4-6-1870

Difficulties with Indian tribes. Message from the President of the United States in answer to a resolution of the House of the 7th ultimo, asking for information relative to difficulties with various tribes of Indians.

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DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

MESSAGE
FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
IN ANSWER TO

A resolution of the House of the 7th ultimo, asking for information relative to difficulties with various tribes of Indians.

APRIL 6, 1870.—Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered to be printed.

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to your resolution of the 7th ultimo, requesting to be furnished with a copy of orders, correspondence, reports of councils with Indians by military and civil officers of the government in possession of the Interior and War Departments, relating to difficulties with the Cheyenne, Comanche, Arapaho, Apache and Kiowa tribes of Indians, during the year 1867, &c., I herewith transmit the reports received from those departments.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 6, 1870.

U. S. GRANT.

FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS—SECOND SESSION.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

March 7, 1870.

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to furnish, for the information of the House, a copy of all orders, correspondence, reports of councils with Indians by military and civil officers of the government, and reports of military commanders, in the possession of the Interior and War Departments, relating to difficulties with the Cheyenne, Comanche, Arapaho, Apache, and Kiowa tribes of Indians, during the year 1867; also, a copy of all orders, reports, and correspondence by and with civil and military officers in reference to the employment of Osage Indians in the military service, the attack upon a village of Cheyenne Indians on the Washita in November of that year, the destruction of the lives and property of said Indians, the treatment and disposition made of the women and children taken captive at that time, and the abandonment for fifteen days of Major Elliot and seventeen of his men.

Attest: EWD. McPHERSON, Clerk.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

PAPERS FROM THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., April 5, 1870.

SIR: On the 8th ultimo this department received, by reference from the President, a resolution of the House of Representatives, dated the 7th ultimo, requesting to be furnished with a copy of orders, correspondence, reports of councils with Indians by military and civil officers of the government, in the possession of the Interior and War Departments, relating to difficulties with the Cheyenne, Comanche, Arapaho, Apache, and Kiowa Indians in 1867, &c.

I now have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a report, dated the 4th instant, from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the accompanying papers therein referred to, containing all the information in the possession of this department in relation to the subject of said resolution, which is herewith returned.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

J. D. COX,
Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., April 4, 1870.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, by reference from your department, of House resolution of the 7th of March last, requesting the President of the United States "to furnish, for the information of the House, a copy of all orders, correspondence, reports of councils with the Indians by military and civil officers of the government, in the possession of the Interior and War Departments, relating to difficulties with the Cheyenne, Comanche, Arapaho, Apache, and Kiowa tribes of Indians during the year 1867;" also "in reference to the attack upon a village of Cheyenne Indians on the Washita in November of that year," &c.

In compliance, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of such papers on the files of this office as relate to the subjects mentioned, with the exception of some orders and correspondence between military officers, copies of which have been forwarded for the information of this office, and which will properly be included in the call upon the War Department.

The reference to the attack upon the Cheyenne village on the Washita is presumed to refer to the attack by General Custer in November of 1868, called by him "the battle of the Washita," and in which the Cheyenne chief, Black Kettle, was killed. No official reports have been received from any officer of this department respecting the battle, or "the destruction of the lives and property of said Indians, the treatment of their women and children, or the abandonment of Major Elliot and his men," but copies of all papers relating to it on file in this office are herewith inclosed.

I return the resolution of the House, referred from your department on the 10th ultimo.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. PARKER,
Commissioner.

Hon. J. D. Cox,
Secretary of the Interior.
ATTACK ON THE CHEYENNES ON THE WASHITA, NOVEMBER, 1868.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., November 21, 1868.

SIR: I submit herewith for your information, and for such action as may seem proper to you, a copy of a letter from Superintendent Thomas Murphy, of date 15th instant, to this office.

In the same connection, I would respectfully call your attention to a copy herewith of the first of a series of resolutions adopted at its late meeting at Chicago by the Indian peace commission.

It is proper also to state that the plan acted upon by this department of inviting all friendly disposed Indians of the tribes said to be hostile, to wit: Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches, to rendezvous at and near old Fort Cobb in the Indian country, and there to receive their annuities, and to be subsisted and protected pending the war, was presented to the commission at said meeting and met the hearty approval of every member present.

In presenting this communication, I must take occasion to say to you that while I regard Lieutenant General Sherman and the gallant officers commanding under him utterly incapable of for one moment entertaining the disgraceful idea of perpetrating a massacre upon peaceful Indians invited to our protection, nevertheless, this department, as their lawful guardian, is bound to take every necessary precaution to shield the innocent and helpless against the fearful punishment now pursuing the actual criminals.

It is clear to my mind that comparatively few of the Indians now considered hostile were willing to engage in this war. We have reason to know that only a small number even of the two hundred—two or three of whom committed the first outrage which led to this war—approved of the atrocities perpetrated by their leaders. We know, moreover, that the chiefs, at the demand of Agent Wynkoop, agreed to deliver up for trial the ringleaders—and I am satisfied the delivery was not effected on their part only for want of time—and that the larger part of all the tribes regarded and proclaimed hostile are really opposed to the war, and will seize the very first favorable opportunity to avail themselves of the protection we have offered the friendly.

The premises considered, I have to suggest that the honorable Secretary of the Interior take such precautionary measures as the facts may seem to demand to secure protection to such individuals of these tribes as may at any time seek it at the hands of the agents of the said tribes and to induce the military authorities to require of all officers and soldiers to be careful in their operations to distinguish between the hostile Indians and the friendly, and in all cases to prevent slaughter or cruel treatment of women and children.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.

N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

TOPEKA, KANSAS, November 15, 1868.

SIR: In view of the fact that Agents Boone and Wynkoop have left for the Indian country under instructions to congregate the Indians of
their respective agencies at or in the vicinity of Fort Cobb, and that the annuity goods purchased for these Indians are also en route to the above-named fort, I am of the opinion that all the Kiowas, Comanches, Apaches; Cheyennes, and Arapahoes will quickly assemble at the place, and gladly avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered them to get out of the way of the military and obtain their annuities. The agents have been instructed to distribute no annuities to any of their Indians unless they give up without ransom all white captives now held by them, and give satisfactory assurances that they will forever hereafter abandon their raiding into Texas, that they will agree to live on their reservations and not leave the same unless written permission is given to them by their agents, and to keep in good faith all their treaty pledges, all of which I feel confident they will agree to and promise.

But while these preparations for peace and promises of protection to these Indians are being carried out, a large army has been rapidly formed, and are now marching to, and, as I am informed, surrounding, Fort Cobb, traveling toward that point from Colorado, Fort Dodge, and New Mexico. Last week the regiment raised in this State left this city under command of Governor Crawford, whose point of destination was the mouth of the Little Arkansas. I was informed yesterday that he stated he would march directly south to the Washita Mountains.

In all these military movements I fancy I see another Sand Creek massacre. If these Indians are to be congregated at Fort Cobb or elsewhere, under promises of protection, and then pounced upon by the military, it were far better that they had never been sent for, or any such promises made them.

It may be that I am mistaken as to the probable intention of the army now marching toward Fort Cobb, (and I hope I am,) but I deemed it my duty as a precautionary measure to advise you of these facts, and would respectfully request that you promptly call the attention of Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman to this subject, so that he may have time to adopt such measures as he may deem proper and most expedient to protect all Indians that may congregate at Fort Cobb and its vicinity.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

EN ROUTE TO FORT COBB, November 29.

SIR: During the year 1864, while an officer in the army of the United States, highest in authority in the Indian country in which I served, I, in the supposed fulfillment of my duty as such, congregated some five hundred friendly Cheyenne Indians together, assuring them the protection of the United States; the consequence of which was, they were attacked by a large body of volunteer troops from Colorado, and nearly two hundred of their women and children and old men brutally murdered. The infamous massacre at Sand Creek will not soon be forgotten. The Indians were naturally under the impression that I was responsible for the outrage; but after they fully understood my position, I became, at their request, their agent, and they have renewed the confidence they had in me previous to the Sand Creek murder, trusting me implicitly up to the time of General Hancock's memorable expedition,
they then having received assurance from me that General Hancock would not harm them, and seeing me with him, whom I had been induced to accompany under assurances from himself that his mission was a peaceful one. Upon the destruction of their lodges and other property, again they naturally inferred the fault was mine, and some time since, while in the performance of my duty among the Indians, I came near losing my life in consequence; but I again succeeded in regaining their confidence, and am now under orders to proceed to Fort Cobb, on the Washita River, and congregate what Indians I can of my agency at that point or vicinity.

Since I have started on my journey thither, I have learned of five different columns of troops in the field, whose objective point is the Washita River. The regular troops are under control, commanded by officers who will not allow atrocities committed; but there are also in the field, under the sanction of the government, volunteer troops and Ute and Osage Indians, the deadly enemies of all the plains Indians, and whom nothing will prevent from murdering all of whatever age or sex, wherever found. The point to which that portion are marching who have expressed their determination to kill under all circumstances the Indians of my agency, is the point to which I am directed to congregate them at. They will readily respond to my call, but I most certainly refuse to again be the instrument of the murder of innocent women and children. While I remain an officer of the government I propose to do my duty—a portion of which is to obey my instructions. All left me under the circumstances, with the present state of feelings I have in this matter, is now to respectfully tender my resignation and return the commission which I have so far earnestly endeavored to fulfill the requirements of. To the President of the United States, who has intrusted me with the commission I have held; to yourself, for the consideration always shown me; to the Superintendent, Colonel Murphy, for his invariable kindness, I shall always feel grateful.

I have the honor to respectfully forward this communication through Colonel Thomas Murphy, superintendent of Indian affairs, to whom I will turn over what property I am responsible for, and make my appearance at Washington as soon as possible to settle my accounts.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Atchison, Kansas, December 4, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on my return yesterday from Paola, whither I had been to pay the fall annuities to Indians of the Osage River agency, I found in the public journals General Sheridan's report of what he calls "the opening of the campaign against the hostile Indians," the perusal of which made me sick at heart. Had these Indians been hostile, or had they been the warriors who committed the outrages upon the white settlers on the Solomon and Saline Rivers, in August last, or those who subsequently fought Colonel Forsyth and his fifty scouts, no one would rejoice over this victory more than myself. But who were the parties thus attacked and slaughtered by General Custer and his command? It was Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes. Black
Kettle, one of the truest friends the whites have ever had among the Indians of the plains; he who, in 1864, purchased with his own ponies the white women and children captured on the Blue and Platte Rivers by the Dog Soldiers of the Cheyennes and by the Sioux, and freely delivered them up at Denver City to Colonel Chivington, who was at the time the military commandant at that place. After this he was induced, under promises of protection for his people, to bring them into the vicinity of Fort Lyon, where they were soon afterward pounced upon by the military, led by Chivington, and cruelly and indiscriminately murdered. Black Kettle escaped, but his people, in consequence of the step he had taken to induce them to come to the vicinity of the fort, refused to recognize him as their chief, and he thus remained in disfavor with them up to the time of the treaty of 1865, at which time, after explanations on the part of the commissioners, he was reinstated.

In 1867, when General Hancock burned the villages of peaceful Cheyennes and Sioux, Black Kettle used all his influence to prevent the Cheyennes from going to war to avenge this wrong, and so persistent were his efforts in this behalf, that his life was threatened and he had to steal away from them in the night with his family and friends and flee for safety to the lodges of the Arapahoes.

In August, 1867, when I was sent out by the Indian peace commission with instructions to assemble in the vicinity of Fort Larned all the friendly Indians belonging to the Kiowas, Comanches, Apaches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, with a view of using them to get into communication with the hostile Indians, Black Kettle was among the first to meet me at Fort Larned, cheerfully proffered me his assistance and protection, and from that day until the conclusion of the treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek no man worked more assiduously than did he to bring to a successful termination the business then in hand, and no man, red or white, felt more happy than did he when his people had finally signed the treaty by which they once more placed themselves upon friendly relations with the government. And when he ascertained that some of the young men of his tribe had committed the atrocities upon the Solomon and Saline in August last, I have been credibly informed that so great was his grief he tore his hair and his clothes, and naturally supposing that the whites would wreak their vengeance upon all Indians that might chance to fall in their way, and remembering the treachery that had once wellnigh cost him his life, (I refer to the massacre at Sand Creek,) he went south to avoid the impending troubles.

This same report says the family of Little Raven, of the Arapahoes, are among the prisoners, and that he too was engaged in the fight. When I recollect that this was one of those who met me at Fort Larned in September, 1867, furnished me with a guard of his young men from that post to Medicine Lodge Creek, protected myself and the few white men with me while there, vigilantly watching over us both day and night, continually sending out his warriors as messengers to the hostile Indians for the purpose of inducing them to abandon the war path and to come in and meet the commissioners, and firmly believing that Little Raven has not been engaged in the recent depredations, nor would have permitted any of his warriors to go upon the war path could he have prevented it, I cannot but feel that the innocent parties have been made to suffer for the crimes of others.

It is likewise said in the report that Sartau-ta came to the assistance of Black Kettle. I regret that he has been drawn into these difficulties. He is one of the most powerful chiefs among the Kiowas, and his influence for the last three years has been exerted in favor of peace.
it not been for him in August last, a desperate fight might have taken place at Fort Zarah, between the Kiowas and the soldiers of that post. (See my letter of the 22d August last, inclosing one from Agent Wynkoop, reporting the affair.)

Knowing these chiefs as I do, I feel satisfied that when all the facts pertaining to the late attack shall become known, it will be found that they and the few lodges with them composed that portion of their tribes who desired to remain at peace, and who were endeavoring to make their way to Fort Cobb for the purpose of placing themselves under the care of their agents on their new reservations.

Judging from the map of the Indian country, this fight took place within some sixty or seventy miles of the latter post; and being so near, it confirms the fears I entertained as expressed in my letter to you of the 15th ultimo, and will have the effect, I apprehend, of frightening away all those Indians who were expected to congregate in the vicinity of Fort Cobb, and of starting upon the war path many Indians who have been friendly disposed toward the government, thus costing the nation many valuable lives and millions of treasure.

Had Congress, at its last session, appropriated sufficient funds to continue the feeding of these Indians last June, I believe we could have kept them at peace, and that by this time they would have been quietly located on their new reservations, where we could control and manage them and gradually wean them from their wild and wandering life, and in doing which it would not have cost the government as much per year as it is now costing per month to fight them, and this course would have been far more humane and becoming a magnanimous and Christian nation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. MURPHY,

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

FORT COBB, DAKOTA TERRITORY,
December 3, 1868.

Sir: I have the honor to report the following statement of Black Eagle, chief of the Kiowas, concerning an action that recently occurred on the Washita River, near the Antelope Hills, between a column of United States troops and the Cheyennes, and the Arapahoes and a small party of Kiowas and Comanche Indians.

On the night of the 25th of November, a party of Kiowa Indians, returning from an expedition against the Utes, saw, on nearing Antelope Hills, on the Canadian River, a trail going south toward the Washita. On their arrival at the Cheyenne camp they told the Cheyennes about the trail they had seen, but the Cheyennes only laughed at them. One of the Kiowas concluded to stay all night at the Cheyenne camp, and the rest of them went on to their own camps, which were but a short distance off.

About daylight on the morning of the 26th of November, Black Kettle's camp of Cheyennes, containing about thirty-five lodges, was attacked by the United States troops. The Indians all fled toward some other camps of the Cheyennes, closely pursued by the troops. After the Indians had run a short distance they separated into two parties, the
braves and the young women who were fleet of foot taking to the right, and the old and infirm taking to the left and running into the brush, where they were surrounded by the soldiers; the other party of Indians who ran to the right (and among them was one Kiowa) were hotly pursued by a party of eighteen soldiers, who were all riding gray horses. They overtook and killed some Indians, when they were met by a large party of Indians who had rallied from other camps. Here a sharp action took place, both parties fighting desperately, when an Arapahoe brave rushed in, and with his own hands struck down three soldiers, when he was shot through the head and instantly killed. Here the soldiers all dismounted and tied their horses. About this time a Cheyenne brave rushed in and struck down two soldiers, when he was shot through the leg, breaking it and knocking him off his horse. The Indians then made a desperate charge, and succeeded in killing the whole of the party of eighteen men; then rushed down to the rescue of the party that the troops had surrounded at first, but found they were all killed or taken prisoners. By this time the soldiers had collected together a large number of Cheyenne horses, which they shot. The Indians then attacked the troops, who dismounted and commenced retreating slowly. The Indians also dismounted and took every advantage of cover, getting ahead of the troops and ambushing them whenever possible. They continued fighting in this way until near night, the soldiers slowly retreating until they met their wagon train, when the Indians retired.

The troops did not commence the retreat until the second day, both parties holding the battle-ground.

The Indians report having counted twenty-eight soldiers killed, and acknowledge the loss of eleven Cheyennes (men) killed, including Black Kettle. The Arapahoes had three men killed; they also had a great many women and children killed in both tribes, as well as a great many taken prisoners. One Comanche boy was badly wounded. The Kiowas report one Osage Indian killed; supposed to have been a guide for the troops. Black Eagle says he does not vouch for the correctness of this report, but the above statement is just as he heard it. The above statement is respectfully submitted for your information.

PHILIP McCUSKY,
U. S. Interpreter for Kiowas and Comanches.

Colonel Thomas Murphy,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

P. S.—Since writing the above, I learn from a runner who has just got in, that the Cheyenne loss is much greater than at first reported; they also report a loss of thirty-seven prisoners, probably women and children.

I forward Black Eagle’s account of the fight as a sample of fifty or more accounts, all current in camp, and all coming from Indian sources.

W. B. HAZEN,
Bvt. Major General.

Official:

W. A. NICHOLS,

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C., January 11, 1869.

Sir: I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that the widow of Moke-ta-va-to, or Black Kettle, late chief of the Cheyennes, is now a prisoner in the hands of the military, and to respectfully suggest that as long as it is acknowledged by the department that her murdered husband was guiltless of any acts of hostility, but on the contrary, notwithstanding his wrongs, was invariably the friend of the white man, that some measures be taken to release her from captivity, and have her conveyed to the abode of her daughter, the wife of George Bent, now residing on the Purgatory River in Colorado.

I draw your attention to this particular case for the reason that on one occasion, when Colonel Thomas Murphy, superintendent of Indian affairs, and myself were endeavoring to congregate the Indians together for the purpose of meeting the commissioners at Medicine Lodge Creek, and at a time when a portion of the Cheyenne tribe remained in a hostile attitude, Black Kettle's life was in danger at the hands of his own people, in consequence of his striving with all his energy to bring them off of the war-path. In a conversation with Colonel Murphy he said that he expected to be killed on account of the position he had taken, and begged that, as a reward for his self-devotion in the cause of the whites, if his wife was left a widow, that we take care of her and let her live among us. It is but a small tribute to the memory of Moke-ta-va-to that we fulfill what would have been his last request. Beside removing her to the home of her son-in-law, measures should be taken to secure her a support in the future.

No one knows better than yourself how the government is indebted to Black Kettle. His wife was all to him, and he to her, both having lost their immediate relatives, murdered at Sand Creek. They were never separated. She was like his shadow, ever by his side, his faithful helpermate, comforting him when disgraced and degraded by his people for being too good a friend to us. Accompanying him on his perilous expeditions on behalf of the whites to the different hostile bands, and encouraging him when a fugitive, hunted to the death by those for whom he had made such sacrifices. Her captors need have no fear of her breaking her “parole,” bearing upon her person the scars of ten wounds received at the Chivington massacre. Her arm is not mighty. Let us not hesitate to take advantage of anything, however slight, to help wipe out the foul, red stain now upon our escutcheon.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. Wynkoop,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapaho and Cheyenne Indians.

Hon. N. G. Taylor,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Department of the Interior,
Office Indian Affairs, January 29, 1869.

Sir: Referring to Senate resolution of the 18th of December last, referred to this office from your department on the following day, requesting you to send to the Senate any information in the possession of your department in relation to the hostile or peaceful character of the Indians recently killed or captured by the United States troops under the command of General Custar; and whether said Indians were at the
time of said conflict residing on the reservation assigned them under treaty stipulations, and if so, whether they had taken up said residence in pursuance of instructions from the Department of the Interior, I desire to say that, as there were no officers of this bureau present at the battle of the Washita, nothing definite respecting that affair was known to this office at the time said resolution was received by me. Hence the delay in complying with the instructions contained in the reference from your department of said resolution.

I now inclose herewith a copy of a letter from late Agent Wynkoop, dated the 26th instant, giving all the information he has received relative to said "battle," and inclosing a letter (copy herewith) from Mr. James S. Morrison, who was formerly in his employ.

These papers, with those transmitted to your department with office report of the 5th instant, in response to Senate resolution of the 14th ultimo, give all the information this office has respecting the battle of the Washita.

I herewith return said Senate resolution.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Hon. O. H. BROWNING,

Secretary of the Interior.

PHILADELPHIA, January 26, 1869.

SIR: In reply to your request to be furnished with all the information I have received relative to the battle of the Washita, I have the honor to state that all the information I have in regard to that affair has been gleaned from the public reports of the same and in two letters I have received from Mr. James S. Morrison, who was formerly in the employ of my agency. One of the letters I herewith inclose; the other is in possession of Colonel S. F. Tappan, of the Indian peace commission. I am perfectly satisfied, however, that the position of Black Kettle and his immediate relatives at the time of the attack upon their village was not a hostile one. I know that Black Kettle had proceeded to the point at which he was killed with the understanding that it was the locality where all those Indians who were friendly disposed should assemble. I know that such information had been conveyed to Black Kettle as the orders of the military authorities, and that he was also instructed that Fort Cobb was the point that the friendly Indians would receive assistance at; and it is admitted by General Hazen, who is stationed at Fort Cobb, that Black Kettle had been at his headquarters a few days previous to his death. In regard to the charge that Black Kettle engaged in the depredations committed on the Saline River during the summer of 1868, I know the same to be utterly false, as Black Kettle at the time was camped near my agency on the Pawnee Fork. The said depredations were undoubtedly committed by a party of Cheyenne Indians; but that same party proceeded with the Sioux Indians north from that point, and up to the time of Black Kettle's death had not returned to the Arkansas River. There have been Indians deserving of punishment, but, unfortunately, they have not been those who received it at the hands of the troops at the battle of the Washita. Black Kettle's village, at the time of the attack upon it, was situated upward of one hundred and fifty miles from any traveled road, in the heart of the Indian country. The military reports state that the ground was covered with snow and the
weather intensely cold. It is well known that the major portion of the village consisted of women and children, and yet the military reports are that they were engaged in hostilities, and excuse the attack for the reason that evidence was found in the camp that the said Indians were engaged in hostilities. How did they know that those evidences existed, previous to the assault? Mr. Morrison states that there were forty women and children killed. That fact needs no comment; it speaks for itself. I do not know whether the government desires to look at this affair in a humane light or not, and if it only desires to know whether it was right or wrong to attack the village referred to, I must emphatically pronounce it wrong and disgraceful.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,

Late United States Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. Taylor,

Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

FORT COBB, I. T., January 1, 1869.

Colonel: Your favor of the 8th ultimo has been received, and in reply would state that, upon a full investigation of the military operations against the Indians in this vicinity, both from officers and the Indians, I have no additional particulars to communicate than that contained in the official report of General P. H. Sheridan, who is now here with a large force.

The most to be regretted in the transaction is the death of Black Kettle.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. G. Boone,
United States Indian Agent for Kiowas and Comanches.

Colonel Thomas Murphy,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

KIOWAS.

AGENCY OF COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Larned, Kansas, April 9, 1867.

SIR: * * *

I arrived at Fort Zarah, Kansas, on the 3d instant. General Hancock arrived there on the 5th with his whole command, consisting of artillery, cavalry and infantry, about fifteen hundred strong. I immediately called upon him and requested information as to the object of his movements, so far as they related to the Indians of my agency, viz: the Comanches and Kiowas. He very kindly and promptly furnished me with the inclosed papers, marked numbers 1, 2, and 3. As none of the Indians of my agency have visited this great line of travel, except a very few, since they received their annuity goods last October, and as it was uncertain what portion of his department he might visit with his command, he expressed a wish that I would accompany him; and as I believed it to be eminently proper, I very willingly consented, and should anything occur concerning the Indians of my agency, or the interest of the Indian Department generally, shall make full report of the same.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. Leavenworth,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. Taylor,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

[General Field Orders No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Riley, Kansas, March 26, 1867.

I. * * * While on the march and in camp, the troops composing the present expedition will receive orders from Brevet Major General Smith, commander of the district of Upper Arkansas, in whose territory we are about to move. When instructions may be necessary,
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

General Smith will receive them from the major general commanding, who will be present.

II. * * * It is uncertain whether war will be the result of the expedition or not. It will depend upon the temper and behavior of the Indians with whom we may come in contact. We go prepared for war, and will make it, if a proper occasion presents. We shall have war if the Indians are not well disposed toward us. If they are for peace, and no sufficient ground is presented for chastisement, we are restricted from punishing them for past grievances which are recorded against them; these matters have been left to the Indian Department for adjustment.

No insolence will be tolerated from any bands of Indians whom we may encounter. We wish to show them that the government is ready and able to punish them if they are hostile, although it may not be disposed to invite war. In order that we may act with unity and in harmony with these views, no one but the commander present, on detachment or otherwise, will have interviews with Indians. Such interviews as may be necessary with them will be reserved, and corresponding reserve will be required from those under his command. No Indians will be allowed in camp, and no "talks" will be had with them, except for the purpose of explaining to them the facts herein stated. The chiefs of any bands of Indians who will wish for any information will be referred to the major general commanding, who will see them at his headquarters.

By command of Major General Hancock: W. S. MITCHELL, Captain, and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian Agent.

W. S. MITCHELL, Captain, and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

AGENCY FOR KIOWA AND COMANCHE INDIANS OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS, IN THE FIELD,
On Pawnee Fork, 31 miles from Fort Larned, April 15, 1867.

SIR: Knowing the wish of the department to learn all pertaining to the military expedition of Major General Hancock, I will state that a council was held near Fort Larned, by General Hancock and some of the chiefs of the Cheyenne tribe of Indians, at which the Indians, I was informed, expressed themselves very friendly. General Hancock marched for Fort Dodge on the 13th instant, advanced up the Pawnee Fork twenty-one miles, in the direction of a camp of about three hundred lodges, Cheyennes and Sioux. General Hancock was visited that evening by chiefs from both tribes, and informed that his approach toward their camp caused great anxiety among their squaws and children. On the 14th General Hancock again resumed his march in the direction of their village, and was met some five or six miles from their town by a white flag, and earnestly requested not to approach any nearer, but he still advanced and went into camp about 3 o'clock p. m., a short mile below their lodges, when it was found all their women and children had left with what few articles they could hastily gather together, leaving their lodges and a large amount of their property just as they had been occupying their homes. Some one hundred or more of their warriors were still
in camp, armed, and apparently ready for fight. Some of their chiefs called upon General Hancock, and he wanted their women and children back, as no harm was intended them, and furnished the chiefs good horses to go for them. In the evening the two horses were returned and he was informed that they had so scattered they could not be found, and at the same time information was brought that the warriors were leaving, when cavalry was ordered out and their village surrounded and searched, but nothing was found but as stated above, and one old swine, and a girl of about eight years of age, blind in one eye, and horribly ravished. This morning she was brought to camp and properly cared for. Some suppose her white, others part white, while others pronounce her Indian. It is evident she is not a Cheyenne or Sioux. She was a pitiable object indeed. Many of their lodges were found cut, as though the party wished for a small part to make a small "tepee" for a night's lodging on a rapid march. This morning General Custer pursued with a heavy body of cavalry.

This is only to the department to let them know that there are stirring events on this frontier. Major Wyukoop is exerting himself all he can in the line of his duty, and will, without doubt, make, as soon as possible, full reports.

In haste, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

SAME CAMP AS ON THE 15TH,
SHORT MILE FROM INDIAN VILLAGE,
On Pasnee Fork, April 17, 1867.

SIR: I have but little to communicate, except General Hancock has determined not to burn the Indian lodges, but has ordered every article taken from their villages returned, and that General Custer reports he has not seen any Indians he was in pursuit of; fifteen hundred Indians escape and not one is seen. He reports he should march for the Smoky Hill on the evening of the 16th, at 7 p.m., from the head of Walnut Creek. In haste.

Very respectfully, &c.,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

P. S.—Cheyennes, without doubt, gone south; Sioux north.

AGENCY FOR COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Zarah, Kansas, May 2, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival at this place late last evening, from Fort Larned, where I left Major General Hancock yesterday afternoon with the remnant of his grand army, having been out with him from this place since the 6th ultimo. I am sorry to say that,
in my opinion, little good, but a great deal of harm, has resulted from this expedition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

AGENCY FOR COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS
FOR THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Zarah, May 4, 1867.

SIR: You may be somewhat surprised at not hearing from me since the 15th ultimo, in relation to matters on this frontier. Up to that time I believed trouble on the plains between the Platte and the Arkansas, and south of the latter, might and would be avoided, but from the course the military soon after took, I was compelled to change my mind; and now as war is the word between the Platte and the Arkansas, I shall in this only say that my whole exertion has been, and still is, to prevent its spread south of the Arkansas River.

General Sherman is to meet General Hancock at Fort Harker on the 7th instant. I shall leave here to-morrow morning to be present at that post at that time, and do all in my power to protect the Indians of my agency, who at the present time were never more friendly. I speak of them as tribes. That there are some bad men it is true, but they can and will be controlled by the tribes. Traders who have been with them for the last two months and just returned, report them in almost a starving condition, but perfectly docile. They were looking forward to the arrival of their annuity goods with much anxiety. The orders from the military embarrass me very much, as regards my intercourse with the Indians of my agency, but I hope when I see General Sherman to have matters properly arranged. General Hancock, owing to the mistakes or mismanagement of the military at Fort Larned, has seen but two or three of the leading men of the Kiowas, and those that committed the raid into Texas last fall and sold the Box family to the officers at Fort Dodge, and have remained in the immediate vicinity of that post since, refusing to come in and give the assurances to the government that hereafter they would comply with their treaties as required by the honorable Secretary Browning's letter to Commissioner Cooley of 22d October, 1866. After my interview with General Sherman, I will report the result.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

AGENCY OF KIOWA AND COMANCHE INDIANS
OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
May 15, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith copies of a correspondence dated March 11, 1867, I have had with Major General W. S. Hancock,
commanding the department of the Missouri. I forward these papers to the department for its information and consideration, and have to request that I may be informed if my action in the matter is approved or disapproved. General Hancock had written his letter on the 11th March, five days before his command was published in the newspapers of the country to march, and sent it to the commanding officer of the post at Fort Larned, thirty-five miles beyond where he knew my agency had been, to a point where he must have known I was not, for I had been in correspondence with him from Washington, D.C., sending him from that city different treaties he had requested me to furnish him.

On his arrival at Fort Zarah on the 5th of April, he requested me to accompany him on his expedition "to show that the officers of the government were acting in harmony." Not knowing of his letter of March 11, 1867, I very readily accepted his invitation and joined his command on the morning of the 6th April, 1867. After I reached Fort Larned I received from the commanding officer of that post General Hancock's letter. I saw at once a wrong conclusion might be inferred from the tenor of his letter, and by my joining his command it was tacitly acknowledging my "inability to arrange these matters satisfactorily." I therefore addressed him my letter of the 19th April, 1867, and received the inclosed, marked from 1 to 8. To these papers I would most respectfully call the attention of the honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

The treaties with the Kiowas and Comanches require when a party is injured to make a written statement, verified by affidavit. Now what do these grave reasons of complaints show? There is but one affidavit in them all, and that shows conclusively that the robbery of the United States officer is false, unless he was associated with Mr. Tappan and Mr. Jones in their illicit trade, for they went evidently to the Indian village with two loaded wagons to trade without a license, at least from the agent of the Kiowas, and as they were there without authority, I think they have no right or claim to make charges against those Indians, especially if it can be shown, and I think it can be, that there was whisky in the outfit, and that the Indians got drunk, and the consequences followed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 11, 1867.

COLONEL: I have the honor to state, for your information, that I am at present preparing an expedition to the plains, which will soon be ready to move. My object in doing so at this time is to convince the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to punish any of them who may molest travelers across the plains, or who may commit other hostilities against the whites. We desire to avoid, if possible, any troubles with the Indians, and to treat them with justice and according to the requirements of our treaties with them; and I wish especially, in my dealings with them, to act through the agents of the Indian Department, as far as it is possible so to do. Concerning the Kiowas of your agency, we have grave reasons for complaint. Among others, it is officially reported to these headquarters that that tribe has been making hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has
very recently returned to Fort Dodge from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers and one white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our posts on the Arkansas; that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us, and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States Army, who have visited them, supposing that they were friends. It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague County, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family. I desire you particularly to explain to them that one reason why the government does not at once send troops against them to redress these outrages against our people is that their Great Father is averse to commencing a war upon them (which would certainly end in destroying them) until all other means of redress fail. I request that you will inform the Indians of your agency that I will hereafter insist upon their keeping off the main routes of travel across the plains, where their presence is calculated to bring on difficulties between themselves and the whites. If you, as their agent, can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to defer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so, I would be pleased to have you accompany me when I visit the country of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony. I will be pleased to talk with any of the chiefs whom we may meet.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent for Comanches and Kiowas.

AGENCY OF KIOWA AND COMANCHE
INDIANS OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Camp on Pawnee Fork, April 19, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 11th ultimo, at Fort Larned, on the evening of the 6th instant. You say in your letter, "We desire to avoid, if possible, any trouble with the Indians, and to treat them with justice and according to the requirements of our treaties with them; and I wish, especially in my dealings with them, to act through the agents of the Indian Department, as far as it is possible to do so. Concerning the Kiowas of your agency, we have grave reasons for complaint. Among others, it is officially reported to these headquarters that that tribe has been making hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has very recently returned to Fort Dodge from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers, and one white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our posts on the Arkansas; that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us, and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States Army who have visited them, supposing that they were friends. It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague County, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family. * * * If you, as their agent, can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to

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defer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so, I would be pleased to have you accompany me when I visit the country of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony."

General, I am extremely happy to inform you that the views expressed in your letter meet with my entire approbation, and that I shall with great pleasure co-operate with you to the extent of my power; and in order to enable me to decide my ability to "arrange these matters satisfactorily," I have to request that you furnish me with the official evidence, according to our treaty with them, that the Indians of my agency, or any members of either tribe, Comanches or Kiowas, have been guilty of—

1st. Of bringing from the State of Texas the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers.

2d. Of threatening our posts on the Arkansas.

3d. That they (Kiowas) are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us.

4th. That they (Kiowas) have robbed and insulted officers of the United States Army.

5th. The murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Texas, the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family.

It may appear strange to you that I should make the murder of Mr. Box and the capture of his family the subject of an official inquiry; but when I inform you that I have no official information, except what is contained in your letter of the 11th ultimo, you will not, I think, be surprised. And it is also well known to the general commanding that the military assumed to act in this matter without consulting the Indian Department, or any of its agents, in a singular particular, and that you have, if I am not mistaken, informed me, "that under the circumstances, no further demands would be made upon the Indians concerning this Box matter."

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding Department of Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 17, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 23, 1867.

COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, in reply to my letter to you of the 11th ultimo, referring to matters connected with the Indians of your agency.

For your information I transmit herewith official evidence concerning the following charges made against the Kiowas and Comanches, as requested by you:

1. "Of bringing from the State of Texas the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers." (See inclosed extract from a letter of Major H. Douglas, Third United States Infantry, commanding post of Fort Dodge, dated February 7, 1867.)

2. Of threatening our posts on the Arkansas. (See copy of affidavit of Mr. F. F. Jones, interpreter at Fort Dodge, dated February 9, 1867.)

3. "That they (the Kiowas) are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us." (See extract from letter of Brevet
Major Asbury, captain Third United States Infantry, commanding post of Fort Larned, dated February 27, 1867.)

4. “That they (the Kiowas) had robbed and insulted officers of the United States Army, giving time, place, and circumstance of the robbery and insults.” (See copy of affidavit of Mr. F. F. Jones, interpreter at Fort Dodge, Kansas, dated February 9, 1867.)

5. “The murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Texas, the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family.” (See inclosed copy of statement of Mrs. Mathew Box to Captain H. J. Sheridan, Third Infantry, dated October 20, 1866, which was generally published in the newspapers, and a written statement of which was furnished from headquarters department of the Missouri to the honorable Secretary of the Interior, shortly after the affidavit was made; also copy of letter of same date, October 20, 1866, from Captain Sheridan, on this subject.)

Lieutenant General Sherman passed along about the time of these transactions and concluded this matter, but disapproved of what had been done in ransoming the women from the Indians. Although the Indian department was notified of this matter, I have not heard of any action whatever being taken by it. Any statement I may have made to you on this subject “that under the circumstances, no further demand would be made upon the Indians concerning the Box matter” was, I presume, verbal; the idea intended to be conveyed being, that old matters of this nature would be left to the Indian Department, which claims that it should investigate such cases. I said the same in substance, I believe, to Colonel Wynkoop, in reference to the Chalk Bluff and Zarah outrages.

I have recently sent you a copy of a letter transmitted to me by General E. O. C. Ord, dated headquarters department of the Arkansas, March 5, 1867, in reference to the Comanches carrying off stock and a negro child from within a few miles of Fort Arbuckle.

There is other evidence concerning these matters on file at headquarters department of the Missouri.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army, Commanding.

Col. J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent.

Extract of Major Douglas’s letter of February 7, 1867, to Major H. Asbury, Third Infantry, commanding Fort Larned, Kansas.

P. S.—Jones reports that during his stay at the Kiowa camp a war party arrived with the scalps of seventeen negroes and one white man, and reported that they had been to Texas; that the negroes were soldiers; that they also captured two hundred head of horses, and that there were several war parties out yet who had not returned.

H. D.

HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 18, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 22, 1867.

Official:

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.
SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of a letter from Captain E. L. Smith, Nineteenth United States Infantry, and Brevet Major United States Army, to Colonel O. D. Green, assistant adjutant general, department of Arkansas, Little Rock, Arkansas, and would most respectfully ask the honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs to examine this letter, particularly the indorsement of Brigadier General Ord. He acknowledges the fact that military posts "demoralize them (the Indians) more than anything else, except money" and whisky. This is true to the letter, in my opinion, and that opinion has not been formed hastily, or from theory, but from a life-long experience, not only on the frontier, but with the Indians in their camps, and years of service in the army. Whisky, sir, will, in some form or other, prostitute the fairest virtue of the Indian maiden, and next to this is the associations formed at military posts, not alone with the enlisted men, but, I say it with pain, with very many of the commissioned officers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,

U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T NINETEENTH U. S. INFANTRY,
Fort Arbuckle, C. T., February 16, 1867.

Colonel: I have the honor to state that previous to my arrival here, a roving band of Indians had made a raid in the vicinity, carrying off stock, chiefly horses, and a negro child, from within a few miles of the post. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Hart, commanding, sent in pursuit the Caddo Indian scouts, who, after more than a week's absence, returned without any intelligence as to the number, tribe, or probable course of the robbers. I have just learned from Horace C. Jones, (white man,) who is an old resident, and has for some years acted as interpreter for many of the tribes of Indians on this frontier, that the band consisted of twenty-five Comanches belonging to the Cashchera-tebakha tribe, (buffalo eaters,) the head chief being Marwha.

About two weeks after those depredations here, they were met in the neighborhood of Fort Cobb, and gave chase to Samuel Paul and Dr. J. J. Stern, (white,) the latter being the issuing commissary of the reserve Comanches, who are reported friendly. These men were saved by the aid of Tuschowa, head chief of the reserve Comanches.

This chief also recovered five of the horses which had been taken from the vicinity, but failed in his efforts to regain the captured negro child.

These facts were obtained by Mr. Jones from Tuschowa himself, who requested they might be made known to these headquarters. In this affair Tuschowa was brought in collision with the Indians of his own tribe, with whom he had formerly acted, and he felt the necessity of avoiding an open rupture. His conduct displays admirable discretion under the circumstances.

I have the honor to state further, that several other tribes than the Comanches have been noticed on the war path, having been seen in their progress, in unusual numbers, and without their squaws and children, a fact to which much significance is attached by those conversant with
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Indian usages. It is thought by many white residents of the Territory that some of these tribes may be acting in concert, and that plundering incursions at least are in contemplation. George Washington, second chief of the Caddoes, a friendly tribe, is of the opinion that the wild Comanches are bent upon mischief.

Since the date of the treaty made at the mouth of the Little Arkansas, I believe on the 6th of October, 1865, in which the Cashchokelka Comanches joined, these and other contracting parties to the treaty have carried off a large amount of stock in violation of its provisions, and have slain and made captive many white persons held in speculation to be ransomed.

The practice of the government of condoning (pardoning, perhaps) these offenses, by the payment of liberal sums, has had the natural effect of encouraging this inhuman traffic among the Indians; and every day of its continuance adds difficulties to the return to what I deem a wiser and sterner policy, and one that would ultimately be the most humane.

My inexperience in the exigencies of the frontier causes me to defer to the views of such sensible white residents, and others, as, from long residence among the Indians, are competent to advise; and this communication, while it expresses my own, is more particularly the embodiment of their views.

In a communication made on the 12th instant, I had the honor to apply for ten additional companies to re-enforce this post; and I now respectfully suggest the subject-matter of this communication as additional reason for the proposed re-enforcement.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,

E. L. SMITH,
Capt. 19th U. S. Inf. and Bvt. Maj. U. S. A.,
Commanding Post.

Colonel O. D. GREEN,
A. A. G. Dept of Arkansas, Little Rock, Ark.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, Indian agent.

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain, and A. A. A. General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARKANSAS,
March 5, 1867.

From the fact that these Indians steal from these frontiers, and have supplied themselves with large caballadas, that they sell and supply horses to the northern Indians on the railroad and mail route, I think it important to put a stop to their wholesale plundering. I propose building posts in their country, as that demoralizes them more than anything else, except money and whisky.

Respectfully forwarded.

E. O. C. ORD,
Brigadier General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MIL. DEPT OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Mo., March 14, 1867.

Respectfully referred to the commanding general Department of the Missouri, for his action in the premises.

By order of Lieutenant General Sherman.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.
AGENCY FOR THE COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS
OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,

Leavenworth City, May 16, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith my letter of the 10th ultimo, addressed to Major General Hancock, commanding the department of the Missouri, together with his reply of the 10th April, 1867.

This order bears equally upon all Indians within this large district, no matter what may be the situation or disposition of the same.

Within the limits of this district, large numbers of what are called wild Indians live, and depend mostly for subsistence for themselves and families, upon game. Heretofore, the buffalo was their whole dependence, and when other game was killed it was more for sport than necessity. Now it is otherwise; the buffalo has greatly decreased in number, and is fast disappearing, and the "red man" finds himself compelled to look to sources for food. The small game becomes important to him, and he says without ammunition he must starve, or seek other sources to sustain himself and those whom nature require him to support. Two traders, lately from some two hundred miles north of the "big bend" of the Arkansas, report to me the Indians of that country in almost a starving condition, living upon the old carcasses of the buffalo killed last fall and during the winter, and upon roots. On their trip up they did not see fifty head of buffalo. If the Indians cannot get ammunition in small quantities, sufficient to kill small game for subsistence, what are they to do? It is impossible for me to tell you the hardship this order works. Cannot something be done about it?

As I have heretofore sent General Hancock's field order No. 1, I inclose herewith his field order No. 2, and will again assure the department that there is no cause of complaint from the Indians of my agency, except those who raided into Texas last fall, and sold their captives to the military at Fort Dodge, as has been reported to the department (see Agent Taylor's report, September 25, 1866,) and who have remained at or near that post since, depending on that post for trade and support.

The great body of the Kiowas, and all the Comanches, have remained away from our great lines of travel, and at their camps near the Salt Plains.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

AGENCY OF COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS
OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Larned, Kansas, April 10, 1867.

SIR: I have received the following order through the commanding officer at Fort Dodge, Kansas:

[General Orders No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Riley, Kansas, January 26, 1867.

It having been officially reported to the major general commanding the department that arms and ammunition have been sold or given away to Indians on permit from the Indian agents, post commanders are hereby ordered to prevent any further sales or gifts of arms or ammunition to Indians in this district, until further orders.

By command of Brevet Major General A. J. Smith.

HENRY E. NOYES,
Captain Second Cavalry, Bvt. Maj. U. S. A. and A. A. A. G.
I have respectfully to request that you will inform me if the above order is still in force; and if so, to inform me under what law, or by what authority, the said order was issued; and, also, if the same has been modified in any manner whatever. I have also to request that I may be provided with a copy of Field Orders No. 1, and dated 26th March, 1867.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH, U. S. Indian Agent.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK, Commanding Department of the Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 11, near Fort Larned, April 11, 1867.

Colonel: In reply to your communication of the 10th instant, I have the honor to state that the order from headquarters, district of the Upper Arkansas, referred to by you, has the sanction of myself, of Lieutenant General Sherman, and of General Grant, as has been published and widely circulated. It was based upon a recent official report received from Major H. Douglass, Third United States Infantry, commanding at Fort Dodge, in which it was stated that large bands of Indians had passed that post, all of whom were supplied with arms in such abundance, that some of them had as many as three revolvers; and further stated that they were abundantly supplied with ammunition.

