenant General Sherman informs me that General Hancock is moving towards the Cheyenne and Kiowa Indians, near Fort Larned, to hold councils with them. I shall leave this afternoon, and join General Hancock's headquarters as soon as possible.

Any and all communications for me should be addressed to me at Fort Zarah, Kansas.

Colonel W. W. Bent is here, and goes out with me this afternoon.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent

Hon. Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

No. 7.

AGENCY COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS, UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Larned, Kansas, April 9, 1867.

Sir: By letter from the department, of the 9th ultimo, I was directed to proceed to St. Louis, Missouri, there to receive from Lieutenant General Sherman a Cheyenne Indian boy, captured by the troops under Colonel J. M. Chivington at the Sand Creek affair, and deliver him to the agent of the Cheyenne Indians at this post. In compliance with the above orders I proceeded to St. Louis and presented my letters of instructions to General Sherman, who informed me the Indian boy had been forwarded to Major General Hancock to be delivered to the Indians in the presence of their agent. From St. Louis I proceeded to Leavenworth City, thence to Fort Zarah, Kansas, via Forts Riley and Harker. At the latter post (Harker) I passed Major General Hancock, with his command, en route for the plains. I arrived at Fort Zarah, Kansas, on the 3d instant. General Hancock arrived there on the 5th, with his whole command, consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, about 1,500 strong. Immediately called upon him and requested information as to the object of his movements, so far as they related to the Indians of my agency, viz., the Comanches and Kiowas. He very kindly and promptly furnished me with the enclosed papers, marked A, B, and C. As none of the Indians of my agency have visited this great line of travel except a very few since they received their annuity goods last October, and as it was uncertain what portion of his department he might visit with his command, he expressed a wish that I would accompany him, and, as I believed it to be eminently proper, I willingly consented, and should anything occur concerning the Indians of my agency, or the interests of the Indian department generally, I shall make full report of the same.

I will state, for the information of the department at Washington, that the Cheyenne boy I was sent to St. Louis for is now here with General Hancock, and that Major Wynkoop, the agent of the Cheyenne Indians, is also here, who will, without doubt, report all of interest relating to the boy and the Indians of his agency.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

J. H. LEAVENWORTH.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
No. 7 A.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 11, 1867.

COLONEL: I have the honor to state, for your information, that I am at present preparing an expedition to the plains, which will soon be ready to move. My object in doing so at this time is to convince the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to punish any of them who may molest travellers across the plains, or who may commit other hostilities against the whites. We desire to avoid, if possible, any troubles with the Indians, and to treat them with justice and according to the requirements of our treaties with them, and I wish, especially, in my dealings with them, to act through the agents of the Indian department, as far as it is possible so to do.

Concerning the Kiowas of your agency, we have grave reasons for complaint. Among others, it is officially reported to these headquarters that that tribe has been making hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has very recently returned to Fort Dodge, from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen (17) colored soldiers and one (1) white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our posts on the Arkansas; that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux, for hostilities against us, and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States army, who have visited them, supposing that they were friends. It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague county, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family. I desire you particularly to explain to them, that one reason why the government does not at once send troops against them to redress these outrages against our people is, that their Great Father is averse to commencing a war upon them (which would certainly end in destroying them) until all other means of redress fail. I request that you will inform the Indians of your agency that I will hereafter insist upon their keeping off the main routes of travel across the plains, where their presence is calculated to bring on difficulties between themselves and the whites. If you, as their agent, can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to defer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so, I would be pleased to have you accompany me, when I visit the country of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony. I will be pleased to talk with any of the chiefs whom we may meet.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent for Comanches and Kiowas.

No. 7 B.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT 19TH U. S. INFANTRY,
Fort Arbuckle, C. N., February 16, 1867.

COLONEL: I have the honor to state that, previous to my arrival here, a roving band of Indians had made a raid in the vicinity, carrying off stock, chiefly horses, and a negro child, from within a few miles of the post. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Hart, commanding, sent in pursuit the Caddo Indian scouts, who, after more than a week's absence, returned without any intelligence as to the number, tribe, or probable course of the robbers. I had just learned from Horace P. Jones, (white man,) who is an old resident, and has for some years

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acted as interpreter for many of the tribes of Indians on this frontier, that the band consisted of twenty-five (25) Comanches, belonging to the Cochataker tribe, (Buffalo Eaters,) the head chief being Mahwee. About two weeks after the depredations here they were met in the neighborhood of Fort Cobb, and a chase to Samuel Paul and Dr. J. J. Stearn, (white,) the latter being the issuing commissary of the reserve Comanches, who are reputed friendly. These men were saved by the aid of Toschowa, head chief of the reserve Comanches. This chief also recovered five (5) of the horses which had been stolen from the vicinity, but failed in his efforts to regain the captured negro child. These facts were obtained by Mr. Jones from Toschowa himself, who requested they might be made known to these headquarters. In this affair Toschowa was brought in collision with Indians of his own tribe, with whom he had formerly acted, and he felt the necessity of avoiding the consequences of an open rupture. His conduct displays admirable discretion under the circumstances. I have the honor to state further, that several other tribes than the Comanches have lately noticed on the war path, having been seen in their progress in unusual numbers, and without their squaws and children, a fact to which much significance is attached by those conversant with Indian usages. It is thought by many white residents of the Territory that some of these tribes may be acting in concert, and that plundering incursions are, at least, in contemplation. George Washington, second chief of the Caddoes, a friendly tribe, is of the opinion that the wild Comanches are bent upon mischief. Since the date of the treaty made at the mouth of the Little Arkansas, I believe on the 6th of October, 1865, in which the Cochataker Comanches joined, they and other contracting parties to the treaty have carried off a large amount of stock in violation of its provisions, and have slain and made captive many white persons, held on speculation, to be ransomed. The practice of the government of condoning these offences, by the payment of liberal sums, has had the natural effect of encouraging this inhuman traffic among the Indians, and every day of its continuance adds difficulties to the return to what I deem a wiser and sterner policy, and one that would ultimately be the most humane. My inexperience in the exigencies of the frontier causes me to defer to the views of such sensible white residents and others as, from long residence among the Indians, are competent to advise, and this communication, while it expresses my own, is more particularly the embodiment of their views. In a communication made on the 12th instant I had the honor to apply for ten (10) additional companies to re-enforce this post, and I respectfully suggest the subject-matter of this communication as additional reason for the proposed re-enforcement.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. L. SMITH,
Colonel O. D. GREEN,
A. A. G. Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, Indian agent.

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.
From the fact that these Indians steal from these frontiers, and have supplied themselves with large caballas; that they are supplying horses to the northern Indians on the railroad and mail routes, I think it important to put a stop to their wholesale plundering. I propose building posts in their country, as that demoralizes them more than anything else except money and whiskey.

Respectfully forwarded:

E. O. C. ORD,
Brigadier General Commanding.

Forwarded from headquarters military division of the Missouri.

By order of General Sherman:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 7 C.

[General Field Orders No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Riley, Kansas, March 26, 1867.

1. * * * While on the march and in camp, the troops composing the present expedition will receive orders from Brevet Major General Smith, commander of the district of Upper Arkansas, in whose territory we are about to move. When instructions may be necessary, General Smith will receive them from the major general commanding, who will be present.

2. * * * It is uncertain whether war will be the result of the expedition or not; it will depend upon the temper and behavior of the Indians with whom we may come in contact. We go prepared for war, and will make it if a proper occasion presents. We shall have war if the Indians are not well disposed towards us. If they are for peace, and no sufficient ground is presented for chastisement, we are restricted from punishing them for past grievances which are recorded against them; these matters have been left to the Indian department for adjustment. No insolence will be tolerated from any bands of Indians whom we may encounter. We wish to show them that the government is ready and able to punish them if they are hostile, although it may not be disposed to invite war. In order that we may act with unity and in harmony with these views, no one but the commander present, on detachment or otherwise, will have interviews with Indians. Such interviews as may be necessary with them will be reserved, and corresponding reserve will be required from those under his command. No Indians will be allowed in camp, and no “talks” will be had with them except for the purpose of explaining to them the facts herein stated. The chiefs of any bands of Indians who may wish any information will be referred to the major general commanding, who will see them at his headquarters.

By command of Major General Hancock:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian agent.

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.
No. 8.

AGENCY KIOWA AND COMANCHE INDIANS, UPPER ARKANSAS,

Pawnee Fork, 31 miles from Fort Larned, April 15, 1867.

SIR: Knowing the wish of the department to learn all pertaining to the military expedition of Major General Hancock, I will state that a council was held near Fort Larned by General Hancock and some of the chiefs of the Cheyenne tribe of Indians, at which the Indians, I was informed, expressed themselves very friendly. General Hancock marched for Fort Dodge on the 13th instant, advanced upon the Pawnee Fork 21 miles, in the direction of a camp of about two hundred lodges of Cheyennes and Sioux. General Hancock was visited that evening by chiefs from both tribes, and informed that his approach toward their camp caused great anxiety among their squaws and children. On the 14th General Hancock again resumed his march in the direction of their village, and was met some five or six miles from their town by a white flag, and earnestly requested not to approach any nearer, but he still advanced, and went into camp about 3 o'clock p.m. a short mile below their lodges, when it was found all their women and children had left with what few articles they could hastily gather, leaving their lodges and a large amount of their property just as they had occupied their homes; some one hundred or more of their warriors were still in camp, armed and apparently ready for fight. Some of their chiefs called upon General Hancock, and he wanted their women and children back, as no harm was attended them, and furnished two chiefs good horses to go for them. In the evening the two horses were returned, and he was informed they had so scattered they could not be found; and at the same time information was brought that the warriors were now coming; when cavalry was advanced out and their village surrounded and searched, but nothing was found but as stated above, and one old Sioux, and a girl of about eight years of age, blind in one eye and horribly ravished. This morning she was brought to camp and properly cared for. Some suppose her white, others part white; while others pronounce her Indian. It is evident she is not a Cheyenne or Sioux. She was a pitiful object, indeed. Many of their lodges were found cut as though the party wished for a small part to make a small "tepee" for a night's lodging in a rapid march. This morning General Custer pursued with a heavy body of cavalry. This is only to the department to let them know that there are still:

on this frontier. Major Wynkoop is exerting himself all he can in the line of his duty, and will without doubt make as soon as possible full reports. In haste.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK.

Thirty miles west of Fort Larned, April 15, 1867.

SIR: I write in haste, as a courier is about leaving camp. I am with General Hancock's expedition, having accompanied him at his request, as he stated that it was his intention to hold a council with the principal men of the agency. I am sorry to say that the result of the expedition is disastrous. General Hancock marched his column right up to the Indian village, composed of 300 lodges of Cheyennes and Sioux, and found, on halting, the children had fled, and the men were alone occupying the camp; he ordered the chiefs to bring back the women and children, and they started for the purpose of endeavoring to do so, but soon returned and stated that it was impossible.
and during the night the men deserted their village, leaving their lodges with all the furniture of the same.

General Hancock has sent General Custer with a cavalry command in pursuit. Understanding that it was the intention of General Hancock to destroy the lodges and other property left in the village, I have written him a letter of remonstrance, as I am perfectly convinced that the conduct of the Indians was the result of intense fear. I am fearful that the result of all this will be a general war, which is much to be deprecated, as there are many unprotected whites on the different roads across the plains, and at the mail stations and ranches. I will report in full the first opportunity.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

G. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches,
Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington.

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No. 10.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., April 24, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter from Agent Wynkoop, dated 15th instant, and of one from Agent Leavenworth, of the same date, this day received, relative to General Hancock's expedition against the Cheyennes.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING.

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No. 11.

SAME CAMP AS ON 15TH,
Mile from Indian Village, on Pawnee Fork, April 17, 1867.

Sir: I have but little to communicate, except General Hancock has determined not to burn the Indian lodges, but has ordered every article taken from their villages returned, and that General Custer reports he has not seen any Indians he was in pursuit of. Fifteen hundred Indians escaped, and not one seen. He reports he should march for the Smoky Hill on the evening of the 16th, at 7 p.m., from the head of Walnut creek.

In haste, very respectfully, &c.,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Cheyennes, without doubt, gone south; Sioux, north.

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No. 12.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK, 32 MILES WEST FORT LARNED,
April 18, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to state that since my last communication a few days back, in which I spoke of the flight of the Indians upon General Hancock's approach, and his intention to destroy the village, I have written a communication to General Hancock, a copy of which I enclose; have received no written
reply, but he stated to me verbally that for the present he would not destroy the village. In my last letter I also stated that General Custer was in pursuit of the Indians; a courier has since arrived from him with the information that the Cheyennes had turned and gone towards the Arkansas river, while the Sioux had continued northward. He followed the Sioux trail, and the last dispatch from him is to the effect that the Sioux, upon crossing the Smoky Hill road, had destroyed a ranch or mail station, and killed three men. Since receiving this news General Hancock has again expressed his determination to destroy the villages. I have again appealed to him on behalf of the Cheyennes, as their village is distinct from the Sioux, and as yet there is no evidence of their having committed any overt act since their flight; and he has promised me to consider the matter. Under the circumstances in which the Indians left here—in my judgment being fully impressed with the belief that General Hancock had come for the purpose of murdering their women and children, as had previously been done at Sand Creek—I have no doubt but that they think that war has been forced upon them, (the Cheyennes,) and will commence committing depredations and following their style of warfare immediately. Thus, in my opinion, has another Indian war been brought on, which might have been averted by the military authorities pursuing a different line of policy. I will continue with General Hancock as long as there is any probability of his falling in with any of the Indians of my agency, for the purpose, as far as lies in my power, of subserving the interest of the department. As soon as possible I will submit to your office an inventory of the effects of both the Cheyenne and Sioux villages.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoe, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 12 A.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK,

April 13, 1865.