No change can be made in the order in question, unless by reference to Lieutenant General Sherman, or higher authority; or unless it should be found that the report of Major Douglass concerning this matter is inaccurate.

A copy of General Field Orders No. 1, current series, from these headquarters, is herewith furnished as requested by you.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF’D HANCOCK, Major General U. S. A., Commanding.

Colonel J. H. LEAVENWORTH, United States Indian Agent, Fort Larned, Kansas.

[General Field Orders No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 11, near Fort Larned, Kansas, April 9, 1867.

1. Chiefs of the Arapahoes, Kiowas, Cheyennes, and possibly of other tribes, have assembled frequently at or near certain posts on the Arkansas and Smoky Hill, and have in manner and word, by message, and verbally to the commanders and other officers, threatened to interrupt the use, by our people, of the public road, and have notified them to leave.

Unless these things are checked they will result in war; the Indians will believe we are afraid of them.

On a recurrence of similar cases, the commanding officers of posts and detachments are directed to punish on the spot such offenders, and to proceed against the tribes in question without delay.

In case of depredations by Indians, driving off stock, &c., a pursuit
will be made at once, in order to arrest and punish the perpetrators, and to determine with certainty the tribe to which they belong. If necessary, a guide, or "tracker," may be employed to assist in the pursuit. Indians may be engaged for this purpose, but they should be of a different tribe from that which has committed the depredations.

Hereafter in case of hostilities by Indians, no peace will be made with them, unless by reference to these headquarters.

By command of Major General Hancock.

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel Leavenworth, United States Indian agent.

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

ST. LOUIS, May 22, 1867.

SIR: On the 4th instant I wrote you from Fort Zarah, Kansas, that Lieutenant General Sherman was expected at Fort Harker on the 7th, at which place I proposed to see him. His non-arrival necessitated my going to Fort Leavenworth, at which place I met him on the 11th; but after a very short interview I became satisfied "all Indian matters" were left exclusively with General Hancock; and, as I supposed I knew his views, I made up my mind things pertaining to the Indians would have to take their course. I went immediately to Atchison and consulted Superintendent Murphy as to the policy best to be pursued toward the Indians south of the Arkansas River. As no regard is paid by the military to our treaties with the Indians, and as the Indians of my agency are now far south, and I could not communicate with them directly from Forts Larned or Zarah, I informed Superintendent Murphy I should adopt the same plan I did in 1864-'65, which met his entire approbation, and which was, going to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, and from there sending reliable messengers, accompanied by some of the To-woc-o-roy Thycoes, or some of the other friendly refugee Indians, that I am well acquainted with, with instructions to the Kiowas and Comanches to stop away from the Santa Fe road, but as near the "salt plains" as they could procure subsistence, until I could meet the chiefs and headmen, as circumstances would permit, on the Cow-skin, Miniskau, Shi-ki-as-ki, or on Bluff Creek.

My runners have gone to them, and as soon as I can see what is to be done about their annuity goods I shall go and meet them; but when I do so, I wish to be prepared to tell them just what they can depend upon. Lieutenant General Sherman finished up his trip west by going to Fort Harker, and on his return I met him on the train. I came to St. Louis, and he informs me—and I am most happy to communicate the fact to the department—that the Indians of my agency, "Kiowas and Comanches, are all right." I cannot make any statement more gratifying, except that this letter will close my correspondence, so far as Major General Hancock's Indian expedition is concerned, unless something of importance turns up.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS,
May 27, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a circular issued by the superintendent of the American Express Company to their employés on the Smoky Hill route from Fort Harker to Denver City.

I would call your attention particularly to the paragraph marked, viz: "If Indians come within shooting distance, shoot them; show them no mercy, for they will show you none."

I am credibly informed that General Hancock has issued similar orders to commandants of all posts in his district, and has virtually declared war upon all Indians found north of the Arkansas and south of the Platte Rivers.

According to existing treaty stipulations, the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches have permission to live in, and roam over, the country lying between these two rivers, until the President orders them removed to reservations selected for them. If the government countenances these arbitrary acts of military commanders and superintendents of express companies in violating treaties, it is unreasonable to expect that the Indians will keep their part of these treaties.

If this condition of affairs is permitted to exist much longer, every effort that has been made during the past two years by the civil officers of the government to promote peace and friendship among those Indians, and to prevent depredations, will have been utterly in vain, and it is but reasonable to expect that an Indian war of gigantic proportions will ensue, which will astonish the American people and cost millions of treasure.

In view of these facts, I respectfully request that you will take such immediate steps as in your judgment will the soonest and most effectually put a stop to these arbitrary and cruel orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

CAMP No. 1, SOUTH SIDE ARKANSAS RIVER,
Near Little Arkansas River, September 2, 1867.

SIR: I crossed the Arkansas River yesterday; shall leave to-morrow morning for the Comanche camp on the Red Fork of the North Fork of the Canadian River, at which point it is my intention to meet all the chiefs and headmen of the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Apaches, and Cheyennes that are south of the Arkansas, to make full arrangements for them to meet the commission authorized to make peace with the hostile Indians. In using the word "hostile," I do not wish you to think that there are any hostile Indians south of the Arkansas, except a very few Cheyennes of Black Kettle's band, notwithstanding the report made by interested parties that the Kiowas are now on the warpath. To show the incorrectness of this report, I would state to you that, at this moment of writing, two herds of cattle, numbering some fifteen hundred, have just arrived here from Texas, and the herders report the seeing of a very few Indians, and them very friendly. So much for reports from those seated at military posts and merely writing letters. Would it not be much better to be in the Indian country, where the facts could be ascertained?
The reports from the Smoky Hill country look ugly. Here we are trying to make peace; there, contrary to orders, the Kansas militia are hunting the Indians like wolves, and getting whipped like dogs. This news, when received by the Indians south of the Arkansas River, tends to excite the young men, and the older ones find it difficult to hold them in check. General Hancock should be held to a strict account for their transactions. Why don't he confine the troops to the great lines of travel? He has burned nearly three hundred lodges, and I should think that was "glory" enough for him!

In regard to an annual report from me, I can only refer you to my correspondence since last spring. The Indians of my agency have remained perfectly quiet and peaceable, so far as relates to the Sante Fé road and the northern frontier. Some complaints have come from Texas; but, whether the Indians of my agency are alone to blame, it is impossible for me to determine. That wrongs of great magnitude have been committed on the people of Texas, there is no doubt; but I do know other Indians, besides the Kiowas and Comanches, have been doing much of this wrong. I shall, however, continue to exert myself to prevent these acts of violence.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

UPPER ARKANSAS.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
April 21, 1867.

SIR: I write hastily, as a mail is about leaving, to inform you that, on the 19th instant, General Hancock burnt the Indian village, three hundred lodges, Sioux and Cheyennes. I know of no overt act that the Cheyennes had committed to cause them to be thus punished, not even since their flight. I have just arrived with General Hancock's column at this post, and learn, since my arrival here, that a few days ago six Cheyenne Indians on foot were attacked by one hundred and thirty cavalry, about twenty-five miles west of this post, and all of them killed. I also learn that they had done nothing to provoke an attack, but were of the party that fled before General Hancock's approach. This whole matter is horrible in the extreme, and these same Indians of my agency have actually been forced into war.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant;

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL HANCOCK'S CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK;
Thirty-two miles west Fort Larned, April 18, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to state that, since my last communication a few days back, in which I spoke of the flight of the Indians upon Gen-
eral Hancock's approach, and his intention to destroy the village, I have written a communication to General Hancock; a copy of which I inclose; have received no written reply; but he stated to me verbally that, for the present, he would not destroy the village. In my last letter I also stated that General Custer was in pursuit of the Indians. A courier has since arrived from him with the information that the Cheyennes had turned and gone toward the Arkansas River, while the Sioux had continued northward. He followed the Sioux trail, and the last dispatch from him is to the effect that the Sioux, upon crossing the Smoky Hill road, had destroyed a ranche or mail station, and killed three men. Since receiving this news General Hancock has again expressed his determination to destroy the villages. I have again appealed to him on behalf of the Cheyennes, as their village is distinct from the Sioux, and as yet there is no evidence of their having committed any overt act since their flight, and he has promised me to consider the matter. Under the circumstances in which the Indians left here, in my judgment, being fully impressed with the belief that General Hancock had come for the purpose of murdering their women and children, as had previously been done at Sand Creek, I have no doubt but that they think that the war has been forced upon them, (the Cheyennes,) and will commence committing depredations and following their style of warfare immediately; thus, in my opinion, has another Indian war been brought on which might have been averted by the military authorities pursuing a different line of policy.

I will continue with General Hancock as long as there is any probability of him falling in with any of the Indians of my agency, for the purpose, as far as lies in my power, of subserving the interests of the department.

As soon as possible I will submit to your office an inventory of the effects in both the Cheyenne and Sioux villages.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK,
April 13, 1867.

GENERAL: For a long time I have made the Indian character my chief study. I regard the late movement of the Cheyennes of my agency as caused by fear alone; so far as I am able to judge, they met us at first with a determination to have a peaceful talk, at such a distance from their village as would make their women and children satisfied that no danger need be apprehended by them. Your movement toward the village terrified the squaws and children, who left with such movable property as they could gather.

I learn that you purpose destroying the lodges and other property now remaining in the village. I would most respectfully request you not to do so. I am fully convinced that the result would be an Indian outbreak of a most serious nature, while, at the same time, there is no evidence, in my judgment, that this band of Cheyennes are deserving of this severe punishment.
I am influenced alone in thus communicating with you by what I consider a strict sense of duty.

With feelings of the utmost respect, I am, general, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Comd'y Dept. of Missouri and Indian Expedition.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK,
Thirty miles west of Fort Larned, April 15, 1867.

Sir: I write in haste, as a courier is about leaving camp. I am with General Hancock's expedition, having accompanied him at his request, as he stated that it was his intention to hold a council with the principal men of the tribes of my agency. I am sorry to say that the result of the expedition is disastrous. General Hancock marched his column right up to the Indian village, composed of three hundred lodges of Cheyennes and Sioux. He found on halting that the women and children had fled, and the men were alone occupying the camp. He ordered the chiefs to bring back the women and children, and they started for the purpose of endeavoring to do so, but soon returned and stated that it was impossible, and during the night the men deserted their village, leaving their lodges with all the furniture of the same. General Hancock has sent General Custer with a cavalry command in pursuit. Understanding that it was the intention of General Hancock to destroy the lodges and other property left in the village, I have written him a letter of remonstrance, as I am perfectly convinced that the conduct of the Indians was the result of intense fear. I am fearful that the result of all this will be a general war, which is much to be deprecated, as there are many unprotected whites on the different roads across the plains and at the mail stations and ranches. I will report in full the first opportunity.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington.

Extract of letter from Colonel Wynkoop, United States Indian Agent for Arapahoe, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

FORT LARNED, KANSAS,
Upper Arkansas Indian Agency, April 24, 1867.

Sir: My last communication was written hastily from Fort Dodge, and I now have the honor to state that I have since arrived at the headquarters of my agency. Since the killing and scalping of the six Cheyenne Indians above Fort Dodge, nothing new has transpired with reference to Indian affairs. Contrary to my expectations the Cheyenne Indians, who fled from their village, committed no depredations while crossing the Santa Fé road, and have not to my knowledge up to the
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present time, notwithstanding their persecutions. It is rumored here that considerable stock has been run off the Smoky Hill road by the Sioux Indians on the occasion of their flight north. General Hancock is still at Fort Dodge with his troops. Since the Indians of my agency have not as yet retaliated for the wrongs heaped upon them, it may be possible, if proper action be taken by the Department of the Interior to prevent the military from forcing trouble on, that a general Indian war may be prevented. As far as lay in my power I have struggled to avert this direful calamity. The Arapaho and Apache Indians are far south of the Arkansas River, and have not yet got into any trouble. I inclose herewith a copy of the inventory taken of property destroyed in both the Cheyenne and Sioux villages.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

List of articles destroyed by General Hancock.

CHEYENNE CAMP.—132 lodges, 396 buffalo robes, 57 saddles, 120 travieses, 78 head-mats, 90 axes, 58 kettles, 125 fry-pans, 200 tin cups, 130 wooden bowls, 116 tin pans, 103 whetstones, 44 sacks paint, 57 sacks medicines, 63 water kgs, 14 ovens, 117 rubbing horns, 42 coffee-mills, 150 rope lariats, 100 chains, 264 parfleches, 70 coffee-pots, 50 hoes, 120 fleshing irons, 200 parflech sacks, 200 horn spoons, 42 crowbars, 400 sacks feathers, 200 tin plates, 160 brass kettles, 40 hammers, 15 sets lodge poles, (uncovered,) 17 stew pans, 4 drawing knives, 10 spades, 2 bridles, 93 hatchets, 25 tea-kettles, 250 spoons, 157 knives, 4 pickaxes.

SIOUX CAMP.—140 lodges, 420 buffalo robes, 226 saddles, 150 travieses, 142 head-mats, 142 axes, 138 kettles, 40 fry-pans, 190 tin cups, 146 tin pans, 140 whetstones, 70 sacks paints, 63 water kgs, 6 ovens, 160 rubbing horns, 7 coffee-mills, 280 ropes, (lariats,) 140 chains, 146 parfleches, 50 curry-combs, 58 coffee-pots, 32 hoes, 25 fleshing irons, 40 horn spoons, 14 crowbars, 54 brass kettles, 11 hammers, 5 sets lodge poles, (uncovered,) 4 stew pans, 9 drawing knives, 2 spades, 8 bridles, 3 pitchforks, 3 tea-kettles, 280 spoons, 4 pickaxes, 1 sword and extra scabbard, 1 bayonet, 1 mail-bag, stone mallets, 1 lance.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Atchison, Kansas, May 13, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Agent Leavenworth arrived here yesterday direct from his agency. I had a conference yesterday with him relative to Indian affairs and military operations in the southwest. He gave me much valuable information; permitted me to peruse all the correspondence he has had with General Hancock and other military dignitaries. If his statements are correct, (and I have no reason to doubt them,) General Hancock’s expedition, I regret to say, has resulted in no good; but, on the contrary, has been productive of much evil. It would have been far better for the interest of all concerned had he never entered the Indian country with his soldiers. Indians who, at the time he got into their country, were peaceable and well disposed toward the
whites, are now fleeing with their women and children, no one knows where to, and what the final result will be is doubtful. In such times, and while such a state of uncertainty exists, I deem it proper that the agents of these Indians should be at some place where they could advise and counsel with them. I so informed Agent Leavenworth, and directed that he return and put himself in communication with his Indians. This he said he would do; but in order to accomplish this he will have to proceed to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, and from that point send out runners to his Indians. Before returning he will report in detail to the department all the particulars relating to recent events connected with himself and his Indians.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
May 28, 1867.

SIR: This office is in receipt of a letter from Agent Leavenworth, dated May 22, in which he states that he had informed you that he should go to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, and from there send messengers to his band, telling them to keep away from the Santa Fé road; but expecting to meet their chiefs at some future day on the Cow Skin, Miniskaw, Shikaski, or on Bluff Creek, he desires definite instructions as to what he shall say to the chiefs.

Presuming that the instructions desired have special reference to the subject of the distribution of annuity goods, and in the hope that you may be able soon to communicate with him, the following instructions are presented, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior:

You will instruct both Agent Leavenworth and Agent Wynkoop that they will take the same course as last year in regard to the delivery of annuity goods; that is, they will not deliver any goods to bands which have committed hostilities; but will cause them to be stored at some safe place under protection of the military until it can be ascertained which bands, if any, have remained peaceable. If a part have kept their pledge of peace, and a part been hostile, all of the goods will be delivered to those who have remained peaceable. No goods will be given to any bands who retain any captive citizens in their possession, whom they refuse or fail to deliver; but the agents are authorized to use their discretion as to the distribution of goods to bands which may have been, to some extent, hostile; provided they shall restore any captives held by them, make restitution of property taken, and promise good conduct in future, if, under the circumstances, there shall exist good reason for believing that such promises will be observed.

A copy of these instructions will be sent to the Secretary of the Interior, with the request that they may be communicated to the War Department, so that the military officers at the various posts may be advised of the course which is intended to be pursued.

Very respectfully, &c.,

THOS. MURPHY, Esq.,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit, in accordance with instructions from your office, a report of the details of Major General Hancock's late operations with reference to the Indians of my agency. My first intimation of his intended expedition was a communication from him of date March 11, 1867, a copy of which I inclose, marked A. The next communication with reference to the same matter was that of March 22, 1867, a copy of which I also inclose, marked B.

In accordance with the request of General Hancock, I communicated with the Indians of my agency and instructed the principal men to be present at Fort Larned on the 10th day of April, for the purpose of holding a council. In consequence of a severe snow-storm they were detained several days, but finally made their appearance, although their animals were in such condition as to be scarcely able to travel. A council was held and at its close General Hancock expressed his intention to march his column up to their village, a distance of thirty-five miles from Fort Larned, which he accordingly proceeded to do. The Indians were dissatisfied with this movement, expressing themselves to the effect that it was calculated to frighten their women and children, who had not forgotten the fearful massacre of Sand Creek. I stated to General Hancock that I thought that such would be the result, viz: frightening the women and children, by marching his column up to the village, but he did not change his intention.

I accompanied the expedition for the purpose of looking out for the interests of my Indians, as well as the public interests. On our arrival at the village, it was found deserted by the women and children, who had fled in terror on the approach of the troops; the men were still in the village, and when General Hancock sent for the chiefs to come to him, they came without any hesitation; he asked them why their women and children had fled, and they answered that it was in consequence of their fears; the men still remained, and were willing to talk at any time. General Hancock then told Roman Nose and Bull Bear, two of the principal chiefs of the Cheyennes, that they must bring their women and children back, and they promised they would exert themselves to do so. General Hancock loaned them two horses and they started. In a few hours they came back to their village, returned the two horses, and sent word that it was impossible for them to bring back their families; and then, undoubtedly being under the impression that General Hancock would punish them on account of the flight of their families, and naturally suspicious, from the fact that the general insisted upon having their women and children present, the horrors of Sand Creek still being before their eyes, they fled, leaving the village deserted, with the exception of an old crippled Indian and a female Indian child, about nine or ten years of age. It has been stated by newspaper correspondents and in military reports that the child found in the village was white, and that she had been brutally ravished. That she was white is false, that she was ravished is correct. She was found after the camp was occupied by the troops, and the question in my mind is still, by whom was this outrage committed? If by her own race, it is the first instance I have any knowledge of.

The Indian village consisted of one hundred and forty lodges of Sioux, and one hundred and thirty-two lodges of Cheyennes. Immediately upon the Indians' flight General Hancock intimated his intention of destroying the village, which I protested against over my official signature, and a copy of which letter I have already transmitted to the de
Difficulties With Indian Tribes.

Department. The Indians, upon their flight, were, by order of General Hancock, pursued by General Custer with his cavalry, and in a communication he forwarded to General Hancock he stated that the Cheyenne Indians had fled south, while he was continuing on the Sioux trail, which led toward the north. At a later date he reported that the Sioux, upon crossing the Smoky Hill, had burned a ranch and killed three men. Upon the receipt of which communication General Hancock immediately ordered the entire village to be destroyed, notwithstanding there was no evidence that the Cheyennes had committed any overt act since their flight. Their village was destroyed, as well as the Sioux. In a former communication I have forwarded an inventory of the property contained in both villages, although the Sioux are not included in my agency. About the time of the destruction of the village six Cheyenne Indians, while crossing the Arkansas River on foot above Fort Dodge, were attacked by a command of cavalry and killed. Notwithstanding all these facts, there is as yet no evidence that any of these persecuted Indians of my agency have in any manner retaliated. Since their flight they have remained far south of the Arkansas River, and the only Indians who have been on the Arkansas River, or who have committed any depredations since that time, have been the Kiowas, the same Indians whom General Hancock proposed to "arm, feed, clothe, and mount," for the purpose of making war upon these poor persecuted Cheyennes, who, from the time of the base treachery practiced at Sand Creek by our own race, should have the sympathy of all humanity.

General Hancock has declared war upon the Cheyennes, and ordered all to be shot who make their appearance north of the Arkansas or south of the Platte Rivers. The question is, what have these Indians done to cause such action? and it is to be hoped that the department will have such question answered.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. Wynkoop,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. Thomas Murphy,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

A.

Headquarters Department of the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 11, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to address this letter to you for the purpose of informing you that I have about completed my arrangements to move a force to the plains, and only await a proper condition of the roads to march.

My object in making an expedition at this time is to show the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to chastise any tribes who may molest people who are traveling across the plains. It is not our desire to bring on difficulties with the Indians, but to treat them with justice and according to our treaty stipulations, and I desire especially in my dealings with them to act through their agents as far as practicable.

In reference to the Cheyennes of your agency, in particular, I may say that we have just grounds of grievance. One is that they have not delivered up the murderer of the New Mexican at Zarah. I also believe that I have evidence sufficient to fix upon different bands of that tribe,
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whose chiefs are known, several of the outrages committed on the Smoky Hill last summer.

I request that you will inform them in such a manner as you may think proper, that I expect shortly to visit their neighborhood, and that I will be glad to have an interview with their chiefs; and tell them, also, if you please, that I will go fully prepared for peace or war, and that hereafter I will insist upon their keeping off the main lines of travel, where their presence is calculated to bring about collisions with the whites. If you can prevail upon the Indians of your agency to abandon their habit of infesting the country traversed by our overland routes, threatening, robbing, and intimidating travelers, we will defer that matter to you. If not, I would be pleased by your presence with me when I visit the locality of your tribes to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel E. W. WYNKOOP,
Agent for Cheyennes, Apaches, and Arapahoes,
Fort Larned, Kansas.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 22, 1867.

SIR: In accordance with instructions which I have received from Lieutenant General Sherman, commanding military division of the Missouri, I have the honor to inform you that during the expedition which I am about to march to the Arkansas, I shall make no demands for the Indian who killed the New Mexican at Zarah last fall, nor for the party who murdered the men, and carried off the stock from Chalk Bluff station on the Smoky Hill during last year.

These cases will now be left entirely in the hands of the Indian Department, and I do not expect to make war against any of the Indians of your agency, unless they commence hostilities against us.

But, as I before stated to you, I am prepared to aid you with the troops at my disposal in case you should request such assistance to control your Indians, or to arrest or punish any of them who have been guilty of outrages or depredations.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. Army, Commanding.

Colonel E. W. WYNKOOP,
Indian Agent.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Atchison, Kansas, June 20, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a letter of the 8th instant, from Agent Wyukoop, inclosing copy of a letter of the 29th ultimo from James J. Morrison, who states that he met and conversed with young Little Big Mouth, a chief of the Arapahoes, who with some of his people—

H. Ex. Doc. 249——3
and a portion of the Cheyennes are on the Washita River, about two hundred and fifty miles south of Fort Zarah, and informing the agent that it was the earnest desire of these Indians to remain at peace. This I believe to be the desire of all the Indians who have gone south of the Arkansas, and I also believe that those Indians who have gone north of the Platte have done so for the purpose of joining other hostile tribes, and are now on the war-path. If I am correct in these conclusions, (and I draw them from the best information obtainable,) I would respectfully ask, is it not right, and is it not the duty of the government to send their agent, or some other proper officers of the government, duly authorized and empowered to see and talk to these Indians while they are friendly disposed? Recollect that war was declared on all Indians found south of the Platte and north of the Arkansas Rivers. This comprised the country inhabited by the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches. The friendly disposed portions of these tribes have gone south of the Arkansas for protection; they are on the Washita asking every white man they see to tell their Great Father they are friendly disposed, and don't wish war; they are starving, and yet are peaceable, and know not what the government intends to do with them. In view of these facts, I would recommend that steps be taken to have some competent person visit these Indians, and assure them that as long as they remain friendly, and live up to their treaty pledges, the government would protect them, and that these parties who may so visit them have authority to provide a place for them where they can be protected from military operations and hostile Indians; and in this last particular, it would be well to consult with and have the co-operation of the military.

These are briefly my views in relation to the best course to be pursued toward these and all other Indians who desire to remain peaceable, with a hope of encouraging them to remain so; and should they meet with your approval, I trust that, faithfully carried out, those Indians who are now friendly will be kept so, and that they will be able to induce others to join them who now are hostile.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

UPPER ARKANSAS AGENCY,
Fort Larned, June 8, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter, lately received, showing the whereabouts at present of my Indians. As it is uncertain where I will be able to congregate the Indians for the purpose of issuing the goods, you will please have them supplied direct to my agency at Fort Larned. I forward by next mail a detailed report of all matters connected with General Hancock’s expedition, together with an account of my investigation of an Indian outrage committed near Fort Dodge on the 4th instant.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.
FORT ZARAH, May 29, 1867.

SIR: I have just returned from the Washita River, two hundred and fifty miles south of here, at which place most of the Arapahoes and Cheyennes of your agency are camped. Young "Big Mouth," on the part of the Arapahoes, wished me to inform you that neither he nor any of his band had committed any hostility, and had no intention of doing so; that he wished for peace on any terms, and would pledge himself to remain neutral, even should the Cheyennes go to war. He is willing to remain in any region of the country, or agree to any arrangement that you wish to make. He says that he does not wish to come near the Arkansas, as he hears of considerable trouble along the road with the soldiers. He wishes to avoid all contact with the military, if possible.

The Cheyennes did not talk quite as friendly, but they said the people on the Arkansas did not treat them well, and that they did not like them, but did not express any intention of going to war.

I shall remain at the Big Bend several days, and if you wish to communicate with me you can do so at that place. I am well acquainted with the country south of here, and if you wish to open any communication with these Indians, I am not otherwise employed.

I remain at your service, respectfully,

JAMES J. MORRISON.

Colonel WYNKOOP.

FORT LARNED, KANSAS, July 1, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to state that since my last letter I have not been in communication with the Indians of my agency. They are some distance south of the Arkansas River, and up to the present time have not, according to my belief, engaged in hostilities, but unless prompt action is taken by the government they will necessarily soon be brought into war, for the reason that the Kiowas at present are engaged in open hostilities, and the consequence will be that the troops will soon take the field against them, and, as has heretofore invariably been the case, they will not discriminate, but be apt to strike the wrong Indians, which will force these friendly Indians, who are disposed and anxious to remain in peace, to make war in self-defense. I therefore consider it of the utmost importance that these Indians should be separated, and those whom I can vouch for as friendly be brought under protection, while the campaign is being carried on against those who deserve punishment, although I believe that the whole Indian difficulty in this section of the country can be settled on a more economical plan than fighting them.

I have reason to believe that two of the semi-civilized tribes of your superintendency, viz.: the Osages and Kaws, have taken advantage of the hostilities existing with the wild tribes to commit depredations, and have the blame thrown upon them.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. THOMAS MURPHY.

Superintendent Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

[Telegram.]

BOX ELDER, COLORADO, August 7, 1867.

N. G. TAYLOR, Commissioner of Indian Affairs:

I to-day met in council a delegation of nineteen Arapahoes from Big Horn River to the north, representing one hundred and seventy lodges heretofore belonging to this superintendency. The whole tribe desire to lay down their arms and come in. Please instruct me what to do. It is dangerous for these men to remain long here. I must act promptly. Answer at Laporte, Colorado.

A. C. HUNT,
Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

UPPER ARKANSAS AGENCY,
Fort Larned, Kansas, August 13, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following as my annual report of the condition of my agency:

The Indians of which I have charge, viz.: the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches, are in a nomadic state, which renders it impossible for the business of my agency to be carried on with the same regularity as those agents who have their Indians on reservations quietly settled down.

When first entering upon my duties last November I found so many difficulties to combat that I was nearly discouraged; but having been for a number of years among these Indians in the position of an army officer, and being in consequence well acquainted with their characteristics, I persevered. They complained of the government not having fulfilled its promises to them, and of numerous impositions practiced upon them by the whites, which complaints I am compelled to admit were correct; then, on the other hand, some of their young men, thinking they had been badly treated, started out and committed some depredations.

I finally succeeded in getting everything running properly, had issued the goods, and the Indians were scattered through their hunting grounds in perfect harmony with the whites; the mail traveled on the Santa Fe road with security, and individual white men were scattered all through the Indian country, and I heard of no complaints of the bad conduct of the Indians of my agency in any respect, when the unfortunate expedition of General Hancock took place, and his act in unnecessarily destroying a village of three hundred lodges by fire has led to troubles which have existed up to the present time, as the department, I think, is well aware.

When the commissioners who have been appointed by Congress arrive here I have no doubt they will find these persecuted Indians willing to accede to any terms they choose to propose; when they make war they are driven to it, and consequently are always anxious for peace, which, in my opinion, they will religiously keep until again driven to desperation by the bad acts of white men. I can, without doubt, procure the attendance of the Indians at the point selected for the council.

I remain constantly in the Indian country and will continue to do so, and exert myself to further the public interests as long as I hold the position I now occupy.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

IN CAMP, THIRTY MILES SOUTH ARKANSAS RIVER,
September 18, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a letter, of the 14th instant, from Agent Wynkoop, replying to certain official communications from Major General Hancock, and which have recently appeared in the Army and Navy Journal, relative to his (Hancock's) expedition into the Indian country last spring.

I respectfully recommend that the agent's communication be incorporated into, and made a part of, the honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs' report for 1867.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. MURPHY,

Hon. CHAS. E. MIX,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Acting Commissioner, Washington, D. C.

ARAPAHOE, CHEYENNE, AND APACHE INDIAN AGENCY,
Fort Larned, Kansas, September 14, 1867.

SIR: My attention having just been attracted to a communication in the Army and Navy Journal and other papers from Major General Hancock to General Grant, in reference to his late operations in the country of the Indians included in my agency, which is calculated to cast some reflection upon me, in consequence of the representations that I made at the time to my department in regard to his course—which representations were simply the facts in the premises, but which General Hancock endeavors to prove were misrepresentations on my part—I consider it a duty I owe to myself to set myself right before the department and the public, by replying to the communication mentioned, and endeavoring to prove that General Hancock, and not myself, was mistaken in some particulars referred to by him. I shall also endeavor to prove that General Hancock was not only mistaken in certain particulars, but that his whole course in reference to the Indians of my agency was a mistake; and as long as General Hancock's communication has had publicity given to it by being published in numerous journals throughout the United States, I think it will be no more than an act of justice to myself to have the same publicity given to this my reply.

In the first communication that General Hancock addressed to myself, informing me of his intention of making an expedition to the plains, he says:

I request that you will inform them, (the Indians,) in such a manner as you may think proper, that I expect shortly to visit their neighborhood, and that I will be glad to have an interview with their chiefs; and tell them also, if you please, that I go fully prepared for peace or war, and that hereafter I will insist on their keeping off the main lines of travel, where their presence is calculated to bring about collision with the whites. If you can prevail upon the Indians of your agency to abandon their habit of infesting the country traveled by our overland routes, threatening, robbing, and intimidating travelers, we will defer that matter to you. If not, I would be pleased by your presence with me when I visit the locality of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.

In accordance with the request made by General Hancock, I assembled the principal chiefs of the Dog Soldiers of the Cheyennes at Fort Larned, for the purpose of having an interview with him, (General Hancock.) These chiefs obeyed my summons with alacrity, coming a distance of thirty-five miles to this post through a deep snow, though their ponies, who subsist entirely upon grass, were in a miserable con-
tion, being scarcely able to travel; the chiefs referred to belonged to the village which was afterward destroyed by General Hancock. A council was held with these chiefs by the general in his camp at night; such a thing being heretofore unknown as holding a friendly converse with an assemblage of Indian chiefs after sunset; it is, as they term it, "against their medicine," and that fact alone was calculated to a certain degree to make them feel suspicious.

General Hancock says in his communication from which I have quoted, that he will defer to me certain matters connected with the Indians of my agency, but, in the council referred to, he took upon himself the whole conduct of the affairs, reprimanded the Indians for supposed depredations committed by them, and stated that he was about to march his column of troops up to their village, which was thirty-five miles from any traveled road. Tall Bull, one of the principal men of his tribe, in reply to General Hancock, stated that from the time that he had taken me by the hand about a year previous he had held firmly to the peace then made, and that his band had not been engaged in any acts of hostility toward the whites subsequent to that date; and afterward, in a conversation with myself, said that he was fearful of the consequences of General Hancock marching his column up to his village, as it was calculated to frighten the women and children, who had not yet forgotten the fearful massacre at Sand Creek. Previous to General Hancock's departure from this post I expressed my fears of the result of his marching his troops immediately on to the Indian village, but notwithstanding he persisted in doing so. The village was located thirty-five miles west of this post, on the Pawnee Fork, and the column started directly away from the Santa Fe road, the great highway of this country, and marched up the Pawnee Fork in the direction of the Indian village; said column was composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, together with a pontoon train, and had as formidable an aspect and presented as warlike an appearance as any that ever marched to meet an enemy on a battle-field. I accompanied the column for the purpose of subserving the interests of my department, by looking after the interests of the Indians of my agency as far as lay in my power. Some of the chiefs who had been in council on the first day's march rode alongside of me, exhibiting in various ways their fear of the result of the expedition—not fearful of their own lives or liberty, as they rode boldly in the midst of the column, but fearful of the panic which they expected to be created among their women and children upon the arrival of the troops. Some twenty-two or twenty-three miles from Fort Larned we went into camp, the chiefs still remaining with the troops, as well as another small party of warriors, who had met the column during the day. Upon going into camp, it was the understanding that we were within five or six miles of the Indian village, and General Hancock dispatched some of the chiefs that night to bring the principal men in at nine o'clock the next morning, for the purpose of having a talk with them. The Indians had not made their appearance at the time specified; the general allowed a short time to elapse, and at their not still making their appearance, he expressed himself to the effect that he believed that they felt guilty and would not come, and accordingly struck his camp and started in the direction of the Indian village, the majority of the chiefs who had been present at the council still remaining with the column. After making a march of about six miles we came in sight of about three hundred Indians rapidly marching toward the camp we had left. Our column was immediately halted, the infantry and artillery forming in line, the cavalry coming up at the
same time on the gallop with drawn sabres, the whole command presenting such an appearance as I have seen just prior to the opening of an engagement. The consequence was that the Indians halted at some distance, became unsteady, and some of them, who were in the rear on foot, precipitately fled. Not knowing what the Indians might do under the circumstances, I asked permission of General Hancock to ride toward the Indian lines for the purpose of re-assuring them with my presence. Permission being granted, I rode into the center of their line. Apparently overjoyed when they recognized me, they surrounded my horse, expressing their delight at seeing me there, saying that now they knew everything was all right, and they would not be harmed. Recognizing one of their principal war chiefs, Roman Nose, I galloped toward him, instructing him to immediately send and bring those Indians who were in flight, and keep all his people steady, as they would not be harmed. I then learned that the Indian village, instead of being five or six miles from our camp, as we had supposed, was at least fifteen; that the Indians had started as soon as possible after receiving General Hancock's message, for the purpose of obeying his instructions by coming to talk with him. I conducted the principal men, and met General Hancock with his generals and their staffs nearly midway between the two lines. General Hancock then told the chiefs that it was too windy to talk then and there at that time; that he was going to march on to their village, and he would hold a council there that evening. The chiefs then left, and the balance of the Indians then moved off rapidly in the direction of their village. General Hancock's column then took up the line of march in the same direction in a short time afterward. During one of the halts, at the solicitation of Bull Brar, the principal chief of the Dog Soldiers, as interpreted by Edmond Guerrier, I appealed to General Hancock, requesting him not to march his column of troops up to the village, as I feared the result would be the flight of the women and children from the same. He said it was his intention to camp his troops in the immediate vicinity of said village. Upon our arrival, after having made camp within a few hundred yards from said village, we learned that the women and children had fled, but that the men still remained. General Hancock immediately summoned the principal men before him, which summons they obeyed promptly, and presented themselves before his tent. He asked them why the women and children had fled on his approach. Roman Nose, one of the chiefs, replied by asking him the question whether the women and children of the whites were not, as a general thing, more timid than the men, who were supposed to be warriors and not afraid of anything; that he himself, (Roman Nose,) who was a warrior, and his comrades who surrounded him, were not afraid of General Hancock and his troops, but their women and children were; and also desired to know if General Hancock had ever heard of the massacre at Sand Creek, where many women and children of his tribe were murdered by United States troops, who came under the same aspect as that now presented by General Hancock's column, and whether it was not natural, under those circumstances, for their women and children to become panic-stricken. The only reply that I heard from General Hancock was that he wanted them—the principal men—to immediately start out and bring in their women and children, as he considered it an act of treachery on their part, the fact of their having fled. Three of the chiefs replied that they were willing to start immediately, and that they would endeavor to bring back the women and children, but appeared doubtful as to their meeting with success. They asked the general to loan them some horses, as their
ponies were not in condition. The horses were furnished, and they
started; returning at midnight, sending back the horses borrowed, and
stating that it was impossible to return their women and children, who
were then scattered in every direction on the prairie. A short time after
the chiefs returned General Hancock surrounded the village with his
cavalry, and found it evacuated by all except an idiot girl and an old
broken-legged Sioux Indian. That night in my presence General Han­
cock expressed his determination of burning the village the next day.
In his letter he says: "My official report of the operations of the expe­
dition last spring shows conclusively that I did not determine to destroy
the Indian villages until I had learned officially of the outrage committed
on the Smoky Hill by the Indians (Sioux and Cheyennes) who had treach­
erously left their camps on Pawnee Fork on the 14th of April or during
the previous night."

Although General Hancock states that no offensive operations were
carried on against the Indians of my agency prior to the burning of the
station on the Smoky Hill, I have to refer to his own report with refer­
cence to the killing of the six Cheyenne Indians, who were attempting
to cross the Arkansas River near the Cimarron crossing. Those Indians
were killed before any word had been received from General Custer, and
in accordance with an order from General Hancock, dispatched on the
night of the Indians' flight, to stop all Indians from crossing the Ar­
kansas River.

Prior to the burning of the village I sent to General Hancock the
following letter of protest, to which I never received any written reply:

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK, April 13, 1867.

GENERAL: For a long time I have made the Indian character my chief study. I
regard the late movement of the Cheyennes of my agency as caused by fear alone, so
far as I am able to judge. They met us first with a determination to have a peaceful
talk, at a such a distance from their village as would make their women and children
satisfied that no danger need be apprehended by them. Your movement toward the
village terrified the squaws and children, who left with such movable property as they
could gather. I learn that you propose destroying the lodges and other property now
remaining in the village. I would most respectfully request you not to do so. I am
fully convinced that the result would be an Indian outbreak of the most serious na­
ture, while at the same time there is no evidence, in my judgment, that this band of
Cheyennes are deserving this severe punishment. I am influenced alone in thus com­
municating with you by what I consider a strict sense of duty.

With feelings of the utmost respect, I am, general, your obedient servant,
E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Com'dy Dept of Missouri and Indian Expedition.

General Hancock states that the depredations committed on the Smoky
Hill immediately after the evacuation of the village were committed by
a portion of the same body of Indians, about eight hundred strong, who
crossed the Smoky Hill road on the 16th of April, and reported them­
selves to be Sioux, Cheyennes, and Pawnees. I would beg leave to
draw your attention to the fact that it is well known by every man who
has the least knowledge of Indian affairs in this country, that the Paw­
nees are the hereditary enemies of the Cheyennes and Sioux, and war
has always existed between them. I also reiterate what I have stated
in former communications, that the first courier who arrived from General
Custer, after leaving in pursuit of the Indians, brought the news that
the Cheyennes had turned south, while General Custer was following
the Sioux trail.

General Hancock also says:

In reference to the statement of Colonel Wynkoop, that the village of the Cheyennes
was distinct from that of the Sioux, I can only say that the villages stood upon the
same ground, and I was unable, after an inspection which I made in person, to distinguish with any certainty the lodges of the Cheyennes from those of the Sioux; nor could any of the officers who were with me say positively where the line of separation between the villages commenced.

And yet General Hancock ordered his inspector general to furnish me with an inventory of the property contained in the Cheyenne village, as well as the Sioux, which inventory was made out under the head of Cheyenne village and Sioux village, and forwarded by me to your department.

General Hancock again says, "that it is not seen upon what ground the Indians became fully impressed with the belief that he had come for the purpose of murdering their women and children, as had previously been done at Sand Creek." In reply to that I would state that the only way the Indians had of judging what his intentions might be were from appearances, and appearances were much the same as those prior to the massacre at Sand Creek.

The nation knows and I know who General Hancock is—know him for the good, brave, faithful soldier, who has won the proud position he now holds through gallant and meritorious services; but the Indians were not aware of General Hancock's antecedents, and had no means of discriminating between him and Colonel Chivington, or distinguishing the man from the monster.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant;

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. Thomas Murphy,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

PAPERS FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
April 5, 1870.

The Secretary of War has the honor to return to the President the resolution of the House of Representatives, dated March 7, 1870, and, in compliance therewith, to submit the accompanying copies of all official documents in possession of the War Department relative to difficulties with the Cheyenne, Comanche, Arapaho, Apache, and Kiowa Indians during the year 1867; the employment of Osage Indians in the military service, and the attack upon a band of Cheyenne Indians on the Washita River in November, 1867, and the alleged abandonment, for fifteen days, of Major Elliott and seventeen enlisted men of the army engaged in said attack.

WM. W. BELKNAP,
Secretary of War.

[General Orders No. 16.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 26, 1867.

It has been officially reported that arms and ammunition are being sold or bartered to the Indians, by traders having permits for this purpose from Indian agents, and by other persons, within the limits of this
department, in quantities greatly exceeding the supply necessary for hunting purposes, and that bands of Indians, whose friendliness was doubted, have been so supplied to such an extent that a large body of them was seen passing one of our posts a few days since, each individual having two, and some of them three revolvers, and many of them armed with the latest improved carbines, and supplied with large quantities of ammunition.

It has also been officially represented that the amount of arms and ammunition sold or bartered to the Indians in question is not limited, but is dependent solely on their ability to purchase.

The practice of supplying these Indians at any time with arms and ammunition, in such quantities as is herein referred to, and especially during their present threatening attitude toward the government, is considered dangerous to the public interest, and is likely to encourage them to make war, and to commit outrages upon unprotected settlements. It is therefore ordered that no arms or ammunition will be sold or bartered to the Indians by any person or persons whomsoever within the limits of this department, save at military posts to be hereafter designated.

In the district of the Upper Arkansas this prohibition will be applied to all posts, save those of Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, as it is particularly desirable to discourage the Indians from frequenting the section of country between the Arkansas and Platte Rivers, with the view of making the mail route and Pacific railroad more secure in the future; and further, to this end, visits of Indians to the posts along the route of the Smoky Hill, and the overland route westward, will be dis­countenanced by the commanders of the posts or troops thereat, and by commanding officers north and south of that line.

On the reservations of Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, on the Arkansas River, ammunition may be sold (they have arms enough) to friendly Indians, by authorized traders, in such quantities only as may be considered by the commanders of those posts absolutely necessary for hunting purposes; but such sales will be made under the rigid supervision of the commanding officers thereof, who will be held strictly responsible that this order is judiciously executed.

The sale of ammunition to each Indian will be confined to an amount required for hunting purposes for himself, and when it is believed they are supplied sufficiently no other sales will be allowed.

The commanding officers of Fort Larned and Fort Dodge will make, through the district commander, monthly reports to these headquarters of the sales of ammunition made under this order, giving the number of Indians to whom such sales are made, the tribes to which they belong, the quantity sold to each individual, the aggregate quantity sold, and the trader permitted to make the sale.

It is understood that it will probably soon be directed by competent authority, that Indians whose reservations are south of the Arkansas, viz., Arapahoes, Apaches, Kiowas, and Comanches, shall not be permitted to go north of that stream, and that the Sioux shall not be permitted to come south of the Platte, which would leave the belt of country between the Platte and Arkansas free from the presence of Indians likely to interfere with the railroad and mail route.

Commanding officers of posts should not countenance the practice of allowing Indians to visit or loiter about their posts, and Indians should never be permitted to know the number of troops forming the garrisons of posts, or to observe the means of defense. Necessary interviews with them should be held outside of the garrison, and only in the pres-
Difficulties with Indian Tribes.

No armed Indians will be allowed to present themselves at any such interview, or to enter any military post.

By command of Major General Hancock.

W. G. Mitchell,

Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

[General Orders No. 39.]

Headquarters Department of the Platte,
Omaha, Nebraska, August 27, 1867.

The general commanding takes pleasure in announcing to his command the following decided successes on the part of troops serving in this department, against greatly superior numbers of hostile Indians.

On the 26th June last, a war party of Sioux and Cheyennes combined, numbering between five and six hundred warriors, under the leadership of Roman Nose, surrounded and attacked a train of supplies escorted by forty-eight men of the Seventh Cavalry, (temporarily serving in this department,) under Lieutenants S. M. Robbins and W. W. Cook. The Indians surrounded the train for three hours, making desperate efforts to capture it, but were gallantly resisted and eventually repulsed, with a loss of five warriors killed and several wounded. Our loss, two men slightly wounded. The officers and men are commended by their commanding officer for good conduct in this their first engagement with hostile Indians.

On the 2d instant, Brevet Major James Powell, captain Twenty-seventh United States Infantry, with twenty-five men of his company and five citizens, employed in getting wood five miles from Fort Philip Kearney, found themselves cut off from the fort by a heavy force of Indians, estimated by cool heads to be about two thousand.

They took position in a small corral, constructed of wagon beds and ox-yokes, and in this little hastily extemporized work these thirty men most gallantly and determinedly defended themselves for three and a half hours against overwhelming odds.

In their first assault the Indians were mounted. Driven back, they dismounted, took their horses to the rear, stripped themselves, and returned to the assault, only to be again repulsed with great loss. Major Powell's party were relieved by the arrival of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel B. F. Smith, major Twenty-seventh United States Infantry, with two companies of infantry and some artillery.

"Fortunately, Major Powell's party had just received the new breech-loading rifles," as Major Smith reports; "had they been armed with the old muzzle-loading arm they must all have been massacred before relief could have reached them."

Major Powell modestly claims sixty Indians killed and one hundred and twenty wounded. It is but just, however, to state that reliable citizens and others, well informed as to result and indications, assert their firm conviction that not less than three hundred Indians were killed or disabled. Major Powell, by his coolness and firmness in this most creditable affair, has shown what a few determined men can effect with good arms and strong hearts, even with such temporary defensive arrangements as are almost always at hand, and that it is always
safer, leaving out the questions of duty and professional honor, to
stand and fight Indians than to retreat from them. Had this party at-
ttempted to fall back, every man would have perished. As it was, it lost
one officer and two enlisted men killed.

Lieutenant Jenness, a most excellent young officer, fell while afford-
ing to his men a fine example of coolness and daring in the perform-
ance of his duty. His loss is regretted by his command, by whom he
was greatly esteemed and loved.

On the 17th instant, Lieutenant Davis, of the Pawnee scouts, sent
out with ten men to reconnoiter near Plum Creek, Nebraska, fell in
with a greatly superior force of hostile Indians. He gradually fell back
until re-enforced by Captain Murie and thirty men of his Pawnees, when
they re-crossed the Platte River and were soon attacked by over a
hundred Cheyennes and Sioux.

Captain Murie coolly held his fire until within proper distance, when
he quickly charged and dispersed them, following them in a running
fight for ten miles, killing fifteen, certain, and it is believed more;
wounding a good many, and capturing two prisoners, thirty-one horses
and mules, and a large number of saddles, blankets, and other property.
Our only loss, one horse killed and fifteen wounded. Captain Murie,
Lieutenant Davis, and their brave Pawnees are entitled to great credit
for this most decided success.

The general commanding regrets that the commanders in these sev-
eral affairs have not given the names of the enlisted men who most dis-
tinguished themselves, that they might be recorded in this order. It is
not too late to remedy this apparent injustice, and the commanders
concerned will, on receipt of this order, report the desired names to
these headquarters.

Hereafter, in all reports of engagements, the names of enlisted men
distinguishing themselves will be embraced in the report.

By command of Major General Augur.

H. G. LITCHFIELD,

[General Orders No. 10.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, November 2, 1867.

1. Whereas the peace commission organized by the act of Congress
approved July 20, 1867, has concluded a treaty of peace with the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache tribes of Indians, and also a separate treaty
of peace with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and as these treaties are
yet incomplete, it is hereby made known that the hostilities heretofore
existing on the part of the troops as against these Indians will cease.

2. By the terms of the treaties, these tribes will ultimately be located
in the Indian country to the south of the State of Kansas, but as they
are to be allowed to hunt game outside the settled limits of Kansas,
Nebraska, and Colorado, in the prairie country to the south of the
South Platte, it is hereby ordered that this treaty right be respected on
the part of all these tribes, although the treaty limits the right to the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes alone.

3. Commanding officers of posts, and of troops en route, are hereby
required to treat all such hunting parties in a friendly spirit, but to
neglect no precautions against safety, which troops should observe al-
ways, no matter where they are; and all troops are commanded to spare no proper effort to keep the peace with these Indians, because it is the earnest wish of the government of the United States that war be avoided, and the civil agents of the government have a full and fair chance to reduce them to a state of comparative civilization.

4. The commanding officers of the departments of the Missouri and the Platte, charged with the police of the plains within the limits of their commands, may also use force, if necessary, to restrain citizens, either on the border, or who travel by established roads, from committing acts of violence against the Indians, trading with them without license, or doing anything calculated to disturb the pacific relations thus established with these tribes.

By order of Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT LARNED, KANSAS,
December 21, 1866.

SIR: In obedience to orders received from district headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the circumstances connected with the murder of the New Mexican at Fort Zarah, by the Cheyenne Indians. On the 9th day of November I was stationed at Fort Zarah, in charge of the picket which was sent from Fort Larned.

Colonel Bent, the Indian trader, was camped a short distance from the post, and around his camp there were several lodges of Cheyenne Indians. The main village of the tribe was, as near as I could learn, about sixty miles south of the Arkansas River.

The name of the Indian who killed the New Mexican was Fox Tail, a son of Medicine Arrow, a prominent medicine chief of the tribe. Fox Tail had a quarrel with his father some days before, and when he left the main camp of the tribe, did so with the avowed intention of killing a white man.

He came to Colonel Bent's camp late the night before he killed the New Mexican, and told him (Colonel Bent) that he came for the purpose of killing a white man, but should not molest him or his men. Colonel Bent told me the next day that the Indian was drunk, and he thought it was only an idle boast, and that he had no intention whatever of carrying out his threat.

After staying some time at Colonel Bent's camp he went to the lodge of an Indian who has the reputation of being very friendly to the whites, and staid there the remainder of the night. In the morning he told the Indian at whose lodge he was staying that he came there for the purpose of killing a white man. The other Indian told him that he should not; that the whites were his friends, and he would fight for them. Fox Tail immediately left the lodge, mounted his horse, saying, as he did so: "I'll see if you will fight for the whites." The New Mexican was passing the Indian camp with Colonel Bent's animals, which he was herding, when the Indian saw him, and riding up to him shot him through the head before he (the New Mexican) was aware of his intentions.

I came up to Colonel Bent's camp a short time after the New Mexican was killed, but was not molested. Colonel Bent told me what had occurred, and I immediately sent a note to my men at the Round House,
by a friendly Indian, and shortly after went down myself, and found all the citizens assembled there. I took a portion of my men up to Colonel Bent's camp and escorted his train down near my post, but as I only had six men there at the time, and they being infantry, I could make no efforts to secure the Indian—he, in the confusion, having escaped across the river.

I understand the Indian commissioners, who were at Zarah a few days subsequently, made a demand on the chiefs for the Indian, but the demand has not been complied with. I sent a dispatch to Fort Larned shortly after the occasion, not knowing what action the Indians might take in the matter.

Colonel Leavenworth, Indian agent, also sent a dispatch to Fort Ellsworth, stating the facts of the case.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN R. THOMPSON,
Second Lieutenant Third United States Infantry.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
District Upper Arkansas.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
January 13, 1867.

GENERAL: I consider it my duty to report what I have observed with reference to Indian affairs in this country, so that such representations may be made to the Department of the Interior by the commanding general of division as he may think proper. Also other items of information which may be useful.

The issue and sale of arms and ammunition, such as breech-loading carbines and revolvers, powder and lead, (loose and in cartridges,) and percussion caps, continues without intermission. The issue of revolvers and ammunition is made by Indian agents, as being authorized by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the sale of them in the greatest abundance is made by traders. Blitterfreed, an Indian trader, formerly of the Overland Express, has the largest investment in Indian goods of all the traders. He has sold several cases of arms to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes.

Charley Rath, a trader who lives at Zarah, has armed several bands of Kiowas with revolvers, and has completely overstocked them with powder.

Between the authorized issue of agents and the sales of the traders, the Indians were never better armed than at the present time. Several hundred Indians have visited this post, all of whom had revolvers in their possession, a large majority had two revolvers, and many of them three. The Indians openly boast that they have plenty of arms and ammunition, in case of trouble in the spring.

The Interior Department does not seem to appreciate the danger of this arming of the Indians. The evil of presenting a revolver to each of the chiefs of bands would hardly be appreciable, but when the whole rank and file are thus armed, it not only gives them greater courage to murder and plunder, but renders them formidable enemies.

The agents have no real control over the traders, in fact, they are accused by many, both Indians and white men, of being in league with them, and of drawing a large profit from the trade.

Should such be the case (and I think it highly probable) it is a natural consequence that the agent does not wish to control the trader.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

The anxiety of Indians at the present time to obtain arms and ammunition is a great temptation to the trader. For a revolver an Indian will give ten, even twenty times its value in horses and furs; powder and lead are sold to them at almost the same rate, and as the bulk is small, large quantities can be transported at comparatively little expense. This anxiety cannot be caused by a lack of such articles because they have plenty to last for some time, but everything tends to show that the Indians are laying in large supplies preparatory to an outbreak. When this outbreak occurs we will see, too late, that we have provided our enemies with the means for our destruction.

A great deal of dissatisfaction seems to have been created among the Indians by the unequal distribution of presents. The Kiowas complain bitterly of Colonel Leavenworth, their agent, stationed at Fort Zarah. Kicking Bird, a chief of the Kiowas, states that only a few small bands of Kiowas got any presents; the balance, last year, got nothing; that it had been represented to Colonel Leavenworth that most of the bands were bad in their hearts, and would not go in to get their presents; that he, Kicking Bird, sent runners to tell Colonel Leavenworth that his stock was poor and he could not move in then, but he would in the spring if the agent would keep his share of the goods; but Colonel Leavenworth would not listen, and either gave all the goods to the bands then in, or sold them to other Indians, and told them they would get no goods that year.

How much of this is true I know not, but from all I can learn there seems to be at least some foundation for the story. Bad management, bad faith, and injustice, are sure to produce the worst results. Kicking Bird says that all bad feeling in his tribe is owing to the injustice of their agent; that it required all his influence to prevent an outbreak, and he is afraid that they will commence hostilities in the spring.

The Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and a large band of Sioux, under the leadership of Big Bear, are now en route for the purpose of crossing the Arkansas into the Kiowa country. They move ostensibly to graze and hunt buffalo. A portion of the Arapahoes, under the general leadership of Little Raven, crossed the river about four miles below this post.

The Sioux and Cheyennes are encamped about one hundred and sixty miles north of this post, on the Republican, and are said to be hostile. They are to cross about seven miles below here. They are all well mounted, and well armed with carbines and revolvers, and supplied with plenty of ammunition.

Kicking Bird says the Sioux and Cheyennes asked his permission to cross the river, and that he refused it for fear of trouble, but, that his men wish them to cross, and he believes that they will all cross the river, and that in the spring, when the grass comes up, there will be war. He had been treated kindly at Fort Dodge, or he would not tell us so; but we must look out for our lives, and for our stock in the spring. He says, as they talk now, all the tribes north and south of the Arkansas will be in the outbreak; his own tribe among them. He also states that Satante, or White Bear, a principal chief of the Kiowas, is always talking of war; that they have already had a council at the Kiowa camp, in which the Cheyennes, Sioux, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches were represented, and it was agreed that as soon as the grass was old enough they would commence war; that he (Kicking Bird) had been kindly treated at Fort Dodge, and he wished to put us on our guard; that before spring the Indians might change their minds, but at present their intention was war. He said he would be backward and forward frequently to give us the news.
The chief (Kicking Bird) is known to General Sherman, who talked with him last fall, and is believed at this post to be the most reliable of all the Indians.

I would respectfully state that it is my purpose to keep the district and department informed of all movements of Indians in large bodies, as far as it is possible.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLAS,
Major 3d Infantry, Commanding Post.

[Indorsements.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS,
January 22, 1867.

Respectfully forwarded to headquarters military division of the Missouri. This communication should have been sent through the district commander, but on account of its importance, I forward it at once, in connection with the sale of arms to Indians, and other matters. I have furnished the district commander (Upper Arkansas) with a copy of it.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. A., Commanding Department.

It may be well to state, (although it is probably well known to the lieutenant general,) that Kicking Bird was one of the chiefs who killed Box and captured the Box family last summer, as stated to me by the eldest daughter.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, January 25, 1867.

Respectfully forwarded to headquarters armies of the United States, with request that it be laid before the Committee on Indian Affairs.

I know Kicking Bird very well; he is intelligent, and I consider full faith can be given to his statements.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
February 24, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday I had a council with Satante, Stumbling Bear, and other chiefs of the Kiowas. Satante stated he had heard no bad news yet; that he did not wish to go to war; that he had not yet accepted the tobacco and blanket of peace from the Sioux; that he was friendly to the whites and expected to remain so; that he might tell me something pretty rough, and I might kill him if I wanted to; he had not much to tell me, but he would conceal nothing. The grass, wood, and water at this post belonged to him; he did not ask the white man to come here, and they must leave; no more wood must be cut on Pawnee Fork; they must stop putting up houses to live in, and white men must not come here to run off the buffalo and eat up the grass, and drink all the water. He said he told me this now, because he would never see me again; he was going to move away from this country; he could get no buffalo, (his party killed four on the way in here,) and he was going away south to hunt; what he was
telling me was the truth and no lie. He asked me to look under his coat and leggings and see if he had concealed anything. His people were crying for something to eat; he wanted me to give him something. If the white people came down into his country, they ought to help him. The road and railroad must be stopped short at Council Grove; there must be no roads or railroads west of that, (here he was interrupted by the other chiefs,) but what he wanted was something to eat for his starving people and crying papooses; he thought I was a good man, and would help them; he would never ask me again.

Some Cheyennes had run off some stock belonging to some white men who were hunting wolves on the Cimarron; I must not lay it to the Kiowas; the mules were in the Cheyenne camp now. He did not care for his annuity goods unless they were hauled to him. The treaty said they would be hauled to the salt plains, but Colonel Leavenworth sent to him to come in for them; that his stock was too poor to do it. Wanted me to let Lieutenant Hesselberger and interpreter go with him to Zarah and see the agent about the goods; there were some twenty chiefs who had not yet had their goods.

During this incoherent speech, Satante was frequently interrupted by the other chiefs, especially when he gave expression to anything like war talk, when he would abruptly change his tone and beg for something to eat.

I replied to his speech as follows: Satante has talked half peace and half war to me, and I do not understand what he means. He says his heart is good, and he don't want war, and then he says the white men must move out of this country—that the wood, water, and grass belong to him. I do not understand such talk. If he wants peace, I advise him to have nothing to do with the Sioux; that they had behaved badly, and the white people were very angry, and it will ruin him and his tribe if they get mixed up with them. I was friendly or I would not tell him this. If he wanted peace, I did not understand what he meant about the roads and railroads stopping west of Council Grove. Neither the roads nor railroads would be stopped. If they disturbed them there would be war, and the country would swarm with white men; they would come on him from all sides and destroy him and his people. The grass grows as green on the prairies as if I had never come here, and there is as much water in the river as there was before white men came here. As for his goods, if he was going to war he would be sure not to get any; he could have his choice either for peace or war; I was ready for war if he wanted war, and was not afraid of him. I would be his friend until he commenced war, and then I would be his enemy.

His only reply to this was to ask for provisions, and for Lieutenant Hesselberger and the interpreter to go with him to Zarah to visit his agent. This was granted; instructions being given to Lieutenant Hesselberger to watch closely the conduct of Satante, and disclose to the agent the result of the council, and on his return report the particulars of his trip. Satante was the only chief who spoke.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLAS,
Major 3d United States Infantry, Commanding Post.

Brevet Brigadier General CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
A. A. General, Headquarters Department of the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

(Through Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters District Upper Arkansas, Fort Riley, Kansas.)

H. Ex. Doc. 240—4
HEADQUARTERS FORT LARNED, KANSAS,
February 27, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Kicking Bird, a chief of Kiowas, and a party of a few men and squaws, to the number of twenty-seven, passed this post last Thursday and proceeded to Fort Zarah to get their goods. There arrival there was reported to me by Lieutenant Thompson. On Monday they returned and went south.

On Sunday, Satante, a chief of the Kiowas, passed by here en route to Fort Zarah, under charge of Lieutenant Hesselberger, from Fort Dodge. They returned yesterday, and will proceed to Fort Dodge to-day.

Kicking Bird told me of an occurrence which happened south of the Arkansas, on the Cimarron, viz., the running off of the stock of some wolf-hunters, which was charged to the Kiowas, and which he stated was done by the Cheyennes.

But very little dependence can be placed on the statement of any Indians in reference to such a thing as this, for each tribe will invariably accuse the others of committing any depredations that may have happened.

In his talk with the sub-agent at Zarah, the substance of what Satante said was, that the hearts of the Indians were bad; that the white men must build no more houses out here; must burn no more of their wood, drink no more of their water; must not drive their buffaloes off; that the railroad must not come any further, and that the Santa Fé line must be stopped. All this may be in a measure bravado, but it illustrates the feelings that actuate the Indians.

Not long ago some of them, while at Zarah, drew an ax on the sub-agent of Colonel Leavenworth, and threatened his life, because they did not get their goods. They have, as far as I am enabled to learn, some cause of complaint against Leavenworth, but I think it only hastens, but will not be the cause of, the impending troubles.

A band of Sioux crossed the Arkansas River going south a few days ago between this post and Fort Dodge, for the purpose, it is understood, of having a talk with the tribes belonging to that region; probably to determine the time for an outbreak.

I have just understood since his departure, that Satante said while here, that when he got back home, some white man had got to be killed on this road near this post; that he had a spite against this post, and that he was going to take revenge from it.

I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of cavalry at this post, as the garrison is small, and there is every indication of a speedy outbreak.

I shall keep you informed, as far as I am able, of any and all movements of the Indians in this vicinity.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY ASBURY,
Captain Third U. S. Infantry,
Brevet Major U. S. Army, Commanding.

The Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters District Upper Arkansas.

Pawnee Fork, Kansas,
(Twenty-one and a third miles from Fort Larned, Kansas)
April 13, 1867.

General: We arrived at this place this afternoon, after a march of twenty-one and one-third miles. The Indians observed our approach,
and fired the grass for several miles below their camp, for the purpose of making it not desirable for us to encamp near their village. We threw a bridge, crossed over the fork, and continued our march until we met Pawnee Killer, a chief of the Sioux, who told us that his people were in camp not far off, and would remain; also the Cheyennes, who were with them or encamped by them. I then resolved to encamp, the trains being detained by the bridge. White Horse (Cheyenne) and Pawnee Killer remain to-night at my headquarters.

The chiefs are all to come to my camp to-morrow morning. I will then talk to them, and move up to their village immediately after, and possibly encamp near it.

Of "Pawnee Killer," General Augur writes as follows, March 8, 1867:

Pawnee Killer is on Beaver Creek. * * * I cannot give the exact locations of all these bands. It is reported that some few of them have gone to the Arkansas to trade in horses. Pawnee Killer was going there to attend a council of the Cheyennes, and on his return has promised to report to me what the Indians intend doing.

This is a beautiful camp. I am not surprised that the Indians do not wish to give up this country and the heads of these streams. The Pawnee Fork for five miles back is well wooded for this country. The buffalo grass is a perfect carpet.

I cannot tell how long I shall remain by these Indians. It will depend on developments. I shall encamp near them to-morrow and to-morrow night. They are on the north fork of the creek. We are now near the forks.

I left the Cheyenne boy at Fort Larned, to be turned over to his nearest relatives, or to the chief of his band, Black Kettle, who is now far south. The boy is a half brother of Charley Bent. The wife of William Bent, mother of Charley, ran away from Bent and married again. This boy is a son by the second arrangement; at least Charley Bent says so. His reputation is not good, however, for veracity.

I send you the "talk" I had with White Horse and Fall Bull last night.

Sunday, April 14, 1867.—Pawnee Killer left camp early this morning to hasten in the chiefs. I had appointed 9 o'clock for the interview. He left word that they would hardly be in before 10 or 11. Bull Bear, a Cheyenne chief, came in at 9½, and reported that they (the chiefs) were coming. I informed him if they could not come in at once I would see them in the evening near their camp. It was at all events too windy to talk to them at length as I desired. It was blowing a gale.

We marched on at 11 o'clock, and soon came up to the Sioux and Cheyenne chiefs, with their warriors, which we did not expect, as it was not part of the programme. The Sioux principally dismounted; the Cheyennes generally mounted. They formed line with a white flag borne by Roman Nose. I formed a hasty front a few hundred yards from them, and they came on until I ordered them to halt. I then invited the chiefs to an interview, in which I asked them if they were the people who were anxious to fight—saying that I was ready if such was the case. They replied, "No." I then told them I would go toward their village and camp near it, and would see their chiefs in council, who promised to come to my headquarters as soon as my camp was pitched. I then told them to go on to their camp. The timid ones had deserted their line as soon as they saw our force, and moved off up the creek. The others then followed, except a few chiefs, who went with me.

We came up to their camp after a march of ten and a half miles in a charming spot on the North Fork. I encamped close to them, about a half mile distant. Roman Nose, Bull Bear, Medicine Wolf, and other
chiefs informed me that the women and children had become frightened and run off, leaving everything in camp. The Sioux had generally gone, too. The chiefs told me that they would have them nearly all brought back to-night, if not all.

It may be true, and I think it is, that the women and children became frightened. They told me such would be the case if I came to their camp, recollecting the Chivington massacre still, as Roman Nose stated. Yet I am in that doubt about the Sioux, that if they do not return I shall feel inclined to think they have been doing something wrong, or were fearful of being punished for the acts of the northern Sioux. I have taken measures to keep their camp until they return.

Sunday night, 12.30 a. m., April 15, 1867.—Since writing the above, a half-breed (Cheyenne) interpreter, Edward Gunier, whom I had sent to the Indian camp with the understanding that he was to report to me every two hours during the night, whether there were any movements among the Indians, or whether any of them were leaving camp, came in and informed me at 9.30 p. m. that the warriors were preparing to leave their village when he started for my headquarters. I immediately directed General Smith to send General Custer with a portion of the Seventh Cavalry to surround their camp and prevent them from leaving it, if they had not already gone. Being a bright moonlight night, General Custer was enabled to move very promptly, but by the time he reached their camp they had all gone, leaving their lodges standing. They had cut large pieces out of their lodges, particularly the Sioux. This looks like the commencement of war. The Sioux and Cheyennes were encamped together, and have gone off together. I shall pursue them with all of the cavalry, but still retain my headquarters with the infantry and artillery at this camp, until I learn whether General Custer succeeds in overtaking them or not.

The Sioux may go north, but I think the Cheyennes will endeavor to get south of the Arkansas. It is possible, however, that the Sioux may stay with the Cheyennes for more safety, and it is very likely that those who were in the encampment at this point may endeavor to join other portions of their tribes, so as to make head against us in case of war. I feel quite satisfied that some of both Sioux and Cheyennes who were in this village were from the north, and had most likely been concerned in the recent outrages there; and this, no doubt, was the main reason why they feared to meet my troops, and the cause of the abandonment of their village. Pawnee Killer evidently lied to me when he told me yesterday morning that he was going to hasten in the chiefs. He did not return again, and I have no doubt made off with the Sioux at once.

Monday, 12 m., April 15, 1867.—Upon a personal examination this morning of the abandoned Indian village, I found an old Sioux who was sick and unable to travel, and in the Cheyenne camp a little girl, partly white, I believe, and not one of the tribe. The latter had been horribly outraged by the Indians, immediately previous to their deserting their camp. She is a child appearing to be about eight years of age. We are taking care of her and will endeavor to find out who she is. I have now determined to burn their village, and destroy everything they have left behind, such as robes, camp-kettles, axes, &c., of which they have left a large quantity; they will be very difficult to replace; but I shall wait to hear from General Custer before doing so. His operations may influence me.

General Custer started at early dawn this morning in pursuit. He has a portion of my Delaware scouts with him, with two guides to fol-
low the trail. Up to this hour I have heard no news from him. I will keep you informed as promptly as possible of whatever occurs.

I have informed the commanding officer at Fort Larned of what has occurred here, and have directed him to be on his guard. I also instructed him to send a copy of my letter to the commanding officers at Harker, Hays, Wallace, Lyon, and Dodge, and have ordered that no trains shall travel between the posts without proper guards; and have also directed that the mail companies to Santa Fé and Denver be warned to look out for trouble with the Cheyennes and Sioux.

Two companies of the Seventh United States Cavalry, from Lyon, are now at Dodge, where I have directed them to await my arrival. The old Sioux who was left in camp says that the Cheyennes wanted to fight, which was the occasion of the Sioux going off. He states, also, that there is another old man and woman lying about the camp, which they were obliged to leave behind on account of not having transportation for them. Some of the lodges were taken away, no doubt, by those having a sufficient number of animals for that purpose, but there are nearly three hundred left standing in the camp.

Fall Leaf; the Delaware chief, whom I have with me, says that all the "sign" in the camp is bad and looks hostile; that is, the cutting of their lodges, &c., in the Sioux camp, by their warriors. They had dug very large excavations along the bank of a dry ravine which extends through their village, for the purpose of hiding their property, but had not time to carry out their intentions. Fall Leaf tells me that the little girl referred to above is not a Cheyenne or Sioux, but has marks on her showing that she was a captive. He says she has white blood.

The principal chiefs with whom I have come in contact were: of the Sioux, Pawnee Killer, Bad Wound, Tall Bear, The Bear that Walks under the Ground, Left Hand, Little Bear, and Little Bull. Of the Cheyennes—Bull Bear, White Horse, Roman Nose, Gray Beard, and Medicine Wolf.

One reason which convinces me that Pawnee Killer was here for mischief is, that I told him that General Augur considered him a friend, and that after I had a talk with the council I would like to see him specially, to have a talk with him, thus showing him that we had no hostile intentions toward him. I do not now believe that we would have seen Pawnee Killer, but from the fact that we got so close to him while he was apparently commanding a party of videttes, that he could not get away from us.

General Custer struck for Walnut Creek, and toward the Smoky Hill, endeavoring to follow the trail. He will march very rapidly, possibly forty to fifty miles a day, and will probably be absent four or five days. If he is out longer he will likely communicate with Fort Hays for rations. I believe this to have been the camp of the Indians who committed most of the depredations on the Smoky Hill and Arkansas, since I have been in this department.

The fighting men of the Cheyennes were nearly all here. I think there were five hundred warriors of the Sioux and Cheyennes in front of me yesterday. Had we come out to punish these fellows absolutely, without qualification, we would then have had a splendid opportunity to have settled all questions of Indian depredations in this quarter.

As soon as General Custer disposes of his present matter, I shall continue on to Fort Dodge, to carry out the original programme, unless something interferes. From present appearances I am of the opinion that we may not be able to move the Seventh Cavalry and Thirty-seventh Infantry to Colorado and New Mexico this summer.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

General Custer is instructed that, in case he meets Cut Nose, (a northern Cheyenne chief,) he will overhaul his camp, and endeavor to find a little white girl, said to be a captive in the hands of that chief.

Had the Sioux not gone off with the Cheyennes, I intended to have told them, when I had an opportunity to talk to them, that they must leave this part of the country at once, and go up to the head-waters of the Republican, and remain there, where they would be safe, or I would have taken them with me.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army, Commanding.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.

P. S.—I inclose a communication found in the camp of the Indians, from General Carrington, at Fort Reno, dated July 16, 1866, recommending Dull Knife, a Cheyenne chief. One man came into my camp yesterday, who represented that he belonged to his band. Dull Knife is not known to have been here with the Cheyennes, and I suppose the man of his band who was here yesterday brought the letter with him as a protection on the route, and was a messenger from the north. It is a common occurrence for them to loan such papers.

WIN'FD S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army.

Talk held with Tall Bull, White Horse, (of the Cheyennes,) and several warriors present, by Major General Hancock, at Fort Larned, Kansas.

General Hancock said as follows:

I told your agent some time ago that I was coming here to see you, and if any of you wanted to speak to me, they could do so. Your agent is your friend. I don't find many chiefs here; what is the reason? I have a great deal to say to the Indians, but I want to talk with them all together; I want to say it at once; but I am glad to see what chiefs are here. To-morrow I am going to your camp. I have a boy, said to be a Cheyenne, whom the Cheyennes claim; we have made a promise in which we pledged ourselves, if possible, to find this boy and a girl, who were somewhere in the United States. We have found the boy, and here he is, ready to be delivered to his nearest relatives, who may call for him. I will leave him at Fort Larned with the commander; he will deliver him up to them. The girl is near Denver. We have written for her, and she will no doubt be sent here, either to your agent, or to the commander of Fort Larned, for delivery to her relatives. You see the boy has not been injured; the girl will be delivered by us also uninjured. Look out that any captives in your hands be restored to us equally uninjured. I tell you these things now, that you may keep your treaties.

Now, I have a great many soldiers, more than all the tribes put together. The Great Father has heard that some Indians have taken white men and women captives. He has heard also that a great many Indians are trying to get up war, to try to hunt the white man. That is the reason I came down here. I intend, not only to visit you here, but my troops will remain among you, to see that the peace and safety of the plains is preserved. I am going, also, to visit you in your camp. The innocent, and those who are truly our friends, we shall treat as brothers. If we find, hereafter, that any of you have lied to us, we will strike them. In case of war, we shall punish whoever befriends our enemies. If there are any tribes among you who have captives, white or black, you must give them up safe and unharmed as they are now. I have collected all the evidence of all the outrages committed by you, so that your agent may examine into the matter and tell me who are guilty and who are innocent. When your agent informs me who the guilty are, I will punish them. When just demands are made, I will enforce them if they be not acceded to. I have heard that a great many Indians want to fight. Very well; we are here, and we come prepared for war. If you are for peace, you know the conditions; if you are for war, look out for its conse-
quenches. If we make war, it will be made against the tribe, who must be responsible for the acts of their young men. Your agent is your friend, but he knows his friendship will not save you from the anger of your Great Father, if we go to war. If we find a bad Indian, and they come to us with clean hands, we will treat them as brothers, and we will separate them from the malcontents, and provide for them if necessary. This we will do, that the innocent may escape the war which will be waged against the guilty. The soldiers are going to stay in the country, and they will see that the white man keeps his treaty as well as the red man. We are building railroads, and building roads through the country. You must not let your young men stop them; you must keep your men off the roads. These roads will benefit the Indians as well as the white man, in bringing their goods to them cheaply and promptly. The steamer and wagon trains must run, and it is of importance to the whites and Indians that the mails, goods and passengers carried on them shall be safe. You know very well, if you go to war with the white man you would lose. The Great Father has plenty more warriors. It is true, you might kill some soldiers and surprise some small detachments, but you would lose men, and you know that you have not a great many to lose. You cannot replace warriors lost; we can. It is to your interest, therefore, to have peace with the white man. Every tribe ought to have a great chief, one that can command his men. For any depredations committed by any one of his tribe, I shall hold the chief of the tribe responsible. Some Indians go down to Texas and kill women and children; I shall strike the tribes they belong to. If there are any good Indians, who don’t want to go to war, I shall protect them. If there are any bad chiefs, I will help the good chiefs to put their heels on them. I have a great many chiefs with me that have commanded more men than you ever saw, and they have fought more great battles than you have fought fights. A great many Indians think they are better armed than they were formerly, but they must recollect that we are also. My chiefs cannot derive any distinction from fighting with your small numbers; they are not anxious for war against Indians, but are ready for a just war, and know how to fight and lead their men. Let the guilty, then, beware, I say to you, to show you the importance of keeping treaties made with us, and of letting the white man travel unmolested. Your Great Father is your friend as well as the friend of the white man. If a white man behaves badly, or does a wrong to you, he shall be punished, if the evidence ascertained at the trial proves him guilty. We can redress your wrongs better than you can.

I have no more to say. I will await the end of this council, to see whether you want war or peace. I will put what I say in black and white, and send it to each post commander in the country I command; you can have it read to you when you please, and you can come back after a while and read it, and you will know whether we have lied to you or not.

Tall Bull replied as follows:

You sent for us, we came here. We have made the treaty with our agent, Colonel Wynkoop. We never did the white man any harm. We don’t intend to. Our agent told us to meet you here. Whenever you want to go on the Smoky Hill, you can go; you can go on any road. When we come on the road, your young men must not shoot us. We are willing to be friends with the white man.

This boy you have here we have seen him, we don’t recognize him; he must belong to some tribe south of the Arkansas. The buffalo are diminishing fast. The antelope, that were plenty a few years ago, they are now thin. When they shall all die away, we shall be hungry; we shall want something to eat, and will be compelled to come in to the fort. Your young men must not fire on us. When they see us they fire, and we fire on them.

The Kiowas, Comanches, Apaches, and Arapahoes, send and get them here and talk with them. You say you are going to the village to-morrow. If you go, I shall have no more to say to you than here. I have said all I want to say here. I don’t know whether the Sioux are coming here or not; they did not tell me they were coming. I have spoken.

General Hancock then said:

I did not come to see you alone; I came to see the Arapahoes, Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches, when I learn where they are. I was told that some Indians were seeking for war. I want to see those who are friendly and those who are not, and wish war. You say that the soldiers and other white people fire on you when you go the Smoky Hill. That was because your young men went there to molest the white people, and fired on them first. We know the buffalo are going away, but we cannot help it. The white men are becoming a great nation. You must keep your young men off the roads. Don’t stop trains and travelers on the roads, and you will not be harmed. You ought to be friends to the white man. Soldiers expect to be killed when they are at war; their business is to fight; I hope as soon as our soldiers are killed we can get more to take their places. But you must keep off the great roads across the plains; or if you should
ever stop one of our railroad trains, and kill the people in it, you would be exterminated. You must go to the white man to be taken care of hereafter, and you should cultivate his friendship. That is all I have to say.

HEADQUARTERS FORT WALLACE, KANSAS,

March 26, 1867.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report that this morning, at 4 o'clock a.m., the mail agent at Pond Creek reported that the Indians had attacked the station next above Pond Creek, and had driven away or killed the occupants.

I immediately saddled up Troop Seventh Cavalry, and taking a few infantry in wagons and accompanied by Lieutenant James Hale and Dr. Turner, assistant surgeon, proceeded rapidly to the station. We were not successful in coming up with the Indians, but I re-established the station and saved it from being burnt. I was on the ground, sixteen miles from here, in three hours after the report coming.

The Indians had attacked and tried to burn the station, but the stage happening to come in just at dark, they seem to have got frightened, and allowed the stage and all the men, as far as heard from, to escape.

They made a very daring attempt, and from all appearances I judge we will have trouble on this route soon. I have heard nothing of the breech-loading arms or ammunition for the infantry at this post, and as the Springfield rifle ammunition is very scarce, I would respectfully have ammunition sent promptly and under good escort. The Indians are the same I think as those reported three days ago, and say they are Cheyennes. The cavalry horses and carbines for which I made requisition some time since are much needed, as in a small outpost as this is every man would count in a case of need, and this seems imminent.

Every effort was made to follow up or trace the Indians. Although plenty of foot-prints could be seen close to the station in the river bed, yet from the fact that the prairie was frozen hard, and the Indians all dismounted, no trace could be seen.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. W. KEOGH,

Captain Seventh U. S. Cavalry, Commanding Post.

Lieutenant T. B. WEIR,

Acting Assistant Adjutant General,

District Upper Arkansas, Fort Riley, Kansas.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,

May 18, 1867.

DEAR SIR: The Indian troubles on the plains are very mischievous to our mail service, and the obstructions are very serious.

The inclosed dispatches indicate the general character of our troubles. Unless there can be found some way of relief, I fear a total suspension of the mails over the routes mentioned in these dispatches.

I hope the government may be able soon to relieve the mail service of such unfortunate obstructions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. W. RANDALL.

General U. S. GRANT.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

[Telegram.]

NEW YORK, May 18, 1867.

GEO. K. OTIS, (care Assistant Postmaster General:)

The Indians on the night of the 12th stole ten head of stock at Willow Creek.

LOUIS McLANE.

[Telegram.]

NEW YORK, May 18, 1867.

GEO. K. OTIS, (care Second Assistant Postmaster General:)

W. H. Hooper telegraphs from Cooper's Creek, 16th:

I arrived here this morning and learn the country is full of Indians. Rock Creek Station is burned, stock taken, surveying party attacked, and murders committed. The government appears to have no troops on the routes to protect the travel and mails. The forty cavalry now here is ordered away. Unless something is done immediately you must stop.

Would it not be well for the government to call on Colorado for mounted troops? Reuben Thomas just arrived from the west, and Spottswood, from Elk Mountain, where he has been with the cavalry. He has bunched the stock here and Elk Mountain, from Rock Creek and Medicine Bow.

LOUIS McLANE.

[Telegram.]

FORT LEAVENWORTH, April 23, 1867.

Major General NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant General:

GENERAL: The following telegram has just been received:

[By telegraph from Denver, Colorado, 20th.] April 23, 1867.

To Major General HANCOCK:

I must have protection for the United States mail from Big Creek to Pond Creek; the Indians have burned Lookout Station, murdered three men, and run off the stock. The United States mails will have to stop unless I can have soldiers at the stations. Will you send a force at once?

W. H. COTTERELL,
Superintendent Smoky Hill Stage Route.

A copy has been forwarded to General Hancock in the field.

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, May 13, 1867.

Major General HANCOCK, Fort Leavenworth:

General Sherman's telegram of 11th received to-day. All the friendly bands have left the Republican and gone north of the Platte. They report two hundred and fifty lodges of Cheyennes, and sixty lodges of Sioux, on Turkey Creek, a tributary of the Republican, and about eighty miles south of Fort McPherson. They are reported to be very short of horses and have many parties out on foot to steal others. They have already stolen a great many.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

If you send through to the Platte, Fort McPherson is the best point, and I will send supplies for you there as you will indicate.

C. C. AUGUR,
Brevet Major General.

Respectfully forwarded to Lieutenant General Sherman, Fort Riley.
W. S. HANCOCK.

[Telegram.]
OMAHA, May 18, 1867.

Lieutenant General SHERMAN:
I have not reported the many instances of Indian hostilities recently occurring within my lines, hoping they were the result of temporary excitement, and would soon cease; but, instead, they are becoming of almost daily occurrence at some point, either on the railroad, telegraph, or mail lines. Two mail stations this side Fort Halleck have been destroyed, and I shall probably have to reoccupy that post, from present indications. My whole force will be required to protect these lines. It will involve the abandonment of the Yellowstone expedition. Do your plans admit of that? If so, I will submit another programme. I anticipate but a temporary relief from Hancock's movement.

C. C. AUGUR.

[Telegram.]
OMAHA, May 20, 1867.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN:
Have been west; wrote you fully to-day. I think more forces will have to be thrown on railroad, stage, and telegraph lines to keep them open.

G. M. DODGE.

[Telegram.]
FORT HAYS, KANSAS, May 22, 1867.

The engineer party on the Union Pacific railroad, about twenty-eight miles beyond Fort Hays, have been attacked by Indians, and their thirteen mules driven off. The escort which I ordered some time since I am informed has not yet been furnished.
Let this party have two six-mule teams and one ambulance, the quartermaster taking receipts for safe return.

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army.

[Telegram from end of track.—May 22, 1867.]

To J. E. GREGG:
Go immediately and inform General Hancock that Indians attacked our party of engineers under Colonel Greenwood, at half past nine a.m., Saturday; drove off thirteen mules, and fought for four and a half hours to get possession of our camp, but were driven off without doing further damage.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

No escort yet received. Get General Hancock to give us order by telegraph for two six-mule teams and one four-mule ambulance at once. Our men are now on the plains entirely without transportation.

R. M. SHOEMAKER.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, May 25, 1867.

General W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant General:

I have just received the following dispatch from General Simpson, end of track, sixty miles west North Platte Station, May 25, 1867:

I feel it my duty to report that two raids have been made on the working parties of the Union Pacific railroad to-day; three men killed and one wounded; and that if more troops and the cavalry are not distributed along where the men are working, they will probably stop. In my judgment, at least one regiment is needed.

J. H. SIMPSON,
Brevet Brigadier General and President Board of Commissioners.

I have stopped the battalion of Pawnee scouts en route for Laramie, and sent them to the end of the railroad to protect their workmen.

What cavalry I have, you know, is in the upper country, except the companies at Sedgwick and McPherson. The former has been out the past week after Indians and stolen stock. The latter is about to start for Laramie with me. The Pawnees are required too for the expedition, and I can only give infantry, and not much of that. I intended to go out myself on Tuesday next. Many of the working parties up the Lodge Pole have also been driven in, and some men killed.

C. C. AUGUR,
Brevet Major General.

[Telegram.]

END OF TRACK, (sixty miles west of North Platte,) May 25, 1867.

Brevet Major General AUGUR,
Commanding Department Platte, Omaha:

The Indians this afternoon took twenty-seven head of stock from a train in sight of here and not half a mile from Lieutenant Hayes's camp. They attacked working parties on Boyle's work about noon, took their stock, killed three men, and wounded one. Day before yesterday they drove off our men on Lodge Pole, and killed three men. The country between the two Plattes is full of these bands. They strike us some point daily. The company of cavalry at Sedgwick ought to scout this country. The infantry can do nothing without they are mounted. Can't a portion of them be? Indians are fully aware of our unprotected condition, and will take full advantage of it. Two companies of cavalry from North Platte to Utah are certainly little protection.

G. M. DODGE.

[Telegram.]

NORTH PLATTE, (via Bishop's,) June 7, 1867.

Lieutenant General SHERMAN, Commanding:

Our division agent, Ingham, telegraphs under date of 6th June, from
Sulphur Springs, on Salt Lake road, first station west of Bridger Pass, as follows:

Was attacked yesterday by about seventeen Indians between here and Pine Grove; fought them from 9 a. m. until dark. Nichols was killed, and a man working for Wilson; myself wounded. Indians captured fourteen head of stock; must have larger escort from here to North Platte Crossing. The country is full of Indians. The boys at Bridger's Pass Station fought them all day; five Indians killed. Nearly all our stock from North Platte Crossing to this place is captured. If we do not get adequate protection, and that at once, I will be compelled to stop running.

GEORGE INGHAM,
Division Agent.

This dispatch indicates to my mind, in connection with recent occurrences, that we are in imminent danger of losing all our stock and property for a distance of four or five hundred miles of road, and, unless immediate and ample protection is afforded us, we shall be unable to keep our line running.

On consultation with our managing men there, they say that the first step to be taken is to make the men and property at stations safe, which will require at least ten soldiers at each station; and, in all probability, it will be necessary to guard the coaches while en route.

We shall remove our stock to end of route immediately, according to your orders, and, as far as practicable, will comply with any requirements you may make.

GEORGE K. OTIS,
Secretary of Wells, Fargo & Co.

[Telegram.]

FORT WALLACE, KANSAS, June 16, 1867.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN:

I arrived here to-day. Everything at this post is well. The following summary of events within the last fortnight, east and west of Fort Wallace, is given to you verbatim from Captain Keogh's report, just received:

This post has been attacked, not by any means vigorously, however, but sufficient to show that the Indians are crowding over on this road from the Platte. Every one of the stations garrisoned by men from this post, east ninety-five miles and west seventy-five miles, has been attacked on an average of four times.

The stage has been attacked by large numbers of Indians, on five different occasions, but the escort of soldiers drove them off, and in each case with slaughter. We have had only one soldier killed as yet escorting the mail coaches.

Four citizens have been killed, scalped, and mutilated within four miles of the post; in all cases, however, through their own recklessness and total disregard of orders from these headquarters.

It is safe to say, from reports received from the wagon-master arrived from Riley with supplies, that the Arapahoe is on the war-path. This wagon-master was formerly a trader in the Arapaho camp, and recognizes as Arapahoes a large body of Indians who attacked his team east of Monument Station. I have advised the doubling of the stages, and with a sufficiency of men this line can be protected until the savages are driven off.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General.
Major General Nichols:

General Smith telegraphs from Fort Harker as follows:

I believe the Cheyennes are now all on the Smoky going south. Old Satanta is on the war-path with all his tribe of Kiowas, and has already hit us a severe kick.

I urgently request that Custer may be sent back to the line of the Smoky Hill at once if his services can possibly be spared. We want cavalry and will require several regiments on north and south of the Arkansas. Now that the Kiowas have gone over, it is my impression that there will be a grand combination on and south of the Arkansas.

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[Telegram.]

DENVER, June 26, 1867.

Lieutenant General Sherman:

Your dispatch of 25th instant, from Fort Leavenworth, received. I do not know accurately what Indians attacked the Smoky Hill line, but I believe they are still near that line, Cheyennes undoubtedly, some Sioux, and it is probable some Arapahoes. I am not clear that the Cheyennes are not from the south of the Arkansas. An hour after I passed Deering's Wells, the Indians, in three considerable bodies, were seen to pass that point, as I learned by a special mail which came up past that point with an escort some days afterward.

I am collecting all the infantry I can to protect the Smoky Hill mail route in its entire length. My orders are to clear out all Indians between the Platte and Arkansas, but our mounted force, especially, is inadequate for that purpose.

All the active force that we have will be collected as soon as possible and kept occupied. I think it would be well, if there are any Gatling guns at Leavenworth or at St. Louis, to send them to Custer by rail to the Platte; those that were formerly sent for him to Fort Hays arrived too late, and will be used for the other cavalry.

The Indians on the Smoky Hill are not in bands of four or five, but generally in bands of from twenty-five to one hundred and fifty, or more.