GENERAL: For a long time I have made the Indian character my chief study. I regard the late movement of the Cheyennes of my agency as caused by fear alone, so far as I am able to judge. They met us at first with a determination to have a peaceful talk, at such a distance from their village as would make their women and children satisfied that no danger need be apprehended by them. Your movement toward the village terrified the squaws and children, who left with such movable property as they could gather. I learn that you propose destroying the lodges and other property now remaining in the village. I would most respectfully request you not to do so. I am fully convinced that the result would be an Indian outbreak of the most serious nature, while at the same time there is no evidence in my judgment that this band of Cheyennes are deserving of this severe punishment. I am influenced alone in thus communicating with you by what I consider a strict sense of duty.

With feelings of the utmost respect, I am, general, your obedient servant.

E. W. WYNKOOP,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoe, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,

Comadj Dep't of Missouri and Indian Expedition.
No. 13.

[Telegram.]

CALIFORNIA CROSSING, 25 MILES EAST OF FORT SEDGWICK, 
April 20, 1867.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner Indian Affairs:

Your telegram of the 16th instant just received, and will be attended to. After great difficulty, we have succeeded in getting the Ogallala and Brulé Sioux in for a talk; representing three hundred and fifty lodges. We have made a satisfactory arrangement with them, and I think we can say with safety that we have prevented over seven hundred warriors from joining the war party. We leave Fort Sedgwick for Laramie in three or four days, and hope to be successful in preventing many more Sioux from joining the hostile party. I suppose you know there has been much difficulty in the road to Laramie from hostile Sioux. This will greatly increase our difficulties and expenses. Will write by mail.

ALF. SULLY,
Brevet Brigadier General, President Commission.

No. 14.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS, April 21, 1867.

Sir: I write hastily, as a mail is about leaving, to inform you that on the 19th instant General Hancock burned the Indian village, three hundred lodges, Sioux and Cheyennes. I know of no overt act that the Cheyennes have committed, to cause them to be thus punished, not even since their flight. I have just arrived with General Hancock's column, at this post, and learned since my arrival here that a few days ago six Cheyennes Indians, on foot, were attacked by one hundred and thirty cavalry about twenty-five miles west of this post, and all of them killed. I also learned that they had done nothing to provoke any attack, but were of the party that fled before General Hancock's approach. This whole matter is horrible in the extreme, and these same Indians of my agency have actually been forced into war.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 15.

CALIFORNIA CROSSING, NEBRASKA, 
April 22, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to report the actions of the special Indian commission, from the 4th day of April, the date of our last communication, to the department up to this time.

Heretofore our communications have been addressed to the Secretary of the Interior, as we did not know officially that there was any commissioner appointed since Hon. L. V. Bogy left that office, till we received your telegram of the 16th instant. We were at Fort McPherson when last I wrote, detained there by snow-storms, and conflicting reports in regard to our meeting certain bands of Sioux in this vicinity.

On the 5th instant Brevet Brigadier General Parker and Mr. Beauvais, of the commission, left us for a point on the road to Denver, twenty-five miles east of
Sedgwick. We found there was a very unsettled feeling in the Sioux south of the Platte, and it became apparent that there was such a want of confidence on the part of some of the Indians, that it would be impossible to induce them to meet the commission at any military post. From the place where the gentlemen of the commission went, (a ranch at the old California crossing) messengers were sent out, who reached the Indian camps, and resulted in principal chiefs and men of the Brulé, Ogalallas and Sioux, some ninety, and in all one hundred and seventy men, women, and children, coming. They represented about four hundred lodges. A portion of the Ogalallas, however, could not be reached, but those who represented that band stated that they were friendly and wished to remain so. As soon as we heard by telegraph that these Indians were coming in, the rest of the commission started, and reached the point of meeting the former ranch of Mr. Beauvais on the 19th, the Indians having arrived the day before. The next day we held a long council with them, and in the evening continued our talk, so as to allow the Indians to take back to their camps next day, as they were a little uneasy about the northern hostile Sioux, who had again commenced their depredations on the Laramie road, and had extended them to within sixty-five miles of Fort Sedgwick, the particulars of which I suppose you have heard through other sources.

These friendly Indians made quite serious complaints, because the government, as they stated, had not fulfilled its obligations assumed by the late Laramie treaty. They stated, that while they had left their old country, and remained at peace to comply strictly with their promises, and had incurred thereby the displeasure of their brothers, the great Grandfather, whose commissioners promised that he would give them seventy thousand dollars a year, to be paid semi-annually, the first installment of which was to be paid last autumn, had not paid nor sent them anything. These complaints we found it difficult to answer.

Notwithstanding their treatment by the government they were disposed to remain friendly. To assure them that the government appreciated their friendly disposition and fidelity, and as an act of partial justice, we presented their principal chiefs with a horse each, and made presents to those of their band present, the whole cost amounting to ($3,241 92) three thousand two hundred and forty-one dollars and ninety-two cents.

To the above amount are to be added expenditures for sending out messengers and subsisting Indians pending council, making the amount, for which a voucher in triplicate has been given this day, of three thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and ninety-two cents, ($3,496 92,) to Messrs. Beauvais & Lee, a mercantile firm composed of E. O. Beauvais and William F. Lee.

These presents were distributed in our presence. They gave the Indians great satisfaction, and they returned to their camps highly pleased.

After lengthy talk, we made what we think a very satisfactory arrangement with these bands, and we hope it will meet the approval of the department.

I will state the substance of this, in as few words as possible.

We have given these Indians permission to remain at present anywhere in the section of country between the Platte and a line ten miles north of the Smoky Hill river, and between the longitude of Pole creek and Plum creek a country not occupied by any whites, and will not be for many years to come.

This country at present is full of game, and where they can probably subsist themselves for six months in the year.

We have given papers of protection to the principal men of these two bands. We have allowed each of the bands a special interpreter, who will be with them, and in case of any difficulties, they will be the means of communication with the nearest military commanders or Indian agents. We have agreed to pay said interpreter five dollars per day. This is a very large amount, but it is only a temporary engagement. A more economical one can probably be made, should this arrangement be a permanent one.

Should war exist near the line of the Pacific railroad, from the hostile Sioux,
on the Smoky Hill route, from Cheyenne or other southern Indians—which may arise, as those latter Indians are very hostile to a railroad going through that route—the interpreters can communicate with the nearest military commanders, so that through their advice they may take those friendly Indians to some point where they will be out of the way of any hostilities, for in such a case they might be forced to take up arms against the whites, or suffer severe chastisement from their own people, and we recommend to provide for such an emergency in this section of country; that orders be issued to military commanders to give these peaceful Indians all the aid and protection in their power.

We would further recommend that parts of rations, such as flour, corn, beans, and some meat, be issued these Indians at military posts, or other posts, should they be in a suffering condition, as a temporary relief, under such regulations as might be deemed judicious.

We propose to bring such friendly Indians as are at present near Laramie to this temporary reservation; but we do not know we shall succeed, not having seen these Indians yet.

It is feared that war with some of the Indians is inevitable, and active military operations necessary; therefore it is of the greatest importance that we organize a peace party among the Indians, and do all we can to foster, protect, and increase this party. We have commenced with a respectable force of over seven hundred warriors, and hope to increase it greatly.

It will be a nucleus around which all Indians at present in hostile camps, friendly-disposed, can concentrate, and be protected until the peaceable Indians far outnumber the hostile.

This will cost money, but will in the end be far more economical than fighting them, from their habits, and the nature and extent of country they occupy, should a general war come, they will be able to do immense damage to the scattered settlers, trains of immigrants, and merchandise, besides jeopardizing the working and continuation of the Pacific railroad, not mentioning the great damage that would ensue to the immense mining region. It will save the country millions.

We leave this place in a day or two for Fort Laramie. As the road is not safe, we will be obliged to travel with an escort; hence our progress will be slow. We would thank you to answer this letter by telegraph, and inform us if you approve of what we have done.

This letter has been submitted to and approved by the other members of the commission.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,

Brevet Brig. Gen., President of Commission.

Hon. N. G. Taylor,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 16.

[Telegram.]

FORT SEDGWICK, — 23, 1867.

Is it true that General Hancock is driving the Cheyennes north? The telegraph says so. Forty-six (46) lodges of northern Brulés are moving south; three of them reached our camp last night; they appear friendly; this will detain us here a few days.

A. SULLY,

Brevet Brigadier General.

Hon. N. G. Taylor,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
No. 17.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office of Indian Affairs, April 24, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a telegraphic despatch just received from Brigadier General Sully, Fort Sedgwick, 23d instant, inquiring if it be true, as stated by telegraph, that General Hancock is driving the Cheyennes north, and informing me that forty-six lodges of northern Brulés are moving south.

In order that General Sully may be immediately advised in the matter, and such steps taken as may be proper to prevent these Indians, who are friendly and evidently seeking to get away from the hostile Indians north, from being involved in any difficulty by such movement, if it be as reported of General Hancock, I respectfully suggest the propriety and necessity of communicating with the War Department upon the subject without delay, with a request that answer be made this day, so as to enable this office to reply to the despatch of General Sully in due time.

Very respectfully,

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.

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No. 18.

FORT LARNED, KANSAS,
Upper Arkansas Indian Agency, April 24, 1867.

My last communication was written hastily from Fort Dodge, and I now have the honor to state that I have since arrived at the headquarters of my agency. Since the killing and scalping of the six Cheyenne Indians above Fort Dodge, nothing new has transpired with reference to Indian affairs. Contrary to my expectations, the Cheyenne Indians who fled from their village committed no depredations while crossing the Santa Fé road, and have not to my knowledge up to the present time, notwithstanding their persecutions. It is rumored here that considerable stock has been run off the Smoky Hill road by the Sioux Indians on the occasion of their flight north. General Hancock is still at Fort Dodge with his troops. Since the Indians of my agency have not as yet retaliated for the wrongs heaped upon them, it may be possible, if proper action be taken by the Department of the Interior to prevent the military from forcing trouble on, that a grand Indian war may be prevented; as far as laid in my power I have struggled to arrest this dire calamity.

The Arapahoes and Apache Indians are far south of the Arkansas river, and have not yet got into any trouble. I enclose herewith a copy of the inventory taken of property destroyed in both the Cheyenne and Sioux villages.

I am in receipt of a communication from your office stating that my bonds had been approved and enclosing my commission.

I would respectfully state I have not received any funds since entering upon my duties as Indian agent; that I am sadly in want of the same, and have made repeated applications. I am obliged to hire a private conveyance when traveling in the performance of my duty, and though notified some time ago that the Commissioner had ordered the purchase of an ambulance and team for my use, as yet I have seen nothing of it.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant.

E. W. WYNKOOP.

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
**INDIAN HOSTILITIES.**

**No. 18 A.**

**Cheyenne camp.**

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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee-pots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sioux camp.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo robes</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddles</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travises</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head mats</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axes</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kettles</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fry-pans</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin cups</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin pans</td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whetstones</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>Sacks paint</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>Water kegs</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>Ovens</td>
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<td>Rubbing horns</td>
<td>160</td>
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<td>Coffee-mills</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ropes (lariats)</td>
<td>280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chains</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Par-fleshes</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currycombs</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee-pots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**No. 19.**

*Fort Sedgwick, Col., April 24, 1867.*

[Received at Washington April 24, 1867.]

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner of Indian Affairs:

Met twenty Sioux from the north at California crossing; they gave all particulars of Phil. Kearney massacre; one admitted he participated—perhaps all did. Learned that Oncpapas, Sans Arcs, Blackfeet, Upper and Lower
Yanctonais, and other bands of Missouri Sioux, were not engaged. It is of
greatest importance that the commission visit these bands at once, to prevent
their going to war; also very important that commission visit Laramie imme-
diately to gather friendly Indians on reservations, separating them from hosti-
 Troops’ instructions give authority to go where proper, but not to separate
We suggest propriety of commission dividing; part visiting Laramie—the other
the Missouri, immediately. Rumored hostilities with Cheyennes south; if true,
will materially affect all Indian affairs west. Telegraph answer here.

ALF. SULLY, Brigadier General, President.

No. 20.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, April 27, 1867.

Sir: I enclose for your consideration a copy of a telegraphic despatch from
General Alfred Sully, one of the special commissioners to visit the Indian coun-
try in the neighborhood of Fort Phil. Kearney, dated at Fort Sedgwick, April
24, in which is stated the great importance of the Onepapas and other
bands of Missouri Sioux being visited by the commission, to prevent their going
to war; and the suggestion is made that the commission be divided, part to visit
the Missouri and part Laramie. That portion of the despatch relating to troops
it will be seen, is not clear; but I infer, taking it in connexion with the instruc-
tions of the department, which informed the commissioners that the various
military commanders would be directed to afford them escorts and protection,
that General Sully has reference to orders of military commanders furnishing
the escorts, which will not allow the troops to be divided.

I recommend the approval of the suggestions of the commissioners, and that
they be instructed accordingly; and further, that the War Department be re-
quested to afford escorts and protection to both parties of the commission.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.

No. 21.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, April 25, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 24,
enclosing one from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the same date, with
General Sully’s telegram of the 22d, asking if it is true that General Hancock
is driving the Cheyennes north? And to state, in reply, that this department,
having no information on the subject, has telegraphed to General Sherman. On
the receipt of his reply it shall be communicated to you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. Secretary of the Interior.
No. 22.

[Telegraphic despatch.]

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, May 3, 1867.

Brigadier General A. SULLY,
President of Commission, Fort Sedgwick, Nebraska:

Your despatch of 22d ultimo, about report of the Cheyennes being driven north by General Hancock, was referred to War Department by Secretary of the Interior. Secretary of War answers that he has no information upon the subject, but he has telegraphed General Sherman, and will communicate the reply when received.

N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner.

No. 23.

FORT SEDGWICK, COLORADO TERRITORY,
April 28, 1867.

Sir: We met a reconnoitring party of twenty Sioux from Iron Shell’s camp, on our way here. They came from the north. As their talk will give you much information about the position of the Sioux Indians north of here, we deem it important to give you here the substance of their conversation with us, which was as follows:

“We came from White river. Left the camp there. Snow very deep. Met a war party of Minneconjou returning from the Platte, who told them the whites had killed nearly all the Brulés, which stopped the balance coming. About forty lodges of Brulés and Ogallallas compose our party. They told me when I left camp if I did not return this moon they would think all was right, and would then come down. Left them about two weeks ago. Left the war party that stole the mules at Fort Mitchell, on White river. They were only six persons, and belonged to the Minneconjou. The northern Indians are all divided. A portion are encamped near the mouth of Tongue river, and part at the mouth of the Yellowstone.