The depredations on the Smoky Hill already reported, occurred between the dates of the 7th and 20th instant, generally in the days toward the latter date.

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General.

[Telegram.]

Major General Nichols:

The following telegram just received:

FORT LEAVENWORTH, June 27, 1867.

General McKeever:

I will make this day, by telegraph, a requisition on the governor of Kansas for a battalion of mounted troops. I do not understand what you mean by a battalion of cavalry. Is it one, two, or more squadrons? Please notify the governor how many
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

companies will be received. I could, with propriety, ask for regiments instead of companies.

Reports just received from Hays, and beyond, as well as from the Arkansas, convince me that the Indians, Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Arapahoes are out in full force. Several attacks have been made on both roads, as you will see by reports forwarded.

A. J. SMITH,
Brevet Major General United States Army.

No reports of additional Indian disturbances have been received since General Sherman left here. Will forward reports referred to in General Smith’s telegram, as soon as received.

CHAUNCEY McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[Telegram.]

BOX ELDER, June 27, 1867.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN:

I sent you a report this morning from Lieutenant Hale, sent by mail, temporarily commanding Fort Wallace. The Indians were reported as numbering from seven hundred to fifteen hundred, consisting of Cheyennes, Sioux, and Arapahoes. Our losses were two soldiers killed, one citizen, teamster, mortally wounded, two soldiers wounded. The Indians finally drew off. The loss of the Indians were ten killed and wounded. From Indians recognized by persons who knew them, I judge that the southern Cheyennes are with them. Charley Bent was there. I heard of one band of one hundred Indians mounted on fine American horses, which I judge to be Kiowas. I do not believe that the Kiowas and Arapahoes would have broken out, had they not the Comanches behind them, from whom I expect to hear shortly. Comstock, the guide, who came into Fort Wallace a few days since from Beaver Creek with a company of Custer’s cavalry for supplies, reports crossing a trail of seven hundred warriors going toward Beaver Creek.

The Indians from Fort Wallace went eastward, as far as it appeared.

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
June 18, 1867.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on the 16th instant a band of Indians, numbering seventy, attacked the stage station at the Cimarron Crossing, and at the same time attacked the portion of the train of Mr. C. G. Parker, en route for the States, which was crossing the river at that point.

The Indians were repulsed at the station by the guard of Thirty-seventh Infantry stationed there. The portion of the train attacked was guarded by three Americans; two of these were killed, and one escaped by swimming the river. The wagons were plundered, and eight head of mules and twenty head of cattle run off. Immediately on receiving intelligence of this, I dispatched Lieutenant Karples, Thirty-seventh Infantry, with forty men of the Thirty-seventh Infantry in wagons to the station, and they covered the crossing of the balance of the train, exchanging a few shots with Indians, but without being able to bring them to any kind of an engagement.

The Indians were supposed to be Cheyennes and Sioux. Lieutenant
Karples lost one man, Company I, Thirty-seventh Infantry, by the accidental discharge of his rifle.

The country in this vicinity is alive with Indians, who operate in bands numbering from fifty to one hundred, and sometimes two hundred. The Kiowas have proved false to their professions of friendship, and the depredations hitherto committed on the road and on the other side of the river are traceable to them.

Satanta himself led his band across the river the night previous to his descent on the cavalry herd, four miles below this point. I certainly expected no attack from this source so soon after his solemn protestations and promises to be peaceable.

Cavalry can find plenty of work to do in this country, operating from this point as a center. By the loss of the cavalry herd I am sadly crippled, but one company is hardly sufficient to operate with advantage.

The Indians have many war parties out in different directions, and while pursuing them in one direction, they commit depredations in another. Infantry they will not fight, and easily escape from them. Three, or at least two companies of cavalry, in fact any number of companies, could be used with great advantage in the present state of the country in this vicinity.

The road between here and Fort Lyon is very unsafe. The stage stations are protected each by a guard of eleven men of the Thirty-seventh Infantry, every ranch but Fort Aubury and Sand Creek has been attacked, and Fort Aubury has been threatened, and two men of the Thirty-seventh Infantry killed near that station while hunting.

I do not believe these stations would now be in existence were it not for the present distribution of troops guarding them. There is no doubt but that all the Indians of this country are at war with us. Their peace promises were only mere pretexts to gain time. A little less than three weeks after I gave to Satanta the document containing proceedings of the council at Fort Larned, he made an attack on the cavalry herd in person, and I have reason to believe that the Arapahoes are as much engaged as any other band. Little Raven may not be favorable to war, but he can't keep his tribe out of it. They are all at war, and I do not believe it would be proper to make any distinction. With the Cheyennes and Sioux to the north of us and the Kiowas and Arapahoes all around us, we have more work in hand than our little garrison can perform. Taking into account guards for the lime kiln and stone quarry, escorts to trains to and from these places, escorts to wood trains, escorts to overland mail stage, and escorts to inspectors and paymasters as they may be called for, we have left barely sufficient for herders and garrison duty.

Our civil employés we design to keep at work and hope that no necessity will compel us to make soldiers of them. I am in hopes that I will be able to have the greater part of this post, (the stone work at least,) finished before winter. I think I can if not interrupted by Indians. There is but one officer to each of the four companies stationed at this post.

I submit these facts for the consideration of the commanding general, and would respectfully suggest that a competent force of cavalry be sent to operate in this section of country with as little delay as practicable.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLAS,
Major Third United States Infantry, Commanding Post.

Brevet Brigadier General CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Department of Missouri.
SIR: The major general commanding directs me to say that you will not permit any Sioux or Cheyennes to approach your post, as we are now in a state approaching hostilities here with those tribes. We encamped yesterday close by the village of those Indians, on this stream, (North Fork,) expecting to hold a council with them, but last night they abandoned their camp and fled. About the time they were leaving their encampment I was notified of the fact and directed them to be surrounded by cavalry so as to prevent their escaping; but they had gone before this could be effected. We now have their camp in possession and will destroy it unless further developments should make it seem unwise to do so. This morning at early dawn General Custer started in pursuit of them with eight companies of the Seventh Cavalry. We will remain at this camp until we hear what success he has had, (possibly for several days,) and will let you know if General Custer has any fighting. In the meantime you will please send a copy of this letter to the commanding officers at Fort Dodge, Fort Lyon, Fort Hays, Fort Wallace, and Fort Harker. General Custer will probably go in between Forts Wallace and Hays, and may stop long enough at Hays to draw supplies.

All Sioux and Cheyennes—men, women, and children—should be arrested and held in custody wherever it is practicable to do so. I am quite confident that Cheyennes and Sioux who have been concerned in recent troubles in the north were in this camp, and no doubt one strong reason for their abandoning their village was that they feared being called to account for their proceedings in the north. I think it possible that the Cheyennes, and probably the Sioux who were with them here, may cross the Arkansas beyond Fort Dodge. The companies of cavalry at that post should be prepared to intercept them. They may strike about the crossing of the Cimmaron.

No trains should now be allowed to pass from post to post without sufficient guard, but all trains laden with supplies heretofore ordered from Harker to Hays, and from Harker to Larned, will proceed as directed, but with sufficient protection.

You had better notify the mail company to Santa Fé and Denver that they should be watchful, and distrust all Cheyennes and Sioux. There are about three hundred lodges in the camp which they abandoned here.

If any engineer's instruments, addressed to Major General Hancock or to Lieutenant M. R. Brown, United States Engineers, arrive at your post by the 23d instant, you will please send them to Fort Dodge.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,
Fort Larned, Kansas.

P. S.—On examination of the Indian encampment, I learn they have left a white child in it—a girl—whom they have brutally outraged. I shall therefore burn their encampment and destroy everything in it, unless I see good reasons to change my opinion.
Indian Camp on Pawnee Fork, Kansas, Thirty-two miles from Fort Larned, April 17, 1867.

General: I inclose you a copy of a letter written to General Smith containing instructions for General Custer, who this morning is on the Smoky Hill about Castle Creek, where Cut Nose's band of Cheyennes ought to be. I also inclose you a note from Colonel Wynkoop, Indian agent, who is in my camp. I have made no written reply as yet, and probably will not make any at all—certainly not before I leave this place.

We have evidently frightened these Indians badly. We have as yet heard of no hostilities by them, either on the Arkansas or Smoky Hill. I shall remain here two days, until the 19th, possibly the 20th, to hear again from the Arkansas mail route and the Smoky Hill, to learn whether they have commenced hostilities or not, holding in the meantime their camp in my hands.

The Sioux and Cheyenne camps being together on the same ground, it would hardly be practicable, with our information, to destroy one without destroying the other. The question is really, whether we shall destroy both, or either, and which.

Considering the uncertainty as to the truth, I think it better to wait; for if I destroy their camps without its being clearly understood by the Indians generally that it was for sufficient cause, I shall inspire alarm among other Indians, and may not be able to see them.

I think we have provocation sufficient to destroy the camp; still we may not have, and by burning it we will certainly inaugurate a war which might otherwise have been avoided.

General Smith is averse to burning the camp. I have concluded not to do so unless I hear of hostile acts in my vicinity before I leave. It may be that we may regret not having destroyed this camp, but it is better to be on the safe side.

I find that the little Cheyenne girl states that she was outraged by a young Indian, probably the last one to leave camp. I will know all about that as soon as Gunier, the Cheyenne interpreter, who is with General Custer, returns.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General U. S. A. Commanding.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.

Headquarters Department of the Missouri,
In the Field, Camp No. 14, Pawnee Fork, Kansas, April 17, 1867.

General: Fort Dodge is the point General Custer should reach as soon as practicable. We wish to go south of the Arkansas for ten days from Fort Dodge, and if we eat up all our forage and subsistence at that point, waiting for General Custer, we cannot go south at all, as we must replace the supplies consumed, in time. We can wait here two days longer, if necessary, possibly three, but then we should have no forage here for General Custer's horses, when he rejoins us. I infer that the great body of Indians belonging to this camp, certainly the Cheyennes, have gone south.

H. Ex. Doc. 240—5
The Sioux may have been frightened and started back for the Republican.

I hear of no Indian hostilities, as yet, on the roads. General Custer appears to have met with no resistance whatever.

If General Custer had the forage and could come down here to rejoin us, it would be best; otherwise, in two or three days he should meet us at Dodge.

You had better inform General Custer that there is such doubt about the propriety of destroying this camp, that should he pass this way and find that I had not done so, to leave it untouched, unless he has in the meantime met with resistance, in which case he should burn the camp, lodge-poles, and all, carrying off all its tools, kettles, iron, &c.

Whether to attribute the abandonment of this village to a panic entirely or not can scarcely be determined until we hear if the Indians have committed hostilities anywhere; if they have, we shall regret not having destroyed this camp.

The agent of the Cheyennes earnestly urges me not to destroy this camp, believing that it would have a bad effect upon the Indians generally, unless we knew that they intended to go to war, and that the burning would probably cause other tribes whom we wish to see to fly from us.

General Custer should come this way, if he meets with hostilities, in order to destroy the camp, as we may leave it; otherwise he need not, unless it is on a direct route from the point on the Smoky Hill, where he may be, to Fort Dodge.

General Custer should let us know immediately where he is, what is the news, whether he hears of hostilities, which way he will go, what he will do, &c. As soon as we hear from him we can go to Dodge. We will go there anyhow, in two days, if we do not hear from him. General Custer has two days' forage from this morning. We have in the camp at least six days' rations for the whole command. General Custer has two days' rations of pork and three of bread, and small rations, from to­morrow morning.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army Commanding.

Brevet Major General A. J. SMITH,
Commanding District of the Upper Arkansas.

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[Special Field Orders, No. 12.]

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 14, Pawnee Fork, April 17, 1867.

1. As a punishment for the bad faith practiced by the Cheyennes and Sioux who occupied the village at this place, and as a chastisement for murders and depredations committed since the arrival of the command at this point by the people of these tribes, the village recently occupied by them, which is now in our hands, will be entirely destroyed. All property in the village, such as tools, camp equipage, &c., will be preserved and taken up as captured property by Captain G. W. Bradley, assistant quartermaster, chief quartermaster of the expedition.

Brevet Major General J. W. Davidson, major Second United States Cavalry, acting inspector general of this department, will take an accu-
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

rate inventory of all species of property in the village previous to its destruction.

Brevet Major General A. J. Smith, colonel Seventh United States Cavalry, commanding District of the Upper Arkansas, is charged with the execution of this order.

By command of Major General Hancock:

W. G. MITCHELL,

Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

PAWNEE FORK, KANSAS, INDIAN CAMP,

April 18, 1867—8 p. m.

GENERAL: I send you two reports from General Custer, the one of latest date being of importance and showing that war has begun, and that the Sioux who came south to hold council with the Cheyennes are not to be trusted.

Hereafter no more Sioux should be permitted to come south of the Platte, but as there are bands on the headwaters of the Republican reported friendly, I shall not interfere with them at present. I shall pitch into all Sioux with whom we may come into contact south of that point, however. If these Indians are really friendly, they should be made to come in near to some military post and be taken care of by the government for the present. As my supplies are at Dodge, I shall go there next, and Custer will join me. I expect to hear of depredations on the Arkansas; I hope to see the Kiowas there. Now is the time to settle this Indian question, so far as the country between the Arkansas and the Platte is concerned. No Indians should be allowed to retain it. Some traders will suffer, and the Indians will soon miss the trader, but no public interests will be injuriously affected.

I consider the general course of the Indian agents in protecting these Indians, and in permitting depredations to occur without their being made to deliver the depredators, or to make restitution, has had a bad effect upon them. As I now intend to destroy this camp—Sioux and Cheyenne—I trust the government will not cause new lodges and implements to be issued to them to replace those lost. I understand it is likely that the Indian Department will do so; and it has been presented to me as an argument for not burning this camp that it would cost the government a large sum to restore the property destroyed, and that it would eventually be a loss to the government and not to the Indians. I trust the government will be more just to its own citizens than to pursue such a course.

It is a cheap victory to burn this camp, but I feel it an imperative duty to do so. Its destruction will be of great loss to the Indians, unless the Indian Department restores it, as I understand it has done in other cases heretofore.

I expect to leave here to-morrow. The burning of the village will be deferred until the time of departure. I wish to get advices from General Custer, which I expect to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock, before leaving.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,

Major General United States Army.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Missouri,

St. Louis, Missouri.
I have the honor to report that I marched in pursuit of the Indians who deserted their lodges on Pawnee Fork, leaving my camp at 5 a. m. yesterday morning.

My guide struck the trail within a short distance of the old encampment, and we followed rapidly without obstacles until we reached Walnut Creek, where considerable difficulty was experienced in finding a crossing, owing to the height and abruptness of the banks. We were compelled, in consequence, to follow up the stream about three miles. The principal part of the Indians were compelled to follow the same course, as was evidenced by their trail. We were so close upon them, upon our arrival at Walnut Creek, that the fires by which they had prepared their breakfast were still burning, and they left in such haste as to abandon several ponies and one mule, some of which were tied to trees and still bore their packs. One of the Delawares found the pack belonging to Roman Nose, containing much of his finery and ornaments, including the large red feather he wore at the meeting on Pawnee Fork. The ponies were so worn out as to render it impossible to keep them with us. After crossing the Walnut, the trail followed the left bank toward its source, frequently crossing the stream for a short distance, evidently to mislead us. Neither I nor any of my command caught sight of any Indians during the pursuit. But the Delawares, who kept in advance and were frequently on its bluffs on our flanks, reported several times seeing small numbers of Indians watching us from the heights at a distance. We continued to gain on them, and were so close that, although the heat of the sun was quite high, the earth disturbed by the feet of their ponies and by dragging their lodge poles was still damp and fresh. I had strong hopes of overtaking them before dark; and to facilitate this I left my wagons to follow under charge of one squadron, while with the other three I continued the pursuit. Seeing that we were gaining upon them, the Indians now began breaking into small bands and separating. I followed the main trail, the direction of which was the general direction of Walnut Creek; most of the bands in leaving seemed to bear to the right, as if being directed toward the Smoky Hill. The trail gradually grew less and more faint, until about 5 p. m., when we could only trace them singly and with difficulty. I had then marched a fraction over thirty-five miles without halting except to water. I encamped my command, and sent the Delawares six miles in advance; they were unable to continue the trail. Signal smokes were seen to the west, north, and east of us, but at no less distances than ten miles; the principal smoke was apparently fifteen miles northwest of us. I had reveille at 2 a. m., and started before 4 o'clock in the direction of the smoke, and where some of the Delawares thought we might find the Indians' trail, and probably their camp. I took the valley of a small stream running from the desired direction, and marched thirteen miles, but failed to discover any signs of Indians having been across our line of march. The stream upon which I had started had become dry, we having passed its source; but for this fact I should have turned northward and marched to the Smoky Hill. Our animals required water, and no alternative presented itself but to return upon our own trail until sufficient water could be obtained. I marched, in returning, nine miles to the point where I now am, reaching here by 2 p. m. Devoting the afternoon to grazing and grooming the animals, I am now getting ready to resume the march in half an hour, (which will be 7 p. m.,) and will direct the march due.
north, striking the Smoky Hill somewhere in the vicinity of Downer's Station. If the Indians have gone to that line, I can hear something of them. Failing to hear anything of them, I shall direct my march "Dodge," whether I go to Hays or not. I shall return by this point, so that any instructions which may be intended for me would reach me by sending either of the two men as bearers who carry this dispatch to you. Even if I should reach this point and leave it again before they join me, I will arrange with them so that they can find me. The hasty flight of the Indians and the abandonment of, to them, valuable property, convinces me that they are influenced by fear alone, and it is my opinion that no council can be held with them in the presence of a large military force. It is difficult for me to form an opinion as to whether the Indians have gone north or south; the Delawares seem inclined to the opinion that they have gone north, on the Smoky Hill. Captain West, of the Seventh Cavalry, and possessed of great experience with Indians, is firmly of the opinion that the Indians have gone south of the Arkansas, to the Cimmaron crossing. He considers their move this far north as a stratagem to mislead us. His opinion is based upon representations made to him at Dodge during the winter, by a chief, that such a plan was contemplated.

My horses have stood the march very well.
Respectfully submitted.

G. A. CUSTER,
Lieutenant Colonel Seventh Cavalry, Brevet Major General.

Lieutenant THOMAS B. WEIR,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District Upper Arkansas.

CAMP OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY,
Downer's Station, Smoky Hill,
Wednesday, April 17, 1867—9.30 p. m.

Leaving my camp on Walnut Creek last evening at 7.20 p. m., I reached the Smoky Hill River at 3.30 this morning, after a march of a fraction over twenty-one miles. I struck the Smoky Hill thirteen miles west of this station, and reached this point at about 5 p. m., where I am now encamped. Upon my arrival here I ascertained from the people belonging to the Overland Stage Company the following: Indians, believed to be Sioux, and others not known, have been crossing this line, going north, since yesterday morning; most of them, small bands, have crossed from thirty to forty miles east of this station. It is expected that all travel will cease on this route, owing to the depredations of the Indians. The latter have begun their long promised attacks. They yesterday attacked Lookout Station, which is the third east of this one, and first this side of Hays. They killed and burned the three men employed at the station; also burned the station and hay, and run off eighteen horses and four mules. They scalped one of the men before burning them. They also robbed the station west of Lookout. The men of the overland route are leaving their stations. Three stages are due from the west, and but one stage from the east has passed in four days. I am informed that the opinion prevails east of Lookout Station that all the stations west of that have been attacked and destroyed. This opinion is incorrect. A few Indians were seen on the high bluffs several miles east of this station about 3 p. m. There is no doubt but that the depredations committed at Lookout were by some of the same Indians
who deserted their lodges on Pawnee Fork, and whose trail I followed until they broke up into small bands. It is the opinion here (Downer's) that the Indians are now on their return to the Platte, and that a portion of them at least are a part of those connected with the Phil. Kearney massacre. The attack of the Indians upon the stations of the overland company have been threatened and expected all winter; the attack has been made, however, sooner than expected, as it had been fixed “when grass came up” by the Indians. In view of the developments of to-day, I intend to march at 3 a.m. in the morning in the direction of Hays, if I can discover any prominent trail. I will leave my train to proceed to Hays under escort of the Harker squadron, while with the other three squadrons I will endeavor to overtake the Indians. If I succeed in the latter I shall treat them as enemies at once. I will go to Hays for supplies. Failing to receive further instructions, I shall in due time set out for Dodge. If this command is to return to Hays immediately from Dodge, I would suggest that an order be sent me by Delawares to remain in this vicinity, or rather in the vicinity of Hays, with a view to affording protection to this route. If dispatches are sent to me I would recommend that they be borne by Delawares.

Respectfully submitted.

G. A. CUSTER,
Lieutenant Colonel Seventh Cavalry, Brevet Major General.

Lieutenant T. B. WEIR,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
District of the Upper Arkansas.

HEADQU'RS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp at Indian Village,
Pawnee Forks, Kansas, April 10, 1867.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that we utterly destroyed the Sioux and Cheyenne village this morning. What property could not be burned, such as tools, &c., we carried off.

I inclose a list of the property found in the camps, the list having been made after a careful inspection by Brevet Major General Davidson, acting inspector general of the department.

The old man and the old woman (Sioux) left in the camp, and the young girl found in the Cheyenne camp, will be taken to Fort Dodge. I shall leave here for that post in the morning.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.
Major General Commanding.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Missouri,
St. Louis, Missouri.
List of the property found in the camps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribes</th>
<th>Lodges</th>
<th>Buffalo robes</th>
<th>Scabbards</th>
<th>Travellers</th>
<th>Head matas</th>
<th>Axes</th>
<th>Kettles</th>
<th>Fry pans</th>
<th>Tin cups</th>
<th>Tin pans</th>
<th>Whelkstones</th>
<th>Sacks paint</th>
<th>Water bags</th>
<th>Ovens</th>
<th>Grabbing hoes</th>
<th>Coffee mills</th>
<th>Lariat ropes</th>
<th>Chains</th>
<th>Parfleches</th>
<th>Crazy comb</th>
<th>Coffee pot</th>
<th>Hoops</th>
<th>Flecking irons</th>
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<tr>
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<th>Stone mallets</th>
<th>Lance</th>
<th>Wooden spoons</th>
<th>Door mats</th>
<th>Rawhide ropes</th>
<th>Meat stones</th>
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Remarks.—About twenty-five lodges were removed by the Indians when they vacated the village. Four ponies were found loose in the camp.

JOHN W. DAVIDSON,
Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Major General,
Acting Inspector General Department of the Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 15, Pawnee Fork, April 15, 1867.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of the Lieutenant General commanding military division of the Missouri.

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army, Commanding.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

CAMP OF THE SEVENTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY,
Near Fort Hays, Kansas, April 19, 1867.

I have the honor to make the following report: My last dispatch was written from Downer’s Station, dated the 17th instant, and sent by a corporal and five men, guided by a Delaware. I marched from Downer’s at 5 a.m. on the 18th, and reached Lookout Station at 3 p.m., having marched thirty-five miles. I should have marched further, but desired to halt and encamp at Lookout Station, to obtain, if possible, satisfactory evidence regarding the massacre of the three men belonging to the station, and of the destruction of the station, &c. I was the first of the command to reach the station, and found the station-house, stable, and hay-stack a pile of ashes, a few pieces of timber being still burning. The bodies of the three murdered men were lying near the ruins. It appears a party of men had been to the station from the next station east, (Big Creek,) and attempted to bury them, but from a lack of implements, or through fear, had merely covered them with some poles; the wolves had uncovered them and eaten a considerable portion of their flesh from their legs. I caused them to be buried near the station with as much care as the circumstances would permit; but before doing so had one of the medical officers of the command examine the bodies. They were so horribly burned as scarcely recognizable; the hair was singed from their heads; the skin and flesh burned from their breasts and arms, and their intestines torn out, (not by the wolves, however, as they could only reach their legs.) I failed, as did the Delaware Indians, to discover the slightest clue as to what tribe committed the act. Nothing supposed to have belonged to an Indian was to be found. All the stock had been taken. I learned at Stony Hollow Station the following facts not stated in my last dispatch:

On Monday, about eight hundred Indians crossed the road within five hundred yards of the station, going due north. They halted near the station two or three hours, and endeavored to gain admittance, but were kept out. They then ran off four mules which had been left outside of the stable; one got away and ran back, but the Indians failing to retake it, killed it by shooting; they also fired a few shots into the station. They were stripped and painted, had their bows strung, and seemed desirous of fighting. There were quite a number of squaws with this party. The Indians were Sioux, Pawnees, and Cheyennes; at least, they represented themselves as such. At the station east of Stormy Hollow Station, a party of about seventy-five Indians halted on their way north. None but the chiefs were permitted to come near the station; of these there were four believed to be Sioux, and named White Clay, Turkey Egg, Bull Knife, and Big Horse. Two or three of these chiefs had papers signed at Laramie last fall by some officer, name not remembered; the papers represented them as good Indians. These chiefs, in order to gain admittance, told the station-keepers that they had just “been down to the Arkansas and made a treaty with General Hancock, and they and the soldiers were now good friends.” I learned of other parties crossing toward the north at other points; two heavy trails were seen, but being two days old, and I, having but sufficient forage to carry me to this post, did not deem it advisable to follow. A party of Indians, twenty-seven in number, passed toward the north, a few miles east of this post, yesterday; they ran off some stock belonging to a working party on the Pacific railroad. All parties residing on this line of travel are firmly of the opinion that the Indians have gone north to the Platte. Gayen, the half-breed guide, is of the same opinion, unless they have halted in the fork of the Solomon, some forty-
five miles north of this post, or gone to Beaver Creek. He thinks the Cheyennes have joined the Sioux, and, have gone to the encampment of the latter, supposed to be located on the streams I have mentioned. My intention, when learning that all the Indians had gone north, was to leave here at dark to-night with the fighting and serviceable portion of my command, leaving all wagons and worn-out horses at this post, and, with forage and rations carried on the saddle, march by daylight to-morrow morning to the point near Solomon Fork, forty-five miles distant, where the half-breed supposed they might be, and, if possible, effect a surprise. But in executing this plan I find an insuperable obstacle, and one, too, that will probably surprise the major general commanding the district as much as it did myself. I find that there is not a pound of forage at this post intended for this expedition, and belonging to the post there is but little over one day's forage for the animals of my command. This I will take and make last as long as possible, but the condition in which I am placed is embarrassing in the extreme. Kincade, the guide, reached here about half an hour ago; he was nearly worn out with fatigue. Lieutenant Sheldon, of the artillery, who started from your camp with him, became exhausted from fatigue, and had to remain at Downer's, fifty-eight miles from this point. He expects to come down on the next stage, but there has been no stage from the west for four days, although three are at Monuments, and expected hourly. Lieutenant Sheldon retained the dispatches sent by the major general commanding the district, believing it to be his duty to deliver them to me in person rather than to intrust them to Kincade. The latter brought me nothing but the letter of the major general commanding, which had inclosed the dispatches now in Lieutenant Sheldon's possession; also a brief note from the latter, acquainting me with the fact that he had important dispatches for me, but did not hint at their nature, nor what is expected of me. From the letter of the general commanding the district referred to above, I can readily infer that the presence of this command is desired elsewhere, and this is what renders my position not only embarrassing but mortifying. I am here with but one day's forage, and that obtained by depriving this post of every grain. To attempt to march my command across this country with this limited amount of forage—the grazing being of but little consequence—I consider impracticable, and, if attempted, would cause the loss of a large proportion of the animals of the command, and unfit the remainder for duty for a long period to come. I have, therefore, followed what I deemed the only practicable course. I have dispatched a courier, (Wild Bill,) mounted upon a fresh mule obtained from this post, to Fort Harker, with a letter to the commanding officer to forward me, with all possible haste, four days' forage for my command, using the Fort Harker post-train to transport it. I represented my situation, and urged that nothing be omitted to hasten the arrival of the forage. Wild Bill will probably reach Harker by daylight to-morrow morning. Allowing them until noon to load and start the train, the forage can, and probably will, reach here by four o'clock p. m. day after to-morrow, 21st. In that case I will march by 7 p. m. to join you. I will cross Pawnee Fork at the point at which I left you encamped, in case I find you have left. If any dispatches are sent to me, the party bearing them should number at least eight or ten. I would suggest that two or more Delawares be sent with them, as they understand best how to avoid hostile Indians. In case the dispatch-bearers should reach this post after my departure, I will leave directions with the post commander how and where I may be found. The guide, Kincade, can give you an account of his journey.
here. I believe him to be a deserving man. I shall exert myself to my utmost ability to join you as soon as possible, in accordance with the directions of the major general commanding the district. At the same time, it is with regret that I turn from the pursuit of the Indians who have just gone north, and who are the perpetrators of the massacre at Lookout Station, and other depredations. I feel that, if we cannot overtake them now, in the present famished condition of their ponies, it will be a hopeless task to undertake it after the grass has strengthened them. Had I been able to march north, as I proposed, in pursuit, Gayere, the half-breed guide, is of the impression that he could find the camp of the Indians. Being prevented from executing this plan, I had induced the guide, who is opposed to going alone, to find the camp, return, and conduct me to it, I hoping to obtain forage by the time he returned. For rendering this service I promised him one hundred dollars, provided I reached their camp. The arrival of Kincade, however, induced me to suspend the sending of Gayere until I heard further from you. I trust the situation, and the manner in which my feet are tied, will be duly considered.

Respectfully submitted.

G. A. CUSTER,
Lieutenant Colonel Seventh Cavalry, and
Brevet Major General U. S. Army, Commanding Regiment.

Lieutenant Thomas B. Weir,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General
District of the Upper Arkansas.

P. S.—I have marched one hundred and fifty-four miles in four days and a half, being an average of about thirty-five miles per day.

Lookout Station was burned and the men massacred on Monday, the 15th, which clears those Indians who were at Pawnee Fork the day of our arrival from the charge of being present at the murder. I am confident, however, that the act was committed with their knowledge and approval, which accounts for their hasty flight.

G. A. C., B. M. G.

HEADQ'RS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 17, on south branch of Pawnee Fork,
northeast of Fort Dodge, 33 1/2 miles from Indian Village, April 21, 1867.

GENERAL: I inclose a dispatch from General Custer to General Smith, (in my camp,) received at 12 o'clock last night, and my orders to General Smith for General Custer, which were sent at 6 o'clock this a. m. It is a matter of great regret that the forage was not at Fort Hays, which I had ordered there two months since. Indeed, I was assured by my chief quartermaster when General Custer left our camp that he would find eight or ten days' supplies there. My orders to General Custer were based upon that assertion. The fact that Hays was the last place I proposed going to, and the long continued freshet in the streams creating many difficulties, caused, I presume, the delay.

As General Custer would have to delay a day or two at Fort Hays for forage before he could start to join me, and as while waiting for him at Fort Dodge we would be eating up the supplies intended for our movements south, I have concluded to let him remain on the Smoky Hill to re-establish the mail route, and to pursue some of the Indian trails reported by him.
These Indians may be on Solomon's Fork still. There will be much damage done the settlements, I fear, unless General Custer pushes them rapidly to the Platte. They might be intercepted on that river, possibly, if there are troops there adequate to the occasion. I do not think they can keep up their late pace long with the present condition of the grass. It is now only sprouting.

The ground has a greenish tinge in the valley where it was burned over last fall, but there is no grass there for animals, and no appearance of it on the highlands.

I shall go to Dodge, and if I can use the Kiowas and Comanches there, well; if not, I may go south for a few days, so far as may be warranted by the condition of my supplies. It may be that I will have to establish the Sante Fé mail route.

General Custer thinks that the Indians who committed the outrages on the Smoky Hill are not those who remained in the village when we arrived at it. He left on Monday morning, the 15th, at 5 a.m. The last Indians to leave the village started at 10 or 11 the night before, and all had gone but a rear guard of warriors at 3 p.m. of the day when we encamped near it, and it is very probable that a good many left the previous night. The depredation occurred on the 16th. It is, from the Indian village to Donner's Station, by the direct route, about forty-two miles; from the same point, in a direct line to Lookout Station; where the outrage was committed, is about fifty miles, so that it is possible that even the latest to leave the village might have been of the party who were at Lookout Station, although it does not seem to me to be of much importance, for I am satisfied that the Indian village was a nest of conspirators.

I think that all of the bands of Sioux and Cheyennes reputed friendly, near the Platte, will prove to be disaffected to the extent that all of the young men will be hostile to us, if they are not so now. Cannot those who remain in their camps be placed near some military post as a guarantee for their truth, and as hostages for their relatives? I can then fight with safety all Indians between the Arkansas and Platte. I did not reach Dodge to-day, finding that there was a great deal of wind and dust, which was trying, upon the infantry especially. We will be there to-morrow.

Our expressman to General Custer on the Smoky Hill reports that he was fired at by the Indians on the 18th and 19th, and chased for twenty miles. The quarrymen from Fort Dodge, near this camp, were chased by Indians while they were hunting buffalo near the quarry about a week since, and were driven to their camp. One of the expressmen also states that he was fired upon while going to Larned a few nights since.

I can meet you at Fort Harker on the 10th of May if you will be there. You can address me at Fort Hays for that purpose.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,

Major General United States Army, Commanding.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Missouri,

Saint Louis, Missouri.

P. S.—I also inclose herewith a copy of instructions from General Smith to General Custer of this date.
HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 16, eight miles south of Middle Branch of Pawnee Fork, on the road from Indian Village to Fort Dodge, nineteen miles from Indian Village, April 21, 1867—1 o'clock a.m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to state that dispatches were received at these headquarters (transmitted by you) about one hour since from General Custer.

It is a matter of supreme regret, and a great injury to the public service, that a supply of grain was not found by General Custer when he reached Fort Hays. Sufficient and timely orders were given by me in this matter, and I was assured by Captain G. W. Bradley, chief quartermaster of this expedition, that there was eight or ten days' supply of forage at that post for the entire command; otherwise we could have sent more with him.

According to the chief quartermaster of the expedition, General Custer started from the Indian village, on Pawnee Fork, on the 15th instant, with four days' forage from the morning of that day.

General Custer states in a postscript to his communication of the 19th that the Indians who were encamped at Pawnee Fork are exonerated from being actually engaged in the massacre of Lookout Station, on the Smoky Hill, which occurred on the 16th instant, for the reason that they could not have been there at that time.

Advanced parties from Pawnee Fork might have been there, however, as some of the chiefs sent us word while we were encamped at Fort Larned that the reason that a portion of them did not come in to meet us there was because some of their young men were off hunting buffalo. They could therefore readily have been on the Smoky Hill at the time of the massacre.

Pawnee Killer (Sioux chief) also told us, when he was in our camp on the 13th instant, that some of the young men were out hunting buffalo. But at any rate, there was sufficient time for them to have reached the Smoky Hill from the Indian village, after we arrived there, in season to have committed the murders and burning at Lookout Station, as we know that the main body of them evacuated the village at least twelve hours previous to General Custer's leaving.

As to the matter of forage, it is surprising that there was so small an amount at Fort Hays, considering the fact that there was a company of cavalry regularly stationed there until about twelve days since, aside from any supply for this expedition.

I am perfectly satisfied with General Custer's movements. He has exercised sound discretion in not returning to join us at Pawnee Fork or at Fort Dodge. He can continue his operations north, (except at the headwaters of the Republican, where there are believed to be some friendly bands of Sioux and northern Cheyennes,) but can pursue the Indians there in case he is following a trail, or in case he has later information than we have which would warrant him doing so.

He can protect the mail route on the Smoky Hill, if the stages are running, or, if the company is disposed to start them again, by sending infantry guards in the coaches, or other guards, if he deems it expedient.

He should communicate with Captain Keogh to protect the mail route for a certain distance on either side of Fort Wallace. The commanding officer at Fort Harker should be instructed to deflect all grain or subsistence to Fort Hays (General Custer specifying which) that may be coming from Fort Harker to the Arkansas, until he has a sufficient reserve supply for, say, fifteen days. General Custer should, if possible, send a discreet officer to see that this is done.
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We will probably be at Fort Hays in about ten days. The object of our expedition required us to show as much force as possible to the Kiowas and Comanches, but this is now defeated to a great extent by the failure of the quartermaster's department to have a sufficient supply of forage at Fort Hays, and by new events which have arisen.

I shall still, with this command and the cavalry at Fort Dodge, go south of the Arkansas, and endeavor to make a coalition with the Comanches and Kiowas against the hostile Indians between the Arkansas and the Platte; that is, unless we can meet those tribes at Fort Dodge and accomplish the matter there.

Please tell General Custer to exercise his discretion, as he has done heretofore, with the knowledge and advices he has, and he will be sustained; and also instruct him to give orders on the Smoky Hill route until you reach there.

I expect to make a march of two days or more toward Bluff Creek, south of the Arkansas, and then to strike for Fort Larned.

Our communications with General Custer hereafter, as a rule, will be by way of Larned and Hays.

I have ordered a supply of clothing and camp equipage to Fort Hays. If it has been sent as directed by me, it will enable General Custer to draw his supplies from that point.

You can inform General Custer that we will be at Dodge to-day or to-morrow, and that we have utterly destroyed the Indian village at Pawnee Fork.

Lieutenant Sheldon should by all means have sent his dispatches from you to General Custer by the scout, Kincaid, and General Custer should be notified that they were written before the new developments of outrages committed by the Indians at Lookout Station were received from him.

I am surprised that Lieutenant Sheldon exercised so little discretion, particularly as he must have known that Kincaid has been trusted by you as a messenger.

It is war against the Cheyennes and Sioux, between the Arkansas and Platte, save some few small bands on the headwaters of the Republican, who may not be complicated, at least until we hear of further developments concerning them.

Two of our Delawares, with one or two good messengers, (Colonel Bradley, chief quartermaster of the expedition, has them,) with an escort of four or six dragoons, can be sent to General Custer to-morrow morning with your orders to him.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Brevet Major General A. J. SMITH,
Commanding District of the Upper Arkansas.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT UPPER ARKANSAS, IN THE FIELD,
Camp between Pawnee Fork and Upper Dodge, April 21, 1867.

GENERAL: Your communication of the 19th instant is received. Your course is approved by these and department headquarters. The information relating to forage at Fort Hays furnished you was based upon the representations of the chief quartermaster of the expedition, and your not finding it is a matter of surprise and regret.
By general field orders No. 12 you are temporarily assigned to com-
mand from Harker, west, on the Smoky Hill route. This order is not
to be construed as confining you to that line. You are to act as you
deem best from the information in your possession. If not otherwise
employed, give such assistance as you may be able in re-establishing
the stage line. For this purpose infantry may perhaps be used to ad-
vantage inside the coaches.

Direct the commanding officers of posts as to the part they are to
perform in this matter. An order has been forwarded to the command-
ing officer at Fort Harker to fill your order for supplies for fifteen days.
Any forage which may arrive there is to be turned over to you, even
though en route for the Arkansas. Send a good officer to Harker to
look after it.

Clothing, camp, and garrison equipage have been ordered to Fort
Hays, and on their arrival will be subject to your orders. War is to be
waged against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians between the Arkansas
and Platte, excepting some small bands near the headwaters of the Re-
publican, concerning which further developments are to be awaited.

Lieutenant Sheldon should have forwarded the dispatches by Kin-
caid, who had proved himself trusty. The dispatches were, however,
written previous to the receipt of your report concerning the outrages
committed. Communications will be sent, as a rule, via Larned and
Hays.

By command of Brevet Major General A. J. Smith:

T. B. WEIR,

First Lieut. 7th Cavalry, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Major General G. A. Custer,

Lieutenant Colonel 7th U. S. Cavalry.

Official copy:

T. B. WEIR,

First Lieut. 7th Cavalry, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,

On South Branch of Pawnee Fork, April 21, 1867.

Official:

W. G. MITCHELL,

Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
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The same point, where they joined four companies of the Seventh United States Cavalry, and one company of the Thirty-seventh United States Infantry. The whole force available for the expedition, about fourteen hundred men, was then concentrated at Fort Riley, save two squadrons and one company of the Seventh United States Cavalry, one squadron of which joined when the expedition reached Fort Harker, (the company joined at Fort Larned,) and the other squadron at Fort Dodge. I arrived at Fort Riley on the 25th of March; and on the 26th issued an order directing Brevet Major General Smith, Colonel Seventh United States Cavalry, commanding the district in which the movements were to take place, to give the necessary instructions for the movements of the troops in the field. On the same day an order was issued directing the troops to march toward Fort Harker.

It may be well to state here, that the instructions concerning the objects of the expedition received by me from the lieutenant general commanding the military division of the Missouri, which were conveyed in his letter of March 14th, (copy inclosed marked A,) directed me, among other matters, to forego the demands which it had been my intention to make upon certain tribes, especially upon the Cheyennes, for murders and depredations which had been committed by members of that tribe upon the whites. These matters were to be left in the hands of the Indian agents, and I was instructed so to inform them. I transmit copies of letters herewith, (marked B, and C, and C,) in which I gave Colonels Leavenworth and Wynkoop the required notification. I was authorized to go among the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Apaches, and Comanches, within the limits of this department, to make a display of force to them, to notify them that if they wished for war they could have it, and to explain to them fully that hereafter they must keep off the routes of travel—railroads and other roads; and that all depredations and molestation of travelers must cease forthwith. I was also empowered to arrest any offenders of the tribes above named who should be designated by their agents as being guilty of offenses against the laws; and to explain to the Indians and impress upon their minds the fact that all threatening of our military posts by them, verbally or by messengers or otherwise, must cease at once or war would ensue.

In pursuance of these instructions, I marched directly from Fort Riley to Fort Harker, arriving at that post on the 1st day of April, and remaining there until April 3d, when the command moved to Fort Larned, on the stage route by way of Zarah, reaching the former post on the 7th of April.

Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian agent for the Comanches and Kiowas, joined me at Zarah and accompanied me. At Larned, I met Colonel E. W. Wynkoop, United States Indian agent for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches of the plains, who informed me that he had sent runners to the chiefs of his agency, asking them to meet me at Larned on the 10th of April, requesting me at the same time to remain at that post until they came in. I acceded to this proposition the more readily as I desired to rest the troops, and wished to have a thorough inspection made of Fort Larned before leaving that post.

On the day on which the command arrived at Fort Larned four Sioux came into our camp. One of them had a paper from Colonel Henry E. Maynadier, stating that they were friendly Ogallallas, and had permission to remain on Horse Creek, a tributary of the North Platte. I learned from them that they were encamped with a portion of their people on Pawnee Fork, about thirty miles above Fort Larned. It was ascertained also that the Cheyennes were encamped at the same point,
their villages being together. Slim Face, an old Cheyenne chief, now on the retired list, but still a man of importance in the tribe as a counsellor, visited my headquarters the same evening for the purpose of seeing the Cheyenne boy, Wilson Graham—a prisoner saved from the Sand Creek massacre—whom I had with me for the purpose of delivery to his relatives.

On the 9th of April, while the command was encamped near Fort Larned, a furious storm, accompanied by a heavy gale from the northeast, occurred, and continued without intermission until about 10 o'clock that night. Most fortunately we were in camp when the storm commenced, and no men were lost, which would almost surely have been the case had we been on the march on the open prairies; for at times the snow was so blinding that it was extremely difficult to move from one point to another in camp. Our animals were saved from perishing by issuing to them a double ration of corn. Not one was lost. The snow fell eight inches deep, by accurate measurement.

On account of the storm, the council which was to have been held with the Cheyennes on the 10th of April was deferred until the weather should become more favorable. On the morning of the 11th I was informed by Colonel E. W. Wynkoop, United States Indian agent, that the Cheyennes and Sioux, who were encamped on Pawnee Fork, were about starting in to Larned, but were deterred by a herd of buffalo appearing near their camp, which they had stopped to hunt. Although I thought this circumstance suspicious, and not sufficiently important to warrant the Indians in not keeping their engagement with me more promptly, I concluded to wait another day before marching toward them. On the evening of the 12th of April, after my orders had been given to march the next morning, Tall Bull and White Horse, two Cheyenne chiefs, accompanied by ten or twelve other Indians of less importance, arrived in camp from the village on Pawnee Fork, and requested a conference with me. I assented, and at a "talk" held at my headquarters the same evening, gave them my views quite freely in reference to the course intended to be pursued toward the Indians, and what they were expected to do, &c., in future; telling them, in the commencement of my remarks, that we were not there to make war, but that we were ready then to fight any Indians who wished for war. I also informed them that I had expected to have seen many more of their chiefs and people at Fort Larned, and that as so small a number of them had come in, I would march to their village the next day, where I could see them all. The Cheyenne boy, Wilson Graham, was shown to them, but was not recognized as belonging to any bands north of the Arkansas. They supposed him to be a member of Black Kettle's band, which was then in Texas. (I left the boy the next day at Larned, when I marched from that post, in charge of the commanding officer, with instructions to deliver him to his relatives when they came for him.) Tall Bull replied to me very briefly, stating that he disclaimed all intention of hostilities toward the whites; that the roads were all free for travelers, &c., and concluded by stating that he would have no more to say to me at his village than he had said there. (I append a copy of the talk in full, marked D.)