“The Uncapapas went to the mouth of Yellowstone and had a fight with a fort, and after the fight had peace.

“We heard that these Indians were going east, down into the valley on the Missouri river, to make a circle and get out of the way. The Brulés are all broken up into small parties, working south. The Yanconna are near the mountain called ‘Heap of Turtle.’ The Bad Faces are at the mouth of Rosebud river. The Cheyennes further up Rosebud. The Brulés would have all come in, but they had soldiers among them who would not let them.

“The ‘Man Afraid of his Horses’ and Red Cloud are with the Bad Faces at the mouth of the Rosebud. Good many Indians would have come down this winter, but they heard in some way that soldiers were coming up to surround and fight them this winter, and they kept moving the other way to keep out of their way. The Brulés and all the little parties want peace, and have no doubt you can make peace with them when you go up.

“I was sent by my brother, Iron Shell, who is a chief, to come and find out how the whites felt. I have come, and have been well treated. If you should happen to see any Indians coming over the hills, you may know they are friendly.”

Another statement:

“Came from Horse Head creek, near the Black Hills. When we first started found plenty of buffalo, but when we got near Big Butte found none. Came
below the Black Hills. The village is coming in, but the snow is so deep that we tread slowly. When we came to the edge of Black Hills we met a party of Minneconjou who told us they had a fight with the soldiers, and nearly all the Brulé and Ogallalla Indians on the Platte were killed. Then Iron Shell did not know what to do. They wanted to come in, but were afraid. When we were ready to start, Iron Shell told us to come on and find out what the white men were going to do, and report.

"The Indians who fought at Phil. Kearney were part of the Ogallalla and Brulé Sioux; 350 lodges Minneconjou; 100 lodges Cheyennes; 100 lodges Arapahoes, and three Crows. There were no Missouri Indians present. Bel Leaf with a large number are coming to Laramie, back of the Black Hills. They will come in small parties."

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALFRED SULLY,

Brevet Brigadier General, President Commission.

No. 24.

AGENCY FOR COMANCHE AND KIOWAS INDIANS
OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Zarah, Kansas, May 2, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival at this place late last evening, from Fort Larned, where I left Major General Hancock yesterday afternoon with the remnant of his grand army, having been out with him from this place since the 6th ultimo. I am sorry to say that, in my opinion, little good, but a great deal of harm has resulted from this expedition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,

United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 25.

AGENCY COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS, UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Zarah, Kansas, May 4, 1867.

SIR: You may be somewhat surprised at not hearing from me since the 15th ultimo in relation to matters on this frontier. Up to that time I believed trouble on the plains, between the Platte and the Arkansas and south of the latter, might and would be avoided; but from the course the military soon after took, I was compelled to change my mind; and now, as war is the word between the Platte and Arkansas, I shall in this only say that my whole exertion has been and still is to prevent its spread south of the Arkansas river.

General Sherman is to meet General Hancock at Fort Harker on the 7th instant. I shall leave here to-morrow morning to be present at that post at that time, and do all in my power to protect the Indians of my agency, who, at the present time, were never more friendly. I speak of them as tribes. That there are some bad men it is true, but they can and will be controlled by the tribes. Traders who have been with them for the last two months, and just returned, report them in almost a starving condition, but perfectly docile, they now look-
The orders from the military embarrass me very much as regards my intercourse with the Indians of my agency, but I hope when I see General Sherman to have matters properly arranged. General Hancock, owing to the mistakes or mismanagement of the military at Fort Larned, has seen but two or three of the leading men of the Kiowas, and those that committed the raid into Texas last fall and sold the Box family to the officers at Fort Dodge, and have remained in the immediate vicinity of that post since, refusing to come in and give the assurances to the government that hereafter they would comply with their treaties, as required by the Hon. Secretary Browning's letter to Commissioner Cooley, of the 22d October, 1866. After my intercourse with General Sherman, I will report the result.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 26.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Atchison, Kansas, May 13, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Agent Leavenworth arrived here yesterday, direct from his agency. I had a conference with him yesterday relative to Indian affairs and military operations in the southwest. He gave me much valuable information; permitted me to peruse all the correspondence he has had with General Hancock and other military dignitaries. If his statements are correct (and I have no reason to doubt them) General Hancock's expedition, I regret to say, has resulted in no good, but, on the contrary, has been productive of much evil. It would have been far better for the interest of all concerned had he never entered the Indian country with his soldiers. Indians who, at the time he got into their country, were peaceable and well-disposed towards the whites, are now fleeing with their women and children, no one knows where to, and what the final result will be is doubtful.

In such times, and while such a state of uncertainty exists, I deemed it proper that the agents of these Indians should be at some place where they could advise and counsel with them. I so informed Agent Leavenworth, and directed that he return and put himself in communication with his Indians. This he said he would do, but in order to accomplish this he will have to proceed to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, and from that point send out runners to his Indians. Before returning he will report in detail to the department all the particulars relating to recent events connected with himself and his Indians.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

No. 27.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, May 18, 1867.

SIR: Your letter of the 13th instant is received, stating that you had had an interview with Agent Leavenworth, and after obtaining full information from him had directed him to seek his Indians, scattered since the expedition of General Hancock, and remain with them. Your action in this respect is approved. Your
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

statement that he will, before returning, "report in detail all the facts relating to recent events connected with himself and his Indians," is noticed.

This office was about to direct you to call upon Agent Leavenworth for such a report. You will state to him that while this office has received the various brief reports forwarded by him from time to time, his detailed and connected reports are necessary, and you will also direct Agent Wynkoop to the same effect. His letters of the 9th, 15th, 18th, 21st, and 24th ultimo have been received, but his detailed and connected reports should also be prepared and forwarded through your office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS MURPHY, Esq.,
Sup't Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

No. 28.

AGENCY KIOWA AND COMANCHE INDIANS OF UPPER ARKANSAS,
May 15, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith copies of a correspondence I have had with Major General W. S. Hancock, commanding the department of the Missouri. I forward these papers to the department for its information and consideration, and have to request that I may be informed if my action in the matter is approved or disapproved. General Hancock had written his letter on the 10th of March, five days before his command was published in the newspapers of the country to march, and sent it to the commanding officer of the post at Fort Larned, thirty-five miles beyond where he knew my agency had been, to a point where he must have known I was not, for I had been in correspondence with him from Washington, D. C., sending him from that city different treaties he had requested me to furnish him.

On his arrival at Fort Zarah, on the 5th of April, he requested me to accompany him on his expedition, "to show that the officers of the government were acting in harmony," not knowing of his letter of March 11, 1867. I very readily accepted his invitation, and joined his command on the morning of the 6th of April, 1867. After I reached Fort Larned I received from the commanding officer of that post General Hancock's letter. I saw at once a wrong conclusion might be inferred from the tenor of his letter, and by my joining his command it was tacitly acknowledging my "inability to arrange those matters satisfactorily." I therefore addressed him my letter of the 19th of April, 1867, and received the enclosed papers, marked from A to H. To these papers I most respectfully call the attention of the honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

The treaties with the Kiowas and Comanches require when a party is injured to make a written statement, verified by affidavit. Now what do these "grave reasons of complaints" show? There is but one affidavit in them all, and that shows conclusively that the robbery of the United States officer is false, unless he was associated with Mr. Tappan and Mr. Jones in their illicit trade, for they went individually to the Indian village with two loaded wagon to trade without a license, at least from the agent of the Kiowas; and as they were there without authority. I think they have no right or claim to make charges against these Indians, especially if it can be shown—and I think it can be—that there was whiskey in the outfit, and that the Indians got drunk and the consequences followed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

No. 28 A.

AGENCY KIOWA AND COMANCHE INDIANS OF UPPER ARKANSAS,
Camp on Pawnee Fork, April 19, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 11th ultimo, at Fort Larned, on the evening of the 6th instant.

You say in your letter, “We desire to avoid, if possible, any trouble with the Indians, and to treat them with justice, and according to the requirements of our treaties with them, and I wish especially in my dealings with them to act through the agents of the Indian department as far as it is possible to do so.

Concerning the Kiowas of your agency we have grave reasons for complaint. Among others, it is officially reported to these headquarters that that tribe has been making hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has very recently returned to Fort Dodge from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers and one white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our posts on the Arkansas; that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us; and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States army who have visited them, supposing that they were friends.

“It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague county, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family.

“If you, as their agent, can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to defer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so, I would be pleased to have you accompany me when I visit the country of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.”

General, I am extremely happy to inform you that the views expressed in your letter meet with my entire approbation, and that I shall with great pleasure co-operate with you to the extent of my power, and in order to enable me to decide my ability to “arrange these matters satisfactorily,” I have to request that you will furnish me with the official evidence, according to our treaty with them, that the Indians of my agency, or any members of either tribe, Comanches or Kiowas, have been guilty of—

1st. Of bringing from the State of Texas the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers.

2d. Of threatening our posts on the Arkansas.

3d. That they (Kiowas) are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us.

4th. That they (Kiowas) have robbed and insulted officers of the United States army.

5th. The murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Texas; the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family.

It may appear strange to you that I should make the murder of Mr. Box and the capture of his family the subject of an official inquiry, but when I inform you that I have no official information except what is contained in your letter of the 11th ultimo, you will not, I think, be surprised; and it is also well known to the general commanding that the military assumed to act in this matter without consulting the Indian department or any of its agents, in a single particular, and that you have, if I am not mistaken, informed me, “that under the circumstances no further demands would be made upon the Indians concerning this Box matter.”

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding Department of the Missouri.

Ex. Doc. 13—7
No. 28 B.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 17, near Fort Dodge, Kansas,
April 23, 1867.

Colonel: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
19th instant, in reply to my letter to you of the 11th ultimo, referring to matters
connected with the Indians of your agency.

For your information I transmit herewith official evidence concerning the fol-
lowing charges made against the Kiowas and Comanches, as requested by you:
1. “Of bringing from the State of Texas the scalps of seventeen (17)
   colored soldiers.” (See enclosed extract from a letter of Major H. Douglas,
   third United States infantry, commanding post of Fort Dodge, dated February
   1867.)

2. “Of threatening our posts on the Arkansas.” (See copy of affidavit of Mr.
   F. F. Jones, interpreter at Fort Dodge, dated February 9, 1867.)

3. “That they (the Kiowas) are about entering into a compact with the Sioux
   for hostilities against us.” (See extract from letter of Brevet Major Asbury
   Captain third United States infantry, commanding post of Fort Larned, dated
   February 27, 1867.

4. “That they (the Kiowas) had robbed and insulted officers of the United
   States army, giving time, place, and circumstances of the robbery and insults.”
   (See copy of affidavit of Mr. F. F. Jones, interpreter at Fort Dodge, Kansas,
   dated February 9, 1867.)

5. “The murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Texas, the capture and bar-
   barous treatment of the women of his family.” (See enclosed copy of statement
   of Mrs. Mathew Box to Captain A. J. Sheridan, third infantry, dated October
   20, 1866, which was generally published in the newspapers, and a written
   statement of which was furnished from headquarters department of the Missouri
   to the Hon. Secretary of the Interior, shortly after the affidavit was made; also
   copy of letter of same date (October 20, 1866) from Captain Sheridan on this
   subject.)

Lieutenant General Sherman passed along about the time of these trans-
actions and concluded this matter, but disapproved of what had been done
in ransomizing the women from the Indians. Although the Indian department
was notified of this matter, I have not heard of any action whatever being
taken by it. Any statement I may have made to you on this subject to the ef-
fect “that, under the circumstances, no further demand would be made upon
the Indians concerning the Box matter” was, I presume, verbal, the idea in-
tended to be conveyed being, that old matters of this nature would be left to
the Indian department, which claims that it should investigate such cases. I
said the same in substance, I believe, to Colonel Wynkoop in reference to the
Chalk Bluff and Zara outrages.

I have recently sent you a copy of a letter transmitted to me by General E.
O. C. Deal, dated headquarters department of the Arkansas, March 5, 1867,
in reference to the Comanches carrying off stock and a negro child from within
a few miles of Fort Arbuckle.

There is other evidence concerning these matters on file at headquarters de-
partment of the Missouri.

I am, colonel, very respectfully,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. Army, Commanding

COL. J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS,
March 11, 1867.

Colonel: I have the honor to state for your information that I am at present preparing an expedition to the plains, which will soon be ready to move. My object in doing so at this time is to convince the Indians within this department that we are able to punish any of them who may molest travellers across the plains, or who may commit other hostilities against the whites. We desire to avoid, if possible, any trouble with the Indians, and to treat them with justice and according to the requirements of our treaties with them; and I wish especially, in my dealings with them, to act through the agents of the Indian department, so far as it is possible so to do. Concerning the Kiowas of your agency, we have grave reasons for complaint—among others, it is officially reported to these headquarters that that tribe has been making hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has very recently returned to Fort Dodge from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen (17) colored soldiers, and one (1) white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our posts on the Arkansas, that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us, and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States army who have visited them supposing them to be friends.

It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague county, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family.

I desire you particularly to explain to them that one reason the government does not at once send troops against them to redress these outrages against our people is, that their Great Father is averse to commencing a war upon them (which would certainly end in destroying them) until all other means of redress fail. I request that you will inform the Indians of your agency that I will hereafter insist upon their keeping off the main routes of travel across the plains, where their presence is calculated to bring on difficulties between themselves and the whites. If you as their agent can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to defer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so, I would be pleased to have you accompany me when I visit the country of your tribe, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.

I will be pleased to talk with any of the chiefs whom we may meet.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Col. J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent for Comanches and Kiowas.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
October 20, 1866.

Sir: I have the honor to report that in accordance with the instructions given to the chiefs of the Kiowa tribe of Indians while in council at this post, that yesterday they brought in and delivered to me one woman (white) and child,
the mother and sister of the two girls recovered from the Indians by us some time ago, whom the Indians captured in Texas. I enclose the statement of Mrs. Mary Box, the mother of these three children.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ANDREW SHERIDAN,

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
In the Field, Camp No. 18, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 22, 1867.

Official:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 28 E.

Statement of Mrs. Martha Box, made to Captain Andrew J. Sheridan, third United States infantry, and brevet major United States army, commanding post, Fort Dodge, Kansas.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS, October 20, 1866.

MAJOR: My name is Mrs. Martha Box; am about forty-two years of age; was born in Gibson county, Tennessee; went to Texas when I was about eight years old; was married to James Box, in Titus county, Texas, when I was seventeen years old. After we were married we lived in Titus county three months, and then moved to Westport, Hopkins county, where we lived for a long time; all my children but one were born in Westport. About the breaking out of the late rebellion we moved to Montague county, Texas, on the extreme frontier. The cause of our moving was owing to my husband being a Union man and did not wish to fight in the rebellion. It was sometime in May, 1861, that we moved. There were five of us, all relations. While we were living in Montague county my husband learned that one of his brothers was lying at the point of death, and that another of his brothers had had a leg amputated, in Hopkins county, and that they wished to see him at once. So we started and went to Hopkins county and staid with my husband’s brothers until they were nearly well—I should say, about five weeks.

We started for home about the 10th day of August last. My husband had put a quantity of leather in our wagon to take home, there being no leather in Montague county. On our journey home it rained a great deal.

About five days after we started, and when we were within three miles of our home, my husband saw somebody on the hill whom he supposed to be one of his neighbors. He said to me, “I wish that man would come down to us, so that I could borrow his horse for our jaded one, and then we could get home faster.” I looked in the direction he pointed and said, “Why, there are three or four of them.” He then said “They are Indians! We are gone! Margaret, get my six-shooter—quick!” Margaret went to get it, and before she could give it to him the Indians came upon us and shot him in the breast. He fell over in the wagon, pulled the arrow from his breast, rose and fired at them. He was shot through the hand by an arrow. He pulled the arrow from his hand, jumped out of the wagon, and ran around to the left side of the wagon, where he fell to the ground. The Indians then scalped him twice and cut his left jaw.

They then pulled me out of the wagon by the hair of the head, robbed and took everything from the wagon. Took Josephine, Maizie, and Ida, and tied them on ponies.

They put Margaret on one, but she jumped off and ran around to her father and held him until they pulled her from him. They put Margaret back on the
pony and started off at a gallop. We travelled fourteen days, night and day, before we stopped. About eleven days after we were taken, my baby, Laura, died. They took her from me and threw her in a ravine. We travelled on until we got to the camp where all the Indians were. I staid in camp about four days with my children, when they moved me off about six miles further to another camp, where I staid until they brought me in here. I had to pack wood and water. When I delayed they would beat and whip me, and even the squaws would knock me down. I was very sick while I was with the Indians; notwithstanding, they would beat me.

It was a terrible life. They gave us nothing to eat but broiled meat; nothing whatever but that.

My husband's three brothers are still living in Texas. Wade Box lives in Johnson county, Texas; Young Box lives in Westport, Hopkins county, Texas, and John Box lives in Westport, Hopkins county, Texas. My mother, brother, and niece are living in our home in Montague county, twenty-five miles from Gainsville.

MARY MATHEW BOX.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
October 20, 1866.

I certify that the foregoing is the statement made to me of the treatment the Box family received from the Kiowa Indians in Montague county, and while in Indian camp, by Mrs. Mary Box.

ANDREW SHERIDAN,

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
In the Field, Camp No. 18, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 22, 1867.

Official:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 28 F.

Extract of Major Douglas's letter of February 7, 1867, to Major H. Asbury, third United States infantry, commanding Fort Larned, Kansas.

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P. S.—Jones reports that during his stay at the Kiowa camp, a war party arrived with the scalps of seventeen negroes and one white man, and reported that they had been to Texas; that the negroes were soldiers; that they also captured two hundred head of horses; and that there were several war parties out yet who had not returned.

* * * * * * * * * *

H. D.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
In the Field, Camp No. 18, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 22, 1867.

Official:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 28 G.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DODGE,
Kansas, February 9, 1867.

Personally appeared before me, this 9th day of February, 1867, F. F. Jones, interpreter at this post, who being duly sworn, states that—On the 27th day of
January, 1867. I left Fort Dodge, Kansas, in company with Major Page, Mr. Tappan, post sutler, and two teamsters, for the purpose of visiting the Kiona Indian camp.

We reached Mulberry creek, fifteen miles south of this post, and there encamped for the night. We there met White Bear and his wife. They informed me they were on their way to Fort Dodge for provisions, but as we had plenty to supply them they concluded to turn back with us to their own camp. On the 28th we again started, and encamped about five miles west of the Indian camp. On the morning of the 29th we started and reached the Indian camp about 11 o'clock a.m.

Immediately upon our arrival they surrounded our wagons and demanded our provisions, and soon afterwards helped themselves, taking from us one barrel of flour, besides a quantity of sugar, rice, apples, and then demanded our saddles, bridles, girths, &c. We refused. They then took what they wanted and remarked to us "that the less we said the better it would be for us." They threatened to shoot Major Page, because they said he was a soldier chief. I explained that Major Page came over to pay them a friendly visit, and that they should not harm him. They also tried to shoot Mr. Tappan, but, happening to meet them, I talked them out of it. On the same night they shot at me also and grazed my hand. On the same evening there was a party of Indians arrived from the Kiona and Comanche camp, further south, and they told us they wanted us to go over to their camp. We refused. They told us it did not make any difference whether we came or not, as they would take the teams themselves, so I agreed to go in order to save the teams.

On the morning of the 30th Major Page and Mr. Tappan told me they intended starting for Fort Dodge, and shortly thereafter I proceeded towards the second camp, which, after camping for the night, we reached next morning about 11 o'clock; then they ordered us to unload the wagons. Immediately after the wagons were unloaded they all came around and helped themselves. That which they did not take we traded for a few old robes.

They also took from us here one of our best mules. On the morning of the 31st we started for the camp we had left the previous day, which we reached on the same evening. Satanta—White Bear—told me to inform the commanding officer at Fort Dodge that he wanted all the military posts and troops removed from this country immediately; he also wanted the Santa Fé road stopped at Council Grove; he wanted the mail coach stopped running; he wanted the railroad stopped at Junction City; and if the roads were not stopped and the posts and troops moved he would take his force and, in company with other Indians, help to move them.

He said his stock was getting poor and tired, and he wanted the government stock fed up a little better than it was, for he would be over in a few days for it.

On the morning of the 1st of February I started for Fort Dodge, which post I reached on the 7th day of February, expecting to find Major Page and Mr. Tappan there.

F. F. JONES.

Sworn and subscribed before me, this 9th day of February, 1867.

G. A. HESSELBERGER,
Second Lieutenant Third Infantry, Post Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
In the Field, Camp No. 18, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 22, 1867.

Official copy:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
No. 28 H.

Extract of Brevet Major Asbury's letter of February 27, 1867, to the assistant adjutant general district of Upper Arkansas.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * 

A band of Sioux crossed the Arkansas river going south a few days ago, between this post and Fort Dodge, for the purpose, it is understood, of having a "talk" with the tribes belonging to that region, probably to determine the time for an outbreak.

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I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY ASBURY,
Brevet Major U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
In the Field, Camp No. 18, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 22, 1867.

Official:
W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 29.

AGENCY COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS OF UPPER ARKANSAS,
Leavenworth, May 16, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter from Captain E. L. Smith, nineteenth United States infantry and brevet major United States army, to Colonel O. D. Green, assistant adjutant general department of Arkansas, Little Rock, Arkansas, and would most respectfully ask the honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to examine this letter, particularly the indorsement of Brigadier General Ord. He acknowledges the fact that military posts "demoralize them (the Indians) more than anything else, except money and whiskey." This is true to the letter, in my opinion; and that opinion has not been formed hastily or from theory, but from a life-long experience, not only on the frontier, but with the Indians in their camps, and years of service in the army. Whiskey, sir, will, in some form or other, prostitute the fairest virtue of the Indian maiden, and next to this is the association formed at military posts, not alone with the enlisted men—but I say it with pain—with very many of the commissioned officers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
Hon N. G. TAYLOR,
United States Indian Agent.

No. 29 A.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NINETEENTH U. S. INFANTRY,
Fort Arbuckle, C. T., February 16, 1867.

Colonel: I have the honor to state that previous to my arrival here a roving band of Indians had made a raid in the vicinity, carrying off stock, chiefly horses, and a negro child, from within a few miles of the post. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Hart, commanding, sent in pursuit the Caddo Indian scouts,
who, after more than a week's absence, returned without any intelligence as to the number, tribe, or probable course of the robbers. I had just learned from Horace C. Jones, (white man,) who is an old resident, and has for some years acted as interpreter for many of the tribes of Indians on this frontier, that the band consisted of twenty-five (25) Comanches, belonging to the Cashetopetka tribe, (Buffalo Eaters,) the head chief being Marwha. About two weeks after these depredations here they were met in the neighborhood of Fort Cobb, and gave chase to Samuel Paul and Dr. J. J. Stearn, (white,) the latter being the issuing commissary of the Reserve Comanches, who are reported friendly. The men were saved by the aid of Toschowa, head chief of the Reserve Comanches.

This chief also recovered five (5) of the horses which had been taken from the vicinity, but failed in his efforts to regain the captured negro child. These facts were obtained by Mr. Jones from Toschowa himself, who requested they might be made known to these headquarters. In this affair Toschowa was brought in collision with the Indians of his own tribe, with whom he had formerly acted, and he felt the necessity of avoiding an open rupture. His conduct displays admirable discretion under the circumstances.

I have the honor to state further that several other tribes than the Comanches have been noticed on the war-path, having been seen in their progress in unusual numbers, and without their squaws and children, a fact to which much significance is attached by those conversant with Indian usages. It is thought by many white residents of the Territory that some of these tribes may be acting in concert, and that plundering incursions at least are in contemplation. George Washington, second chief of the Caddoes, a friendly tribe, is of the opinion that the wild Comanches are bent upon mischief.

Since the date of the treaty made at the mouth of the Little Arkansas, I believe on the 6th of October, 1865, in which the Cashetopetka Comanches joined, these and other contracting parties to the treaty have carried off a large amount of stock, in violation of its provisions, and have slain and made captive many white persons, held in speculation to be ransomed. The practice of the government of condoning (pardonning, perhaps) these offences by the payment of liberal sums, has had the natural effect of encouraging this inhuman traffic among the Indians, and every day of its continuance adds difficulties to the return to what I deem a wiser and sterner policy, and one that would ultimately be the most humane.

My inexperience in the exigencies of the frontier causes me to defer to the views of such sensible white residents and others as, from long residence among the Indians, are competent to advise, and this communication, while it expresses my own, is more particularly the embodiment of their views.

In a communication made on the 12th instant I had the honor to apply for ten (10) additional companies to re-enforce this post, and I now respectfully suggest the subject-matter of this communication as additional reason for the proposed re-enforcement.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. L. SMITH,

Colonel O. D. GREEN,
A. A. G. Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, Ark.

Official copy, respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, Indian agent:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant General.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

[Endorsements.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARKANSAS,
March 5, 1867.

From the fact that these Indians steal from these frontiers, and have supplied themselves with caballadas, that they sell and supply horses to the northern Indians on the railroad and mail route, I think it important to put a stop to their wholesale plundering. I propose building posts in their country, as that demoralizes them more than anything else, except money and whiskey.

Respectfully forwarded:

E. O. C. ORD,
Brigadier General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, March 14, 1867.

Respectfully referred to the commanding general, department of the Missouri, for his action in the premises.

By order of Lieutenant General Sherman:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

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No. 30.

AGENCY COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS OF UPPER ARKANSAS,
Leavenworth City, May 16, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith my letter of the 10th ultimo, addressed to Major General Hancock, commanding the department of the Missouri, together with his reply of the 11th April, 1867.

This order bears equally upon all Indians within this large district, no matter what may be the situation or disposition of the same.

Within the limits of this district large numbers of what are called "wild Indians" live, and depend mostly for subsistence for themselves and families upon game.

Heretofore the buffalo was their whole dependence, and when other game was killed it was more for sport than necessity. Now it is otherwise; the buffalo has greatly decreased in number, and is fast disappearing, and the "red man" finds himself compelled to look to other sources for food. The small game becomes important to him, and, he says, without ammunition he must starve, or seek other sources to sustain himself and those whom nature requires him to support.

Two traders, lately from some two hundred miles north of the Big Bend of the Arkansas, report to me the Indians of that country in almost a starving condition, living upon the old carcasses of buffalo killed last fall and during the winter, and upon roots. On their trip up they did not see fifty head of buffalo. If the Indians cannot get ammunition in small quantities sufficient to kill small game for subsistence, what are they to do? It is impossible for me to tell you the hardship this order works. Cannot something be done about it?

As I have heretofore sent General Hancock's Field Order No. 1, I enclose herewith his Field Order No. 2, and will again assure the department that there is no cause of complaint from the Indians of my agency, except those who raided into Texas last fall, and sold their captives to the military at Fort Dodge, as has been reported to the department, (see Agent Taylor's report, September 25, 1866,) and who have remained at or near that post since, depending on that point for trade and support.
The great body of Kiowas, and all the Comanches, have remained on our great lines of travel, and at their camps near the Salt plains.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 30 A.

AGENCY COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS OF UPPER ARKANSAS.
Fort Larned, Kansas, April 10, 1867.

SIR: I have received the following order through the commanding officer at Fort Dodge, Kansas:

[General Orders No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Riley, Kansas, January 26, 1867.

It having been officially reported to the major general commanding the department that arms and ammunition have been sold or given away to Indians without permits from the Indian agents, post commanders are hereby ordered to prevent any further sales or gifts of arms or ammunition to Indians in this district.

By command of Brevet Major General A. J. Smith:

HENRY E. NOYES,

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding Department of the Missouri.