The following morning, (April 13,) the command moved from Fort Larned by a road leading up Pawnee Fork, and encamped on that stream twenty-one and one-third miles above that post. During the day we observed several small parties of Indians ahead of us, moving in the direction of their villages. They fired the grass for several miles below their encampment with a view of delaying our march, or of pre-
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venturing us from camping near them. We threw a bridge, however, over the stream and moved on, when shortly afterward we came up with Pawnee Killer, a chief of the Sioux, accompanied by four or five warriors, Sioux and Cheyennes. Pawnee Killer informed me that his people were encamped with the Cheyennes only a few miles further on, and stated that they would remain in camp until we came up to have a talk. White Horse (Cheyenne chief) and several others also joined us about this time, and it was arranged that they should remain in our camp during the night, and the next morning all of the chiefs from the villages were to come to my headquarters for a conference. I had received a report concerning Pawnee Killer from General Augur before leaving Fort Leavenworth, stating that he was friendly, and had gone down from Beaver Creek to attend a council of the Cheyennes, and would report the proceedings of the council to him (General Augur) when he returned. I informed Pawnee Killer through the interpreter that I had had a good report of him from General Augur, and intimated to him that I wished to have an interview with him after the conference with the chiefs on the succeeding day. I relate these facts now concerning Pawnee Killer, as his treacherous conduct the next day and night surprised me more than that of the Cheyenne chiefs, in whom I had but little confidence, especially since they had shown bad faith in their engagement to meet me at Fort Larned. Early on the morning of the 14th of April Pawnee Killer left my camp for the purpose, he said, of bringing in the Sioux and Cheyenne chiefs to the appointed conference. I had designated 9 o'clock as the hour for the interview. At 9.30 a.m. Bull Bear, Cheyenne chief, came in and reported that the chiefs were on their way to my camp. I informed him, as they could not come in at once, I would march up the stream nearer to their village, and would see them after we had encamped for the night. I could not have spoken to them at all events, as it was blowing a heavy gale, which would have prevented us from hearing what might have been said. To this Bull Bear assented. We accordingly marched up the stream at 11 a.m., but had gone but a few miles when we perceived a large body of Indians, several hundred in number, approaching us in line. Our troops formed a hurried front, and when we were within a few hundred yards of each other I halted the troops and directed the Indians to halt also. I then invited the chiefs to an interview, and rode forward to meet them between the lines, accompanied by General Smith, General Custer, and a few other officers. Roman Nose, (bearing a white flag,) Bull Bear, White Horse, Grey Beard, and Medicine Wolf advanced on the part of the Cheyennes, and Pawnee Killer, Bad Wound, Tall Bear, The Bear that Walks under the Ground, Left Hand, Little Bear, and Little Bull on the part of the Sioux. When we met the chiefs I asked them if they came there to fight, stating that we were ready then to commence. They replied hastily, professing great friendship for us, and stating that they did not desire war, and did not wish to fight. I then informed them that we would move on toward their village and encamp near it, but would give directions that no soldiers should be permitted to enter their camp or to molest them in any manner whatever. We then separated, having made an engagement by which the chiefs were to come to my headquarters for the purpose of holding a council as soon as my camp was pitched. The chiefs appeared to be exceedingly nervous during the interview, and it was observed from our line that many of their warriors, especially the dismounted ones, deserted their front as soon as our troops came in sight, and moved off rapidly up the stream toward their encampment. The command followed in the direction the Indians had taken, and after
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a march of ten and one-half miles from our camp of yesterday, we approached their villages, which were found to be situated in a beautiful grove on the north fork of Pawnee. We encamped within one-half mile of their villages, which we found to contain about three hundred lodges, Sioux and Cheyennes. I immediately ordered guards to be placed, surrounding our camp, and prohibited all persons of my command from approaching the villages, unless by special instructions. Some loose ponies belonging to the Indians were grazing near us when we arrived there; we collected them and sent them to their camp. Soon after our tents were pitched Roman Nose, Bull Bear, Grey Beard, and Medicine Wolf, (Cheyennes,) came to my headquarters from the village and informed me that upon our approach their women and children fled, being terrified by the presence of the troops, and having the Chivington massacre still fresh in their minds. The Sioux, men and women, had also made off. I stated to them that all who had abandoned their villages must immediately return; that no harm was intended to them, but that I would hold their camp responsible in case they ran away during the night and left it in my hands. The chiefs said that they could bring their people back if they had horses to pursue them, but their own ponies were so poor and weak that they could not overtake them. I then directed two horses to be furnished them for that purpose, and arranged with the chiefs present before they left my camp that Mr. Guerrier, a half-breed Cheyenne and interpreter in the government service, who was at my headquarters, should remain in the villages during the night, with instructions to report every two hours as to whether there were any movements among the Indians, and especially whether any of them were leaving their camp. With this understanding the chiefs last named left my camp, assuring me that it was their intention to bring those of their people who had fled back to the villages during the night, and to meet me at a conference the following day. The chiefs returned to their camp about 7 o'clock p. m., Mr. Guerrier accompanying them. At 9.30 p. m. Guerrier came back to my headquarters and reported that when he left their village all of the chiefs and warriors remaining there were saddling up to leave, and that they evidently did not intend to return, as they were packing up whatever articles they could carry with them, and many of them were cutting and otherwise destroying their lodges which they were about to abandon.

Upon receipt of this intelligence, I immediately instructed General Smith to send General Custer, with a portion of the Seventh United States Cavalry, to surround their villages, and, if practicable, to prevent their departure. The infantry and artillery were ordered to parade under arms, in case there should be any resistance on the part of the Indians. It being a bright moonlight night, General Custer was enabled to move promptly and rapidly, but arrived at the village too late to oppose the escape of the Indians.

This conduct on their part (Sioux and Cheyennes) convinced me that the reason why they abandoned their villages and property, and would not remain and meet us in council, was that they felt guilty on account of past offenses; that they intended to make war, and that the Sioux had come down from the north to the Cheyenne village to conspire with them there against the whites; and that, most probably, they were a portion of those Sioux who had been engaged in the recent troubles in the north, and were keeping south to avoid being called to account for their depredations and outrages north of the Platte. I therefore determined to pursue them and capture them if practicable; and, to effect that object, directed General Smith to prepare a force of cavalry,
under General Custer, to take their trail at early dawn the succeeding morning. Accompanied by General Smith, I visited the village the next day, and found that when the Indians had deserted it they had left one old man (Sioux) who was unable to travel, and a little girl, probably eight or nine years of age, said to be partly white, who was found in the Cheyenne camp. This child had been brutally outraged before the Indians left the village, and was discovered by some of our officers in a pitiable condition of suffering and destitution. She was cared for at once by us, and was afterward left at Fort Dodge, under charge of the commanding officer there, together with the Sioux before mentioned, and an old Sioux woman who was subsequently discovered near the Indian camp.

At 5 o'clock a.m. of the 15th of April General Custer started in pursuit of the Indians, with four squadrons of the Seventh United States Cavalry. He found their trail a short distance from the village, and followed it rapidly in the direction of Walnut Creek, where he was so close upon them that he found their fires still burning and, some of their ponies loaded and packed and tied to trees, which they had been too hard pressed to carry off with them, with many other evidences of their hasty flight. Our cavalry followed them closely, their trail crossing Walnut Creek and leading along its left bank toward its headwaters. Finding that he was gaining upon them rapidly, and learning from his Delaware scouts that they had seen small parties of Sioux or Cheyennes (evidently the rear guard) in advance of him, General Custer decided to leave his wagons containing forage and ammunition to follow, guarded by a squadron of cavalry, and pushed on with his remaining force, hoping to overtake them before nightfall. The Indians, finding themselves hotly pressed, broke into many small bands and separated, taking different directions; our cavalry following the main trail, however, which led in the general direction of Walnut Creek, and continued on it until about 5 p.m., when the trail became so small as to be scarcely perceptible. Having then marched over thirty-five miles continuously, except while watering, the troops then halted and encamped on the headwaters of Walnut Creek until 4 a.m. on the morning of the 16th, when they again marched in pursuit, following the valley of a small stream which lay in the direction of some smokes which had been seen the previous evening by the Delaware scouts, and where it was supposed they might find the Indians encamped or strike their trail. In this they were disappointed, however, and marched thirteen miles without discovering any signs whatever of the Indians. General Custer had now passed the source of the stream on which he had been moving, and was without water for his animals; and believed, from the information which he received from his guides that the Smoky Hill was too distant from where he was to march without water. He then decided to retrace his steps for a distance of nine miles to Walnut Creek, with the intention of pushing on to the Smoky Hill, where he conceived the Indians had gone, after his animals had rested, hoping to intercept them before they crossed that stream.

It was unfortunate that the information in the possession of General Custer concerning the country in which he was operating, and his distance from the Smoky Hill, was not more accurate. As it was, he was misled by his guides, upon whom he was forced to depend, and induced to make a retrograde march of nine miles for water, losing many hours of valuable time thereby, when it was definitely ascertained afterward that, by keeping directly on, he would have reached the Smoky Hill about fifteen miles from the point at which he turned back—probably as
soon as the Indians he was following—and might have prevented, by his close pursuit, the destruction of Lookout Station, and the killing and burning of the men there. He was delayed at Walnut Creek until 7 p.m. of the 16th, when he marched toward the Smoky Hill, striking that stream thirteen miles west of Downer’s Station. He moved on to Downer’s Station and encamped, learning upon his arrival there that Indians, believed to be Sioux, and others, (Cheyennes,) had been crossing the Smoky Hill in bands since the morning of the 16th of April; that they had attacked and captured Lookout Station, (first mail station west of Fort Hays,) killing the three men at the station and burning their bodies, burning the station-house and hay stored there, and carrying off with them eight horses and four mules. They also robbed the mail station west of Lookout. Great alarm and a general interruption of stage travel on the Smoky Hill had followed these outrages, which General Custer stated, in a dispatch dated April 17, were certainly committed by the Indians who abandoned their villages on Pawnee Fork. He marched from Downer’s Station at 5 a.m. on the 18th of April toward Lookout Station, reaching the latter point at 3 p.m. of the same date, where he halted to obtain satisfactory evidence, if possible, in reference to the murder and burning of the three men there and the destruction of the station-house. He found the remains of the men lying near the ruins of the station-house, partly consumed by fire and partly eaten by wolves, but failed to obtain any clue to the tribe which had committed the outrage. General Custer then proceeded toward Fort Hays, and at Stony Hollow Station was informed that on Monday, the 16th of April, about eight hundred Indians had crossed the road within five hundred yards of the station, traveling north. This was evidently the main body from Pawnee Fork. They halted near Stony Hollow Station for several hours, and endeavored to gain admittance, but were prevented from so doing, when they ran off some stock belonging to the mail company, and fired some shots into the station-house before they left. They were all stripped and painted for war, had their bows strung, and seemed desirous of fighting. They stated themselves to be Sioux, Pawnees, and Cheyennes, but were doubtless all Sioux and Cheyennes. Another band, about seventy-five in number, had stopped at the station east of Stony Hollow and endeavored to gain admittance there, but were warned off. Some of them had papers signed by some officers at Fort Laramie last fall, (names not given,) stating that they were friendly Indians. They were, no doubt, Sioux, who had been at the village with the Cheyennes at Pawnee Fork. Some of the chiefs of this party informed the station keepers that they had just come from the Arkansas, where they had concluded a treaty with General Hancock. General Custer learned of other parties of Indians crossing the road to the north, and saw two heavy trails, but did not deem it expedient to follow them, on account of having only sufficient forage with him to carry his command to Fort Hays. He was now convinced that all of the Indians, or the great body of them from Pawnee Fork, had gone to the North Platte, unless they had halted on the Fork of the Solomon, about forty-five miles north of Hays, or on Beaver Creek. He therefore determined to push on to Hays, replenish his forage, and, taking only the serviceable portion of his command, make a forward movement from that point on the morning of the 20th, with forage and rations carried on the saddles, to the Solomon Fork, hoping there to effect a surprise of the Indians. This plan was, however, entirely frustrated, for, upon the arrival of General Custer at Fort Hays, he discovered that there was no forage there whatever for the expedition, and that the post supply was
barely sufficient for the animals of his command for one day. This unfortunate circumstance rendered fruitless General Custer's whole pursuit of the Indians, and compelled him to abandon his purpose, when he had good reasons to suppose that he would have overtaken them within the next forty-eight hours. He had marched with rapidity from Pawnee Fork, a distance of one hundred and fifty-four miles in four days, and would doubtless have come up with the Indians on the Solomon Fork or Beaver Creek, had he been enabled to make his intended movement from Hays. As it was, he was compelled to desist from the pursuit, and remain at Hays until forage could arrive from Harker, which he at once ordered up from that post.

It was a matter of the greatest surprise and regret to me when I ascertained that General Custer had been compelled to suspend his movements on account of there being no forage at Hays. I had given special instructions that a large supply should be placed at that post, to await the arrival of the expedition there, when we should go up to the Smoky Hill from the Arkansas; and had been informed by Captain G. W. Bradley, chief quartermaster of the expedition, before General Custer left Pawnee Fork, that there was at least eight days' forage at Hays for my entire command. Had I not believed that there was an ample supply of forage at Hays, I would have directed the cavalry to have carried a larger supply when it started from Pawnee Fork. After I had received the intelligence that there was then not sufficient forage at Hays for the cavalry, I directed that General Custer should continue his operations to the north as soon as he was enabled to do so, (except in the vicinity of the headwaters of the Republican, where it was understood that there were some bands of friendly Sioux and northern Cheyennes,) but authorized him to pursue other Indians there, in case he was following a trail or had information which would warrant him in doing so.

I also gave instructions that he should assume command of the line of the Smoky Hill, temporarily, (not restricting his movements to that line, however,) and take measures for the re-establishment and protection of the mail route.

In the meantime, I remained encamped (awaiting news from General Custer) with the infantry and artillery, and a small detachment of cavalry, on Pawnee Fork, near the Indian village, which I had had carefully guarded, permitting nothing whatever to be taken from it or destroyed. I felt called upon to burn the villages as a chastisement for the treachery practiced by the Indians toward us in case they did not return to it, but did not finally determine to do so until I learned of the outrages on the Smoky Hill. (See copy of report from General Custer, dated at Downer's Station, 9.30 p.m. April 17, 1867, marked A.) I then only awaited the events to be produced by General Custer's movements before carrying my intentions in this matter into execution. As soon, therefore, as I learned from General Custer that he was unable to pursue the Indians further, or to march down and join me at Pawnee Fork, (for want of forage,) and learned, in addition to the murders on the Smoky Hill, that the Indians have pursued and endeavored to kill my express men, I issued the order for the total destruction and removal of the villages, which took place on the morning of the 19th of April. (See copy of special field order No. 13 current series, headquarters Department of the Missouri, inclosed herewith, marked B.) About forty lodges were selected to be carried to Fort Dodge, for the purpose of issuing them to any Indian scouts whom we might be able to enlist in our service. All of the serviceable axes, camp kettles, hatchets, crowbars, &c., of which there were a great number, were ordered to be taken.
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up by the quartermaster's department as captured property. Everything else then remaining in the villages was entirely destroyed, including lodges, lodge poles, nearly one thousand buffalo robes, and a vast number of other articles of great value to the Indians, which it will be almost impossible for them to replace, at least for a long time. I transmit herewith a copy of an inventory of the property in the village when the Indians abandoned it, marked E.

Colonel E. W. Wynkoop, United States Indian agent, was in my camp (he had accompanied me from Fort Larned) at the time of the burning of the villages. I had explained to him my reasons for destroying them. They failed, however, to convince him of the propriety of doing so.

I had remained at the Indian villages awaiting dispatches from General Custer as long as my supplies would permit, and delayed for that purpose on Pawnee Fork until the morning of the 20th of April, when I had barely sufficient forage left to carry me to Fort Dodge, to which post I intended to march with the view of meeting the Indians south of the Arkansas—Kiowas, Arapahoes, and Comanches. We accordingly marched on the morning of the 20th of April from Pawnee Fork, moving directly across the prairie in the direction of Fort Dodge, as indicated by our maps, camping that night near some pools of good water between North and South Forks of Pawnee. On the following morning we were misled by our guides, and lost several hours, which prevented us from reaching Fort Dodge that day, but finally struck a road leading from some stone quarries to Fort Dodge, which we followed to south branch of Pawnee Fork, where we encamped, about twelve miles from Fort Dodge. On the morning of the 22d we marched to Dodge, reaching that post by 11 a. m. On my arrival there I was informed that on the 19th a party of Cheyennes (evidently runners from the north) had approached the Cimarron crossing, and were discovered skulking around the bivauc of a detachment of the Seventh United States Cavalry, which was at that point under the command of Major Wielklife Cooper of that regiment. When the Indians were perceived, they were endeavoring to steal up to some herders who were in charge of the cattle of the command, and it is supposed they were not aware of the presence of the troops. Major Cooper directed Lieutenant Berry, Seventh United States Cavalry, with twenty men, to advance and demand their surrender, which was done through an interpreter. In reply, the Indians fired upon the troops. They were then attacked and pursued across the river, and six of them (all that were seen) were killed. One of our men was wounded and one horse was shot. The official reports in this matter were forwarded to headquarters military division of the Missouri by me while I was at Fort Dodge. Copies of same reports are also filed herewith, marked F.

We found some Kiowa Indians at Dodge awaiting our arrival for the purpose of having a conference. The chiefs present were, Kicking Bird and Stumbling Bear, with a few warriors of the tribe, among others, The Man that Moves, a brother of the late celebrated Kiowa chief, To-haw-son. I appointed the morning of the 23d of April at my headquarters for an interview with them, which took place accordingly. A copy of the talk which ensued is appended, marked G. During my remarks, among other subjects, I proposed the matter of the young men of the Kiowas, Arapahoes, and Comanches, enlisting in our service as scouts, and requested an answer on the subject from the Kiowas as soon as practicable. Kicking Bird replied with the usual professions of peaceful intentions and good will toward the whites, and said that the question of enlisting their young men as scouts would be laid before them in
the spring when they were collected to receive their annuity goods, but could not be decided until the head chiefs, White Bear, Heap of Bears, Lone Wolf, Black Bird, Sitting Bear, and Little Heart, had been consulted. Little Raven, head chief of the Arapahoes, had been at Dodge a few days before we arrived there, for the purpose of meeting me, but had gone south. I arranged with Kicking Bird that he should follow Little Raven, and bring him back to Dodge, and agreed to wait for his return there for a few days. While we remained at Dodge, orders were issued directing that a company of the Thirty-seventh United States Infantry should remain at each of the posts, Larned, Lyon, and Dodge, for the purpose of furnishing escorts to the stages on the Santa Fé line, and further protecting that route. One company of the Seventh Cavalry was ordered to Lyon, and one company of the same regiment was left at Dodge, and one company of the Tenth Cavalry ordered to Larned, to be used in patrolling the roads.

Major Henry Douglas, Third United States Infantry, commanding at Fort Dodge, was charged with the protection of the southern overland mail route from Zarah to Fort Lyon, and was authorized to call upon the commanding officer at Larned and Lyon for details for that purpose from the companies of the Thirty-seventh United States Infantry stationed at those posts. It was reported to me on the 24th of April that on the previous night eleven mules had been stolen from the mail station at Cimarron crossing. It was supposed that Indians were the robbers, but there was no evidence to that effect. I instructed General Smith to take measures to pursue the depredators if their trail could be found. They were not apprehended, however. The agent who reported the loss of the mules to me stated, upon being questioned, that there were no guards out at the station when the mules were driven off, and that the employés were all asleep at the time. From all I could learn on the subject, the same culpable neglect by the employés of the mail company in reference to guards appeared to exist along the whole line of the mail route on the Arkansas; and the same inefficiency and carelessness in this respect was reported by General Custer as obtaining on the Smoky Hill route. If the civilians at the stations were vigilant, kept up proper guards, and had had their arms in readiness, it is believed that they could repel the attacks which are usually made upon the stations by the Indians, who are generally in small parties on such occasions.

On the night of April 27th the messenger who had accompanied Kicking Bird south of the Arkansas to the camp of the Kiowas and Arapahoes for the purpose of bringing in Little Raven, returned, and reported that that chief would arrive at Dodge the following morning. Orders had already been issued for the command to move on the morning of the 28th, but on the receipt of the above intelligence in reference to Little Raven, I decided to suspend my departure until it was ascertained whether or not he would arrive as was expected. I therefore waited at Dodge until 2 p.m. of the 28th of April, when Little Raven, accompanied by Cut Nose, (Arapaho,) and several others of his tribe, arrived at the post and requested an interview with me. Yellow Bear, an Arapaho chief of importance, was also at the post. A conference was held with them at once, a copy of which is forwarded herewith, marked H.

In the talk which ensued Little Raven stated that his tribe had kept the peace with the whites which had been concluded at the Little Arkansas some two years since; disclaimed all connection with the Sioux and Arapahoes in the north; said that they (the Arapahoes) would not interfere in any manner with our lines of travel across the plains, and
announced the intention of his tribe to remain south of the Arkansas as long as there were any troubles north of that stream, &c. I informed him (Little Raven) in the course of my reply, that we considered him the head chief of his nation, and that I was gratified to see him as being a responsible person; that our soldiers would not cross the Arkansas if there were no depredations committed there, or unless the Sioux and Cheyennes should cross that stream, when we would be compelled to follow them; but that we wished the tribes south of that river (Arapahoes, Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches) to keep the Arkansas route free for travel. I presented the question of the young men of his tribe enlisting with us as scouts, and demanded that they should give up the mules in their possession which they had stolen from the whites, and notified them that all hostile incursions by them into Texas must cease forthwith, unless they wished war. Little Raven then concluded by stating that his tribe were now at peace with the people of Texas, and would go to that country no more for war; that they had twenty-three mules belonging to white men in Storm’s Village, south of the river; and that they would bring them in and deliver them to Major Douglas, commanding officer at Fort Dodge. He further said that if any Sioux or Cheyennes come south of the Arkansas, they would report their presence to us. The interview then closed.

The troops took the road (Dry Route) the same afternoon toward Fort Larned, where I had engaged to meet some chiefs who had promised their agent, Colonel Leavenworth, to come to that post about the 25th of April.

It had been my original intention to proceed south of the Arkansas from Dodge, for the purpose of visiting the camps of the Kiowas, Arapahoes, and if possible the Comanches, with the object of letting them see the strength of our forces; but as the cavalry was detained on the Smoky Hill, the command appeared less numerous and formidable than it had been; and as I found, too, that I would be more likely to see the chiefs of the tribes south of the Arkansas by remaining at Dodge or Larned, (for the approach of the troops might have frightened them from their camps, thus complicating matters south of that river,) I concluded not to cross the Arkansas, but to proceed to Larned, meet the chiefs who were expected there by Colonel Leavenworth, and from that post march north to Fort Hays. In pursuance of this decision the command had reached Big Coon Creek, when Satanta (Kiowa chief) arrived in my camp, and requested me to hold a talk with him. He had reached Fort Dodge after we marched from that post, and had been sent on to overtake me, by Major Douglas. As we were just about striking camp when he arrived, I arranged with him to accompany us to Larned, where we could hold the proposed conference. We then continued our march, the command reaching Larned at 2 p.m., April 30.

On the following morning a talk was held with Satanta at my headquarters near that post. When it was about to commence, and before any one had spoken, Mr. Jones, United States Indian interpreter, said that he wished to state that he understood that Colonel Leavenworth, agent for the Kiowas, had told Satanta not to say much in the council, but to come to him (Colonel Leavenworth) afterward at Zarah, and that he would make matters all right. Mr. Jones said that, in consequence of that communication with Colonel Leavenworth, it was probable that Satanta would not talk as much as he had intended to do. Colonel Leavenworth immediately denied that he had had any such conversation with Satanta. In the course of his speech Satanta very strongly disclaimed any intention of war against the whites on the part of the Kiowas,
declaring repeatedly that all his efforts had been to maintain peace; he had no objection to the road along the Arkansas, but did object to the construction of a railroad along that river; said that he and his people would take no part with the northern Indians in a war with the whites; closed his remarks by stating that Colonel Leavenworth, United States Indian agent for the Kiowas, had withheld his annuity goods from him unjustly, charging him in that respect with dishonest practices.

Colonel Leavenworth, who was present at the conference, afterward stated that Satanta was of those Kiowas who had killed the Box family in Texas, and that he had been instructed from Washington not to deliver the annuity goods until certain conditions had been complied with. He asked permission to file a copy of his instructions referred to with the proceedings of the council. A copy of the same will be found with the copy of the talk inclosed herewith, marked I.

I said to Satanta, during my reply to him, that we would not move troops south of the Arkansas, provided the tribes living there remained quiet and committed no depredations, and provided they did not permit the Sioux and Cheyennes to cross. I recalled to his recollection the fact that he, (Satanta,) as well as Kicking Bird, had told Major Douglas last winter that the Sioux were coming down to make a coalition against us; that they intended to make war this spring, and that we must get off the Arkansas line. I informed him that we were there then to see whether they were going to carry their threats into execution. I also, among other matters, recalled to his memory the fact that he, with other chiefs of his tribe, had long since (at the treaty made on the Little Arkansas) given his consent to the passage of the railroad along the Arkansas route, and that it was now too late to withdraw it.

After the conference had closed, Satanta with his party returned to Fort Dodge, and as the other chiefs expected by Colonel Leavenworth at Larned did not come in, I started for Fort Hays on the morning of the 2d instant, marching almost in a direct line across the prairie nearly due north, crossing Little Ash and Walnut Creeks, a portion of the time following a trail made by a company of the Seventh Cavalry and a company of the Tenth Cavalry, which had recently marched down from Hays to Larned. The passage of our troops and heavy trains made a well-defined and permanent trail, which will no doubt be used hereafter as the best road between the two posts. Our route led to the Smoky Hill at an excellent crossing about five miles above Fort Hays, which post we reached on the afternoon of the 3d instant. We found four squadrons of the Seventh United States Cavalry there, under command of Brevet Major General Custer, who had been unable to make any further movements against the Indians since his arrival at that post, on the 19th ultimo, on account of the unserviceable condition of his horses, the absence of sufficient supplies of subsistence stores and forage, &c., as set forth in the accompanying copy of a communication from him, dated at Fort Hays, May 4, marked K.

Three companies of the Thirty-seventh Infantry and regimental headquarters were left at Hays to await final orders to proceed to New Mexico, which they will receive about the 25th instant. One company of the same regiment was directed to proceed to Downer's Station and take post there.

I remained at Fort Hays until the 5th instant, when I marched toward Fort Harker with Battery B, Fourth United States Artillery, which proceeded to Fort Riley to take post there temporarily, one company of infantry and the train arriving there on the afternoon of the 6th. I received a copy of a dispatch from Governor Crawford to the commanding
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An officer at Fort Riley on the 5th instant, while on the march between Hays and Harker, stating that six citizens had recently been killed by Indians at White Rock on the Republican near Lake Sibley. The dispatch requested that troops might be sent there at once. I had given orders before starting on the expedition that, as soon as the grass was up, a company of infantry should march from Harker and a company of cavalry from Leavenworth, to take position on Buffalo Creek in that vicinity for its protection. I now found, contrary to my expectations, that those troops had not yet moved. I immediately ordered the company of infantry to march from Harker, (which it did next day,) and telegraphed the same instructions for the cavalry company at Leavenworth. The company has since gone.

Intelligence reached me on the 6th of May, before I had reached Harker, that Black Kettle, a Cheyenne chief, had sent a messenger to Fort Larned, stating that he was coming up from Texas to that post, and wished to meet me there. I dispatched an interpreter from Harker, (Mr. John Smith,) who had recently left Black Kettle's band, to ascertain whether that chief had arrived in the vicinity of Larned, with instructions, if such was the case, to conduct him to Harker, where I would give him an interview. Mr. Smith has since returned from Larned, and has reported that Black Kettle was not in the vicinity of that post, but would probably be there as soon as the grass was sufficiently grown to enable him to move.

During the expedition I had a thorough inspection made of each post visited, by the staff officers accompanying me, of their respective departments, and of the command generally by the acting inspector general, making a general inspection of each myself, commencing at Harker, where a great deal of building had been done since last fall and the past winter. I found the plan of some of the buildings which had been erected (particularly the officers' quarters) very faulty, and instructed General Easton, chief quartermaster department of the Missouri, before I left that post; to prepare more suitable plans for the buildings which are yet to be put up. I directed the garrison to be withdrawn from Old Fort Ellsworth, and that work to be leveled. The Union Pacific railroad, eastern division, will, in all probability, be completed to that post by the 1st of July at furthest, (it is now in running order to within about fifteen miles of it,) when it will be advisable to make it the depot, instead of Fort Riley, for supplies for the Arkansas and Smoky Hill routes. It is advantageously located for that purpose.

At Zarah I found a small, badly constructed round-house, loopholed for defense, and capable of accommodating probably thirty men, with no accommodations for officers. The officer commanding the garrison was living several hundred yards distant from the round-house. I am having plans prepared for a block-house or defensible barrack, which I design to erect there instead of the round-house in question. It will hold a garrison of half a company, and will have the officers' quarters under the same roof with the troops. I consider the erection of some such building, in place of the one now there, absolutely necessary for the defense of this place.

The erection of the new buildings at Larned has progressed very slowly, there being not nearly so much accomplished there in that respect as I had anticipated. Its location is an exceedingly bad one for defense, particularly on account of a dry ditch (old channel of a stream) which nearly surrounds it, and would afford concealment and shelter to a very large body of men. I was informed that the ditch in question was used successfully by the Indians as a shelter, when they attacked that post.
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Several years since. They will, undoubtedly, use it again for the same purpose, should they make another assault upon it. While I was encamped at Larned, I convened a board of officers for the purpose of examining and reporting upon its present site, and as to the practicability and propriety of removing the post to a more suitable location in the vicinity. The report of the board was forwarded to headquarters military division of the Missouri, before I left the post. Since it has been concluded not to remove the fort, the defects of the site will be remedied as much as possible by additional block-houses.

The new buildings at Dodge are further advanced than at any other of the posts visited by me. They will, from present appearances, all be ready for occupation by the fall. There appeared to be more order and discipline, and a better administration of public business at that post, than at any of those mentioned, which is due, I believe, to the energy and efficiency of its commanding officer.

At Fort Hays no permanent buildings have been erected, on account of its site having not yet been definitely determined. It will, most probably, be removed hereafter to a location nearer the point where the Union Pacific railroad, eastern division, crosses Big Creek. The garrison of that post is, at present, quartered in rude log and adobe huts.

I ascertained during my stay at the different posts, that scurvy was prevalent to some extent, especially among the companies of cavalry at Hays. Prompt instructions were given that a supply of anti-scorbutics should be furnished to remedy this matter.

The day on which I left Fort Harker to return to Fort Leavenworth, (May 7,) I wrote to General Smith, (copy of letter inclosed, marked L,) whom I left in charge of the operations against the Indians within the limits of his district, instructing him to make an expedition with the cavalry at Fort Hays at the earliest possible day (if practicable before the ponies of the Indians had fattened upon the new grass) against all Sioux and Cheyennes who might be found between the Arkansas and Platte, save those Sioux (Brulé and Ogallallas) who are permitted to roam within the scope of country defined by the recent treaty made by the "commission to investigate the Fort Phil. Kearney massacre." I inclose herewith (marked M) a copy of a dispatch received by me at Fort Harker on the 6th instant, from Brevet Brigadier General A. Sully, United States Army, one of the members of that commission, by which it will be seen that, according to the requirements of the treaty referred to, the Brulés and Ogallallas are permitted to roam to within ten miles of the Smoky Hill, and east and west between Plum and Lodge Pole Creeks.

If the reservation in question, designated by the "Phil. Kearney Commission," is to be permanent, I am of the opinion that it will prove to be a refuge for all Indians between the Platte and Arkansas who may be pursued by our troops; and will in fact render it impracticable to expel the hostile Cheyennes and Sioux from the country embraced between those two streams, as is at present contemplated. In fact if the Brulés and Ogallallas are to roam without interference to the vicinity of the Smoky Hill and between Plum and Lodge Pole Creeks, such confusion and complications must ensue in that region that it would seem better to desist from all operations against hostile Indians there, as it would be impossible for our troops to distinguish on the reservation those Indians who are friendly from those with whom we are at war. I have already represented this matter to the Lieutenant General commanding the division, who concurs with me in the views I have herein
expressed touching it, and has suggested measures for the modification of the limits of the treaty question.

In the mean time, while awaiting more definite information concerning the boundaries of the reservation granted to the Brulés and Ogalallas, General Smith has been directed, in accordance with instructions from Lieutenant General Sherman, to guard the country along as far as Fort Sedgwick, in the absence of Brevet Major General Augur's troops, and for that purpose to send the cavalry north to the Platte, thence to Fort McPherson, thence to Fort Sedgwick; from which point it would return to Fort Hays.

It is my present intention to maintain active operations during the summer and as late into the winter as practicable (unless a peace should be made meanwhile) against all Sioux and Cheyennes (save friendly bands of the former) who may be found between the Arkansas and Platte.

I left Fort Harker the evening of the 7th instant and marched during the night to Spring Creek, twenty-five miles east of that post, where I took the cars of the Union Pacific railroad, eastern division, and proceeded to Fort Leavenworth, which point I reached on the evening of the 9th instant. During almost the entire time which I had been absent with the expedition the weather had been quite cold, and the spring was so backward that, until after we left Hays, on the 5th of May, we saw no grass sufficiently advanced to serve as forage.

I transmit herewith the report of the chief medical officer of the expedition, marked N, and will forward hereafter a report of the officer of the engineers who accompanied me, giving sketches of the country through which we passed, streams crossed, bridges built upon our route, distances marched each day, &c. I also inclose herewith, marked O, copy of a dispatch received on the 13th instant from Brevet Major General Augur, from which it will be seen that he reports all friendly bands of Indians have left the Republican and gone north of the Platte, &c.

I am, general, very respectfully,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army, Commanding.

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General,
Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.
hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has very recently returned to Fort Dodge from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers and one white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our posts on the Arkansas, that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us, and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States Army who have visited them, supposing that they were friends.

It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague County, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family. I desire you to particularly explain to them that one reason why the government does not at once send troops against them to redress these outrages against our people is that their Great Father is averse to commence a war upon them (which would certainly end in destroying them) until all other means of redress fail. I request that you will inform the Indians of your agency that I will hereafter insist upon their keeping off the main routes of travel across the plains, where their presence is calculated to bring on difficulties between themselves and the whites. If you, as their agent, can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to defer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so I would be pleased to have you accompany me when I visit the country of your tribes to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony. I will be pleased to talk with any of the chiefs whom we may meet.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent for Arapaho,
Apache, and Cheyenne Tribes.

Official copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 11, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to address this letter to you for the purpose of informing you that I have about completed my arrangements to move a force to the plains, and only await a proper condition of the roads to march.

My object in making an expedition at this time is to show the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to chastise any tribes who may molest people who are traveling across the plains. It is not our desire to bring on difficulties with the Indians, but to treat them with justice and according to our treaty stipulations; and I desire especially, in my dealings with them, to act through their agents as far as practicable.

In reference to the Cheyennes of your agency in particular, I may say that we have just grounds of grievance; one is that they have not delivered up the murderer of the New Mexican, at Zarah. I also believe that I have evidence sufficient to fix upon different bands of that tribe,
whose chiefs are known, several of the outrages committed on the Smoky Hill last summer.

I request that you will inform them in such a manner as you may think proper, that I expect shortly to visit their neighborhood, and that I will be glad to have an interview with their chiefs; and tell them, also, if you please, that I will go fully prepared for peace or war; and that hereafter I will insist upon their keeping off the main lines of travel, where their presence is calculated to bring about collisions with the whites. If you can prevail upon the Indians of your agency to abandon their habit of infesting the country traversed by our overland routes, threatening, robbing, and intimidating travelers, we will defer that matter to you. If not, I would be pleased, by your presence with me when I visit the locality of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel E. W. WYNKOOP,
Agent for Comanches and Kiowas,
Fort Larned, Kansas.

Official copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenuorth, Kansas, March 22, 1867.

SIR: In accordance with instructions which I have received from Lieutenant General Sherman, commanding military division of the Missouri, I have the honor to inform you that during the expedition which I am about to make to the Arkansas, I shall make no demands upon the Cheyennes for the Indian who killed the Mexican at Zarah last fall, nor for the party who murdered the men and carried off the stock from Chalk Bluff Station on the Smoky Hill during last year. These cases will now be left entirely in the hands of the Indian Department, and I do not expect to make war against any of the Indians of your agency unless they commence hostilities against us. But, as I before stated to you, I am prepared to aid you with the troops at my disposal, in case you should request such assistance to control your Indians, or to arrest or punish any of them who have been guilty of outrages or depredations.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel E. W. WYNKOOP,
Indian Agent.

Official copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
List of articles abandoned in the Sioux and Cheyenne village on Pawnee Fork.

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<th>Parfleches</th>
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<th>Axes</th>
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Remarks.—Six ponies were also found running loose near the village.

Official copy:

J. W. Davidson,
Lieutenant Colonel Tenth Cavalry and Brevet Major General,
And Inspector General Department of the Missouri.

W. G. Mitchell,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

[Special Field Orders No. 13.—Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPT' OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 15, Pawnee Fork, April 18, 1867.

1. As a punishment for the bad faith practiced by the Cheyennes and Sioux who occupied the Indian village at this place, and as a chastisement for murders and depredations committed since the arrival of the command at this point by the people of those tribes, the village recently occupied by them, which is now in our hands, will be entirely destroyed.

All property within the village, such as tools, camp equipage, &c., will be preserved and taken up as captured property by Captain G. W. Bradley, assistant quartermaster, chief quartermaster of the expedition.

By command of Major General Hancock:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT SEVENTH CAVALRY,
Cimarron Crossing, April 19, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 11 a. m. to-day, videttes west of our bivouac discovered Indians skulking on our flank. Lieutenant Berry rapidly advanced with twenty men who had returned from a scout northward and whose horses were saddled.

Lieutenant Berry, through the guide Jones, demanded a surrender, when the Indians fired upon our men. Lieutenant Berry and his party were promptly supported by C troop, Seventh Cavalry, under my immediate command, placing B troop inside the ranch inclosure, under command of Lieutenant Bragg, Third Cavalry. Lieutenant Berry crossed the river after having killed two or three of the enemy in the stream. Jones reports them Cheyennes and Sioux on the war path, from their equipments. We succeeded in killing six of them, (all that we first saw,) and I send herewith an inventory, in pencil, of things taken. They were dismounted, and were, in my opinion, spies. They fought to the death.

I have two patrols between here and Pawnee Fork, one returning and one going. I shall look after them this evening.

Our casualties are: one man, Private Weinart, B troop, Seventh Cavalry, wounded in the thigh from a rifle-ball; one horse was shot with an arrow and will probably die.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WICKLIFFE COOPER,
Major Seventh Cavalry, Commanding.

P. S.—Please excuse paper, &c.; will send a detailed report to-morrow. If there is any mail, please send it by the detail.

W. C.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Report of captures made at Cimarron Crossing on April 19, 1867, by the troops under Major W. Cooper, commanding squadron Seventh Cavalry.

1 rifle.
1 pistol.
2 bows and quivers; 1 bow lost.
2 sets of arrows.
3 blankets.
1 pair moccasins.
1 belt and flask containing powder.
1 chief's head-dress.
1 white woman's scalp.
1 silver breast-plate.

Official copy: GEORGE H. WALLACE,
First Lieutenant Third Infantry, Post Adjutant.

A true copy:
W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
April 22, 1867.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to hand herewith, Major Wickliffe Cooper's dispatch relative to the killing of six Cheyenne Indians at the Cimarron Crossing on the 19th instant. Also my instructions to him in sending his squadron to that point.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. DOUGLASS,
Major Third Infantry, Commanding Post.

Lieutenant T. B. WEIR,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General District of Upper Arkansas.

A true copy:
W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

[Indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Dodge, April 22, 1867.

Respectfully forwarded. The mail has been detained for this paper, and I have no time to write in detail.
This Kiowas are reported here under Kicking Bird and Stumbling Bear. Little Raven has been here (of the Arapahoes) to see me, and will be here again to-morrow, it is said. We marched fifteen and one-third miles to-day.

W. S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DODGE, KANSAS,
April 21, 1867.

MAJOR: I am directed by the commanding officer to instruct you to return to this post to-morrow morning with one company of your command, as there will be a number of Indians, leaving at the Cimarron Crossing one company, under the command of Lieutenant Berry; Doctor Crandell and the guide will remain with the company left at the Cimarron.

H. Ex. Doc. 240—7
Positive instructions must be given Lieutenant Berry that friendly Indians must not be molested, or cause given them to think that the United States desire other than friendly relations with them.

Should bands of Sioux or Cheyennes be met with by Lieutenant Berry, it will be his duty to have a talk with them, and make them understand that they must remain with him as prisoners, and if they do so peaceably that they will be well treated. If, however, they should refuse to do so he must capture them, and only use force when it is absolutely necessary to effect that end.

As you are about to leave only one company, you will have corn enough without sending you a new supply.

Lieutenant Brewster, of course, returns with you. Should you on your return meet any bands of Indians, which is very probable, as numbers of Arapahoes and Kiowas are coming in, you should be careful to distinguish them from Sioux and Cheyennes.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. WALLACE,
First Lieutenant 3d United States Infantry, Post Adjutant.

Major W. Cooper,
7th United States Cavalry, Commanding B and C Companies.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, March 14, 1867.

GENERAL: I have delayed some days complying with my promise to you in our interview here on the 8th instant, to reduce to writing the substance of our conclusions as to your general disposition of matters this season in your department.

The fact that the management of Indian affairs is left by Congress in the control of the Department of the Interior, deprives us of a legal right to control them, and prevents our adopting preventive measures. We are compelled to respect the Indian treaties because they are the law of the land, obligatory on all, especially on us who are intrusted with the execution of the law. We are bound also to respect the authority of commissioners or agents, who are charged with the intercourse with and control of the various tribes, and to leave them to manage all questions not amounting to actual war. You need not, therefore, make demand on the Cheyennes for the drunken fellow who killed the New Mexican at Zarah last fall, nor for the party who killed the men and carried off the stock at the stage station, at Chalk Bluffs, on the Smoky Hill route, last year. Leave these cases to the agents and so notify them.

Our duty is to protect our own people, while engaged in their lawful and natural pursuits, against all enemies of whatever race or color. This embraces citizens who have made settlements on surveyed lands, or other lands where it is lawful for them to make locations; all mail routes established by law; all roads traveled through the Indian country established by competent authority, or to which a right has accrued by former implied consent; and especially we are bound to protect and command the respect due our own authority as represented by forts, stations, and troops on the march.

I understand that the Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, and Kiowas, each and all, on several occasions, have assembled at or near our posts on the Smoky Hill, and on the Arkansas, in numbers and strength mani-
festly beyond the control of their agents, and have in manner and word threatened to interrupt the use by our people of those roads. This cannot be tolerated for a moment. If not a state of war, it is next thing to it, and will result in war unless checked. I therefore authorize you to instruct your commanding officers of posts, on a recurrence of the same or similar cases, to punish on the spot; and I authorize you to organize out of your present command a sufficient force to go among these Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, or similar bands of Indians, and notify them that if they want war they can have it now; but if they decline the offer, then impress on them that they must stop their insolence and threats, and make their conduct conform more nearly to what we deem right than was the case last year.

I have no fear that you or any other officer under you will kill or injure unresisting people of any race or kind, and will not suppose the case. But such an impression has got abroad, and I have an inquiry from the War Department on this subject, under date of 8th instant, a copy of which I inclose with my reply. You may construe both these papers as official and bearing on the case.

The transfer and addition to you of the Indian Territory west of Arkansas may force you to modify somewhat your former plans. I wish to leave you free to act according to your better knowledge on the spot; and will be prepared on notice to modify any former orders to suit the new case.

After visiting those tribes now supposed to be south of the Arkansas, below Fort Larned, you can direct the detachments to move to the posts designed for them this summer.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding Department of the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

A true copy:

C. McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:

J. D. GRAHAM,
First Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DODGE,
Kansas, April 17, 1867.

MAJOR: Being advised by the major general commanding department of the probability existing that the Cheyennes and Sioux will attempt to cross the Arkansas at or near the Cimarron crossing, the commanding officer of this post directs that you will proceed without delay to that point with your command and encamp there. The crossing of the Arkansas commonly known as the Pawnee Fork, about twenty-two miles above the Cimarron, is considered a favorite crossing of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. I would therefore advise that a strong detachment be sent to that crossing and the road patrolled between; as there are many places where the Arkansas can be crossed be-
tween this post and the Cimarron, patrol the road eastward for about fifteen miles, also northward as far as South Branch of Pawnee Fork.

Our troops under General Hancock are in a state approaching hostilities with the Cheyennes and Sioux, and it is your duty to make prisoners of all these tribes you may fall in with, including women and children.

You will be furnished with a guide who has an excellent knowledge of all these Indians in this vicinity, and who will enable you to distinguish Cheyennes and Sioux from other tribes professedly friendly.

Once convinced of the nationality of any band you may meet with, should they prove to be Cheyennes or Sioux, and refuse to give themselves up, fight them without any hesitation. Keep your command constantly on the alert and so disposed that it may be rapidly concentrated, and rapidly thrown to any point. Scouts should be sent out day and night to the northward, eastward, and westward, and should be sent at the same time, so as to diminish the chances of the Indians crossing without your knowledge. Should you obtain any prisoners send them under guard to this post.

Your command will carry rations and forage for eight days, and should it be necessary you will receive an additional amount of rations and forage.

Please keep me advised of all movements of Indians you may discover, and any other items of information that may be useful.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. WALLACE,
First Lieutenant Third United States Infantry, Post Adjutant.

Major WICKLIFFE COOPER,
Commanding Squadron Seventh United States Cavalry.

Official copy:

GEO. H. WALLACE,
First Lieutenant Third Infantry, Post Adjutant.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DODGE,
Kansas, April 19, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have this day received a dispatch from Major W. Cooper, Seventh Cavalry, stating that at 11 o'clock a. m. to-day a party of Indians were discovered by a vidette skulking on the flanks of this command.

Lieutenant Berry, Seventh United States Cavalry, with a detachment of twenty men, advanced in their direction, and through the guide demanded a surrender, when they were fired upon by the Indians, the fire was returned, killing two or three while crossing the stream. Lieutenant Berry was quickly supported by C company, under the immediate command of Major Cooper, and as the Indians fought until death, all that were first discovered (viz., six) were killed.

Upon examining the dead they proved to be a party of Sioux and Cheyennes on the war path; probably spies.

The casualties on our side were one private wounded in the thigh by a rifle ball, and one horse shot with an arrow; the horse will probably die.
Among the effects found on the bodies of the dead was one white woman's scalp, which appeared to be quite fresh.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLASS,

Major Third Infantry, Commanding Post.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Department of the Missouri in the Field,

(Through headquarters District of Upper Arkansas.)

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,

Captain and A. A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,

Camp No. 17, near Fort Dodge, April 23, 1867.

Talk held with Kiowa chiefs Kicking Bird, Stumbling Bear, The Man that Moves, half-brother of the late chief Te-haw-son, and several other warriors present.

General Hancock said as follows:

'We do not come here to make war upon the Indians, but to confirm the good feelings of those who are friendly toward us. We come, however, to fight those who wish to have war with us.

A good many depredations have been committed on the Smoky Hill and Arkansas, and some south of the Arkansas. If we find those who are guilty of them, we will hold them responsible. We wish to ascertain here who stole the mules lately on the Arkansas, and have them returned to us.

The Cheyennes and Sioux have committed a good many depredations. When we find the guilty among them, they shall be tried the same as we try the white men who have done wrong.

We have heard that the Sioux came down here to stir up bad blood among you toward the white men. We want to see and to know whether they have told you lies or not. When we came to Larned, we sent for the chiefs of the Cheyennes and Sioux to come to our camp. Two chiefs of the Cheyennes came, White Horse and Tall Bull. The Sioux and other Cheyenne chiefs sent me word that their young men were hunting buffalo, and they could not come in to see us. This did not look friendly. We then started to their camp to see them. They burned the grass all around and ahead of us, on the side of the river where we were marching, but we crossed the river on a bridge which we have with us, and marched up on the other side. When we got near their village we met Pawnee Killer, of the Sioux, and told him we considered him a friend of the white man. They all promised to come down the next day to our camp for a talk; but the next day there was a high wind, so that we could not have talked, and as they did not come to my camp at the time appointed, I marched at eleven o'clock toward their village, and told them I would talk to them there. When we got near the village we met a long line of warriors with some of the Sioux chiefs and many of the Cheyennes. Roman Nose was among them. He had a white flag. When the lines were close they halted. General Smith and myself went out to meet them, and asked them if they wanted war. They said no. I then told them we would have a talk when we encamped, to which they assented. We then marched near the village and found that the Sioux and all of the women and children had gone. Roman Nose, Bull Bear, and some warriors were in the camp. Bull Bear and Roman Nose came to see me and said they would bring the women and children back, but could not bring their horses back, as they were too poor to travel. I gave them horses to go. At half past nine o'clock at night they sent word to me that they could not bring their women and children back, and I found they were all leaving their village. I immediately put all my cavalry around their camp, but they all left, save an old man and woman and a child, before the cavalry arrived at their camp. They had treated the little girl very badly before they left camp. We did not intend to kill them unless they fired on us first. They left all of their robes, tools, &c., in their camp. We started all of our cavalry after them and followed fast, but they had too much start for us to overtake them. They killed three men on the Smoky Hill and burned a mail station, and also...
try to get into another station to kill the men there. They were stripped and painted for war when they crossed the Smoky Hill. Our cavalry is in pursuit of them yet. We waited at their village five or six days, to see if the Cheyennes would come back and say they were innocent. But none came back. We then burned their village and destroyed everything in it, except some lodges. We have Bull Bear's tent, and that of Roman Nose. We will give them to the Kiowas and Comanches who will enlist with us for scouts. I have since told all of my chiefs that we are going to have war with the Sioux and Cheyennes between the Arkansas and Platte. I sent some cavalry to Cimarron crossing, to intercept any of the Cheyennes who tried to cross there. Some of the Cheyennes came there and tried to shoot our men, before they were discovered. Our cavalry then attacked and killed six of them. I only tell you this to show you that we did not come here to make war on those who are innocent, but on the guilty and those who feel guilty toward us. It is not safe for any Indians to be between the Arkansas and Platte, for our young men can't tell who they are unless they have good scouts with them, and may kill them. I want all friendly Indians south of the Arkansas to stay there, so that our young men won't mistake them for Sioux or Cheyennes. If all is quiet here, our young men will fight on the Smoky Hill and Platte. But if they have to come down to the Arkansas they can't tell Cheyennes from other Indians.

Last year I had not many soldiers, but now I have more horsemen than all of your warriors together. I intended to have brought them down here to let you see them, but the Cheyennes and Sioux behaved so badly I had to send them after them. We want to get some Indians who are friendly to us, for scouts, Kiowas, Comanches, and Arapahoes. We want no others. We will give them the same pay as our soldiers, horses, guns, blankets, &c. They will have white officers to command them, who will tell them what we want them to do. We wish them to keep the Cheyennes and Sioux away from this route. Whenever they want to quit as scouts, they can. Their families will be placed near our posts, and be cared for while they are out scouting. We will dress them up finely and feed them. They will be soldiers of the Great Father, as we are. Tell other chiefs about this, for I want to know if they like it. We expected to see other chiefs here. We intend to go south, to meet the Kiowas and Comanches, unless they shall come up here to see and talk to us. Afterward we are going north of the Arkansas, on some of the creeks, to look for Sioux and Cheyennes. We will not be back here again unless there is trouble in this country. This is all I have to say.

The Man that Moves, half-brother to Te-haw-son, late chief of the Kiowas, then said:

What the big chief says I believe. So will all of the chiefs, every word of it. I am an old man, brother of Te-haw-son. What this big chief says listen to, young men.

Kicking Bird then said:

I know you are a big chief. I heard some time ago that you were coming, and am glad to see you, and glad that you have taken us by the hand. Our great chief, Te-haw-son, is dead. He was a great chief for the whites and Indians. Whatever Te-haw-son said they kept in their hearts. Whatever Te-haw-son told them in council they remembered, and they would go the road he told them; that is, to be friendly to the whites. Te-haw-son always advised the nation to take the white man by the hand, and never war. Whatever Smoky Hill advises the same. Kicking Bird advises the same. We live south of the river, Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, and Apaches, we all in our hearts want peace with the whites. This country south of the Arkansas is our country. We want peace in it, and not war. We have seen you, (General Hancock,) and our hearts are glad. We will report the talk you have had with us to all of the nations, so that they will know what you have said. When there is no war south of the Arkansas, our women and children can sleep without fear of being molested, and our men can hunt buffalo there without fear of enemies. My heart is big and glad that you have told us that you will not make war on Indians whose consciences are good. We have often wished for the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes not to come down here. They steal our horses when they come here, and we do not want them to come. I have heard that our goods are coming early this spring. When they arrive that will be the time to pick out young men for guides and scouts. After I get back to my people, I will tell the words you have said to our chiefs, and when it has been told our young men they will report what they will do. You can see for yourself that we are peaceably encamped on the other side of the river, and no matter what kind of a storm came, we have staid to have a talk with you. Whatever you have to tell us we will listen to and say the truth. Now and then we have robes to trade for sugar and coffee for our women and children. On the prairie we eat buffalo meat. We are encamped close by here.

General Hancock then said:

Your temper is good, and satisfactory to us. Be assured that there will be no trouble south of the Arkansas while you are in this mind. I command now all of the country
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

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down to the Red River, north to the Platte and New Mexico. No one can harm you unless by orders through me, but my officers are ordered to punish depredations which may be committed, and I cannot answer for such matters. I wish to know your answer about the scouts as soon as possible and the other matters about which I have talked. If I am gone before your answer is ready, you can give it to General Smith, or, if he is not here, to the commander of Fort Dodge.

Kicking Bird then said:

We cannot give an answer until we consult our chiefs, Satanta, or White Bear, Heap of Bears, Lone Wolf, Black Bird, Sitting Bear, and Little Heart. We want to know what we are to do with the Cheyennes who have gone south, (Black Kettle’s band.)

General Hancock said:

You had better keep away from them until your Great Father tells you what to do. It is dangerous to be in the same camp with them. We could not tell the other day at Pawnee Fork the Sioux from the Cheyennes when they were in the same camp. The buffalo are getting very scarce, and will soon be gone. It is important, therefore, that you should make friends with the white men, so that after awhile they will protect you and feed you, if necessary. The whites are getting numerous, and they are coming west like the resistless waves of the sea. This cannot be helped, and you must make the best of it. You should soon settle in your own country and begin to teach your children to raise corn and animals, as other Indians further east are now doing. We have had white men among us, but if they wrong you, instead of redressing your injuries, you should come in and tell your agents, and your wrongs will be redressed. It is difficult to tell from the reports who are wrong, but if you keep quiet and commit no depredations there will be no war, and bad men who injure you will be punished.

Kicking Bird then said:

There are but a few of my young men with me, but if you could give me some clothing for the tribe, they would all see that what you have said is so.

General Hancock replied:

I have no clothing except for my soldiers. The government gives the clothing to your agents for you. If you enlist as guides and scouts I can give you plenty of clothing.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 17, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 24, 1867.

GENERAL: We had a little snow night before last, but as it was followed by a rain, no damage was done. It is now raining.

I had an interview with Kicking Bird and Stumbling Bear yesterday, which I send you, as recorded by my adjutant general. Little Raven was here to meet us a few days since. Kicking Bird has gone after him, and has promised to have him here again in two days, together with others; so I shall wait. Other Kiowa chiefs are expected in at Fort Larned before the end of the month—possibly some Comanches.

The Indians have generally gone far south, fearing complications which might involve their families.

There are all kinds of influences bearing upon this subject, and the Indians are bewildered in consequence. Little Raven has promised to deliver at once forty head of stock, taken from Gilchrist by some Arapahoes. Unfortunately, eight white men, who had lost a few head of horses and mules by the Cheyennes, stole twelve horses from Little Raven by way of reprisal. Still, although Little Raven asks Major Douglass to restore those animals, he made no opposition to the delivery of those in his possession. As the thieves had four days’ start, it is not likely that his animals will be recovered, unless they pass Fort Lyon.

I have thought it best not to go farther south at present, in order not to complicate matters, and I cannot go far enough to have it prove advantageous, as I can see more of the principal men at Dodge and Larned, by being at those posts, than I would be likely to do in a march south, of the number of days which my forage would warrant.
My cavalry being absent, I do not appear so formidable as I did a short time since, and the effect would not therefore be valuable. The agent had sent for their chiefs to come in at Larned by the 31st, and I will be there then; at Hays by the 2d or 3d, and at Harker about the 7th proximo.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General United States Army.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp near Fort Harker, Kansas, May 7, 1867.

GENERAL: The major general commanding directs me to say that forty-five thousand rations of subsistence are now at Fort Harker for Fort Hays, and that the remaining portion of a supply of forage for the cavalry now at that post, until the 1st of June, will leave Fort Harker for Fort Hays to-morrow morning. There will, therefore, in all probability, be no further difficulty or delay in the way of moving troops from that post on account of supplies of subsistence and forage.

In view of those facts, the major general commanding wishes you to make an expedition at the earliest possible day, with the cavalry at Fort Hays, or with that portion of it which may be in a condition to move, against all Sioux and Cheyenne Indians who may be found between the Arkansas and Platte Rivers, save those Sioux who may be within the scope of country defined in the copy of the inclosed dispatch from Brevet Brigadier General A. Sully, president of a commission to investigate the "Fort Phil. Kearney massacre." It is the opinion of the major general commanding that it is not intended by the commission referred to, that the Brulé and Ogallalla Sioux shall come as far south as the Smoky Hill, but of this the general will inform you when he receives more definite information on the subject, which he hopes to do in a day or two. It is particularly desirable that the movement herein directed against the Sioux and Cheyennes should be made before their horses, which are now poor, are fattened on the new grass.

After that expedition has been made, subsequent movements against Indians can all be at your discretion. The major general commanding will furnish you with all of the information he can obtain relative to Indian matters in your district, and requests that you will communicate with him as frequently as possible on the same subject.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.

Brevet Major General A. J. SMITH,
Commanding District of the Upper Arkansas.

Official copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS, April 28, 1867.

"Talk" held with Little Raven, (head chief of the Arapahoes,) Yellow Bear, Beardy, Cut Nose, and several warriors present.

Little Raven said as follows:

We had heard from the Sioux above here, about their going away and leaving their lodges, but for all that we have come in as fast as our horses could carry us. This route and the Smoky Hill route are now free. We don't stop the roads. We love the whites. We made peace with the commissioners from Washington at the month of the Little Arkansas, and that peace we have kept for two years. We have a great many brothers and friends in the southern country, and we have sent runners to tell them to listen to what you (General Hancock) have to say. The Sioux in the north do not listen to me, nor the Arapahoes, who have lived in the north for years. They do not belong to the nation; they are the same as the Sioux. The commissioners at Washington look to me as the head chief of the Arapahoes. I have told all of the Indians of all the nations the same as I tell you, and you sent for me to come and see you, and I came as fast as I could. My heart is glad to see you. We wish you to inform your soldiers on the roads that we are not with the Sioux and Cheyennes. We will report what you say to us to the nation. Whenever you have to say let it be in plain language, so that we can understand it. We do not belong north at all, with the Sioux or any other tribe; we belong south. Until the Sioux and Cheyennes go north of the North Platte, we will remain south of the Arkansas. It is a good thing for the soldiers to camp along the different streams, for we can then come in and trade with them. We don't want to stop the railroad tracks at all. Our hearts are glad when we come here with our wives and children and meet all you chiefs with friendship. What you say we will listen to, and when our people come in for their treaty goods we will have a good chance to report to them. I will tell you that you have heard of Arapahoes committing depredations; that is false. Other Indians have done so, and have laid it to Arapahoes. The other villages of our people, save mine, are a great ways off, and that is the reason we came in first; they will all be in. Their lodges are further off south. The Arapahoes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Osages are almost all camped at Salt Plains. We hope that you will give us provisions to take home with us. We hope that when you go to Washington you will report that Little Raven has a good heart toward the whites. The Great Spirit listens and knows that this is true. I am getting old. These young men are my children. I am working hard, myself, for peace. We are glad to meet all of your chiefs, and glad to take you by the hands. We want to know if you have heard of forty animals being taken by us from the whites up the road. Three Cheyennes and three Arapahoes took them. The Arapahoes got twenty-five head and the Cheyennes the remainder.

General Hancock then said as follows:

We are glad to see you here. I have always heard that you (Little Raven) were the head chief of the Arapahoes. We like to see a tribe with one head, whom the members respect, so that we can talk with one responsible man, instead of to half a dozen who have no influence, because we expect to hold the tribe responsible for its actions, and we can do that better when there is one head than when there are many different heads. We brought a great many soldiers with us, many of them horsemen, but when we found there was to be war with the Sioux and Cheyennes, we could not bring them down here. When we arrived at the camp of the Sioux and Cheyennes, on Pawnee Fork, to have a talk with them there, they ran away and behaved badly, and we had to send our horsemen after them. But we brought a good many soldiers down here with us, and would have sent for the horsemen if there had been any trouble here. We sent for Little Raven's band, and have now seen them and talked to their chiefs, and we do not wish to frighten the women and children away from their village by going further south. To-day we were afraid that you could not remain, and we could not have waited longer, for we have an engagement to meet some chiefs at Fort Larned, and have sent a part of our soldiers there, but we kept a part of them with us, and waited until near the last moment to see you. If there are no troubles further south, the soldiers will not come back, but if there is trouble on this route, they will return. We want them to go after the Sioux and Cheyennes, if this country is quiet; but they will be on the Smoky Hill, and can come down here at any time when it is required. We wish the Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches to keep this road clear and free for travelers. Then there will be no occasion for soldiers to come down south. If any of you wish to be soldiers of your Great Father in Washington, as we are, you can do so, and your families will be taken care of and have provisions given them. Those who are willing to be soldiers shall have horses, guns, blankets, pay, and clothing as our horsemen have. We want them to keep the plains free for travel between the Arkansas and Platte. We would sooner have some Arapahoes, some Comanches, some Apaches, and some Kiowas. But if the other tribes do not wish to be soldiers, we
will take all Arapahoes. Think over this matter and let Major Douglass know the result after you have decided. We did not come to make war, but came to see who wished for war and who desired peace. If any tribes wish for war, we will fight them. If they wish for peace, we will treat them as friends. Your Great Father at Washington and all of his soldiers are friends of the Indian as well as of the white man, but the Indians must not murder and commit other depredations; and you must give up those of their tribes for trial who commit such depredations hereafter. We did not intend to make war on the Sioux and the Cheyennes, but we wished to find those among them who had robbed and murdered, and to have them tried. But they ran away, and would not talk to us, and when they reached the Smoky Hill they set fire to one of the mail stations, and burnt three men in it. They also tried to burn another station and kill the men there. When we came to their village on Pawnee Fork we did not intend to harm them, and they promised to remain all night in their village and talk to us in the morning, but they lied to us, and ran away in the night. We then sent our horsemen after them. We camped five or six days near their village to see whether the Cheyennes would come back and say they were innocent, but they did not come. They were in the same camp, and we could not tell the Cheyennes from the Sioux. Before we left their village we burnt it. Before that time they had fired on my expressmen going to Larned, and to the Smoky Hill, and at other places. The Sioux left an old man and woman in their village when they ran away, and the Cheyennes left a little girl, whom they had treated very badly. The Sioux, and little Cheyenne girl, are here. You can see them if you wish. I did not know whether the Indians were going north or south when they ran away from their camp, but I sent some cavalry to the Cimarron Crossing to take prisoners any Sioux or Cheyennes who came there. Some of the Cheyennes came to that point and tried to creep up and kill our herders, but our cavalry attacked and killed six of them. We are now going to make war on the Sioux and Cheyennes between the Arkansas and Platte. If they go south of the Arkansas our soldiers will follow them, but if you keep them north of the Arkansas no soldiers will go into your country. You know well that the game is getting very scarce, and that you must soon have some other means of living; you should, therefore, cultivate the friendship of the white man, so that when the game is all gone, they may take care of you if necessary. The roads and railroads must not be molested, and it is to your interest as well as ours to have them, to bring your goods to you cheaply. You must not disturb them, for if you do, your Great Father will be angry and take the whole country from you, and leave no Indians in it. When I go away from here I will leave General Smith in this country. He will stay here, and if he hears of any stealing or other depredations, he will follow the guilty ones until he finds them. General Smith was in this country twenty years ago with General Kearney. He knows all about the plains and the Indians. We always hear when depredations are committed, and know what tribes steal horses, &c. We understand the Arapahoes have got some mules belonging to white men. We wish you to give them up. If the white men commit depredations against you, come in and report the matter to your agents, or the nearest commander of troops, and you shall have redress. We hear that some of the tribes south of the Arkansas go down into Texas, where they kill men, capture women, and all the country on both sides of the Arkansas is now under my command, and I shall look after these matters. We can move in the winter as well as in the summer. Our horses are fat when yours are poor, and we can go over the plains in winter as certainly as at any other time. Next winter if any depredations are committed south of the Arkansas, we will go down to the Red River and come this way, when we will punish those who may be guilty. We do not wish war, but desire peace and order; but our Great Father will certainly punish those who disturb travelers, rob, or commit other depredations. I am very glad to see you here, and am sorry that I had to ask you to talk before you had had something to eat; but I must go on to Fort Larned, where I am expected. I will tell Major Douglass to give you sufficient provisions to take you home.

Little Raven then said:

We wish you to bear in mind that we will stay in the south if there is war north of the Arkansas with the Sioux and Cheyennes, and that we will go north if there is war south of the Arkansas with the Kiowas, Comanches, and other tribes. We wish to be in a country where there is peace. We have made peace in Texas this spring, and have quit going there for war. All the whites in Texas are at peace with us now. The Kiowas are big fools, and will go to Texas for war; but as soon as they do so again, the Arapahoes will go north of the Arkansas. If any war parties go south, our young men will tell Major Douglass of them. We know Major Douglass well, and whenever he has sent for us, we have come in. When we come into this fort we will come to the fort above the post, and Mr. Jones and Addkins and Major Douglass will know we are Arapahoes when they see us at that ford. The Sioux and other Indians don't know that ford. Our young men will come to the fort any time this summer to trade, and they will come to that ford in the day time. When the Sioux come down here they
come at night. Our young men will let Major Douglass know if any of the Sioux or Cheyennes come south of the Arkansas. We will report all we have heard here when we get home. I have spoken.

General Hancock then said as follows:

Those Indians who are at war with us are fools. They have not many men to lose. We have plenty of men. They cannot replace those who are killed. The Indians are few in numbers. The whites are like the grass on the prairies. If the Kiowas are going to keep up the war in Texas, we wish to know it. If they do not stop sending war parties there, they will be punished. We may not go there to-day or to-morrow, or in a month, but when we do go it will be with a strong force. But we do not wish to take soldiers there, unless it is necessary. But we would sooner go there now than at any other time. If there are bad men in your tribe whom you cannot control, let those who wish to be quiet and peaceable come to us, and we will take care of them. I wish you would think over the matter of being soldiers of your Great Father. We would like to have two or three hundred of your young men for scouts. I have but little more to say, but wish to speak about one matter again; that is about the mules you have belonging to white men. You can bring them in, and give them to Major Douglass, as you have promised to do. We have heard that you lost some horses. We will try to catch the thieves, but we do not know whether we can do so or not. We have written letters to the different forts, telling the commanders to try and recover your horses. We are as anxious that you should not lose your horses as that the whites should not lose theirs.

Little Raven then said:
I told Mr. Jones some time ago that we had twenty-five head of mules belonging to white men. One of the mules died, and one them was lost while we were hunting buffalo. We have twenty-three yet. They are in Storm's village. We will bring them in and turn them over to Major Douglass.

General Hancock then said:
We are going away, and do not wish to come back here with our soldiers to disturb your women and children. We want you to keep this country quiet. But you know, if the Cheyennes and Sioux come south of the river, we must follow them.

Little Raven then said:
Whenever you follow them south of the river, you will not find them in the same camp with us. We will not camp with them.

General Hancock said:
That is right, but do not let them come south; then there will be no war here.

Little Raven replied:
If any Cheyennes or Sioux come south of the river, we will report it to Major Douglass.

General Hancock replied:
We will reward you well if you do so. The last words I have to say to you is, to keep this road clear.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp No. 20, near Fort Larned, Kansas, May 1, 1867.

GENERAL: I have seen some notices in the newspapers, stating that the expedition has been detained for want of forage, and that our animals are suffering, &c. There is not a word of truth in such statements, as we have not been detained at all on account of forage. We have had all the grains necessary. The hay contractors failed almost entirely, owing to high water, bad roads, &c., and we have consequently only had hay sufficient for the animals during the most inclement weather. I had a good deal of difficulty in placing the forage at the points where it was specially required, but being on the ground myself, have been able to control this matter.

The only serious trouble we have met in respect to forage was that when General Custer arrived at Fort Hays from Pawnee Fork he found there was only a sufficient supply for his command for one or two
days, and was unfortunately delayed on that account. I had been assured by Captain Bradley, the chief quartermaster of the expedition, that there was a sufficient supply of forage at Hays for my entire command for eight or ten days.

Had I known that the forage was not there, General Custer need not have gone to Hays at that time.

I believe that I have advised you already that I have left an additional company of the Thirty-seventh Infantry at Lyon, Dodge, and Larned, each, for the protection of the roads, &c.; and that a company of cavalry has also been left at each of the above-mentioned posts. One company of cavalry will also be stationed on the Little Arkansas to patrol the line of that stream, and to follow any Indian trails which may cross the road.

General Custer will be kept actively employed with four or five squadrons. He will use them in small detachments, if necessary. I presume he is now operating against the Cheyennes and Sioux; but if he is not doing so, he will commence when I reach Fort Hays. As soon as matters are a little more straightened out, General Custer will be an exceedingly valuable officer to pursue the Indians. I desire none better for such service.

I have with me here four companies of the Thirty-seventh Infantry, the battery, and a small detachment of the Seventh Cavalry. One of the companies of the Thirty-seventh Infantry will be stationed at Downer's, and one at the Monument, for the purpose of guarding passing trains, protecting the roads, &c.

I have a great deal to say to you when I meet you at Harker concerning the building of posts on the Arkansas. There is such an abundant supply of stone along that route, and it is so easily worked, that I think the post should be built without delay. They would be permanent if built of stone, and can probably be constructed as cheaply as if they were erected of more perishable material, which would have to come from a distance. As to Larned, I have referred the subject of the block-houses and the shoveling down of the banks of the slough to Lieutenant Brown, United States Engineers, who is with me, for examination and report; but I am positively satisfied that it would be economy and good sense to remove that post at once to a different site. I have been informed that Mr. Butterfield, Indian trader, would take the buildings now erected at Larned, and, as a compensation for them, would place as many cut stone as they contain on the new site selected for the fort, which would be an economical arrangement for the government. The roofs of the present buildings at Larned would probably be somewhat damaged by being removed. I have been told here that during the late war the Kiowas, under Satanta and Satank, attacked Fort Larned, taking advantage of the same dry ditches which are now reported as so objectionable, and captured every thing of value there. The sentinels were shot in the garrison, and every horse belonging to six hundred troops, (among them a battery,) which were stationed at the post at the time, was taken. The bridge over Pawnee Fork was burnt at the same time right under the eyes of the troops.

If we have an Indian war, I predict disaster at Larned, whether we have block-houses or not. I consider it impossible, except at an enormous expense, to shovel the ground off at the ditch, so as to make the round-house defensible. The old buildings at the post are falling down every day.

At the new site proposed for the location of the fort, there would be no probability of capture by the Indians, if proper precautions were taken. I do not consider the present commanding officer at Larned
equal to his duties, and have therefore ordered him to be relieved by a major of the Tenth Cavalry.

The block-house at Zarah is in such a state of dilapidation, and is so surrounded by other buildings, that I have decided to remove it and replace it by a new building, to be constructed from the materials of the present one. The new block-house will be built near the site of the old one, giving accommodations for the officers in it, which is not the case in the present round-house at that point. I understand that, during the late war, Stumbling Bear made an attack on Fort Dodge and captured all of the stock at that post when it was garrisoned by a heavy force. I have no fear of such a disaster there under its present commander, Major Douglass. Everything looks well at the post. The troops are under fine discipline, and it is the only place which I have seen in this region, thus far, in which I have confidence in its ability to protect itself.

My impression is that the real route of travel for emigrants hereafter will be from Fort Hays or Harker (most probably from Hays) directly across to some point a little west of Dodge, crossing Walnut Creek and the branches of Pawnee Fork, where the country affords excellent grass, good running water, plenty of wood, good roads—wood, water, and grass at convenient intervals.

Pawnee Fork and Walnut Creek would have to be bridged, however, as the level of the water in them is far below the banks of the streams. I believe that to be the most practicable route for the railroad also; but still the Arkansas route, lower down, will be followed by emigrants and trains from the south and to the eastward; and as that river is a permanent line of defense against the Indians south of that stream in the Indian Territory, to which all the Indians who have not homes north of the Platte should be removed, I consider it as a suitable line for permanent posts, even if no other new posts are established in this department until the line of the railroad is determined. The posts should be completed at once, before a cry for retrenchment is commenced.

With a judicious supply of rations there would be no difficulty in settling the Indian question, provided that the person having the authority to order the issue of rations has control over the Indians and a sufficient scope of country under his command.

I wish to enlist two or three hundred of the Comanches, Arapahoes, and Kiowas as scouts. I believe their enlistment with us would demoralize the other tribes on the plains. I think it would be best to receive scouts from the tribes I have mentioned above, before we accept the Pawnees, Omahas, and Winnebagoes who have offered to us.

I am of the opinion that a strong military post should be established at the Wichita Mountains, over the North Fork of the Canadian, to threaten those Indians who make incursions into Texas.

If General Sheridan was instructed to notify me of any authentic information he may obtain of depredations by Indians below that river, and if authority was given to me to make war upon them at any time, unless they made restitution, those questions would soon be settled; and now is the time to settle them definitely, if there can be unity of action under the control of the military authorities. As it now is, we are hampered and delayed by the advice and interests of the Indian agents who are present in this country, who are governed by different objects and have different points of communication from the military authorities. I have uniformly treated the Indian agents in this department with a great deal of consideration, have invited them to accompany me on this expedition, and have listened to them so far as I have considered that their views were guided by an equal public interest.
with those that I have held; but I fear that in some cases they have complicated matters by giving advice to Indians as to how much they should talk, what they should say, &c.

I have laid the evidences of outrages and depredations before some of them, but as yet I have in no instance been called on to make energetic efforts for restitution or redress from the Indians.

I think the questions arising between the Indian and War Departments, as to the control of the tribes, have a seriously injurious effect upon the Indians. The traders as a rule are opposed to any hostilities against the Indians for any cause whatever, for the reason that war interferes with their business. How far the agents, who give the traders their license, are governed by similar views, can only be a matter of conjecture.

I inclose herewith the opinion of Lieutenant Brown, United States Engineers, as to putting up the two block-houses of stone and shoveling down the banks of the slough at Fort Larned.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

General W. T. SHERMAN,
Com'g Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.

Offical:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[From North Platte, Nebraska, June 21, 1867.]

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 21, 1867.

To General U. S. Grant:

GENERAL: Sanborn is just down from Laramie, and says "that some friendly Sioux are coming down to join Spotted Tail's band near here. Runners have gone out, and allow thirty days for the rest to come. All others to confer with you. I suppose you cannot do much but propose during these thirty days." The Cheyennes south are also cutting up, and I have calls for Custer's cavalry. Had we not better keep it in motion between Fort Morgan and the Smoky Hill? Nothing here, or along the line. Will go down to Omaha to-morrow, and stay till I hear from you at Laramie. Railroad will reach Julesburg Saturday.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

Official:

GEO. K. LEET,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH U. S. CAVALRY,
Riverside Station, 40 miles west of Fort Sedgwick, July 6, 1867.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN:

On the 24th ultimo, forty-five Sioux warriors attacked a detachment of twenty-five men of this regiment, under Captain S. M. Hamilton,
near the Forks of the Republican. Captain Hamilton's party, after a
gallant fight, defeated and drove off the Indians, killing two warriors
and wounding several others—his own party losing but one horse
wounded. On the 26th ultimo, a war party of Sioux and Cheyennes,
combined numbering between five and six hundred warriors, attacked
and surrounded forty-eight men of this regiment, who, under Lieutenants
S. M. Robbins and W. W. Cook, Seventh Cavalry, were escorting my
train of supplies from Fort Wallace. The Indians surrounded the train,
for three hours making desperate efforts to effect its capture; but after
a well-contested fight upon the part of Lieutenant Robbins, the Indians
were repulsed with the loss of five warriors killed, several wounded, and
one horse captured; our injuries were but two men slightly hurt. The
Indians were under the leadership of Roman Nose, whose horse was shot
in one of the attempts to charge the train. At daylight on the morning
of the 24th, a large band of Sioux warriors surrounded my camp and en­
deavored to stampede my animals; my men turning out promptly, drove
the Indians away without losing a single animal. One of my men was
seriously wounded in the melee by a carbine shot. To Captain Hamil-
ton, Lieutenants Robbins and Cook, as well as their men, great praise
is due for the pluck and determination exhibited by them in these their
first engagements with hostile Indians.

G. A. CUSTER,
Brevet Major General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION MISSOURI,
St. Louis, July 10, 1867.

Official copy respectfully forwarded to headquarters of the army for
the information of the general commanding.

L. M. DAYTON,
Lieutenant Colonel and Military Secretary,
(in absence of the Lieutenant General commanding.)

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY,
July 13, 1867.

Official copy:

GEO. K. LEET,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July 31, 1867.

MAJOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of copies of the
following communications, referred to me by command of General Grant
May 23, 1867:

1. Copy of a letter from Colonel E. W. Wynkoop, United States
Indian agent for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Apaches of the plains,
to Hon. L. V. Bogy, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated March 22,
1867, inclosing copies of communications received from my headquarters,
and from headquarters district of the Upper Arkansas.

2. Copy of a letter written by myself to Colonel Wynkoop, dated
March 13, 1867, informing him that I was about to march with an expedi-
tion to the plains, stating the objects of the expedition, &c.

3. Copy of a letter to Colonel Wynkoop from headquarters district
of the Upper Arkansas, dated March 14, 1867, in reference to Wilson Graham, a Cheyenne boy, a captive in our hands.

4. Copy of a letter, dated March 14, 1867, from Major H. Douglass, Third Infantry, commanding post of Fort Dodge, to Brevet Major Henry E. Noyes, acting assistant adjutant general, district of the Upper Arkansas, concerning certain threats made by Satanta, (Kiowa chief,) &c.

5. Copy of a letter, dated April 9, 1867, written by Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian agent for the Comanches and Kiowas, concerning Wilson Graham, the same Cheyenne boy referred to in Colonel Wynkoop's letter of March 14, 1867.

6. Copy of a letter written by myself to Colonel Leavenworth, dated March 11, 1867, informing him that I was engaged in preparing an expedition to the plains, and giving the objects of the expedition, &c.

7. Copy of a letter, dated February 16, 1867, from Captain E. L. Smith, Nineteenth Infantry, commanding post of Fort Arbuckle, to Colonel O. D. Green, assistant adjutant general, department of the Arkansas, with copy of an indorsement by Brigadier General E. O. C. Ord, concerning depredations committed by the Cochataker band of Comanches, &c.

8. Copy of General Orders No. 1, headquarters department of the Missouri, in the field, dated at Fort Riley, Kansas, March 26, 1867.

9. Copy of a letter, dated (from my camp at the Indian villages) April 15, 1867, from Colonel Leavenworth to Hon. N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, giving information as to the movements of the expedition which was then on the plains under my command, &c.

10. Copy of a letter, dated April 15, 1867, (also written in my camp,) from Colonel Wynkoop to Hon. N. G. Taylor, giving his (Colonel Wynkoop's) views of my military operations, &c.

11. Copy of a letter, dated April 17, 1867, from Colonel Leavenworth to Hon. N. G. Taylor, on the same subject.

12. Copy of a letter, dated April 18, 1867, at the Indian camp, from Colonel Wynkoop to Hon. N. G. Taylor, on the same subject.

13. Copy of a letter, dated April 19, 1867, from Colonel Wynkoop, addressed to myself, giving the reasons for his request that the villages of the Sioux and Cheyennes on Pawnee Fork should not be destroyed, &c.

14. Copy of a letter, dated April 21, 1867, from Colonel Wynkoop to Hon. N. G. Taylor, on the subject of the movements of the expedition, the killing of the six Cheyennes at Cimmaron crossing on the 19th of April, 1867, &c.

15. Copy of a letter, dated April 24, 1867, from Colonel Wynkoop to Hon. N. G. Taylor, in reference to Indian matters, the movements of the expedition, &c., inclosing a copy of the inventory of property destroyed in the villages of the Sioux and Cheyennes, April 19, 1867.

In reply to the letters of Colonels Wynkoop and Leavenworth, herein referred to, and to a telegram, dated May 23d, 1867, from General Grant, upon the subject of the burning of the Indian villages on Pawnee Fork, April 19, 1867, I have the honor to submit the following statement: First, That I have replied to General Grant's telegram of May 23 by a telegram premising the same date, and that in my official report of the operations of the expeditions made last spring to the plains, under my command, forwarded to General Grant by Lieutennant General Sherman, a full and accurate history is given of the objects of that expedition and the military movements connected with it, together with my reasons for destroying the villages of the Sioux and Cheyennes on Pawnee Fork, &c. The report in question touches upon all the main points mentioned in the copies of the letters from Colonels Wynkoop and Leavenworth, referred to me by General Grant May 23, 1867, and is believed to be sufficiently
full in its details to cover the questions mentioned therein; yet there are a few statements made in some of them which are inaccurate, and which I desire to correct. They are as follows:

Among the letters inclosed is a copy of one to Colonel Wynkoop, dated headquarters district of the Upper Arkansas, March 14, 1867, stating that "Wilson Graham, the Cheyenne boy, who was captured from that tribe some time since, is now en route to this post, (Fort Riley.) As soon as he arrives he will be sent to you, in order that he may be delivered to his nearest relatives. Please inform this office of the name and band of his nearest relations."

No authority was ever given by me to the commanding officer of the district of the Upper Arkansas to transfer the child in question to any agent of the Indian Department whatever. On the contrary, I informed the commanding officer at Fort Larned, (through headquarters district of the Upper Arkansas,) in a letter dated at these headquarters, March 11, 1867, (copy inclosed, marked A,) that the boy in question (who was then under my charge at Fort Leavenworth) would be sent to that post (Fort Larned) for delivery to his nearest relatives, and that he had been obtained from the persons who had had possession of him since his capture through the exertions of the military authorities, this action on my part being in accordance with the instructions I had received on that subject from headquarters military division of the Missouri, in a special order, dated St. Louis, Missouri, February 12, 1867, (copy inclosed, marked B.) The boy being too unwell to travel as soon as was anticipated, I detained him here until I started with the expedition to the plains, (March 25,) when he accompanied me, and was delivered by me personally to the commanding officer at Fort Larned, leaving with him the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Near Fort Larned, Kansas, April 12, 1867.

SIR:

On leaving this camp it is the intention of the major general commanding to place in your charge the Cheyenne boy now in his possession, known by the name of "Wilson Graham." You will retain him until an opportunity presents for delivering him to his nearest relatives, (his mother is said to be living,) believed to belong to "Black Kettle's" band. When you deliver him to his relatives you will take a receipt for him.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,
Fort Larned, Kansas.

In a conversation which I had with Colonel Wynkoop on this subject while I was at Fort Larned, I informed him that my instructions required me to deliver the boy to his nearest relatives through the military authorities, and not through the Indian agents.

A copy of a letter from Colonel Leavenworth, United States Indian agent for the Comanches and Kiowas, to Hon. N.G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated April 9, 1867, states that he (Colonel Leavenworth) was directed by instructions from the Indian Bureau to proceed to St. Louis to receive from Lieutenant General Sherman "Wilson Graham," the Cheyenne boy in question, and to deliver him to Colonel Wynkoop at Fort Larned. Upon his arrival at St. Louis Lieutenant General Sherman informed him that the child had been sent to me, with instructions to deliver him to the Cheyennes in the presence of the agent. These instructions would have been carried out while I was present at Fort Larned had the band of Cheyennes to which his relatives belonged.

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(Black Kettle's) been in that country at that time, (it was reported to be in Texas,) and I left the boy with the commanding officer at Fort Larned, with the instructions before referred to.

Shortly after that time, (April 15,) the Cheyennes commenced the present war against us, which has thus far rendered the delivery of the boy to his friends impracticable.

In the letter of Colonel Wynkoop, dated at my headquarters, on Pawnee Fork, April 18, 1867, addressed to Hon. N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he states that a courier had arrived in my camp from General Custer (then in pursuit of the Sioux and Cheyennes from Pawnee Fork) with the information that "the Cheyennes had turned and gone toward the Arkansas River, while the Sioux had continued northward. We followed the Sioux trail, and the last dispatch from him (General Custer) is to the effect that the Sioux upon crossing the Smoky Hill road had destroyed a mail station and killed three men."

Colonel Wynkoop then goes on to state that as there was yet no evidence of the Cheyennes having committed any overt act of hostility, he made an appeal to me to preserve the village belonging to that tribe, as it was distinct from that of the Sioux.

There is no evidence in General Custer's report of his pursuit of the Sioux and Cheyennes from the villages on the Pawnee Fork, which would go to prove that they had separated, or that the Cheyennes were not implicated in the killing and burning of the three men at Lookout Station, on the 15th of April, and burning of the station. On the contrary, in General Custer's report to Brevet Major General A. J. Smith, commanding district of the Upper Arkansas, of April 19, (received after the destruction of the village, and too late to be considered in that connection,) in reference to the outrages at Lookout Station, on the Smoky Hill, he says expressly that, after a careful examination by himself and the Delaware scouts who were with him, it was found impracticable to discover the "slightest clue" as to what tribe had committed the act; but says, in his report to General Smith, of the 17th of April, (copy inclosed, marked D,) that the outrages were certainly committed by the Indians who abandoned the villages on Pawnee Fork. They were a portion of the same body of Indians, about eight hundred strong, who crossed the Smoky Hill road on the 16th of April, and reported themselves to be Sioux, Cheyennes, and Pawnees. They were all stripped and painted for war at that time, and in addition to the previous killing and burning at Lookout Station, they fired into Stormy Hollow mail station, and ran off stock from that point belonging to the mail company, threatened the mail station east of Stormy Hollow, and ran off stock belonging to the Union Pacific railway, eastern division, a few miles further north.

My official report of the operations of the expedition of last spring shows conclusively that I did not determine to destroy the Indian villages, until I had learned officially of the outrages committed on the Smoky Hill by the Indians (Sioux and Cheyennes) who had treacherously left their camps, on Pawnee Fork, on the 14th of April, or during the previous night.

In none of the reports which were received from General Custer of his pursuit of the Indians from Pawnee Fork was there any fact going to show that the main body of the Cheyennes had left the Sioux and gone south. All of the information contained in the dispatches of General Custer at that time was to the effect that the Indians from Pawnee Fork (Sioux and Cheyennes) remained together (with probably a few exceptional small bands) until they arrived at the Smoky Hill,
when they committed the murders and depredations on the mail stations, and then pursued their flight northward.

In reference to the statement of Colonel Wynkoop, that the village of the Cheyennes was distinct from that of the Sioux, I can only say that the villages stood upon the same ground, and I was unable, after an inspection which I made in person, to distinguish with any certainty the lodges of the Cheyennes from those of the Sioux; nor could any of the officers who were with me say positively where the line of separation between the villages commenced, although it was understood that the Sioux were on the north side, and the Cheyennes on the southern and eastern sides.

It is not seen upon what ground the Indians became "fully impressed with the belief that General Hancock had come for the purpose of murdering their women and children, as had been previously done at Sand Creek." (See same letter from Colonel Wynkoop to Hon. N. G. Taylor, of April 18, 1867.) Nothing which I said to the Sioux and Cheyenne chiefs whom I had met at Larned on the 12th of April, or at the meeting near the villages on the 14th of that month, could have led the Indians to such a conclusion, or have given them apprehension of such murderous inclinations on my part; for I had constantly assured them that my intentions were peaceful, and that I had only marched into their country for the purpose of having a conference with the different tribes, so that they might have a full and just understanding of the views and intentions of the military authorities in reference to their future conduct, and their interference with the railways and other routes of travel, emigrants passing through their country, and the treatment of our frontier settlers.

Such were well known to Colonels Wynkoop and Leavenworth to be the objects of the expedition, and they constantly assured the Indians, when in my presence, that my intentions were peaceful; and it was not until after the hostilities on the Smoky Hill, subsequent to their abandonment of the villages on Pawnee Fork, which compelled me to destroy their villages, that the assertions were made that the Indians had "actually been forced into a war." (See Colonel Wynkoop's letter of April 21 to Hon. N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs.) While on this subject, it is proper to state that none knew better than Colonels Wynkoop and Leavenworth that I did not march to the plains last spring for the purpose of commencing a war with the Indians; for before my departure from Fort Leavenworth I had written to each of them, informing them of my instructions, and of the objects of the expedition, and stating that no Indians would be arrested or called to account by me for past outrages and depredations, unless upon the application of the agents themselves.

In his letters of April 21 and 24, the first from Fort Dodge, the latter from Fort Larned, Colonel Wynkoop again reiterates the statement that the village of the Cheyennes on Pawnee Fork was burned without provocation or any overt acts on the part of that tribe, notwithstanding he must surely have known, when he was at Fort Dodge with me, from the reports which I had received from General Custer, the contents of which were made known to him, (and these were the only possible sources of information on that subject at the time,) that the Cheyennes generally had not gone south of the Arkansas when they deserted the village at Pawnee Fork, but had fled north of the Smoky Hill with the Sioux, and were parties with the latter to the murders and burning at Lookout Station, and the other outrages committed on the Smoky Hill about the same time.