No. 30 B.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
In the Field, Camp No. 11, near Fort Larned, April 11, 1867.

COLONEL: In reply to your communication of the 10th instant, I have the honor to state, that the order from headquarters district of the Upper Arkansas referred to by you, has the sanction of myself, of Lieutenant General Sherman, and of General Grant, as has been published and widely circulated. It was based upon a recent official report, received from Major H. Dougla, third United States infantry, commanding at Fort Dodge, in which it was stated that large bands of Indians had passed that post, all of whom were supplied with such abundance that some of them had three (3) revolvers; and further stated that they were abundantly supplied with ammunition.

No change can be made in the order in question, unless by reference to Lieutenant General Sherman, or higher authority; or unless it should be found that the report of Major Douglas concerning this matter is inaccurate.

A copy of General Field Orders No. 1, U. S. C. S., from these headquarters furnishes, as requested by you.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. A. Commanding.

Colonel J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent, Fort Larned, Kansas.
INDIAN HOSTILITIES.

No. 30 C.

[General Field Orders No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

In the Field, Camp No. 11, near Fort Larned, Kansas, April 9, 1867.

I. Chiefs of the Arapahoes, Kiowas, Cheyennes, and possibly of other tribes, have assembled frequently at or near certain posts on the Arkansas and Smoky Hill, and have, in manner and word, by message and verbally, to the commanders and other officers, threatened to interrupt the use by our people of the public road, and have notified them to leave. Unless these things are checked, they will result in war; the Indians will believe we are afraid of them. On a recurrence of similar cases, the commanding officers of posts and detachments are directed to punish on the spot such offenders, and to proceed against the tribes in question without delay.

In case of depredations by Indians, driving off stock, &c., a pursuit will be made at once, in order to arrest and punish the perpetrators, and to determine with certainty the tribe to which they belong. If necessary, a guide, or "tracker," may be employed, to assist in the pursuit. Indians may be engaged for this purpose, but they should be of a different tribe from that which has committed the depredations.

Hereafter, in case of hostilities by Indians, no peace will be made with them, unless by reference to these headquarters.

By command of Major General Hancock:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.

Official copy, respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel Leavenworth, United States Indian agent.

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.

No. 30 D.

[General Orders No. 4.]

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
February 2, 1867.

I. The following General Order from headquarters, district of the Upper Arkansas, received this day, is published for the information of all concerned:

[General Orders No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Riley, Kansas, January 26, 1867.

It having been officially reported to the major general commanding the department that arms and ammunition have been sold or given away to Indians, or furnished from the Indian agents, post commanders are hereby ordered to prevent any further sales or gifts of arms or ammunition to Indians in this district until further orders.

By command of Brevet Major General A. J. Smith:

HENRY E. NOYES,
Capt. 2d Cav., Brevet Major U. S. A., A. A. A. G.
II. All traders who are trading, or who design to trade, with Arapahos, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Comanches, or Apaches, or any other Indians in the vicinity of this post, are hereby warned to desist from the sale or gift of arms and ammunition, under penalty of subjecting their persons and goods to seizure.

III. The officers and soldiers of this command are hereby enjoined to do all in their power to prevent the sale of arms and ammunition to Indians. It will be their duty to impart promptly to the commanding officer any information they may obtain of arms or ammunition sold, or designed to be sold, or in any way supplied to Indians.

IV. No trader's outfit will be allowed to leave or pass this post without thorough inspection. The duty of inspecting will devolve upon the officer of the day, and the guard will be instructed to stop all wagons, with exception of government trains, and report their arrival to the officer of the day.

By order of Major Henry Douglas:

G. A. HESSELBERGER,
Second Lieut. 3d U. S. Inf., Post Adjutant.

Copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian agent, Fort Zarah, Kansas.

No. 30 E.

I have to respectfully request that you will inform me if the above order is still in force; and if so, to inform me under what law, or by what authority, the said order was issued, and also if the same has been modified in any manner whatever. I have also to request that I may be furnished with a copy of Field Orders No. 1, and dated March 26, 1867.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL.

No. 31.

St. Louis, Mo., May 22, 1867.

Sir: On the 4th instant I wrote you from Fort Zarah, Kansas, that Lieutenant General Sherman was expected at Fort Harker on the 7th, at which place I proposed to see him. His non-arrival necessitated my going to Fort Leavenworth, at which place I met him on the 11th, but, after a very short interview, I became satisfied "all Indian matters" were now left exclusively with General Hancock, and, as I supposed I knew his views, I made up my mind things pertaining to the Indians would have to take their course. I went immediately to Atchison, and consulted Superintendent Murphy as to the policy best to be pursued towards the Indians south of the Arkansas river. As no regard is paid by the military to our treaties with the Indians, and as the Indians of my agency were far south, and I could not communicate with them directly from Forts Larmee or Zarah, I informed Superintendent Murphy I should adopt the same plan I did in 1864 and 1865, which met with his entire approbation; and which was, going to the mouth of Little Arkansas, and from there sending reliable messengers, accompanied by some of the To-woc-a-roc, Wycoos, or some of the other friendly refugee Indians, that I am well acquainted with, with instructions to the Kiowas and Comanches to stay away from the Santa Fé road, but as near the Salt plains as they could procure subsistence, until I could meet the chiefs and headmen, as circumstances would permit, on the Cow-skin, Miniekaew, Shikaski, or on Bluff creek.
My runners have gone to them, and, as soon as I can see what is to be done about the annuity goods, I shall go and meet them; but when I do so, I wish to be prepared to tell them just what they can depend upon. Lieutenant General Sherman finished up his trip west by going to Fort Harker, and on his return I met him on the train I came to St. Louis on. He informs me, and I am most happy to communicate the fact to the department, that the Indians of my agency, “Kiowas and Comanches, are all right.” I cannot make any statement more gratifying, except that this letter will close my correspondence, so far as Major General Hancock’s Indian expedition is concerned, unless something of importance turns up.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D C.

No. 32.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, May 28, 1867.

Sir: This office is in receipt of a letter from Agent Leavenworth, dated May 22, in which he states that he had informed you that he should go to the north of the Little Arkansas, and from there send messengers to his band, telling them to keep away from the Santa Fé road, but expecting to meet their chiefs at some future day “on the Cowskin, Mineskaw, Shikaski, or on Bluff creek;” and he desires definite instructions as to what he shall say to the chiefs.

Presuming that the instructions desired have special reference to the subject of the distribution of annuity goods, and in the hope that you may be able soon to communicate with him, the following instructions are presented, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior:

You will instruct both Agent Leavenworth and Agent Wynkoop that they will take the same course as last year in regard to delivery of annuity goods—that is, they will not deliver any goods to bands which have committed hostilities, but will cause them to be stored at some safe place, under protection of the military, until it can be ascertained which bands, if any, have remained peaceable. If a part have kept their pledges of peace, and a part been hostile, all of the goods will be delivered to those who have remained peaceable. No goods will be given to any bands who retain any captive citizens in their possession whom they refuse or fail to deliver; but the agents are authorized to use their discretion as to the distribution of goods to bands which may have been to some extent hostile, provided they shall restore any captives held by them, make restitution of property taken, and promise good conduct in future, if, under the circumstances, there shall exist good reason for believing that such promises will be observed.

A copy of these instructions will be sent to the Secretary of the Interior, with the request that they may be communicated to the War Department, so that the military officers at the various posts may be advised of the course which is intended to be pursued.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner.

THOMAS MURPHY, Esq.,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, May 27, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a circular issued by the superintendent of the United States Express Company to their employés on the Smoky Hill route from Fort Harker to Denver City. I would call your attention particularly to the paragraph marked, viz: "If Indians come within shooting distance shoot them; show them no mercy, for they will show you none." I am credibly informed that General Hancock has issued similar orders to commandants of all posts in his district, and has virtually declared war upon all Indians found north of the Arkansas and south of the Platte rivers.

According to existing treaty stipulations the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches have permission to live in and roam over the country lying between these two rivers until the President orders their removal to reservations selected for them. If the government countenances these arbitrary acts of military commanders and superintendents of express companies in violating treaties, it is unreasonable to expect that the Indians will keep their part of those treaties. If this condition of affairs is permitted to exist much longer, every effort that has been made during the past two years by the civil officers of the government to promote peace and friendship among these Indians, and to prevent depredations, will have been utterly in vain; and it is but reasonable to expect that an Indian war of gigantic proportions will ensue, which will astonish the American people and cost millions of treasure.

In view of these facts, I respectfully request that you will take such immediate steps as will, in your judgment, the soonest and most effectually put a stop to these arbitrary and cruel orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

No. 33 A.

OFFICE UNITED STATES EXPRESS COMPANY,
(Denver Division,) St. Louis, May 18, 1867.

To Agents and Employés:

General Hancock, commanding department of the Missouri, will at once place a sufficient number of soldiers at each station, from Lookout to Lake, inclusive, for your and our mutual protection. You are instructed to carry mail matter and communications from the officers and men to the several posts and commandants—to deliver them promptly and with certainty. You will also carry to the amount of two hundred pounds of rations for soldiers between stations when required; furnish transportation for all soldiers on regular coaches on proper authority, in writing, from the commanding officers of the several posts, and will not furnish without, under any circumstances; neither encourage nor countenance desertions in any form.

You will hold no communication with Indians whatsoever; if they wish "talk," they must go to the regular posts. If Indians come within shooting distance, shoot them; show them no mercy, for they will show you none. You must be watchful; when you have so many at each station, one must constantly on guard, day and night, and at all hours. In this watchfulness you will save your stations from being fired, and can prepare yourself for any dan-
ger. You will also report to either Fort Hayes, Fort Wallace, or posts that will be established, whichever is nearest to you, all depredations as they may occur, and to your division agent, without exaggeration. General Hancock will protect you and our property, but requires, as we do, your vigilance and hearty co-operation.

W. H. COTTRILL, Superintendent.

No. 34.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

SIR: The accompanying communication from General J. B. Sanborn, special Indian commissioner, dated Fort Laramie, May 18, 1867, is referred for your information, and is to be returned to the department for presentation to the President to-morrow, the 31st instant. If you desire it, a copy may be taken of the letter for the use of your office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. OTTO, Acting Secretary.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

No. 34 A.

FORT LARAMIE, D. T., May 18, 1867.

DEAR SIR: The operations of General Hancock against the Cheyenne Indians have been so disastrous to the public interests, and at the same time seem to me to be so inhuman, that I deem it proper to communicate my views to you on the subject.

Permit me to premise by saying that I have the highest appreciation of the services and character of General Hancock and his subordinates, and shall say nothing with a view of injuring them or marring their well-earned fame, but write with the sole view of subserving the public interests.

You will recollect that my information and acquaintance with the Cheyenne tribe is somewhat extensive, having campaigned against and made treaties with them in the summer and autumn of 1865.

This tribe of Indians had been allies of the government, and had done more to make travel and transportation across the plains safe than any other class of people, up to August, 1864, when by being cursed and driven away from trains to which they had returned cattle that had been stampeded in storm, without food, presents, or compensation, which they had been accustomed to receive in such cases for many years, and by having several of their young men killed by Colorado troops because they took back a pony from a ranchman, who, in violation of law, had taken him from a drunken Indian in payment of a pint bottle of whiskey, they or some of the young men went to war.

Notwithstanding these outrages upon them, the head chiefs gathered all their people possible, bought from the hostile Indians all the captives possible, and at great expense in ponies, and proceeded to Fort Lyon and surrendered them, and offered to do anything in their power to restore friendly relations.

The commanding officer at the post guaranteed them protection, designated a place for them to camp on Sand Creek while the chiefs and young men were absent to bring in the hostile and procure food for their people, and gave them a United States flag to indicate their friendship and insure their protection.

While thus encamped, and at a moment of their feeling of greatest security,
with a few chiefs who had always been the firm friends of the whites—some old men and many women and children present—a body of United States troops seen by them approaching, presumed by them to be on a friendly mission of course. White Antelope, who had made himself a servant of the whites on the plains, stepped out apparently to greet and welcome the troops. As he did, instead of beholding friends, he saw the line halt, and in obedience to orders, preparation made to fire. He raised his hands to his face and was shot like a dog, and the massacre of women and children commenced. Some twelve old men and about one hundred and fifty women and children were put to death by the troops. Helpless infancy and decrepit age shared the same fate. Women were scalped, disembowelled, and unseemly parts cut from their places and borne off on the pummels of saddles or bridles of horses. Some of the few captured children, after they had been carried many miles with the troops, were taken from the wagons and their brains beaten out.

This tribe is again in trouble, and how has it been brought about? General Hancock, in his speech to the head-men on the 16th ultim, used the following language to them, as reported in the Army and Navy Journal: "I intend not only to visit you here, but my troops will remain among you to see that the peace and safety of the plains is preserved. I am going to visit you in your camps!" It is true that there is nothing wrong in these words, in themselves considered, and there are many tribes of Indians who would have heard them with delight and hailed a visit from the troops with joy; but to the Cheyennes these words were words of war. They could see nothing in the execution of the promise therein contained but murder and scalped women and children, captured ponies and burned villages. There were in the tribe wives of chiefs who had not less than twelve scars of bullet wounds from shots received at Sand Creek while lying upon the ground and imploring mercy on account of their sex, and were left for dead, but came to life. How, then, does the case stand? Is it not in this wise? "You Indians permitted our army to visit your villages, supposing it friendly, and we killed your women and children and old men, captured and drove away your ponies, burned your lodges. Now we are going to visit your village again, and if you do not trust us, and dare leave before our arrival, we will burn it up and wage a war of extermination against you." Thus stands the case; and for a mighty nation like us to be carrying on a war with a few staggering nomads, under such circumstances, is a spectacle most humiliating, an injustice unparalleled, a national crime most revolting, that must, sooner or later, bring down upon us or our posterity the judgment of Heaven.

It is true that horses have been stolen, ranches burned, and men killed, in the region in which these Indians hunt, but in what part of our country have such crimes been committed? and they are little, if any, more frequent in occurrence in this Indian country than in other places having the same number of people. Holding states, nations, or tribes responsible for crimes committed, has been abandoned for many years, and there seems no reason for applying that rule in this case.