I consider the evidence as to the participation of the Cheyennes in the.
massacre at Lookout Station and other depredations on the Smoky Hill, after they had abandoned the village on Pawnee Fork, contained in General Custer's reports of his pursuit of the Cheyennes and Sioux, conclusive and beyond question; their conduct on that occasion being, in my opinion, only a continuation of the outrages which they had been previously committing against the whites in this department ever since I had assumed the command of it, August, 1866.

To show the temper of the Cheyennes toward us, and the feelings of hostility which animated them, (before the expedition to the plains of last spring;) I inclose herewith the reports of former outrages perpetrated last summer and fall, with evidence which it is considered fixes the guilt of these outrages upon that tribe beyond any question or doubt, viz:

September 19, 1866.—A party of Indians ran off fourteen horses and two mules from Fort Wallace. (See copy of a report from Lieutenant Flood, Sixth United States Volunteers, inclosed, marked E¹; also, an indorsement on a report of Lieutenant Joseph Hale, dated November 10, 1866, inclosed, marked E²; also, copy of affidavit of Mr. H. F. Wyatt, on the same subject, marked E¹; copy of affidavit of Mr. William Comstock, government guide and interpreter at Fort Wallace, marked E¹; and copy of statement of Mr. John Smith, United States Indian interpreter, marked E¹.)

September 28, 1866.—Two employés of the Overland Mail Company murdered at Chalk Bluffs mail station. As evidence showing that the murders were committed by the Cheyennes, I transmit copies of a letter from Mr. D. Street, agent Overland Mail Company, marked F¹, dated October 23, 1866, of an affidavit from Mr. William Comstock, United States guide and interpreter at Fort Wallace, marked E¹; of an affidavit from Mr. James Wadsworth, driver on overland mail line, marked F²; of a letter from Captain M. W. Keogh, Seventh Cavalry, commanding post of Fort Wallace, dated December 20, 1866, marked F³, with inclosure of a letter from Lieutenant Joseph Hale, Third Infantry, dated December 19, 1866, marked F¹.

October 12, 1866.—A band of Indians burned the mail station at Chalk Bluffs. I invite attention to the following papers before referred to (inclosed herewith) fixing that outrage upon the Cheyennes: Letter from First Lieutenant Joseph Hale, Third Infantry, dated November 10, 1866; letter of October 23, 1866, from Mr. D. Street, agent Overland Mail Company; and a letter from Lieutenant Hale, Third Infantry, dated December 19, 1866.

November 10, 1866.—An unprovoked murder of a New Mexican was committed at Fort Zarah by a Cheyenne, Fox Tail, a son of Medicine Arrow, a prominent man of that tribe. (See, on this subject, the inclosed copy of a report from Second Lieutenant J. P. Thompson, Third Infantry, marked G.) That murder has never been denied, even by the agent of the Cheyennes.

I also inclose a copy of a statement marked H, from Mr. John Smith, United States Indian interpreter, dated July 14, 1867, in reference to the killing of six white men by the Cheyennes in the month of June, 1866, on one of the tributaries of Solomon's Fork, and a copy of a letter dated February 22, 1867, from Mr. F. R. Page, United States agent for the Kansas Indians, (marked I,) stating that about the 1st day of January, 1867, a party of Cheyennes attacked the Kaw chief, Kahl-ti-augoh, capturing forty-four horses and wounding one man.

I have also on record at my headquarters the official reports of various outrages and depredations committed before the present war by other tribes belonging to the agencies of Colonels Wynkoop and
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Leavenworth, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches, some of which, the Indians themselves, when in council with me last spring, acknowledged to have been justly charged to them. The reports in all such cases were promptly transmitted by me to the Indian Department as soon as they were received; and although I had constantly informed that department, through the agents, that I was ready to assist them with the troops under my command in arresting the offenders, I have never, in a single instance, been called upon to render such assistance; and in all cases, (even in that of the murderer of the New Mexican at Zarah, when the name of the culprit was known,) the guilty ones have been permitted to go unpunished.

Colonel Wynkoop's letter of April 21 also contains the following:

I have just arrived with General Hancock's column at this post, (Fort Dodge,) and learn, since my arrival here, that a few days ago six Cheyenne Indians, on foot, were attacked by one hundred and thirty cavalry, about twenty-five miles west of this post, and all of them killed. I also learn that they had done nothing to provoke an attack, but were of the party that fled before General Hancock's approach.

In reply to this passage I will merely quote that portion of my official report which referred to this matter. It contains the facts which I drew from the report of the late Major W. Cooper, Seventh Cavalry, who commanded the detachment which had the encounter at the Cimarron crossing with the Indians referred to in Colonel Wynkoop's letter:

On my arrival there (at Fort Dodge) I was informed that on the 19th instant (April) a party of Cheyennes (evidently runners from the north) had approached the Cimarron crossing, and were discovered skulking around the bivouac of a detachment of the Seventh Cavalry, which was at that point, under the command of Major Wickliffe Cooper, of that regiment. When the Indians were perceived, they were endeavoring to steal up to some herders who were in charge of the cattle of the command, and it is supposed they were not aware of the presence of the troops. Major Cooper directed Lieutenant Berry, Seventh Cavalry, with twenty men to advance and demand their surrender, which was done through an interpreter. In reply, the Indians fired upon the troops. They were then attacked and pursued across the river, and six of them (all that were seen) were killed. One of our men was wounded and one horse shot.

I also transmit herewith a copy of Major W. Cooper's official report of the affair, marked K.

In concluding this letter, it is proper for me to say again, that before the expedition of last spring set out, I informed Agents Wynkoop and Leavenworth fully of its objects, telling them that war was not intended against the Indians, and that it was my earnest desire to act through them in all matters connected with the tribes of their agencies. I also invited them to accompany me on my march from Fort Larned to Fort Dodge, so that they might be present at my interviews with the chiefs of the various tribes, and hear what I had to say to them. During the time they were in my camp they must have observed that all of my conferences were with a view of preserving peace on the plains, and all of my actions friendly until the treachery of the Sioux and Cheyennes at Pawnee Fork, and the murders and depredations committed by them on the Smoky Hill after they ran away from their villages, compelled me to take hostile measures against them.

It is worthy of remark in this connection, that while in my camps, Colonel Leavenworth stated to me in conversation, that the tribes of his agency had been greatly wronged by having been charged with various offenses which had undoubtedly been committed by the Indians of Colonel Wynkoop's agency, (Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Apaches,) In the opinion of Colonel Leavenworth, as expressed to me, the Indians of Colonel Wynkoop's agency, especially the Cheyennes, deserved severe and summary chastisement for their numerous misdeeds, very many of
which had been laid at the doors of his innocent tribes, (Kiowas and
Comanches.)

But Colonel Wynkoop informed me in conversation, about the same
time, that the Arapahoes, Apaches, and particularly the Cheyennes,
were really peacefully inclined, and rarely committed offenses against
the laws, but that, most unfortunately, they were charged, in many
instances, with crimes which had been perpetrated by other tribes, and
that in this respect they had suffered heavily from the Kiowas of Col-
nel Leavenworth's agency, who were of the most turbulent Indians on
the plains, and deserved punishment more than any others.

More recent events have shown that all the tribes above referred to,
(same, probably, a portion of the Comanches,) including the Sioux, were
determined upon a general outbreak this summer, and that the aban-
donment of the villages on Pawnee Fork and the murders committed
immediately afterward on the Smoky Hill were but the commencement
of a war which had been threatened to our post commanders on many
occasions during the winter, and which is now waged with savage fury
on the part of the Indians throughout my command and the departments
of the Platte and Dakots.

In reference to the threats made last winter by the Indians, of war
against us this summer, I transmit herewith, marked L\textsuperscript{1}, \textsuperscript{L\textsuperscript{2}}, copies of two
communications from Major H. Douglas, commanding post of Fort
Dodge, which concern particularly the Kiowas and Arapahoes. One
of the letters is addressed to the assistant adjutant general, depart-
ment of the Missouri; the other to the acting assistant adjutant general,
district of the Upper Arkansas. I also transmit a copy of a letter
from Brevet Major Asbury, Third Infantry, bearing on this subject,
marked L\textsuperscript{3}.

This reply to the statements of Colonels Wynkoop and Leavenworth
contained in the copies of their letters referred to me by orders of Gen-
eral Grant, May 23, would have been transmitted promptly after the
date of their receipt, but for the fact that since that time, until the 15th
instant, I have been constantly on the plains, marching almost every
day, which prevented me from giving my attention to the matter until
the present moment.

Owing to the absence of Mr. John Smith, United States Indian inter-
preter, I have withheld two of his affidavits, marked H, until his return,
believing that an error was committed by him in giving the names of
one of the bands of Indians at the time of writing them, which can
then be corrected. They will then be transmitted for file with this com-
munication. Herewith I return the originals of the papers referred to
me by General Grant, May 23, for my remark.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

Major General United States Army, Commanding.

Major GEORGE K. LEET,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters

Army of the United States, Washington, D. C.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Proceedings of council held by Major General Hancock, commanding department of the Missouri, with the head chief Satanta, of the Kiowa tribe of Indians, in Kansas, at Fort Leaven, Kansas, May 1, 1867.

Mr. Jones (interpreter) said:

Before the council commences I wish to say that I understand that Colonel Leavenworth told Satanta not to talk much to-day, but to go down to Fort Yara to him tomorrow, and he would make it all right. He may not, therefore, talk as much as he otherwise would have done.

General Hancock said:

Colonel Leavenworth is present, and can answer for himself.

Colonel Leavenworth said:

All I have to say in regard to that is, that not a word of that kind has passed between us. I did not ask him to come to Zarah, nor tell him anything about talking.

General Hancock to Mr. Jones:

That is sufficient now; if Satanta wishes to proceed, you can let him do so whenever he is ready.

Satanta said:

I look upon you and General Smith as my fathers. I want friends, and I say by the sun and the earth I live on, I want to talk straight, and tell the truth. All other tribes are my brothers, and I want friends, and am doing all I can for peace. If I die first, it is all right. All of the Indians south of here are my friends. When I first started out as a warrior, I was a boy; now I am a man, and all men are my friends. I want the Great Father at Washington and all the soldiers and troops to hold on. I don't want the prairies and country to be bloody; but just hold on for awhile. I don't want war at all; I want peace. As for the Kiowas talking war, I don't know anything about it; nor do I know anything about the Comanches, Cheyennes, and Sioux talking about war. The Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Comanches are poor. They are all of the same color. They are all red men. This country here is old, and it all belongs to them. But you are cutting off the timber, and now the country is of no account at all. I don't mean anything bad by what I say. I have nothing bad hidden in my breast at all; everything is all right there. I have heard that there are many troops coming out in this country to whip the Cheyennes, and that is the reason we were afraid and went away. The Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowas heard that there were troops coming out in this country, so also the Comanches and Apaches, but did not know whether they were coming for peace or for war. They were on the lookout and listening, and hearing from down out of the ground all the time. They were afraid to come in. I don't think the Cheyennes wanted to fight, but I understand that you burned their village. I don't think that is good at all. To you, general, and to all these officers sitting around here, I want to tell you that I know the truth, and I don't want anything else but the truth told. Other chiefs of the Kiowas who rank below me have come in to look for rations and to look about, and their remarks are reported to Washington, but I don't think their hearts are good.

Colonel Leavenworth said:

What he means by that is that other chiefs come in to make speeches for nothing else but to get something to eat.

Satanta continued:

Lone Wolf, Stumbling Bear, — Wolf, and Kicking Bird all came in with that object, and their speeches amount to nothing. The Cheyennes, the Arapahoes, the Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and some Sioux all sent to see me, for they know me to be the best man and sent information that they wanted peace. They do not work underhanded at all, but declare plainly that they want peace. I hope that you two generals and all these officers around here will help the Cheyennes, and not destroy them, but let them live. All of the Indians south of this desire the same, and when they talk that way to me I give them praise for it. Whatever I hear in this council, and whatever you tell me, I will repeat when I reach my villages; and there are some Cheyennes over there whom I will tell, and will induce them to preserve peace; but if they will not listen to me, all my men and myself will have nothing more to do with the Indians, and will try to make them keep peaceful. The Kiowa braves have grown up from childhood, obtaining their medicine from the earth.

Many have grown old, and continue growing old and dying from time to time, but there are some remaining yet. I do not want war at all, but want to make friends, and am doing the best I can for that purpose.

There are four different bands of Comanches camped at different points in the south,
along on the streams, and there are five different bands of Kiowas—those of Lone Wolf, Heap of Bears, Timber Mountain, and Stumbling Bear, and they profess to be chiefs, although they have but two or three lodges each. They are waiting, however, to hear what they can learn before taking the war path. The Kiowas do not say anything, and whatever the white man says is all right for them. The Kiowas and the white men are in council to-day, but I hope no mistake will be made about what the Indians say here, and that nothing will be added to it, because I know that everything is sent right to Washington.

General Hancock:

There are two or three interpreters here to witness and prevent mistakes in the translation, so that all will be properly written down,

Satanta continued:

About 2 o'clock I want to start back to Fort Dodge, and I want you to give me a letter.

General Hancock:

As soon as I can copy it I will give you the written proceedings of this council, but cannot say that I can give it to you as soon as that.

Satanta:

I simply want a letter when I go into camp, so that I can show it.

General Hancock:

I will give you a copy of the proceedings to take with you, so that you may show it to any man who may be able to read it to you.

Satanta continued:

As for this Arkansas wagon road, I have no objection to it; but I don't want any railroad here, but upon the Smoky Hill route, a railroad can run there and it is all right. On the Arkansas, and all those northern streams, there is no timber, it has all been cut off; but nevertheless if anybody knows of anything bad being done, I do not like it. There are no longer any buffalo around here, now or anything we can kill to live on; but I am striving for peace now, and don't want anything construed to be bad from what I say, because I am simply speaking the plain truth. The Kiowas are poor. Other tribes are very foolish. They make war and are unfortunate, and then call upon the Kiowas to aid them, and I don't know what to think about it. I want peace, and all these officers around this country know it; I have talked with them until now I am tired. I came down here and brought my women with me, but came for peace. If any white men steal our stock, I will report it openly, I continue to come often and am not tired. Now I am doing the best I can, and the white man is looking for me. If there were no troops in this country, and the citizens only lived around here, that would be better. But there are so many troops coming in here that I fear they will do something bad to me. When Satank shot the sentinel here at the post some two or three years since, there was then war, and that was bad; I came near losing my life then. The Kiowas have now thrown him (Satank) away. If the Indians up north wish to act foolishly, that is not any of my business, and is no reason why we should do so down here. If the Indians further south see the white man coming, they will not come upon the war path, nor fight. They will not do so if they want to fight, but will call a council to come and talk as they do here now. To-day it is good, and to-morrow it is good; and when the grass comes it will be good; and this road, which runs up to the west, is good also. Everything is all right now. If you keep the horses herded around here, close to the fort, they will never be good. Let them run away off on the prairies. There is no danger; let them get grass, and they will get fat. But do not let the children and boys run away off on the hills now. That is not good; I don't do it, nor do the Cheyennes. I think that is a very good idea. You are a very big chief; but when I am away over to the Kiowas, then I am a big chief myself. Whenever a trader comes to my camp I treat him well, and do not do anything out of the way to him. All the traders are laughing and shaking hands with me. When the Indians get a little liquor they get drunk, and fight sometimes, and sometimes they whip me, but when they get sober, they are all right, and I don't think anything about it. All the white men around here can look at me and hear what I say; I am doing all I can to keep my men down, and doing the best I can to have peace. Down at the mouth of the Little Arkansas, where a treaty was made, Colonel Leavenworth was present, and I was the first man who came in there to make peace with Colonel Leavenworth, and I did it by my word. Little Mountain, the former chief of the tribe, is now dead. He did all he could to make peace, and kept talking and talking, but the white man kept doing something bad to him, and he was in so much misery that he died. The white men and Indians kept fighting each other backward and forward, and then I came in and made peace myself. Little Mountain did not give me my
commission, I won it myself. These here braves (pointing to some Indians around him) are chiefs also, and are not afraid of soldiers, and the sight of them does not frighten them at all. This prairie is large and good, and so are the heavens above, and I do not want them stained by the blood of war. I don’t want you to trouble yourself, and have fear about bringing out too many trains in this country, for I don’t want to see any wagons broken or destroyed by war. Now I want to find out what is the reason Colonel Leavenworth did not give me some annuity goods. I have never talked bad, and I don’t want to talk bad, but want to find out the reason why I did not get my annuity goods. There are Lone Bear, Beef of Bears, Stumbling Bear, and Little Heart, and others, six chiefs with very small hands, and they all received their annuity goods, while those of my tribe are as plenty as the grass, and I came in for my goods and did not see them. You can look upon us all, and see if we have any of those goods; all that we have we have bought and paid for. We are all poor men, and I think others have got all the goods; but let them keep them, I want peace, and I don’t want to make war on account of our goods. I expect to trade for what I get, and not get anything by making speeches. My heart is very strong. We can make robes and trade them. That is what we have to live upon. I have no mules, horses, nor robes to give Colonel Leavenworth for my goods. I am a poor man, but I am not going to get angry and talk about it. I simply want to tell this to these officers here present. Such articles of clothing as the white man may throw away, we will pick up, and brush off, and use, and make out the best we can, and if you throw away any provisions, we will clean and use them also, and thus do the best we can. I see a great many officers around here with fine clothing, but I do not come to beg. I admire fine clothes, although I never did beg or anything of that sort; I have no hat, and am good with my bow, and all the other Kiowas Colonel Bent used to come over often to my tent, and the Kiowas went there to him very often, and were glad, and shook hands with him, and Mr. Curtis went there, and he was treated the same way. All were treated the same. But I am not poor enough to die yet. I think my women can make enough to live upon, and can make something yet. When Colonel Bent was our agent and brought our goods out to us, he brought them out and kept them in a train, and when he arrived he unloaded all our goods to us, and that was the way to do it. But now there is a different way of doing things. At my camp I waited and sent for the agent, and did not see him, but other chiefs mounted their horses and went there and claimed to be principal men. I heard that the railroad was to come up through this country, and my men and other tribes objected to it. But I advised them to keep silent. I thought that by the railroad being built up through here, we would get our goods sure; but they do not come. I would like to get some agent who is a good and responsible man, one who would give us all our annuities; I do not want an agent who will steal half our goods and hide them, but an agent who will get all my goods and bring them out here and give them to me. I am not talking anything badly or angrily, but simply the truth. I don’t think the great men at Washington know anything about this, but I am now telling you officers to find it out. Now I am done, and whatever you (General Hancock) have to say to me, I will listen to, and those who are with me will listen, so that when we return to camp, we can tell the others the same as you tell us.

General Hancock said:

We have heard always that you were the great war chief of the Kiowas, and that is the belief among the white people whom I have seen in this country. I am very glad to see you here for that reason. We are speaking of very serious and important things, and therefore wish to speak with those who have the most influence in their tribes.

The Great Father did not send me here to make treaties with you, but we came to see who are respecting the treaties which have already been made; and if their agents report any guilty ones we are ready to punish them. We did not come down here to make war, but with the hope of avoiding war. We came prepared for it, however, and if we found anybody in this country who wanted war (we heard there were some) we were ready and intended to meet them. When, on first coming to Fort Larned, we went up the Pawnee Fork, I had then more soldiers with me in my command than all of your men together. Your Great Father has many more soldiers. You know this very well. If we lose soldiers we do not have to wait for them to grow up. Your Great Father will send us more, a great many more if necessary. You know that when you lose a man, you have no reserve and cannot send another; but must wait till one grows up. It is for your interest, then, to have peace. The Great Father is as much a friend to the Indians as to the white man. But he learned that there were many murders and depredations committed upon the trains and travelers on the Smoky Hill, and sometimes on the Arkansas, and also in Texas, and he became angry. I have been sent here to find out who committed those depredations. Some time ago we were at war with Texas. They thought they were a great people, and rebelled against their Great Father, but they have now been punished and put down; and they are his chil-
drew now as before; and you must not make war upon them. As I have told the other Indians before, I command all the troops in the country down to the Red River, including New Mexico to the west and to the Platte on the north, so that then any ordered fight Indians in that country are made by the Great Father, they pass through me. I like, therefore, to see tribes who have one chief whom I can talk to about such matters, and whom the young men will obey, instead of their being two or three or more chiefs with divided authority. The Great Father will not permit the young men of the tribes to roam around and commit such outrages as have been reported to him, and if there is no Great Chief who can prevent them, the Great Father must do it with his soldiers.

When I started I intended to go south of the Arkansas, and see the Kiowas and Comanches, as well as the Apaches; but when we got into this war with the Cheyennes and Sionex, and have sent all of our cavalry after them. We do not wish to call them back here, because they have plenty to do where they are. Nor do we want to go south of the Arkansas now, because the tribes living there tell us they are afraid of the troops, which causes them to run away. We do not wish to frighten the families of those tribes who are at peace with us. We will then not go south of the Arkansas River now, unless we find that we have enemies there. The Cheyennes and Sioux at the north are fighting and behaving very badly; a great many troops are in pursuit of them. Many Sioux and Cheyennes came down south here last winter. I learned that they were coming south to induce the Indians here to join them. Satanta and Kicking Bird told Major Douglas so, and that we must get off from this road. Satanta also told us that the Sioux came down here to make coalitions against us, and that they intended to make war here in the spring, and that is one of the matters which brought us here. We know that the depredations that were committed last summer and winter, and recently on the Smoky Hill, were by the Sioux and Cheyennes. We know this and have evidence of it. You say the Indians do not want to make war. Is not that war? The other day we came here and sent for the chief of the Sioux and Cheyennes to come to our camp at Fort Larned. None but two chiefs came, although I waited here for several days, and although they were only thirty miles distant. They sent word to me that the young men were out buffalo hunting, and that was the reason they could not come; but I know the reason. We soon found out that the young men were out on the Smoky Hill. Their agent was with us, and I took him along so as to convince them that we did not mean to harm them unjustly; but I told them that whoever their agent told me was guilty, I would make a demand if we found they were coming, but it was so windy that we could not have a conference. I told them so, and said we would talk with them in the evening in camp, and invited them to accompany us. They said, "Very well," and that they would be in camp in the evening and have a talk. But all the time they were going to talk with me, the Cheyennes and Sioux, and all, excepting some few warriors or a rear guard, were running away. When we reached their village I encamped quietly by them, and we sent their stray mules to them. Bull Bear and Roman Nose came to me and told me that the women and children were frightened and ran away. They did not tell me, though, that the Sioux and nearly all the Cheyenne warriors had run away also; but told me if I would give them some horses they would go and bring the women and children back that night, and they promised to keep the warriors in camp until morning. I told them, "Very well." We put our interpreter there to see if they remained in camp, and instructed him to come and tell us if they did not remain in camp all night. He came and told us after dark that they were all running away, and thus it was seen that they lied to us. I then concluded that the village was a nest of conspirators, and that they were there for mischief, as Satanta had told us and all the others. I believe they ran away because they were guilty, fearing that we would punish them. We sent our horsemen after them, and waited there nearly a week to see if they commenced war or not. We had made no war yet. We placed a guard around their camp so as to allow nobody to touch it. We wished to see if the Sioux and Cheyennes committed any murders on the road, and waited there for that purpose. They had started so early that they arrived on the Smoky Hill a good while before the cavalry arrived there, and they burned one station and tried to burn another, and burned three white men. That we considered war; and then ordered their camp to be burned, and everything they had in it to be destroyed or carried off. Before that time they had fired upon our expressmen on the Smoky Hill and elsewhere. We wanted to ascertain whether the Cheyennes went north or south, and sent a few of the cavalry to the Cimarron crossing with orders that if any Cheyennes came there to take them prisoners. There were some horses out herding
and grazing there, and six Cheyennes came along and tried to crawl up and shoot the herdsmen. I do not think they saw the cavalry. The commander of the troops thinks that the Indians did not know that the cavalry were there. Twenty soldiers happened to come up just then and demanded the Cheyennes to surrender; but they, in answer, fired upon the troops. The soldiers then killed them all. I then wrote to all my commanders, and to General Smith, who commands in this part of the country, that we were at war with the Cheyennes and Sioux. When the Great Father knows all that has taken place out here, he will see and say what has to be done with the Cheyennes and Sioux. It is very difficult for soldiers to tell one tribe from another, and therefore during the time this war is going on with those tribes, you had better remain south of the Arkansas. Unless they pass north from the south, or south from the north, going or returning from war expeditious, there will be peace south of the Arkansas, if everything is quiet there. There must be no trouble now on this road, otherwise I shall have to bring my troops here. If the Cheyennes cross the river and we see their trails, we shall have to follow them. We shall soon know whether the Cheyennes mean war or not, and whether the Sioux do, or whether any other Indians mean war; and we shall then know how to act ourselves.

If we have war with the Sioux and Cheyennes we will not make peace with them until the Great Father tells us to do so. They will have to show by their acts that they are honest; that they are not again telling us lies. If the Kiowas, Arapahoes, Comanches, Apaches, or either of them keep this road clear, I will not have to send any soldiers down here for that purpose, and then their families will not be frightened. You will not have to go to war, unless so disposed; and if this war continues with the Cheyennes and Sioux we would like to get two hundred or three hundred of your tribe. We will clothe, feed, and dress them well, and arm them, and furnish them with blankets and pay them the same as our horsemen. I want them to keep this road clear, and to tell us who are the Cheyennes and the Sioux, and who are the other Indians, so that we may only kill the guilty. We prefer to have some Kiowas, some Arapahoes, some Apaches, and some Comanches; but if we cannot get them from all the tribes we will take them from one tribe. I wish you would think over this matter, and let Major Douglas know at Fort Dodge, after you have considered it, what your conclusion is. I will put a white officer with the scouts, so that our troops can know who they are; and will give them the Sioux lodges which we did not burn, to put them in if they are rich in lodges. The most important thing is to keep this road clear upon the Arkansas River, and allow no murders or depredations upon it, and permit no horses nor mules to be stolen, so that I will not have to collect all this force out here and come down to punish the depredators. The time is coming when every tribe should have one principal chief, because we intend to demand that the tribe shall be responsible for the acts of their young men. You see that you cannot travel in winter. We have forage and storehouses, and can move in winter, when our horses are fat. We may not come down south of the Arkansas this month, nor the next month; but whenever we find out anything is going wrong, and when we are at home and who are not at home, we shall come, even although we should not come until next winter. But we do not wish to make war upon you; the soldiers do not wish it; but whenever there is a good cause it is our business to do so, because that is what soldiers are for. You know very well that in a few years the game will go away; what will you do then? You will have to depend upon the white man to assist you and depend upon the Great Father to feed you when hungry. Your children will have to depend upon raising corn and stock, as other Indians do, before long. This generation may not have to do it, but the next generation will be obliged to do so. The white man should cultivate the friendship of the white man now, in order that he may be your friend when you may need his assistance. The white man is coming out here so fast that nothing can stop him; coming from the east and coming from the west, like a prairie on fire in a high wind. Nothing can stop it. The reason of it is that the whites are a numerous people, and they are spreading out. They require room, and cannot help it. These on one sea in the west wish to communicate with those living on another sea in the east, and that is the reason they are building these roads, the wagon roads, and railroads, and that is the reason the whites will bring along the wood there as soon as the Indians are out of it here. But we found other things that answer the purpose as well as wood, and the same will be found here when the white men have explored this country. It is just as good as wood, and indeed is better. They will have coal here. They find it in the ground. They will
find it somewhere in this country. It has been found upon the Smoky Hill already. In the east, where the Great Father lives, they nearly all burn coal. You need have no fear on this point. We build these garrisons as places of rest for the travelers and as stations for soldiers to be ready in case the travelers are disturbed. But they will disturb no Indians unless they have sufficient cause. We will also protect the Indian in his property, and if he loses property and the white man commits a depredation upon him, he must not redress these wrongs, but come to us, for we can do it better, and will arrest the offenders. If there is any danger of their escaping, you should arrest them and bring them to us, not kill them. I have listened to what you have said about your annuity goods. I have nothing to do with that matter whatever. What you have said here, however, and what I have said, will go to Washington. I cannot tell anything about your agent. After I have finished speaking, if he (the agent) desires to say anything he can do so. I have no control over him whatever. I have said everything now which I desire to say. I do not expect to see you for some time again, unless we have to go to war south of the Arkansas River.

Colonel Leavenworth said:
These are the men who killed the Box family in Texas, and my instructions were not to give them any annuity goods until the conditions of my written instructions were complied with. I accordingly file copies of these instructions for record, in the proceedings of this council, as an explanation why these Indians did not receive their annuity goods. These papers are from Washington. The commission at Washington told me in these papers that until all these captives were returned without ransom, of which he (Satanta) knows, and we obtained sufficient assurances that no further depredations would be committed, no annuities should be given. But Satanta has never come and given any assurances in this matter.

Satanta said:
Stumbling Bear was in that raid, and why should he get so many goods?

Colonel Leavenworth:
Because he had come in and given the assurances that had been required of him.

Satanta:
Why was Moh-way given so many goods?

(Colonel Leavenworth declined to be questioned thus.)

General Hancock said:
He does not wish to be questioned upon this matter. This council will now end, unless Satanta has something more to say. (To Satanta:) This general on my left is General Smith, an old soldier on the plains and who was here a great many years ago. He commands in this country when I am not here. I wish you to know it.

Official copy:

J. D. GRAHAM,
First-Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.

Upper Arkansas Agency,
Fort Larned Kansas, March 22, 1867.

Sir: I have the honor to inclose to you copies of communications just received from Major General Hancock, and from headquarters of this military district. I think that no trouble will arise in consequence of General Hancock's expedition, as the Indians of my agency are well satisfied and quiet, and anxious to retain the peaceful relations now existing.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent, Upper Arkansas Agency.

Hon. Lewis V. BOGY,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
SIR: I have the honor to address this letter to you for the purpose of informing you that I have about completed my arrangements to move a force to the plains, and only await a proper condition of the roads to march.

My object in making an expedition at this time is to show the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to chastise any tribes who may molest people who are traveling across the plains. It is not our desire to bring on difficulties with the Indians, but to treat them with justice and according to our treaty stipulations, and I desire especially in my dealings with them to act through their agents as far as possible.

In reference to the Cheyennes of your agency in particular, I may say that we have just grounds of grievance; one is, that they have not delivered up the murderer of the New Mexican at Zarah. I also believe that I have evidence sufficient to fix upon different bands of that tribe, whose chiefs are known, several of the outrages committed on the Smoky Hill last summer. I request that you will inform them, in such a manner as you may think proper, that I expect shortly to visit their neighborhood, and that I will be glad to have an interview with their chiefs; and tell them also, if you please, that I go fully prepared for peace or war, and that hereafter I will insist upon their keeping off the main lines of travel where their presence is calculated to bring about collision with the whites.

If you can prevail upon the Indians of your agency to abandon their habits of infesting the country traversed by our overland routes, threatening, robbing, and intimidating travelers, we will defer that matter to you; if not, I would be pleased by your presence with me, when I visit the locality of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel E. W. WYCKOOP,
Agent for Cheyennes, Apaches, and Arapahoes,
Fort Larned, Kansas.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Riley, Kansas, March 14, 1867.

COLONEL: The brevet major general commanding directs me to inform you that Wilson Graham, the Cheyenne boy who was captured from that tribe some time since, is now en route to this post. As soon as he arrives he will be sent to you in order that he may be delivered to his nearest relative.

Please inform this office of the name and band of his nearest relations.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY E. NOYES,
Captain Second Cavalry, Bvt. Maj. U. S. A., A. A. A. G.

Colonel E. W. WYCKOOP,
United States Indian Agent.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

AGENCY OF THE COMANCHE AND KIOWA
INDIANS OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Larned, Kansas, April 9, 1867.

SIR: By letter from the department of the 9th ultimo, I was directed to proceed to St. Louis, Missouri, there to receive from Lieutenant General Sherman, a Cheyenne Indian boy, captured by the troops under Colonel I. M. Chivington, at the Sand Creek affair, and deliver him to the agent of the Cheyenne Indians at this post. In compliance with the above orders I proceeded to St. Louis, and presented my letter of instructions to General Sherman, who informed me the boy had been forwarded to Major General Hancock "to be delivered to the Indians in the presence of their agent." From St. Louis I proceeded to Leavenworth City, thence to Fort Zarah, Kansas, via Forts Riley and Harker; at the latter post (Harker) I passed Major General Hancock with his command en route for the plains.

I arrived at Fort Zarah, Kansas, on the 3d instant; General Hancock arrived on the 5th with his whole command, consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, about fifteen hundred strong. I immediately called upon him and requested information as to the object of his movements so far as they related to the Indians of my agency, viz: the Comanches and Kiowas; he very kindly and promptly furnished me with the inclosed papers marked Nos. 1, 2, and 3. As none of the Indians of my agency have visited this great line of travel, except a very few, since they received their annuity goods last October, and as it was uncertain what portion of his department he might visit with his command, he expressed a wish that I would accompany him, and as I believed it to be eminently proper I willingly consented, and should anything occur concerning the Indians of my agency, or the interest of the Indian Department generally, shall make full report of the same. I will state for the information of the department at Washington that the Cheyenne boy I was sent to St. Louis for is now here with General Hancock, and that Major Wynkoop, the agent of the Cheyenne Indians, is also here, who will, without doubt, report all of interest relating to the boy and the Indians of his agency.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 11, 1867.

COLONEL: I have the honor to state for your information that I am at present preparing an expedition to the plains, which will soon be ready to move. My object in doing so at this time is to convince the Indians within the limits of this department that we are able to punish any of them who may molest travelers across the plains, or who may commit other hostilities against the whites. We desire to avoid, if possible, any troubles with the Indians, and to treat them with justice and according to the requirements of our treaties with them, and I wish especially in my dealings with them to act through the agents of the Indian Department, as far as it is possible to do so. Concerning the Kiowas of your agency we have grave reasons for complaint; among
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others, it is officially reported to these headquarters that that tribe has been making hostile incursions into Texas, and that a war party has very recently returned to Fort Dodge from that State, bringing with them the scalps of seventeen colored soldiers and one white man. I am also informed that the Kiowas have been threatening our post on the Arkansas, that they are about entering into a compact with the Sioux for hostilities against us, and that they have robbed and insulted officers of the United States Army who have visited them, supposing that they were friends. It is well ascertained that certain members of that tribe (some of whom are known) are guilty of the murder of Mr. James Box, a citizen of Montague County, Texas, last summer, and of the capture and barbarous treatment of the women of his family. I desire you particularly to explain to them that one reason why the government does not at once send troops against them to redress these outrages against our people is, that their Great Father is adverse to commencing a war upon them (which would certainly end in destroying them) until all other means of redress fail. I request that you will inform the Indians of your agency that I will hereafter insist upon their keeping off the main routes of travel across the plains, where their presence is calculated to bring on difficulties between themselves and the whites. If you as their agent can arrange these matters satisfactorily with them, we will be pleased to refer the whole subject to you. In case of your inability to do so, I would be pleased to have you accompany me when I visit the country of your tribes, to show that the officers of the government are acting in harmony. I will be pleased to talk with any of the chiefs whom we may meet.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding.

Colonel J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
United States Indian Agent for Comanches and Kiowas.

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
NINETEENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY,
Fort Arbuckle, C. N., February 16, 1867.

COLONEL: I have the honor to state that previous to my arrival here a roving band of Indians had made a raid in the vicinity, carrying off stock, chiefly horses, and a negro child from within a few miles of the post. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Hart, commanding, sent in pursuit the Caddo Indian scouts, who after more than a week's absence returned without any intelligence as to the number, tribe, or probable course of the robbers. I had just learned from Horace P. Jones, (white man,) who is an old resident, and has for some years acted as interpreter for many of the tribes of Indians on this frontier, that the band consisted of twenty-five Comanches belonging to the Cochatoke tribe, (Buffalo Eaters,) the head chief being Mahwee. About two weeks after their depredations here, they were met in the neighborhood of Fort Cobb, and gave chase to Samuel Paul and Dr. J. J. Stern, (white,) the latter being the issuing commissary of the reserve Comanches, who were reputed friendly. These men were saved by the aid of Toshchowa, head chief of the reserve Comanches. This chief also recovered five of the horses which had been stolen from the vicinity, but failed in his effort to regain the captured negro child. These facts were obtained from Mr. Jones from Toshchowa himself, who requested that he might be made known to
these headquarters. In this affair Toshchowa was brought in collision with Indians of his own tribe with whom he had formerly acted, and he felt the necessity of avoiding the consequences of an open rupture. His conduct displays admirable discretion under the circumstances. I have the honor to state further that several other tribes than the Comanches have lately been noticed on the war path, having been seen in their progress in unusual numbers and without their squaws and children, a fact to which much significance is attached by those conversant with Indian usages. It is thought by many white residents of the Territories that some of these tribes may be acting in concert, and that plundering incursions are at least in contemplation. George Washington, second chief of the Caddoes, a friendly tribe, is of the opinion that the wild Comanches are bent on mischief. Since the date of the treaty made at the mouth of Little Arkansas, I believe on the 6th of October, 1865, in which the Cochotoku Comanches joined, these and other contracting parties to the treaty have carried off a large amount of stock in violation of its provisions, and have slain and made captive many white persons, held on speculation to be ransomed. The practice of the government of countenancing these offenses, by the payment of liberal sums, has had the natural effect of encouraging this inhuman traffic among the Indians, and every day of its continuance adds difficulties to the return of what I deem a wise and sterner policy, and one that would ultimately be the most humane.

My experience in the exigencies of the frontier causes me to defer to the views of such sensible white residents and others as, from long residence among the Indians, are competent to advise; and this communication, while it expresses my own, is more particularly the embodiment of their views. In a communication made on the 12th instant I had the honor to apply for ten additional companies to reinforce this post, and I now respectfully suggest the subject-matter of this communication as additional reason for the proposed re-enforcement.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. L. SMITH,
Captain Nineteenth United States Infantry, Brevet Major
United States Army, Commanding Post.

 Colonel O. D. GREEN,
Assistant Adjutant General Department of Arkansas,
Little Rock, Arkansas.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth.

W. S. MITCHELL,
Captain, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Indorsed by General Ord as follows:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARKANSAS,
March 5, 1867.

From the fact that these Indians steal from their frontiers, and have supplied themselves with large caballadas—that they supply horses to the Northern Indians on the railroad and mail routes—I think it important to put a stop to their wholesale plundering. I propose building posts in their country, as that demoralizes them more than anything else, except money and whisky.

Respectfully forwarded.

E. O. C. ORD,
Brigadier General Commanding.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Forwarded from headquarters of military division of the Missouri by order of General Sherman.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[General Field Orders No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Riley, Kansas, March 26, 1867.

1. While on the march and in camp the troops comprising the present expedition will receive orders from Brevet Major General Smith, commander of the district of Upper Arkansas, in whose territory we are about to move. When instructions may be necessary, General Smith will receive them from the major general commanding, who will be present.

2. It is uncertain whether war will be the result of the expedition or not; it will depend upon the temper and behavior of the Indians with whom we may come in contact; we go prepared for war, and will make it if a proper occasion presents. We shall have war if the Indians are not well disposed toward us. If they are for peace, and no sufficient ground is presented for chastisement, we are restricted from punishing them for past grievances which are recorded against them; these matters have been left to the Indian Department. No insolence will be tolerated from any bands of Indians whom we may encounter; we wish to show them that the government is ready and able to punish them if they are hostile, although it may not be disposed to invite war. In order that we may act in unity and harmony with these views no one but the commander present on detachment or otherwise will have interviews with Indians; such interviews as may be necessary with them will be reserved, and corresponding reserve will be required from those under his command. No Indians will be allowed in camp, and "no talks" will be had with them except for the purpose of explaining the facts herein stated. The chief of any bands of Indians who may wish any information will be referred to the major general commanding, who will receive them at his headquarters.

By command of Major General Hancock.

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, United States Indian agent.

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

AGENCY FOR KIOWAS AND COMANCHE, INDIANS OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS, IN THE FIELD, ON PAWNEE FORK, Thirty-one miles from Fort Larned, April 15, 1867.

SIR: Knowing the wish of the department to learn all pertaining to the military expedition of Major General Hancock, I will state that a council was held near Fort Larned by General Hancock and some of the

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chiefs of the Cheyenne tribe of Indians at which the Indians, I was informed, expressed themselves very friendly. General Hancock marched for Fort Dodge on the 13th instant, advanced up the Pawnee Fork twenty-one miles in the direction of a camp of about three hundred lodges of Cheyennes and Sioux. General Hancock was visited that evening by chiefs from both tribes, and informed that his approach toward their camp caused great anxiety among their squaws and children. On the 14th again resumed his march in the direction of their village, and was met some five or six miles from their town by a white flag and earnestly requested not to approach any nearer; but he still advanced, and went into camp about three o'clock p.m. a short mile below their lodges, when it was found that all their women and children had left with what few articles they could hastily gather together, leaving their lodges and a large amount of their property just as they had been occupying their homes; some one hundred or more of their warriors were still in camp, armed and apparently ready for fight. Some of their chiefs called upon General Hancock, and he wanted their women and children back, as no harm was intended them, and furnished two chiefs good horses to go for them. In the evening the two horses were returned, and he was informed they had so scattered they could not be found, and at the same time information was brought that the warriors were leaving, when cavalry was ordered out and their village surrounded and searched, but nothing was found but as stated above, and one old Sioux and a girl of about eight years of age, blind in one eye and horridly ravished. This morning she was brought to camp and properly cared for. Some suppose her white, others part white, whilst others pronounce her Indian.

It is evident she is not a Cheyenne or Sioux. She was a pitiable object indeed. Many of their lodges were found cut, as though the party wished for a small part to make a small "tepe" for a night's lodging, on a rapid march. This morning General Custer pursued with a heavy body of cavalry. This is only to the department, to let them know there are stirring events on this frontier. Major Wynkoop is exerting himself all he can in the line of his duty, and will, without doubt, make as soon as possible full reports.

In haste, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,

U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK,
Thirty miles west of Fort Larned, April 15, 1867.

I write in haste, as a courieris about leaving camp. I am with General Hancock's expedition, having accompanied him at his request, as he stated that it was his intention to hold a council with the principal men of the tribes of my agency. I am sorry to say that the result of the expedition is disastrous. General Hancock marched his column right up to the Indian village, composed of three hundred lodges of Cheyennes and Sioux; he found on halting the women and children had fled, and the men were alone occupying the camp; he ordered the chiefs to bring back the women and children, and they started for the purpose of endeavoring to do so, but soon returned and stated that it was impossible, and during the night the men deserted their village, leaving their lodges
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with all the furniture of the same. General Hancock has sent General Custer with a cavalry command in pursuit. Understanding that it was the intention of General Hancock to destroy the lodges and other property left in the village, I have written him a letter of remonstrance, as I am perfectly convinced that the conduct of the Indians was the result of intense fear. I am fearful that the result of all this will be a general war, which is much to be deprecated, as there are many unprotected whites on the different roads across the plains and at the mail stations and ranches. I will report in full the first opportunity.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington.

SAME CAMP AS ON THE 15TH,

Short mile from Indian Village, on Pawnee Fork, April 17, 1867.

SIR: I have but little to communicate, except General Hancock has determined not to burn the Indian lodges, but has ordered every article taken from their villages returned, and General Custer reports he has not seen any Indians he was in pursuit of; fifteen hundred Indians escape, and not one seen. He reports he should march for the Smoky Hill on the evening of the 16th, at 7 p.m., from the head of Walnut Creek.

In haste, very respectfully, &c.,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs.

Cheyennes without doubt gone south, Sioux north.

GENERAL HANCOCK'S CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK,
32 miles west Fort Larned, April 18, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to state that since my last communication, a few days back, in which I spoke of the flight of the Indians upon General Hancock's approach and his intention to destroy the village, I have written a communication to General Hancock, a copy of which I inclose. Have received no written reply, but he stated to me verbally that for the present he would not destroy the village. In my last letter I also stated that General Custer was in pursuit of the Indians. A courier has since arrived from him with the information that the Cheyennes had turned and gone towards the Arkansas River, while the Sioux had continued northward. He followed the Sioux trail, and the last dispatch from him is to the effect that the Sioux upon crossing the Smoky Hill road had destroyed a ranch or mail station and killed three men. Since receiving this news General Hancock has again expressed his determination to destroy the village. I have again appealed to him on behalf of the Cheyennes, as their village is distinct from the Sioux, and as yet there is no evidence of their having committed any overt act since their flight, and he has promised me to consider the matter. Under the circum-
stances in which the Indians left here, in my judgment being fully impressed with the belief that General Hancock had come for the purpose of murdering their women and children as had previously been done at Sand Creek, I have no doubt but that they think that war has been forced upon them, (the Cheyennes,) and will commence committing depredations and following their style of warfare immediately. Thus, in my opinion, has another Indian war been brought on which might have been averted by the military authorities pursuing a different line of policy. I will continue with General Hancock as long as there is any probability of him falling in with any of the Indians of my agency, for the purpose, as far as lies in my power, of subserving the interests of the department. As soon as possible I will submit to your office an inventory of the effects in both the Cheyenne and Sioux villages.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Apache Indians.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK, April 13, 1867.