But as loudly as Christianity, mercy, and humanity call for peace with a people who can be forever kept quiet with a tithe of the expense of even a small military expedition, sound policy calls still more loudly. The whole object sought or desired to be obtained by the government in its dealings with the Indians of the plains is supposed to be safety of travel and transportation to and from the mountains. Can this result be secured by war! Reason and observation unite their voices in answering No.

He who argues that the safety of travel and transportation is secured by war, argues that a hostile country is safer for its enemies than a friendly one is for its friends. This is an absurdity. In peace alone does the traveller on the plains find safety.
But some war policy man may say, We wage war to secure permanent peace. No Indian war has ever thus resulted, and in the nature of things cannot so result; for the Indians have no permanent villages, no base of supplies, and no strategic points.

That they can be driven from their country and from the plains is true, but only after all animals upon which they subsist were so far destroyed that the Indian can no longer find food; for, adding the reason of the man to the instinct of all animals to secure their own safety from destruction by all possible means, he will, of course, be the last to be destroyed; and while life lasts, and war continues against him, he will steal the property and take the life of the whites on every favorable occasion.

War against them is, then, the most absurd, expensive and ridiculous policy. Pursuing them with a command sufficiently large, only one or two can occasionally be seen; while with a small command, they are wont to mass and destroy it. And with a country some thousand or fifteen hundred miles square for them to roam over, unfit for settlement or occupation by civilized men, they cannot, though few in number, be destroyed in many years.

The war policy is not urged by general public sentiment of the country, but furiously urged by ranchmen on the plains, army contractors, and some of the army officers, who in this matter, at the present time, seem to be ruled and controlled by the ranchmen and contractors.

Military posts in the Indian country, which used always to be the refuge of the peaceful Indians in time of war, in some instances now refuse to afford any protection to the innocent, and the Indians flee from them as from a pestilence.

Army officers of high grade openly proclaim their intentions to shoot down any Indian that they see, and say that they instruct their men to do likewise.

I do therefore most earnestly urge that no new wars shall be commenced. If Indians are dissatisfied, satisfy them with most liberal presents. Above all do I urge, that either your department issue a circular, or the War Department an order, defining the rights of the Indians while in their own country, and the relations sustained by them to the whites, as expressed and established by our Supreme Court, for the use of the army, whose officers seem to be all at sea on this subject.

We should easily have secured a general peace had it not been for the trouble with the Cheyennes. We may prevent general war still. Operations against the Cheyennes should immediately cease, and commissioners be sent them; otherwise our mining interests, railroad interests of the plains, and all our interests in the mountains will suffer terribly, only to gratify the whims or caprice of some men and officers who have openly proclaimed that we must have a general Indian war and an extermination of the race.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. SANBORN,

Late Maj. Gen. Volunteers, Special Indian Agent.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,

Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C.

No. 35.

OLD FORT SULLY, June 1, 1867.

HONORABLE SIR: In accordance with the instructions received in the letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated 2d March, 1867, by which I was appointed special commissioner to visit all the Indian tribes on the Missouri river, both on the north and south side of it, &c., and to correspond with the

Ex. Doc. 13—8
Indian Bureau, I have the honor and take this present opportunity to address to you the following communication:

I left St. Louis on the 12th of April, via Chicago, and hence by the north-west railroad for Omaha. At Boonsboro we were detained three days; the sudden melting of the snows had swollen the rivers and creeks, and the spring floods had carried off the bridges and inundated the railroad track in several parts, rendering it impassable. On the 16th the cars proceeded to Dennison, a distance of 90 miles, where I hired a wagon and continued on my way to Sioux City, one hundred miles. On the 30th I took my passage on the steamer Gideon, in company with the Yancton chiefs, their companions, the Brule and others. We arrived at the Yancton agency after six days' progress, 260 miles.

I need not dwell on the good and friendly dispositions of all the chiefs composing the various deputations, under the fostering care of their worthy agents. Their trip to Washington has had a most happy result, and bears evidence of proving very beneficial and lasting. The Yanctons, in this upper portion of the country, set the example to the other Sioux tribes. They like agriculture; they go cheerfully to work, in which they are much encouraged by their worthy agent, and their farmer, who spare no trouble to assist them in their various avocations of labor.

On the 17th of May the Big Horn, after thirty-three days' navigation from St. Louis, arrived at the Yancton agency and landed my wagon, my three animals, and the little stock of provisions for my trip.

On the 21st, I left the agency, by land, with an interpreter well recommended, the son of old Zephyr Rencontre, Mr. Joseph Picotte as assistant, very favorably known among the Indian tribes, and a half-breed horse-guard. I met several Indian bands and families, all friendly and well disposed towards the whites.

On the 26th I arrived at Fort Thompson. I found over one hundred Indian lodges encamped, chiefly of Brulés, Two Kettles and Yanctonnais. The next day I held a council with the chiefs and braves. The principal chiefs were the Iron Nation, the Iron Eyes, the Two Lances, White Hawk, the Bone Neccloth, and the White Bear. I explained to them in full length the benign views of government in their regard, the absolute necessity of keeping aloof from the hostile bands, and to continue at peace with the whites for the security and welfare of their families. The council lasted several hours, and to all appearance had a happy effect. In their speeches and replies they made the most solemn promises to listen to the advice of their Great Father, (the President) and remain at peace with the whites. They declared at the same time that their critical situation and dread of their own people, now on the war path, would receive constantly insulting and threatening menaces.

The above bands express a great desire to imitate the example of their Yancton brethren, and, like them, "to stir up the ground, to nourish their women and children. They trust their Great Father will take pity on them and assist them in their need." I remained two days among them.

On the 29th I proceeded on my way, and arrived at old Fort Sully on the 30th. Over two hundred lodges were on the spot, consisting principally of the Two Kettle bands, Blackfeet Sioux, Brulés, Yanctonnais, Yanctons, Sans-Arcs, Minneconjou and Ogallallas. The next day I held a long council with them, which was attended by over twenty-four chieftains. The principal chiefs were the "Great Mandan," the man who serves as a shield; the "Fire Heart," the man who kills the first; the "Iron Horn," the "Yellow Hawk" and the "Red-tail Eagle." Like at Thompson, I made them acquainted with the object of my visit, in accordance with the instructions I have received. All their answers and speeches were very favorable, expressing a strong determination of peace and the whites. All these portions of tribes express the greatest desire to be placed on reserves for the cultivation of the soil; and, until the fields would...
yield them plenty, they intend to rove peaceably over the prairies in quest of

From all I have observed and learned among the Indians at Thompson and Sully, I entertain no doubt of their good disposition towards the whites. Fatherly and kind agents, with proper attendants, will always effect great good among these poor and benighted people. They look to the government for protection and assistance, of which they stand much in need.

The chief Long Mandan, who was in Washington lately, sent out six young warriors to carry the words of their Great Father to the hostile bands in the plains; at the same time to apprise them of my presence in the country, and my earnest desire to meet them. They may soon bring back the answer of the enemy. I trust it may be favorable, and that I shall be allowed to meet him in his own camp. The return of the six Indians must regulate my immediate and future course. I shall deem it my duty to inform you on the first occasion.

With the highest consideration of respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, honorable sir, your humble and obedient servant,

P. T. DE SMET, S. T.

P. S.—Before closing my letter I am happy to learn that on the 4th instant, General Sully will be at his old post and hold a conference with the Indians. The general's experience in the country is great, and he stands high in the opinion of the Indians. His advice and direction will be of great value to me in carrying out the views of government.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior:

Twelve (12) chiefs and three hundred (300) Ogallallas and Brulé Sioux, representing two hundred (200) lodges, came in here yesterday. They say they will remain at peace and join Spotted Tail. They report all the northern Indians have abandoned hostilities and will arrange for peace.

JOHN B. SANBORN,
Special Indian Commissioner.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that on the 12th and 13th instants we held councils with the chiefs, headmen, and warriors of the hostile portion of the Ogallalla and Brulé bands of Sioux Indians. Some Minneconjou were present, but that band was not duly represented. These three bands, with the northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, comprise all the Indians, with few exceptions, that participated in the massacre at Fort Phil. Kearney, and the hostile Indians of the northwest. These Indians affirmed that the Minneconjou, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes would follow any policy or course adopted by them. They also stated that they were badly punished at the Phil. Kearney massacre, poor and tired of the war, and willing to make peace and keep it. We required all that were earnestly in favor of peace to leave their country and go to the vicinity of the forks of the Platte. We feel confident that about one hundred and fifty
lodges of the two hundred represented will go, and many more may go. This will weaken and discourage the hostile Indians so much that they will not hold out any more.

The Indians made urgent appeals for powder, but we refused to allow them any. Our firmness in this respect, and kindness at the same time in other matters, seemed to have a favorable effect upon them. Friendly chiefs Big Mouth and Spotted Tail made strong peace speeches to the hostile, with marked effect, and they went away resolved to abandon war. Time must test their sincerity and firmness. Red Leaf and the other chiefs promised to see the chiefs of the northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and of the Minneconjous, as soon as they get back to their country, and induce them if possible to come in here and make peace. They stated they would be back or send messengers in thirty days. We promised them that Commissioner Beauvais should remain here to meet and counsel with them at that time. He will remain accordingly. I shall now leave for the east.

The Indians still strenuously object to the Powder River road, and say it destroys their only reliable hunting ground, but stated they did not want to fight any more, and did not know what they could do about it. We proposed to them to have one of the chiefs of each band and one leading soldier visit Washington in the fall, and make a final treaty in regard to it. To this they did not respond further than to say they would deliberate upon it and make up their minds.

We have arranged to have chief Big Mouth move his village, numbering about seventy-five lodges, to the vicinity of the forks of the Platte, and join Spotted Tail.

General Sherman informed us yesterday that chief Pawnee Killer, with about fifty lodges, (Ogallalla Sioux with the southern Cheyennes,) had offered to come in with his people to Fort McPherson, and join Spotted Tail. He was permitted to do so by General Sherman upon our recommendation. All these additions will increase the number with Spotted Tail to about five hundred lodges.

The commissary here has been unable to supply us with rations either for Big Mouth's village or the Indians in council, from want of stores, and there has been a very scant supply in the country. But we have purchased beef and corn and some coffee and sugar. This condition has greatly increased our expenses. We have issued since we have been here, mostly for subsistence, vouchers to the following parties, at the date and for the amounts named:

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Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. SANBORN,
Special Indian Commissioner, President pro tempore of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 38. FORT RICE, June 16, 1867.

SIR: A boat just about leaving gives me the opportunity of writing you to inform you of our whereabouts. We reached here to-day, found over 500 lodges of the two hundred represented will go, and many more may go. This will weaken and discourage the hostile Indians so much that they will not hold out any more.
of Upper Sioux waiting for us, and hear many more are on their way, in which we will see. Our meeting here will be of much importance. I will send you a full report of the same if it is so. I have no time to write you at present except in this semi-official manner.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,

Brevet Brigadier General, President of Commission.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE, YANCTON, D. T., June 17, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to enclose the report of Special United States Agent General Charles T. Campbell, dated June 13, 1867. Having distributed the Indian goods intrusted to him in the autumn of 1866 among the Sioux of the Upper Missouri, I have deemed it proper to require him to report to you in person at Washington for further orders.

This course I have adopted specially because it is, in my opinion, important for him to communicate more fully to you his knowledge of the present condition and wants of the tribes above referred to. You will find his report full of practical views and valuable recommendations.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

A. I. FAULK,
Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

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YANCTON, D. T., June 13, 1867

SIR: I arrived at the Crow Creek agency 29th of May last. I found, owing to the want of implements and the wet season, very little progress made in ploughing. What was ploughed was very readily planted by the Indians, who seem anxious to go ahead with their farming. The want of the saw-mill is a great obstacle in the way of their progress, and I would recommend its early repair. There were at the agency about 150 lodges anxiously waiting for the arrival of the farming implements, and the ground to be ploughed. Owing to this want and the wet season, there will be but little progress made this year in farming at the Crow Creek agency.

I arrived at old Fort Sully June 1, instant. I found there about 220 lodge of the different bands belonging there; they were waiting the coming of the farming implements and the distribution of the balance of their goods, which was done the following day, satisfactorily to them and myself; all were issued as equally as possible. There remained on hand a portion of the Ogallalla goods which I shipped to Fort Rice for Major Hanson, or any other agent, to distribute to the Ogallallas that may be there at the next distribution. This was satisfactory to the 28 lodges that were at Fort Sully (old.)

These Indians are in excellent condition at present and are satisfied with what has been and will be done for them, except that they have been again disappointed in getting their ground ready in time for planting, and that they have to depend upon hunting for subsistence while the crops are growing. Major Hanson, immediately after the arrival of the farming implements, sent them six yoke of cattle and wagons, with ploughs sufficient, which have arrived by this time, as I met them going up when on my way to this place. I urged upon the department in my report of last February, and others previously made, the
The great necessity of having, early in the spring, the cattle and implements of ground, ready for work when the season opened; a week longer delay would certainly have put an end to farming operations and found the Indians scattered over the prairie.

The visit of the headmen and chiefs of these bands to Washington has had a most extraordinary effect upon them and their bands. They acknowledged their former erroneous opinion with regard to their position and power, and the intentions of the white man and his government; they feel satisfied what has been done is for their benefit. I now feel satisfied that if the hostile Indians could be compelled to leave their present haunts and return to their respective bands, they could all be located on the banks of the Missouri, and in a few years be self-sustaining.

The change for the better in these Indians since 1863 is greater than in any civilized or uncivilized people in the same time whose history I am conversant with.

The appearance among them again of Father —— has an astonishing influence; they adopt his religion, made plain to them by his peculiar zeal and manner of instruction; they adhere to it and wear with pride the medal of the Holy Cross as a charm that may lead them to good acts, knowledge and happiness.

I must again urge the great necessity of making reservations for these Indians immediately. They have now under the treaty, most of them, designated their locations, and are now occupying them; they have selected very judiciously the best lands for planting, with sufficient timber and water; really no better soil exists than it is. As it is, these lands are subject to destruction by everybody who chooses to use them; it is the constant complaint of the Indians, and various to them, to see their timber destroyed, and locations made upon what they are guaranteed by the treaties to hold forever; to prevent this it is highly necessary to have positive landmarks here as well as anywhere else for the same purpose.

By making these reservations you would have four Indian reservations nearly joining each other on the Missouri river, upon which there would be ample room for the whole nine bands of Dacotah Sioux.

Whilst these Indians are being located and commencing their new pursuits, it will be necessary beyond any doubt, to enable them to more successfully progress, that part of their annuity be expended in the purchase of subsistence for them during the summer months, (if no further appropriation can be made, which I would recommend.) This they wish and ask for; their complaint that they are not able to live without hunting during the planting season would then cease: and if instructions be given to the agents to issue to none but those who work, they would soon see the advantage of a little industry.

At the Yancton agency everything looks prosperous and happy. Their grounds are mostly planted. I estimate they have about one thousand acres ploughed, which will all, and probably more, be planted.

The prosperity of these Indians, and their pride of their possessions, and the reward for their industry, are sufficient to convince any reasonable person that the Indian can, and eventually will, become a good and valuable citizen. The Indian is susceptible of cultivation. In comparison with the African, he is greatly superior; and with the advantages the African now has, he would rise far above him in knowledge and usefulness.

On the 5th instant, at old Fort Sully, a Brulé Indian, belonging to the Lower Brulé band at Crow Creek agency, returned from near the Red Buttes on the Platte. I sent for him, and questioned him particularly about the whereabouts and movements of the hostile Indians. He left the Platte about the 1st of May; came by the Bear Butte, where he saw the first Indians. They were ten lodges of Ogallallas. He found no others until he came to the Low Pines upon the headwaters of the Heart river, which is about one hundred and fifty miles north-west of new Fort Sully, where he found a large camp of all the different bands.
of hostile Indians. The camp was so large that he could not enumerate the number of lodges; but it was larger than he had ever seen before. The men were mostly away on the war path. When they returned they were going to the Missouri to trade. They were then preparing for it. They were rich in horses and mules, and had been successful in war and hunting. From this camp he came to old Fort Sully, where he crossed the river. He gave me this information with a great deal of care, and I have since learned from other Indians that it is true and reliable.

A few days before I arrived at old Fort Sully; the headmen and chiefs of the Minneconjou and Sans Arcs, hearing that a camp of their bands was about eighty miles distant upon the Meauro, sent six of their young men to the camp to urge them to come in and quit the war path. These young men returned on the 6th instant, followed by about two or three hundred Indians from this camp, with many mules packed with material for trade. This impressed me with the belief that they would in all probability remain with their bands at old Fort Sully; but I was mistaken. They seem to have no disposition to do it. General Sully and Colonel Parker, the commissioners, arrived the same day, and on the 8th instant held a council with all the chiefs present, including those who came from the camp on the Meauro, who were invited by the commissioners to come over to the council. They replied to the words of the commissioners with a great deal of earnestness and warmth. Instead of approving of the wishes of their Great Father, they demanded the removal of all the troops and white men from that country except the traders, the vacating of all roads, and the stopping of all steamboats. It was the only way peace could be had. They wanted no assistance or care, and it was not their wish or nature to cultivate the soil; that they were not coming over the river with their lodges, but that they came to trade, and more would come. They came for nothing else.

Of the locality of these Indians I immediately advised General Stanley, commander of this district at Fort Sully.

The intentions or plans of these Indians cannot now be known with any certainty. That they are determined to prevent, by every means, the march of civilization in their country, is certain. They are united, and feel themselves strong. Being successful in war and the chase of late, they are rich in their estimation, and proud of their condition when compared with those of their tribe who have remained at peace and taken the advice of the white man. It will not be possible for them to remain long inactive so near the Missouri settlements. The late raid upon Fort Randall, and the shooting of every white man they found on that side of the river, is only a commencement of their marauding and murder. There is nothing to prevent them from their pursuit between the town of Yankton and the remotest fort on the upper Missouri. They can pass the military posts garrisoned with infantry, as a traveller does a hand-board, and return by the same road with their scalps and plunder, as I saw them and heard them sing their war song near Sully on my way to this place.

They may not commit many depredations upon the settlements immediately, as the most of their warriors are now on the war path far westward. I think their intention is to trade and supply themselves with blankets and ammunition wherever they can procure them. They have, no doubt, an arrangement with the Red river traders to meet them this season, as they did last, with a full supply.

I cannot too strongly urge upon the department the great necessity of preventing this infernal traffic with these Indians, and again say that it is impossible to prevent it or the expected depredations of the hostile Indians without a strong force of cavalry, to be used against these offenders whenever they appear, it matters not under what pretence whatever. There can be no mistake made in attacking any Indians between the Missouri and the Yellowstone or the Platte. There are no friendly Indians there. They are where they have been since the treaties, on the north and east banks of the Missouri. The influence
upon the friendly Indians of these hostile hordes, who are now near and
...ing among them, is very bad. They ridicule them for their inactivity, and best
...est inactivity, and best of their wealth and power, which induces many of their restless young men to join the hostile camp, in opposition to the entreaties of their headmen and chiefs.

If the government intends to conquer these hostile Indians, they should do it at once, or at least use every endeavor. The longer the delay the stronger the enemy grows. They must give up summer campaigns upon travelled roads, and penetrate the heart of the country with active troops, ready to hunt them in the winter and drive them from the timber to the frozen plain, occupy their profitable places of resort, and you will soon find them coming crawling back to their respective bands east of the Missouri, and join with them in their pursuits.

I am now convinced that no further treaty should ever be made with these Indians. They belong nearly all of them to the nine bands of Sioux. A nucleus of each band, with their headmen and most of their chiefs, remain at peace, and are satisfied with the treaties and the stipulations thereof already made. They should be either killed or compelled to join their respective bands.

The Territory of Dakota to-day would be in a most prosperous condition, were it not for the hostile attitude of these Indians. Her citizens are deprived of opening and developing her mineral resources, or improving some of her best agricultural lands. Here in this vicinity to-day are two hundred men ready to go to the Black Hills to locate and develop that country, said to be rich in gold and pine; but they are suddenly met by thousands of hostile Indians, who say they shall not cross the Missouri. Could these enterprising men be successful in reaching their intended location, they would soon be followed by thousands of others from the east and west, which would give a death-blow to the operations of this common enemy. I do hope the department may see the necessity of immediate action being taken, and may urge the War Department to use every means to thwart the ruinous intentions of these roaming savages.

I am, sir, most respectfully, yours,

C. T. CAMPBELL,
United States Special Agent.

Hon. A. I. FAULK,
Ex officio Superintendent Indian Affairs.

No. 40.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., June 19, 1867.

Sir: The accompanying copies of despatches from Lieutenant General Sherman, dated Fort McPherson, Nebraska, were handed to me on yesterday by the honorable the Secretary of War, and are referred for your information.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. OTTO, Acting Secretary.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

No. 40 A.

FORT MCPHERSON, NEBRASKA,
June 17, 1867.

Sir: Your two despatches of the 15th are received. General Sanborn reported to me the same from Laramie. He is very sanguine; I am less so; but General Augur is en route for Laramie to judge for himself. We, Augur and self, are willing the peaceably intended may come into Brady's and Grand Islands, on the Platte, or as prisoners at one of the posts. All else to be considered hostile.

They will simplify the game. Say to the President that I think the Indians
on small reservations in absolute contact with the whites, peaceable from habits and necessity, should be managed by the Interior Department; but the Plain Indians are by nature nomadic and hostile, and should be passed over to us.

We are perfectly willing that the agents named and runners should go out and bring in Indians from the hostile tribes, but they must come in as prisoners until we can make permanent provision for them. I came here to start General Custer round by the Republican on the 24th. General Augur will be at Laramie to confer with the commission.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

No. 40 B.
FORT McPHERSON, NEBRASKA,
June 17, 1867.

My opinions of Indian matters now are best embraced in two letters written to General Grant and one to Secretary Browning. I ordered a copy of them to be sent you from St. Louis to-day. My opinion is, if fifty (50) Indians are allowed to remain between the Arkansas and Platte we will have to guard every stage station, every train, and all railroad working parties. In other words, fifty (50) hostile Indians will checkmate three thousand soldiers. Rather get them out as soon as possible, and it makes little difference whether they be coaxed out by Indian commissioners or killed.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

No. 41.
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Atchison, Kansas, June 20, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor herewith to transmit a letter of the 8th instant from Agent Wyukoop, enclosing copy of a letter of the 29th ultimo from James J. Morrison, who states that he met and conversed with young Little Big Mouth, a chief of the Arapahoees, who, with some of his people and a portion of the Cheyennes, are on the Washita river, about two hundred and fifty miles south of Fort Zarah, and informing the agent that it was the earnest desire of these Indians to remain at peace. This I believe to be the desire of all the Indians who have gone south of the Arkansas, and I also believe that those Indians who have gone north of the Platte have done so for the purpose of joining other hostile tribes, and are now on the war-path. If I am correct in these conclusions, (and I draw them from the best information obtainable,) I would respectfully ask, is it not right and is it not the duty of the government to send their agent or some other proper officers of the government, duly authorized and empowered, to see and talk with these Indians while they are friendly disposed? Recollect that war was declared on all Indians found south of the Platte and north of the Arkansas rivers. This comprised the country inhabited by the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches. The friendly disposed portions of these tribes have gone south of the Arkansas for protection. They are on the Washita, asking every white man they see to tell their Great Father that they are friendly dis-
posed, and do not wish war. They are starving, and yet are peaceable and know not what the government intends to do with them. In view of these facts, I would recommend that steps be taken to have some competent persons visit these Indians, and assure them that as long as they remain friendly and live up to their treaty pledges the government would protect them, and that these parties who may so visit them have authority to provide a place for them where they can be protected from military operations and hostile Indians, and in the last particular it would be well to consult with and have the co-operation of the military.

These are briefly my views in relation to the best course to be pursued towards these and all other Indians who desire to remain peaceable, with a hope of encouraging them to remain so, and should they meet with your approval, I trust that, faithfully carried out, those Indians who are now friendly will be kept so, and that they will be able to induce others to join them who are now hostile.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 41 A.

UPPER ARKANSAS AGENCY,
Fort Larned, June 8, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter lately received, showing the whereabouts at present of my Indians. As it is uncertain where I will be able to congregate the Indians for the purpose of issuing the goods, you will please have them shipped direct to my agency at Fort Larned. I forward by next mail a detailed report of all matters connected with General Hancock's expedition, together with an account of my investigation of an Indian outrage committed near Fort Dodge on the 4th instant.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

No. 41 B.

FORT ZARAH, May 29, 1867.

SIR: I have just returned from the Washita river, two hundred and fifty miles south of here, at which place most of the Arapahoes and Cheyennes of your agency are camped. Young "Big Mouth," on the part of the Arapahoes, wished me to inform you that neither he nor any of his band had committed any hostility, and had no intention of doing so; that he wished for peace on any terms, and would pledge himself to remain neutral even should the Cheyennes go to war. He is willing to remain in any region of country or agree to any arrangement that you wish to make. He says he does not wish to come near the Arkansas, as he hears of considerable trouble along the road with the soldiers. He wishes to avoid all contact with the military, if possible.

The Cheyennes did not talk quite as friendly, but they said the people on the Arkansas did not treat them well, and that they did not like them, but did not express any intention of going to war.
I shall remain at the Big Bend several days, and if you wish to communicate with me, you can do so at that place. I am well acquainted with the country south of here, and if you wish to open any communication with these Indians, I am not otherwise employed.

I remain, at your service, respectfully,

JAMES J. MORRISON.

Colonel WYNKOOP.

No. 42.

FORT BERTHOLD, D. T., June 22, 1867.

Sir: Our last official communication was forwarded you from the Indian camp, at the place where Fort Sully formerly stood. Leaving our animals and waggons at the new fort, we took passage on a steamboat bound up the river, the reverend Father De Smet accompanying us. We reached Fort Rice the sixteenth instant. Here were encamped over six hundred lodges of Yanktonais, Flatheads, Uncapapoes, and a few Blackfeet Sioux bands, awaiting our arrival. The following were the principal chiefs of these bands: Two Bear, Medicine Bear, Thunder Bull, and Bighead, Yanktonais; Blackeyes and Blackleaf Fish, Cuthead, Killeagle, Blackfeet Sioux; Red Eagle, Running Antelope and Long Dog, Uncapapas. The representation of the Uncapapas was much larger than was expected, being over 120 lodges. Some of the chiefs and principal men have heretofore been very hostile to the whites. There were only about twenty lodges of the Blackfeet. The balance, except the 120 lodges of Uncapapas, were Yanktonais or Cutheads, who are about the same as the Yanktonais. All the Yanktonais, with the exception of the few located below and at the Lower Creek agency, were present; also all the Cutheads except Wahutoah's band, which we were told were on their way in. So, with the exception of the Santee Sioux, who we have not yet seen, they being located near the British line, and about their disposition towards the government we cannot state, it may be safely said that all the Indians east of the Missouri river are friendly. Of course there may be depredations committed occasionally by small war parties, and small parties of Indians on the west side of the river may cross over to steal. The military, however, are about establishing a line of posts on a mail route from Minnesota to this point, to which the Indians strongly object as interfering with their buffalo hunting. How far this may change the present friendly disposition of these Indians we are not prepared to state, although we fear it may, without some arrangement is made with them. On the west side of the Missouri, however, a large number of Indians are still hostile, and the success they have lately met with in their war about the Powder and Platte river countries, if not properly checked, may induce a great many of the young men of the peaceable bands to join them. It is as hard for an ignorant wild Indian as it is for an educated cultivated white man to remain quietly at home starving to death, having no means of hunting, being obliged to kill his horses to keep himself and children alive, and at the same time not allowed to purchase arms and ammunition to kill small game with, while he is visited daily by Indians from the hostile camp, trying to induce him to join them, and sees, by their warring with impunity on the whites, they have more horses and mules than they want, have plenty to eat, and procure all the arms and ammunition they want. Government must do something to relieve the immediate wants of the peaceable Indians, and prosecute without delay a vigorous war against those who are hostile, if they wish to prevent the war from being general and avoid involving the peaceable Indians of this section of country in it. The Indians at Fort Rice, in council, appeared to be more contented, more peaceably disposed, and had less complaints to make, than any we have yet met with. We think this in a great measure is due to kindness shown by officers at the post to the Indians and the judicious conduct of the
commander in their intercourse with them. The following is the substance of their complaints, which we promised them we would report: They state that the commander who last visited them promised them many things which had not yet been fulfilled. The Yanctonais particularly complained that they were promised certain goods and farming implements, to be received last year at Fort Rice; that they looked for them all last summer and all this year, and as yet they have received nothing, while the few Yanctonais who had separated from them and went down to Crow creek had received all the goods intended for them. There is a general complaint by all that unauthorized persons have made men chiefs who were not the wish of the people, thus dividing the bands into fractions and destroying the authority of the proper chiefs, so that there was no proper one to govern them, no responsible head. They also complain that the amount of arms and ammunition allowed to be sold to friendly Indians is far from being sufficient for their wants. For these reasons it was difficult for the chiefs to keep the young men together. In spite of all they could do to prevent it, some of them would leave and join the hostile camp. In connection with the complaints of the small amounts of powder sold to friendly Indians, we beg leave to add that we know that the half-breeds of the north came across the line with a cargo of powder and whiskey. Generally they take the winter for their trade. Two Bear, the Yanctonais chief, states that many of his young men, against his order, visited the camp of these rascals, got drunk while there, and parted with their horses, clothing, and everything they had. We also understood from the military commander at Rice, that last October a party of the half-breeds came within sixty miles of his post. A force was sent after them but as they have no ferry-boat there and no means whatever of crossing animals except by swimming them, so much time was lost that the half-breeds got off. There should be a good ferry at Fort Rice; a steam ferry is required, but this is a matter belonging to the military, with which we have nothing to do. We only mention it as the Indians begged us to report the necessity. We obliged them to remain for the present on the east side of the river, and they cannot cross over to communicate with the fort or trade at their only convenient trading post. As regards the Indians' complaints of the making of chiefs by unauthorized persons, we would respectfully beg leave to call the attention of the department to this. It is doing a great deal of mischief. We find not only these Indians here, but the Indians below here, as well as those on the Platte, make the same complaint about this matter. Military commanders, superintendents of Indian affairs, Indian commissioners, and even Indian agents, have created chiefs in different bands, so that Indian chiefs, like brevets in the army, are become so common they are not properly respected. Before leaving Fort Rice we deemed it necessary to cross over the friendly Indians encamped near the fort on the west side of the river to the east side, to prevent any of them from joining the hostile party on the west side.

I would beg leave to add that I have read this to the reverend Father De Smet, and he has requested me to state that he concurs in all here written.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,
Brevet Brigadier General and President of Commission.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

No. 43.

FORT BUFORD, D. T., June 25, 1867.

SIR: We arrived here to-day. Our last communication to you was written at Berthold. There we met Rees, Gros Ventres, and Mandan Indians. We found that the Indians had suffered greatly from starvation last winter.
These Indians, as you are aware, no doubt, have for many years been at war with the Sioux. At present the Sioux, who are friendly to the whites, do not molest them, except by horse-stealing, which many of the friendly Sioux consider as yet a legitimate business, so far as regards these Indians. Even the Yanctons make raids on them, coming a distance of over five hundred miles to procure horses. Occasionally the Berthold Indians retaliate, and frequently Indians on both sides are killed in these operations. The hostile Sioux, however, kill them whenever they get the opportunity.

Being a very small body of Indians—not over two thousand, men, women, and children, in these three tribes—they dare not leave their village to hunt, even a short distance, without they all go together. They have to depend chiefly on cultivating the soil, and should the season prove an unsuccessful one, which is frequently the case in this section, they suffer greatly. They are warm friends to the whites; but at times, when they are almost starving to death, it is difficult for the chiefs and old men to keep their people from joining the more successful and happy hostile Sioux.

Policy, as well as humanity, demands that the government make more strenuous efforts to ameliorate their condition. We were very sorry to hear them express themselves so much opposed to the military. The troops lately have been moved from this place to a point twenty miles below. They begged that we would request the Great Father never to let the troops be located any nearer their village. If all the complaints they made of the actions of the troops are true, we are compelled to say that the commanding officer of this post showed a very great want of judgment in his intercourse with them. This request of theirs in regard to removal of troops is the more remarkable, as in 1864, at their urgent request for their protection, I stationed a company there, and during the time I was in command, up to 1866, I never had any complaint from them on this subject.

The order issued, prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition to Indians, though a very necessary order as far as it regards the hostile Indians, is a very cruel and unnecessary one as far as it concerns these friendly Indians. While I was in command I furnished them with thirty old muskets and ammunition to protect themselves. These have since been taken away from them.

Another order issued, prohibiting traders from accompanying the village in winter when they move on their hunt, is very hard on these Indians. Timber being scarce in the vicinity of their village, they are obliged, in the cold weather, to move to the timber above. There they hunt. Sometimes they are located over sixty miles from Berthold. It is almost impossible for them to travel from their camps to Berthold in small parties, and without they do that they cannot procure the few necessaries they require to live on. We recommend that some limit be placed on the profits of the traders. These Indians complain bitterly about this; and from what we can learn, the traders at Berthold pay six pints of sugar, two pints of coffee, and four pints of flour, for a robe; in value, not over two or three dollars for a robe worth ten dollars at least.

These Indians, unlike the Sioux, are an agricultural nation, and are very anxious that the government furnish them with assistance to cultivate the soil. In fact, all the Indians we have so far met with express a desire to try the experiment of planting, except the very wild ones, who tell the others, "We will wait and see you try it first, and if you succeed, then we will follow your example." As it appears to be the desire of the government to induce the Indians to cultivate the soil, which will tend very much to civilize them and stop their warlike habits, we cannot too strongly urge upon the government the necessity of doing all they can to furnish them with the necessary implements, and render them some assistance in ploughing the soil. This should be done promptly, as promises made them not fulfilled, and delay, may cause many to give up in disgust their present good intentions.
I would beg leave to add that this letter has been read to the Rev. Father De Smet, who concurs in all that is said.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,
Brevet Brigadier General, President of Commission

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

No. 44.

FORT PHILIP KEARNEY, DAKOTA TERRITORY,
June 4, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of the proceedings of the special Indian commission, of date Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, May 10, 1867.

In pursuance of the resolution which is herewith transmitted, I left Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, on the 13th of May, under the escort of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel John Green, of the second United States cavalry, and arrived at this post on the 31st of May.

Nothing of importance occurred en route, with the exception of the appearance of hostile Indians on two different occasions, one at Bridger's Ferry, and the other at Sage creek. At Bridger's Ferry the Indians appeared in considerable force and drove off the cattle of Mr. Jules Coffey, a freighter of government commissary stores for this post.

Colonel Green promptly sent a number of mounted men, who recovered all the stock and captured two Indian ponies, without the loss of life on either side.

At Sage creek a number of Indians were seen about our camps, evidently in pursuit of stock; and on this occasion Colonel Green, in person, with three lieutenants and about fifty mounted men, pursued them about two miles. The Indians at times stopped to fire, and succeeded in killing two cavalry horses.

The troops killed one Indian and one Indian pony.

On each of these occasions I am fully persuaded that the Indians were hostile, and belonged to bands of war parties that are now infesting the road between Fort C. F. Smith, Dakota Territory, and the crossing of the North Platte.

The arrows that were found upon the Indian that was killed are pronounced by good judges to be Cheyennes', but the hostile bands now operating upon this road are mainly Sioux.

These bands are led by Red Cloud, and the commission, at Fort McPherson, went so far as to send a message to General Wessels, of this post, by him to be sent to this chief, asking why he was at war, and whether he wished to meet, or would send any message to the commission sent out by his Great Father. This message was intrusted to a Crow Indian at this place, and sent to Red Cloud, but as yet no answer has been returned.

On arriving at this post I found a small camp of Crow Indians, who, in connection with many others, had come here to meet the commission upon the invitation forwarded from Fort McPherson.

In consequence of our detention at points below, and my slow progress from Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, to this place, quite a number of these Indians, becoming impatient at the delay of the commission, left on a hunt for Tongue river. I found in camp here the following chiefs: White Mouth, Bad Elk, and Roman Nose. White Mouth is one of the principal chiefs of the nation.

After a short interview with these chiefs, giving them some idea of my mission to the Crows, and making them a few presents, I engaged Roman Nose to go to the villages and inform the Crows that I had arrived, and requested them to come as soon as possible to see me.

These villages are located as follows: the first on Tongue river, about sixty-
five miles distant, and is composed of one hundred and ten lodges; the second about forty-five miles further on, and composed of ten lodges; and the third about thirty miles still further on, upon the Yellowstone river, and is composed of about forty lodges.

The names of the principal chiefs as they rank in the Crow nation are as follows: Winking Eye, Shot-in-the-Jaw, White Mouth, Thin Belly, Black Foot, Bird-on-the-Neck, Roman Nose, Long Horse, Bad Tooth, and Bad Elk.

A few days before I arrived the hostile Sioux came down upon the ponies of the Crows while herding at this place, and drove off in broad daylight forty-three of them, which were not recovered. I was obliged to furnish Roman Nose with a horse to bear my message, and instructed him to send Indian runners out from the nearest villages to the most remote, and to hasten the Indians in as soon as possible. I shall probably be delayed here until the 1st of August before I can see all these Indians.

In the war against these northern Sioux that seems now inevitable, the importance of separating from the scene of action the Crow Indians, and making of them permanent allies and friends, cannot be too highly estimated. They are peculiarly situated. The country from the Powder river to the Yellowstone river was their country until 1859, when they were driven from it by the Sioux. These mountain Crows have always been the friends of the whites. They would like to follow their instincts, which would lead them to oppose the Sioux, but being weak and the Sioux powerful, negotiations have been pending and an informal treaty of peace made by which they were to be friends with the Sioux. Without our protection, self-preservation will require them to join the Sioux. They much prefer the former.

I impressed upon Roman Nose the necessity of gathering in all the mountain Crows, intending as I do to locate them near this post while the war continues. In my own judgment they should be reinstated in the country of which they have been deprived. The Crows should be saved from alliance with the Sioux, not only for their own sakes, as an act of justice to them, but to limit as far as possible the number of Indians to be subdued.

It has been the policy of the commission to separate and protect all, without inquiring into their past conduct, who are now willing to be at peace with their Great Father. No class of Indians are better entitled to this consideration than the Crows.

Communication for the last six months has only been kept up between this post and Fort C. F. Smith, ninety-five miles above, through Crow messengers sent from the respective posts, and it is believed that Fort C. F. Smith with its small garrison of two companies has been saved by the timely advices communicated to the commanding officer of that post by the Crows.

In case I succeed in bringing in the Crows and establishing them near this post it will be necessary for your department to furnish them with supplies, such as flour, beans, rice, corn, and a little sugar and coffee; the corn for their own consumption and not for their horses. It will also be necessary that all suitable military protection be extended to them against incursions from the Sioux.

I regret that answers to our despatches from below, asking for specific instructions in relation to these Indians, have not come to hand. I find myself embarrassed, not having direct authority to promise protection, future supplies, or to reinstate them permanently in their country.

While speaking with Thin Belly, he advanced the point that forty-three ponies, stolen by the Sioux, mentioned before in this communication, were lost while the Crows were waiting for the commission, after the time set for the commission to arrive, and that the government should replace the stock lost, and this is some embarrassment to me in treating with them.

In consequence of the condition of the country, I cannot hope to receive any more definite instructions before it will be time to act. I shall not, however, besi-
tate to take such responsibility as may seem best for the public interest, trusting
that, in the exigencies of the case, a liberal construction of my instructions
will be deemed sufficient authority for taking such responsibility.

For present supplies for the Indians I shall probably be able to procure a
portion from the commissary department at this post, General H. W. Westall,
commanding the district, being disposed to extend every reasonable facility to
the commission in the discharge of its duty; but in case I succeed, as I hope to
do, in locating the Indians temporarily here, while the war continues, it will be
necessary for arrangements to be made by your department for their sustenance.

It was suggested by the commission, before leaving Fort Laramie, that it
might become necessary, in consequence of the peculiar position of this nation,
that a few of the principal chiefs visit Washington. Of this, however, I shall
be more able to speak when the Indians arrive.

I shall keep you fully advised of the result of the conferences which I may
have with these Indians.

If this is received by July 10, I doubt not a telegraphic communication to
Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, would reach me here before I leave. I forward
this letter by an ox-train, the only method of communication between this
point and Fort Laramie, at this time.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Hon. N. G. Taylor,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory,
May 10, 1867.

At a meeting of the special Indian commission held at this post on the 7th
instant, the following resolution was passed, and is now part of the records of the
commission:

Resolved, That Judge J. F. Kinney do proceed to Fort Philip Kearney, or
C. F. Smith, and visit the Mountain Crows, and such other Indians as may be
ready to meet the commission in that region, and exercise all the authority of
this commission in regard to said Indians, with authority to expend for pre-
sents for them, if satisfied of their friendship, a sum not exceeding three thou-
sand dollars.

ALF. SULLY,
Brevet Brigadier General, President.

A true copy:

S. T. BULKLEY, Secretary.

No. 45.

Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs,
Washington, D. C., July 9, 1867.

Do not bring the Crows to the fort, but leave them in their own country on
Tongue river. If driven from there by troops or Sioux, have them come to a
railroad, or some place on the Missouri river, and this department will feed
them. Upon your return, turn in all public property of this department to H.
B. Denman, Omaha, and take receipt.

N. G. Taylor, Commissioner.

Hon. J. F. Kinney,
Special Indian Commissioner, Fort Philip Kearney,
Care of G. P. Beavais, Fort Laramie, D. T.