GENERAL: For a long time I have made the Indian character my chief study. I regard the late movement of the Cheyennes of my agency as caused by fear alone. So far as I am able to judge, they met us at first with a determination to have a peaceful talk at such a distance from their village as would make their women and children satisfied that no danger need be apprehended by them. Your movement toward the village terrified the squaws and children, who left with such movable property as they could gather. I learn that you purpose destroying the lodges and other property now remaining in the village. I would most respectfully request you not to do so. I am fully convinced that the result would be an Indian outbreak of the most serious nature, while at the same time there is no evidence in my judgment that this band of Cheyennes are deserving of this severe punishment. I am influenced alone in thus communicating with you by what I consider a strict sense of duty.

With feelings of the utmost respect, I am, general, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Commanding Department of Missouri and Indian Expedition.

FORT DODGE, KANSAS, April 21, 1867.

SIR: I write hastily, as a mail is about leaving, to inform you that on the 19th instant General Hancock burnt the Indian village, three hundred lodges, Sioux and Cheyenne. I know of no overt act that the Cheyennes had committed to cause them to be thus punished, not even since their flight. I have just arrived with General Hancock's column at this post, and learn since my arrival here that a few days ago six Cheyenne Indians on foot were attacked by one hundred and thirty
cavalry, about twenty-five miles west of this post, and all of them killed. I also learn that they had done nothing to provoke an attack, but were of the party that fled before General Hancock’s approach. This whole matter is horrible in the extreme, and these same Indians of my agency have actually been forced into war.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Extract of letter from Colonel Wynkoop, United States Indian agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

FORT LARNED, KANSAS,

Upper Arkansas Indian Agency, April 24, 1867.

SIR: My last communication was written hastily from Fort Dodge, and I now have the honor to state that I have since arrived at the headquarters of my agency. Since the killing and scalping of the six Cheyenne Indians, above Fort Dodge, nothing new has transpired with reference to Indian affairs. Contrary to my expectations the Cheyenne Indians who fled from their village committed no depredations while crossing the Santa Fé road, and have not to my knowledge up to the present time, notwithstanding their persecutions. It is rumored here that considerable stock has been run off the Smoky Hill road by the Sioux Indians on the occasion of their flight north. General Hancock is still at Fort Dodge with his troops. Since the Indians of my agency have not as yet retaliated for the wrongs heaped upon them, it may be possible, if proper action be taken by the Department of the Interior to prevent the military from forcing trouble on, that a general Indian war may be prevented. As far as lay in my power I have struggled to avert this direful calamity. The Arapaho and Apache Indians are far south of the Arkansas River, and have not yet got into any trouble. I inclose herewith a copy of the inventory taken of property destroyed in both the Cheyenne and Sioux villages.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,

U. S. Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches.

Hon. N. G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Inventory.

CHEYENNE CAMP.—132 lodges, 396 buffalo robes, 57 saddles, 120 travaises, 78 headmats, 90 axes, 58 kettles, 125 frying-pans, 200 tin cups, 130 wooden bowls, 116 tin pans, 103 whetstones, 44 sacks paint, 57 sacks medicines, 63 water kegs, 14 ovens, 117 rubbing horns, 42 coffee-mills,
150 rope lariats, 100 chains, 264 parfleches, 70 coffee-pots, 50 hoes, 120 fleshing irons, 200 parflech sacks, 200 horn spoons, 42 crowbars, 400 sacks feathers, 200 tin plates, 160 brass kettles, 40 hammers, 15 sets lodge-poles, (uncovered,) 17 stew pans, 4 drawing knives, 10 spades, 2 bridles, 93 hatchets, 25 tea-kettles, 250 spoons, 157 knives, 4 pickaxes.

Sioux Camp.—140 lodges, 420 buffalo robes, 226 saddles, 150 travaises, 140 headmats, 142 axes, 138 kettles, 40 frying-pans, 190 tin cups, 146 tin pans, 140 travel cases, 70 sacks paint, 63 water kegs, 6 ovens, 160 rubbing horns, 7 coffee-mills, 280 rope lariats, 140 chains, 146 parfleches, 50 currycombs, 58 coffee-pots, 82 hoes, 25 fleshing irons, 40 horn spoons, 14 crowbars, 54 brass kettles, 11 hammers, 5 sets lodge-poles, (uncovered,) 4 stew pans, 9 drawing knives, 2 spades, 8 bridles, 3 pitchforks, 3 tea-kettles, 280 spoons, 4 pickaxes, 1 sword, 1 extra scabbard, 1 bayonet, 1 mail-bag, stone mallets, 1 lance.

Respectfully referred to Major General W. S. Hancock, commanding department of the Missouri.

By command of General Grant:

GEO. K. LEET,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES, May 23, 1867.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DODGE, KANSAS, March 14, 1867.

MAJOR: In answer to your communication, February 21, just received, relating to the names of the chiefs or bands of Kiowa Indians, who are or have been making threatening demonstrations, or sending insulting messages, I have the honor to state that I received from Little Raven, head chief of the Arapahoes, a message to the effect that no more wood must be cut by this command on the Pawnee Forks, and that the troops must move out of the country by the time grass grows.

Mr. Jones, the interpreter at this post, brought me a message from Satanta, the principal chief of the Kiowas, to the effect that all white men must move east of Council Grove by the spring; that he gave me ten days to move from this post; that he wanted the mules and cavalry horses fattened, as he would have use for them, for he intended to appropriate them; that all the Indians had agreed to stop the railroads and roads at Council Grove; that no roads or railroads would be allowed west of that point. Major J. H. Page, Third Infantry, brought me a message from the same chief: "Tell the chiefs on the road that they must gather together their soldiers and leave; if they don't I will help them to leave. No wagons will be allowed on the road except those that bring presents. If any are found they will be taken."

Subsequently, in council, Satanta stated in substance the same, but not in an insulting manner, which has already been reported to district headquarters.

It has been reported to me that eight Arapahoes, apparently friendly, stopped on the 10th instant at the camp of Mr. Gilchrist, a wagon-master for a Mr. Wedells, of Mora, New Mexico, on the other side of Fort Aubery, one hundred and twenty miles from here, shot at the herder, and run off forty head of mules and one mare.

The extreme severity of the weather, together with the refusal of the
man who reported the fact to act as guide, and put a party on their trail, prevented me from attempting their recovery.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DOUGLAS,
Major Third United States Infantry, Commanding Post.

Brevet Major H. E. NOYES,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters District Upper Arkansas.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS POST, FORT WALLACE, KANSAS,
September 20, 1866.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows, viz:

On the 19th instant, at 3 p. m., my guide and interpreter came into camp, and reported that a band of about one hundred and fifty Indians had stampeded the quartermaster's stock and were driving them off. I immediately had every horse saddled in Company M Second Cavalry, (eighteen present,) and started in pursuit.

Owing to one of the most intense snow-storms that I have ever witnessed, I was unable to keep their trail, from its being filled with snow. I pursued them eleven miles, and returned to camp.

It is impossible for me to pursue them this morning, as I have not over twenty mounted men, which is an insufficient number of men to overpower one hundred and fifty Indians armed as they are at present. One commissioned officer and twenty-two enlisted men of Company M Second Cavalry are now absent in pursuit of deserters and on escort duty, leaving me a very small command of mounted men, as Company M is not half mounted, there being only forty horses in the company, and about the same number of carbines.

A non-commissioned officer in charge of a detachment just returned this morning from Fort Ellsworth, reports that a party of twenty-five or thirty Indians came to a station and demanded stock from a stock-tender, who would not let them have it; therefore, they beat him nearly to death with clubs.

They have been committing such depredations from time to time for the last month and a half. The party that took the stock from here yesterday came from the northwest. They belong to a different band to those reported by Lieutenant Baks to General Palmer last month. They have been in the vicinity of this post for two weeks, but have not visited the post only once during the summer and fall.

From their actions I am convinced that they intend war. My guide ran into them before seeing them, and only escaped by having a swift horse. They shouted to the guide to inform the white chief that they were ready to fight. Their manners have been hostile since they first visited this post, and they have gone just as far as a party could without killing any people.

The party that the chief Spotted Horse was with entered a ranch twenty-two miles west of here and took saddles and bridles, blankets, and everything they wished, and then passed on the north of this post.
en route for their main body, somewhere between this post and Fort Ellsworth, Kansas.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. FLOOD,
First Lieut. Sixth U. S. Infantry, Com'g Post.

Brevet Major W. H. HARRISON,
Acting A. A. G. Dis. Middle Ark., Fort Riley, Kan.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Riley, September 24, 1866.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the commanding general department of the Missouri.
It seems the Indians have already began up on the Smoky Hill.

J. W. DAVIDSON,

POND CREEK, KANSAS,
December 19, 1866.

SIR: In compliance with your request I will now proceed to give you a statement relative to a raid or theft by a small band of Cheyenne Indians, which occurred at this post (Wallace) on the evening of the 19th September, about 2 o'clock on the evening of the above-mentioned date. A band of fifteen Cheyenne Indians rode up to my house, and asked permission to go in and warm. It was then snowing, and unusually cold for the season. After remaining about half an hour, during which time they eat some cold bread and drank several cups of coffee, at a given signal from the head man or chief, they all left the house, mounted their ponies, and rode away in the direction of the post, some two miles distant. About two hours after their departure, I learned from a detachment Company M Second United States Cavalry, then in pursuit, that these same Cheyenne Indians—good Cheyennes, as they remarked several times while in my house—had driven some twenty or thirty head of horses and mules from the post. As you already are aware, this stock was never recovered. And now, sir, in conclusion, there is but little doubt existing in my mind but what this band of Indians was composed entirely of the Cheyenne tribe, for several reasons which I will give you. First. During their stay at my house I questioned them at different times as to what tribe they belonged. The universal response was Cheyennes. I also recognized several among this band who had passed by here several weeks prior to this with a band of twenty-four, under a Cheyenne chief called Spotted Horse, and who committed several depredations on the Overland Stage Company at Big Timbers station, some twenty miles west of this post, and who also made many threats—among others, giving us all fifteen days to leave this road, under the penalty of all being scalped if we did not comply.

Most respectfully, yours,

H. P. WYATT,
Beef Contractor, Fort Wallace, Kansas.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
To Captain John S. Smith, United States Interpreter:

Sir: For the safety and protection of the people on the Smoky Hill road, I think it important that you should accompany and remain with the Indians belonging to this agency, during their stay in that country, in order that you may report to me, either in person or by letter, whatever may transpire.

Given under my hand at Fort Zarah, July 26, 1866.

J. C. Taylor,
United States Indian Agent.

A true copy:

A. Kaiser,
First Lieut. Third United States Infantry.

Fort Zarah, Kansas,
December 29, 1866.

I certify on honor, that upon receipt of the above order, I immediately proceeded to Black Kettle's camp, head chief of the southern band of Cheyenne Indians, then on the Walnut Creek, some four or five miles from this point, and continued with them until the 14th October, 1866, at which time his whole band came here expecting to receive their annuities. At the time I joined the Black Kettle camp, Roman Nose was with this band and remained with us all the time, up to the time I came here on the 14th October, 1866. I am confident that during all this time there was not any war party, great or small, from Black Kettle's camp, except one party of thirty-three, under Spotted Horse, and another party of seven young men, without any responsible head. Both parties started out on or about the 1st September, and the small party of seven remaining out only about two weeks, when they returned with one large American mule with a sore back. The party under Spotted Horse was absent until about the 1st October, 1866, when they returned, having in their possession some fourteen head of mules and ponies, got, as they alleged, on the Huerfano, in Colorado Territory. Had there been any other party out, or had they brought to their camp any other property or plunder, I think I should have known it.

During the time I was with this band of Cheyenne Indians, I visited Fort Ellsworth with eight chiefs, Black Kettle and Roman Nose among the number, and held a council with Major E. W. Wynkoop, their special agent, at which time promises were made to them that their annuities should be delivered to them at or near this point in two months; which was the reason that the Indians came here in October. I will add, in connection with this statement, that I learned from the Indians I was with that there was a camp of Sioux Indians of some twenty-four lodges, only one day's ride from Fort Wallace or Pond Creek, and I know that some of these same Sioux Indians stole, from citizens near this place, four mules and three ponies, and from the Cheyenne Indians three horses, which were followed north by Charley Bent and recovered from them.

In presence of—

J. H. Leavenworth,
Indian Agent.

A true copy:

W. G. Mitchell,
HEADQUARTERS POST OF FORT WALLACE,
December 20, 1866.

SIR: In reply to your letter of the 9th instant, (received on the 18th instant,) in regard to the circumstances of the driving away from this post of government stock by Indians, and the more recent circumstances attending the burning of Chalk Bluff Station, and the killing of two stock tenders, I have the honor to submit the following report:

With the exception of the guide now absent with Captain N. V. Sheridan, there is no one at this post cognizant of the matter in question; but on the reception of your letter, I immediately proceeded to the stations of the Overland Mail Express Company, and having hunted up all parties who were in any way acquainted with the burning of Chalk Bluff Station and the murders of the stock tenders, I can make the following statement, with complete certainty as to its accuracy: The Indians connected with the Chalk Bluff outrage were Cheyennes, as horses or ponies lost by them on that occasion and picked up by the overland stage drivers were afterward claimed and turned over to a Cheyenne chief called Bull Bear and a party of his tribe; some of this party were recognized by an escaped ranchman from Chalk Bluff as having been present at the massacre. Also from arrows found that had been shot off around the station, it was seen that they were fashioned peculiar to the Cheyenne tribe. I have the statement of one of the drivers of the Overland Mail Company's express in my possession in regard to Bull Bear claiming the ponies that his party had lost at Chalk Bluff, and I can lay hands on the arrows in case the major general commanding desires them sent forward in support of this report. As regards the driving away of the government stock at this post, it is a matter of great difficulty to gain any more authentic information than that already forwarded by my predecessor in command of this post. I have been fortunate enough, however, to get the following from a most trustworthy man, and I beg to forward it for the information of the major general commanding, as in my opinion it is a clear and convincing proof that the Cheyenne tribe have been the perpetrators of all these outrages, and these same Cheyennes to whom I saw issued rifles and ammunition at Zarah, in November last.

Trusting that this report will be found to have covered all the requirements of your letter, I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully,

W. W. KEOGH,
Captain Seventh U. S. Cavalry, Commanding Post.

Brevet Major HENRY E. NOYES,
Acting Asst Adjt Gen., District of the Upper Arkansas,
Fort Riley, Kansas.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT ZARAH, KANSAS,
December 29, 1866.

MAJOR: In compliance with the letter received this day from headquarters department of the Missouri, dated Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
December 18, 1866, I have the honor to forward herewith inclosed the statement of Captain John S. Smith, United States interpreter.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. KAISER,
First Lieutenant Third United States Infantry.

Captain HENRY ASBURY,
Brevet Major U. S. Army, Com’d’y Fort Larned, Kansas.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,

POND CREEK, KANSAS,
January 16, 1867.

SIR: I herewith submit a report relative to certain depredations committed by a small band of Indians at this post (Wallace) on the evening of 19th September, 1866.

About two o’clock of the above-mentioned date, a band of fifteen Cheyennes rode up to my house and asked permission to come in and warm; it was then snowing and quite cold for the season. After remaining about half an hour, during which time they drank some coffee and ate some cold bread, at a given signal from the head man or chief, they all left the house, mounted their ponies, and rode off in the direction of the post, some two miles distant. Some two hours after their departure I learned from a detachment of Company M Second United States Cavalry, then in pursuit, that these same Indians, Cheyennes, had run off some twenty or thirty head government mules and horses.

Now, sir, in conclusion, there is but little doubt existing in my mind but what these were all Cheyenne Indians, from the following facts: First. During their stay at my house I repeatedly asked them to what tribe they belonged; the universal response was Cheyenne. Secondly. I recognized several in the band who had passed up by here several weeks prior to this, under a somewhat noted chief, Spotted Horse, who committed several depredations on the Overland Stage Company, and made many threats, among others, giving us fifteen days to leave this road.

Most respectfully yours,

H. P. WYATT.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 17th day of January, 1867.

FRED. H. BEECHER,
Second Lieutenant Third Infantry, Post Adjutant.

FORT WALLACE, KANSAS, January 17, 1867.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT WALLACE, KANSAS, January 19, 1867.

Personally appeared before me William Comstock, guide and interpreter at this post, who makes the following statement, viz:

On the evening of the day that the stock-tenders were massacred at Chalk Bluff Station, a passenger by the coach from the East, named Hughes, a merchant of Denver City, found two arrows at the station,
one sticking in the door and the other in the ground near there, which he showed to me at Pond Creek Station, and asked my opinion to what tribe they belonged. I immediately informed him that they belonged to the Cheyenne tribe, having seen any number of arrows; and being acquainted with the manners and customs of the Cheyenne nation I could not be mistaken in the tribe of Indians to which these arrows belonged.

As regards the Indians who drove away the government stock from this post, I cannot state positively whether they were Cheyennes or Sioux, but am of opinion that they were Cheyennes, on account of they being at stations west of here the day before they had driven away the stock, and having recommendations from the Indian agent, (Doyle,) which they showed to the man in charge of Pond Creek Station.

W. COMSTOCK.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 19th day of January, 1867.

FRED. H. BEECHER,
Second Lieutenant Third Infantry, A. A. Q. M.

OFFICE OF THE KIOWA AND COMANCHE INDIANS
OF THE UPPER ARKANSAS,
Fort Lane, Kansas, January 22, 1867.

SIR: Yours of the 18th instant reached me this morning by the down mail, sending a copy of a letter signed by sundry Kiowa Indians. If the complaints hinted at by you (but of which I am totally ignorant) are of no greater magnitude than the one contained in your letter, or rather this, I do not think they can be very bitter. Herewith I inclose you papers which I will thank you to read and then return them to this agency. The Indians who have signed the letter written by John Dodge are the principal ones who raided into Texas and sold their captives, white women and children, to the military at Fort Dodge for a price, and have continued to hang around that post, or its vicinity, to sell the mules, horses, and other property stolen in Texas at the same time they killed men and women, taking captives the women and children rendered helpless by their acts. These Indians were sent for by me in October last, to meet me here at the agency, (not at a military post,) but they failed for some cause, not known fully, to meet me in council. All the Kiowa and Comanche Indians of my agency, who have or did come as requested, and showed their hands clean, and gave me full assurance that in the future their treaties would be observed, received their goods. When the others do the same they will be treated as I always try to treat the Indians-kindly. But until they do so, they and others may rest assured I shall do all my duty to the extent of my power, promptly, energetically, and with a firm determination to carry out my orders.

If the Indians of my agency have any complaints to make I should be glad to have them make them to me. I shall be most happy to attend to any and all their grievances.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. LEAVENWORTH,
U. S. Indian Agent.

Major H. DOUGLAS,
Third United States Infantry,
Commanding Fort Dodge, Kansas.

A true copy: W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
WASHINGTON, February 22, 1867.

SIR: I have to call your attention to the fact that on or about the 1st day of January last a party of Cheyenne Indians captured from one of the Kaw chiefs (Wah-ti-au-goh) forty-four horses, and wounded one man. I hope you will give your earliest attention to this subject, with the view of making the Indians return the horses or pay the Kaw Indians for them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. R. PAGE,
United States Agent for Kansas Indians.

Furnished for the information of Colonel Leavenworth, Washington.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP ON PAWNEE FORK, KANSAS,
April 15, 1867.

GENERAL: For a long time I have made the Indian character my chief study. I regard the late movements of the Cheyennes of my agency as caused by fear alone. So far as I am able to judge, they met us at first with a determination to have a peaceful talk, at such a distance from their village as would make their women and children satisfied that no danger need be apprehended by them. The movement toward the village terrified the squaws and children, who left with such movable property as they could gather. I learn that you purpose destroying the lodges and other property now remaining in the village. I would most respectfully request you not to do so, as I am fully convinced that the result would be an Indian outbreak of the most serious nature, while at the same time there is no evidence, in my judgment, that this band of Cheyennes are deserving of this severe punishment.

I am influenced alone in thus communicating with you by what I consider a strict sense of duty.

With feelings of the utmost respect, I am, general, your obedient servant,

E. W. WYNKOOP,
United States Indian Agent for Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apache Indians.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK,
Comdy Dept’ of the Missouri and Indian Expedition.

Official copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

OFFICE HOLLIDAY OVERLAND MAIL AND EXPRESS Co.,
Omaha, October 23, 1867.

SIR: Your telegram of the 18th instant, asking what Indians burned Chalk Bluff Station on the Smoky Hill route, is received. I immediately telegraphed both our agent at Leavenworth City and at Denver to send
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

you a statement of the particulars of the affair, as I had not received them myself.

I am satisfied, however, that it was done by the discontented band of Cheyennes known as the Dog Soldiers. This band consists of some two hundred and fifty to three hundred young bucks, and as it was them who killed our two employés at that station about three weeks ago, it is reasonable to presume that they are the ones who burned the station. The only particulars I have of the affair is that they told our men to take the horses out of the stable and go; that they did not want the horses nor to shed their blood. Our men do not appear to be apprehensive of trouble from any other Indians now on that route, except these "Dog Soldiers." Mr. Ben Holladay, president of our company, addressed a letter to Major General Hancock, from Denver, in regard to protection on the Smoky Hill route. I trust it was received, as the suggestions it contains would have been valuable in the distribution of troops.

We received a telegram this morning from Julesburg, on the Platte route, saying that the mules, ninety-six in number, of one of our supply trains were run off by the Indians last night twelve miles east of Fort Sedgwick. We are without any further particulars, but I presume it was Sioux Indians, from the north side of the Platte.

I have the honor to remain yours, respectfully,

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General, St. Louis, Mo.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,

FORT WALLACE, KANSAS,
December 19, 1867.

SIR: In obedience to your letter of the 9th instant, calling for a detailed report of the Chalk Bluff affair, and the evidence upon which I based my reports, I have the honor to make the following: I was first informed of this affair while en route to this post by one of the overland stage-drivers. I was at that time about two days' march from Chalk Bluff Station. Upon my arrival at that station I found it deserted. I carefully examined the station-house, and found several bullet holes and marks of arrows; while engaged in this examination the stage from the west arrived, from the driver of which I learned that a few days previous to this outrage a party of Cheyennes had been in the neighborhood of the station, and that one of the murdered men lived long enough to tell one of the drivers that the Indians who committed this outrage were from this same party. I have since learned that three ponies that were found a few days after this affair in the vicinity of Chalk Bluff by some of the employés of the Overland Mail Company were afterward claimed by a party of Cheyenne Indians. The arrows left behind by the Indians who committed this outrage have been pronounced by persons who profess to know, Cheyenne arrows. As for the burning of Chalk Bluff Station by the Cheyennes, there is no room for doubt. In a private letter written by Lieutenant Flood, Sixth United States volunteers, to Dr. Turner, United States Army, of this post, he mentioned the fact of his having spoken to Bull Bear, one of the chiefs of the Cheyenne tribe,
at Chalk Bluff Station, the very day on which the station was burned, and that this chief had about forty warriors with him.

I have since learned that in less than one hour after Lieutenant Flood left, the station was in flames. Lieutenant Flood knew Bull Bear to be a Cheyenne chief, as he, Bull Bear, had visited this post several times during the past summer, accompanied by members of his tribe. I would also state that I have been informed by persons who have been continuously over this route, between this post and Fort Hays, during the last six months, that no other tribe of Indians than the Cheyennes have been seen in the vicinity of the route.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES HALE,
First Lieutenant Third United States Infantry.

Brevet Major HENRY E. NOYES,
A. A. A. G. Dist. of the Upper Arkansas,
Fort Riley, Kansas.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT WALLACE, KANSAS,
January 19, 1867.

Personally appeared before me James Wadsworth, a driver of the Overland Mail Company's express, who makes the following statement, viz:

On the day before the massacre of the stock-tenders at Chalk Bluff Station they (the stock-tenders) told me that a party of three Indians were at the station that day. I inquired of them what Indians they were, and they informed me they were Cheyennes. From the description they gave of two of them I am positive they were two of the same party of Indians that attacked me at Monument Station. One of the attacking Indians, after we had made friends with them, told me that they were Cheyennes.

The day before the massacre I saw three ponies near Chalk Bluff Station. A Mr. Parker picked up the same ponies, which were in a few days afterward claimed and turned over to a Cheyenne chief called Bull Bear and his party. I am perfectly satisfied that the Indians who attacked me at Monument Station were Cheyennes; also the Indians who massacred the stock-tenders were of the same party. I base my statements on the description given me by the men the day before they were murdered, of two of the Indians which were at the station that day, and which, no doubt, were of the party who committed the outrage. Also on that of one of the men who escaped from Chalk Bluff, who recognized some of the party who claimed the ponies as having been present at the massacre.

JAMES WADSWORTH.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 19th day of January, 1867.

FRED. H. BEECHER,
Second Lieutenant Third Infantry, Post Adjutant.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,
Captain and A. A. A. General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, August 8, 1867.
To the ADJUTANT GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY:
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram has just been received:

To Lieutenant General SHERMAN:
Your dispatch of yesterday received, and I will comply with its requirements. Today the officer sent to wreck of railroad train reports the number of Indians not to exceed fifty, and that they came from the south. From all I can now learn they are a band of Cheyennes and Sioux from the Republican, and that Spotted Tail’s people are not implicated, except perhaps a few. Colonel Dodge, Thirtieth Infantry, will be there this morning with three companies and clear the country about there of Indians. Trains are running as usual today.

C. C. AUGUR,
Brevet Major General.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

Official copy respectfully furnished by mail.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

This is to certify that I, Captain John S. Smith, United States interpreter, have been living with the Indians on the plains for some thirty years, and that I have generally been engaged by the Department of the Interior as an interpreter.

Some time last summer (early in June) I was with Black Kettle in his village south of the Arkansas River, and during my sojourn was invited by Black Kettle to attend a council, where I learned that Indians (Dog Soldiers) had killed six men somewhere on the headwaters of the Solomon. One of the party who committed this depredation belonged to Black Kettle’s village, and he acknowledged that it was committed by Cheyennes, and gave his reasons why they did it, viz: being hungry, they attempted to go into the camp of these men, but were fired into and one of their party wounded. They then charged the camp and killed the men. I also state that on the 15th of September, 1866, a party of Cheyennes, twenty-three in number, led by Spotted Horse, being one of the Cheyenne braves or warriors, left their camp on the Smoky Hill, in the vicinity of Lookout Station. The party returned on or about the 1st of October, 1866, with fourteen head of stock, horses and mules, taken from ranches near the Huerfano, on the Upper Arkansas.

About the same time two men were killed in the neighborhood of Chalk Bluffs, said to have been killed by the sons of Powder Face, one of the leading men of the Dog Soldiers’ band.

About the 7th of November, 1866, I found on my arrival from Fort Harker at Fort Zarah that the son of Medicine Arrows, one of the principal chiefs of the Cheyennes, had killed a Mexican herder employed at that time by W. W. Bent, Indian trader at that post.

About the 1st of January, 1867, I met a party of Cheyennes from Black Kettle’s band, Charley Bent being one of the number, at Fort Zarah, on their return from an expedition against the Kaws as they re-
ported to me, and that they had killed one Kaw and wounded several, likewise capturing a number of horses and ponies, thirty or forty head, which I believe they had with them when I met them at Zarah.

JOHN S. SMITH,
United States Indian Interpreter.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, this 15th day of August, 1867.

J. B. LLOYD,
Notary Public.

A true copy:

W. G. MITCHELL,

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 17, 1867.

MAJOR: In the absence of the major general commanding, I have the honor to transmit herewith (marked H) the statement of Mr. John S. Smith, one of the inclosures to General Hancock's letter to you of the 31st ultimo, which was retained for correction when the letter was forwarded.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. G. MITCHELL,

Major GEORGE K. LEET,
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters
Army of the United States, Washington, D. C.

The information concerning the running off of the fourteen head of horses and mules by Spotted Horse's band, and the killing of the two men at Chalk Bluff mail station, is also contained in the affidavit of Mr. Smith, forwarded to you with the letter of the 31st ultimo, marked E.

Respectfully,

W. G. MITCHELL,
Capt., Aide-de-Camp.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, August 25, 1867.

To the Adjutant General U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram U. S. Army received:

Lieutenant General SHERMAN:

GENERAL: Captain Armes, Tenth Cavalry, in command, with one company of his regiment and two companies of the Eighteenth Kansas volunteers, was attacked on the 21st, at noon, on the Republican, by a large force of Indians, reported to be eight hundred or one thousand in number. They were engaged until the night of the 22d. Our troops, about one hundred and fifty in number, covering a wide space of country, were finally forced to retire, losing three men killed left on the field, and thirty-five wounded
who were brought in, with a loss of forty horses. Captain Armes reports a large number of Indians killed and wounded. Lieutenant Price, of the Eighteenth Kansas, says about one hundred and fifty.

Captain Armes with the rear guard and the wounded encamped three miles from Fort Hayes last night. Major Moore, of the Kansas cavalry, from whom I have also had a report, informs me that he, with the remainder of his battalion, and Major Elliott, of the Seventh Cavalry, with about two hundred men of that regiment, would leave this morning for the Indians.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major General.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Asst. Adjutant General.

Official copy respectfully forwarded by mail.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[By telegraph from St. Louis, Missouri,—2, 1868.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
December 2, 1868—1.30 p. m.

To General E. D. Townsend,
Assistant Adjutant General:

The following dispatch is just received and is sent for the information of the department.

This gives General Sheridan a good initiation. I understand his supply depot to be on Rabbit-Ear Creek, a little west of south from Fort Dodge, whence he can direct operations, and his very presence there will give assurance that the troops will act with energy, and that nothing will be done but what is right. The bands of Black Kettle, Little Raven, and Satanta are well known to us, and are the same that have been along the Smoky Hill the past five years, and, as General Sheridan reports, embrace the very same men who first began this war on the Saline and Solomon.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

IN THE FIELD, DEPOT ON THE NORTH CANADIAN RIVER,
AT THE JUNCTION OF BEAVER CREEK,
Indian Territory, November 29, 1868—via. Hayes.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report for the information of the Lieutenant General, the following operations of General Custer's command. On November 23d I ordered him to proceed with eleven companies of his regiment of Seventh Cavalry, in a southerly direction, toward the Antelope Hills, in search of hostile Indians.

On the 26th he struck the trail of a war party of Black Kettle's band, returning from the north, near where the eastern line of the Pan-handle of Texas crosses the main Canadian. He at once corralled his wagons and followed in pursuit over to the headwaters of the Washita; thence down that stream; and on the morning of the 27th surprised the camp of Black Kettle, and after a desperate fight, in which Black Kettle was assisted by the Arapahoes under Little Raven, and the Kiowas under Satanta, captured the entire camp—killing the chief Black Kettle, and one hundred and two Indian warriors, whose bodies were left on the field—all their stock, ammunition, arms, lodges, robes, and fifty-three
women and three children. Our loss was Major Elliott, Captain Hamilton, and nineteen enlisted men killed; Brevet Colonel Barnitz, badly wounded; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel T. W. Custer, Second Lieutenant E. J. Marsh, and eleven enlisted men, wounded.

Little Raven's band of Arapahoes, and Satanta's band of Kiowas, were encamped six miles below Black Kettle's camp.

About eight or nine hundred animals captured were shot, the balance kept for military purposes.

The highest credit is due General Custer and his command. They started in a furious snow-storm and traveled all the while in snow about twelve inches deep.

Black Kettle's and Little Raven's families are among the prisoners. It was Black Kettle's band who committed the first depredation on the Saline and Solomon Rivers, in Kansas.

The Kansas regiment has just come in. They missed the trail and had to struggle in the snow-storm, the horses suffering much in flesh and the men living on buffalo meat and other game for eight days.

We will soon have them in good condition. If we can get one or two more good blows there will be no more Indian troubles in my department.

We will be pinched in our ability to supply, and nature will present many difficulties in our winter operations, but we have stout hearts and will do our best.

Two white children were recaptured. One white woman and one boy ten years old were brutally murdered by the Indian women when the attack commenced.

P. H. SHERIDAN,

FORT COBB, INDIAN TERRITORY,
December 3, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following statement of Black Eagle, chief of the Kiowas, concerning an action that recently occurred on the Washita River, near the Antelope Hills, between a column of the United States troops and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and a small party of Kiowas and Comanche Indians.

On the night of the 25th of November a party of Kiowa Indians, returning from an expedition against the Utes, saw, on nearing Antelope Hills, on the Canadian River, a trail going south, toward the Washita. On their arrival at the Cheyenne camp they told the Cheyennes about the trail they had seen, but the Cheyennes only laughed at them. One of the Kiowas concluded to stay all night at the Cheyenne camp, and the rest of them went on to their own camps, which were but a short distance off. About daylight on the morning of the 26th of November, Black Kettle's camp of Cheyennes, containing about thirty-five lodges, was attacked by the United States troops. The Indians all fled toward some other camps of the Cheyennes, closely pursued by the troops. After the Indians had run a short distance they separated in two parties, the braves and young women who were fleet of foot taking to the right, and the old and infirm taking to the left and running into the brush, where they were soon surrounded by the soldiers. The other party of Indians, who ran to the right, (and among them was one Kiowa,) were hotly pursued by a party of eighteen
soldiers, who were all riding gray horses. They overtook and killed some Indians, when they were met by a large party of Indians who had rallied from the other camps. Here a sharp action took place, both parties fighting desperately, when one Arapaho brave rushed in, and with his own hands struck down three soldiers, when he was shot through the head and instantly killed. Here the soldiers all dismounted and tied their horses. About this time a Cheyenne brave rushed in and struck down two soldiers, when he was shot through the leg, breaking it and knocking him off his horse. The Indians then made a desperate charge and succeeded in killing the whole of the party of eighteen men.

They then rushed down to the rescue of the party that the troops had surrounded at first, but found that they were all killed or taken prisoners.

By this time the soldiers had collected together a large number of the Cheyenne horses, which they shot. The Indians then attacked the troops, who dismounted and commenced retreating slowly. The Indians also dismounted and took every advantage of cover, getting ahead of the troops and ambushing them whenever possible. They continued fighting in this way until near night, the soldiers slowly retreating until they met their wagon train, when the Indians retired.

The troops did not commence the retreat until the second day, both parties holding the battle-ground.

The Indians report having counted twenty-eight soldiers killed, and acknowledge a loss of eleven Cheyennes (men) killed, including Black Kettle. The Arapahoes had three men killed. They also had a great many women and children killed in both tribes, as well as a great many taken prisoners. One Comanche boy was badly wounded. The Kiowas report one Osage Indian killed, supposed to have been a guide for the troops.

Black Eagle says that he does not vouch for the correctness of this report, but that the above statement is just as he has heard it.

The above statement is respectfully submitted for your information.

PHILIP McCUSKY,
United States Interpreter for Kiowas and Comanches.

Colonel THOMAS MURPHY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, Atchison, Kansas.

P. S.—Since writing the above, I learn from a runner, just got in, that the Cheyenne loss is much greater than at first reported. They also report a loss of thirty-seven prisoners, probably women and children.

I forward Black Eagle’s account of the fight as a sample of fifty or more accounts, all current in camp, and all coming from Indian sources.

W. B. HAZEN,
Brevet Major General.

Official:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT COBB, December 7, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I now thoroughly agree with you, that there should be hostile movements from this point. I think I have succeeded
in gaining, to a great degree, the confidence of all the Indians down here, and they have been given to understand, from the first, that this is to be a point where everything shall be at peace, and where the hostile ones even can come and find peace and friends when the war shall cease. They have sent me word from the hostile camps to fear nothing from them; that they understand my mission here; were pleased with the talk I sent them by Black Kettle, although he was killed the night after his return; and that they will neither molest my animals nor the peaceful people gathered here.

The Kiowas are all (or nearly all) coming in, and my confidence that but a few irresponsible men have been near the Arapahoes and Cheyennes is increasing. I am taking measures to have a responsible trader with them, who will know positively all their movements.

Very respectfully,

W. B. HAZEN.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN INDIAN DISTRICT,
Fort Cobb, December 7, 1868.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.:

Colonel A. G. Boone, agent of Kiowas and Comanches, is at Arbuckle, without any of his annuities.

I have recommended that he do not come among his people without them, so many promises having already been made about these goods, and not carried out. He writes me that he has no knowledge of their having been forwarded from Lawrence at all. It is very important that these goods be on the spot and issued. If they are still in Kansas they ought to come at once by the mouth of the Little Arkansas.

Very respectfully,

W. B. HAZEN,
Brevet Major General.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN INDIAN DISTRICT,
Fort Cobb, Indian Territory, December 7, 1868.

Lieutenant General W. T. SHERMAN, U. S. Army:

Since my last report there has been some changes in positions of Indians. I inclose a copy of Captain Alvord's report, covering nearly everything. This is the officer who has assisted me, and now under department orders continues to gather the same line of information, which I find equally useful to myself and the department commander. The fight before reported has assisted me more than anything in learning the status of the people. About half the Kiowas under Satanta go with the hostile party, while the remainder, under Black Eagle, remain here,
or rather about twenty miles up the Washita, promising to come this way as the grass is eaten by their horses. I have never had faith in Satanta, and if he finally gets a drubbing with the rest, it will be better for everybody. I think by large presents of sugar and coffee he might have been bought for peace, but not for a valuable or lasting one. Black Eagle is probably sincere, and when he moves close in, as he promises to do, and I can keep them from communicating with the outside bands, about all will have been done that can be hoped for till the military power has done its work thoroughly. The prevailing sentiment of the people who have gone out to the hostile camp is no doubt warlike, and although they profess passive peace, will likely be found in the next fight. I am more strongly of the opinion than ever that General Sheridan should do his work thoroughly this winter, and that it will then be lasting. If he could throw a sub-depot of supplies directly south of the Antelope Hills, operating from there with cavalry without wagons, by quickly succeeding expeditions, there can be little doubt of the result. To suppose the late battle decisive, and cease offensive operations, would be very unfortunate. The Indians are now as below:

A, B, and C, Washitas and affiliated bands, 970.
F and D, Comanches, 1,500.
G, Kiowas and Apaches, about 1,400.

At H are the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, about one-third of the Kiowas, and Mo-a-cou's band of the Comanches, with a few others, probably in all about four hundred warriors. The Qua-ho-dahs or Staked Plains Onas are still on the Pecos. A Kiowa post, in from their camp, reports Satanta not gone; that four inferior chiefs, with about one-third of the Kiowas, having been stampeded by the battle, and would probably all come back and all come in. I find the Indians very sensational, and the exact facts are hard to get at. I am well satisfied with what I have already accomplished, and can now send to Big Mouth, (Arapaho,) who was in with Black Kettle, that he can now come in with his immediate family or band, some twenty lodges, and remain at peace, without the fear of making a boarding-house for the winter, only to turn out fighters for the summer. The Kiowas all say and repeat that one Beat, a half-breed guide with the troops, in communicating with the Indians, told them (the Kiowas) that this (Cobb) was only a trap to get them together, when they would be made prisoners and dealt with in bad faith. This is
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

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Part of the advice given them by John Smith, another Indian man. The influence of the men is always bad.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. B. HAZEN,
Brevet Major General.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Summary of information regarding hostile Indians.—Semi-weekly report No. 5.

CAMP AT OLD FORT COBB, INDIAN TERRITORY,
Monday, December 7, 1868.

The action on the 27th of November, near the Antelope Hills, seems to have caused the line between the friendly and hostile Indians now in this territory to be distinctly drawn. There has been no doubt as to the status of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and the Quahade Comanches went westward out of reach some time ago, so that they have not been communicated with by General Hazen. But the Kiowas and Apaches, the Costcheteghta Comanches, and smaller bands, while professing the greatest friendship and frequently visiting this place, have kept their camps well up the Washita, and were, until the recent engagement, really "on the fence." Besides the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, a small band of Quahade Kiowas and a few Costcheteghka Comanches undoubtedly participated in the fight, one of the latter being killed. Other Kiowas, chiefs among them, admit that they at least lent the moral influence of their presence during the latter part of the action, and probably acted with the hostile tribes. The latter supposition appears substantiated by the fact that when the fighting ceased, and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes breaking camp on the Washita moved south, Satanta, Sitank, and Timbered Mountain, with a full half of the Kiowas, joined and accompanied them. The death of one of his young warriors decided, Ma-o-wi and his band, the Costcheteghkas, also moved their camp southward from the Washita. A small band of the Comanches, called the Tea-chatz-kennas, (Sewers,) Sie-nad-aker, chief, and a very few of the most wandering of the Noconees, (Wanderers,) who have been with Ma-o-wi's people during the summer, accompanied his band. On Monday, November 30, all these Indians moving south established their camps near together on the North Fork of the Red River, at the mouth of Sweetwater Creek, a point nearly south from Antelope Hills. Tuesday, December 1, a grand council of all the chiefs and head-men of the Indians in the vicinity was held at that place. Kicking Bird and Little Heart, Kiowa chiefs, not of the disaffected half, but who witnessed the fight, visited the hostile camp apparently from curiosity, and were present at the council referred to. By those two, at the request of the principal hostile chiefs, the "talk" of that council was transmitted to Lone Wolf, Black Eagle, and the other Kiowas remaining on the Washita in a friendly attitude. The voice of the council was in substance as follows:

Toward the remaining half of the Kiowas, the Apaches, the Comanches in this vicinity, the Wichitas, Caddos, Chickasaws, &c., and the white people, soldiers included, as well as toward all people south of them, the hostile Indians entertain still only friendly feelings, and while the friendship will not be so close as to lead them to expect any of the
substantial benefits received by the Indians hereabout, or to induce them
to move their camps this way, all people to the east and south of them
need have no fears of being molested or in any way disturbed by them,
unless those people take the initiative in the hostilities. But against
all the people of the west and north, the Navajoes, Utes, and Osages, as
well as the soldiers, they will continue to wage war to the last extremity.
So far, they feel the contest to be about equal, but they are determined
to soon make a balance in their favor. They feel themselves secure in
their present position and not in need of re-enforcements. They advise
the Indians still quietly encamped in this vicinity to preserve their
friendly relations with all, and especially to do nothing to cut themselves
off from the benefits of those relations; and they suggest that as their
position of hostility toward the people north, will cut them off from all
supplies from the government during the winter, so that they will need
sundry articles, of which the Indians here will receive an abundance, the
latter will exhibit a proper appreciation of their friendship by sending to
them such surplus stores and goods as they may have. Black Eagle was
requested to come in here with Kicking Bird and Little Heart to commu-
nicate that portion of the above affecting the troops and the friendly
Indians in the immediate vicinity. They are expected here to-morrow.
Ma-o-wi spoke at the council. He said that although early in the fall he
had intended to bring his people here, when sent for, he felt misgivings as
to the sincerity of the messages he received, and as to the status of his
band as the season advanced, and that now, although he remained fond of
his white brothers and would not go on the war path against them, he had
concluded to remain on the prairie until spring at least. This disappoints
some firm friends to Ma-o-wi who are here; they assert that his followers,
the Costchetegkhas, will not join the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in offen-
sive operations, but may be considered their allies in defending their
homes.

Black Eagle and Lone Wolf sent word that they feel better since
hearing this talk from the hostile camp. They assure General Hazen
that they will hold fast to him, and will continue to control the half of
the Kiowas still on the Washita. One of Black Eagle’s men happened
to be at Black Kettle’s camp at the time of the attack, but escaped and
came to his own lodge very destitute. Black Eagle refitted him entirely,
and loading him with presents, sent him to the hostile camp. By him
he sent word that he was pleased with the talk brought to him, and that
he would remain on the Washita and use all his influence to prevent
hostile operations toward them, so long as they would not move this way
to molest any one, and not to go to Texas, thereby bringing trouble upon
his people. Black Eagle hopes that when this “good talk” reaches the
Sweetwater camps the seceding Kiowas will rejoin the friendly party.

At the same time that the hostile camp was established on the North
Red and Sweetwater, the friendly Kiowas, Apache, and the Tanewa
Comanches moved down the Washita, and are now located on the north
side of that stream, at the mouth of a small creek, half a day’s ride from
this place. These two camps of Indians are the only ones now known
to be west of the place and east of the Staked Plains. Beyond the camp
of the friendly Kiowas, &c., the valley of the Washita is not occupied
by any Indians.

The mouth of Sweetwater Creek, on the North Fork of Red River, was,
on the morning of Wednesday, December 2, the center of a congregation
of camps, estimated as follows: One hundred and eighty lodges of Arapa-
hoes, one hundred and fifty lodges of Cheyennes, eighty lodges of Kiowas,
and seventy-five lodges of Comanches, most Costchetegkas—about four
hundred and seventy-five lodges. The fighting men of the various camps were mostly at home at that time, averaging very nearly one to each lodge.

The latest accounts of the fight by eye-witnesses and persons who have been over the field since confirm the reports heretofore rendered. The camp surprised was that of Black Kettle, Cheyenne chief, rather isolated, and of about thirty lodges. The bodies of twenty-nine soldiers (including three officers) and one Osage Indian were found dead upon the field. The Indians lost five chiefs and distinguished braves, Black Kettle among them, and about seventy-five of their ordinary fighting men were killed. Thirty-seven Cheyenne boys, women, and girls are missing, supposed to have been taken prisoners.

The last heard of the troops they had crossed to the north side of the Canadian, followed only by two well-known braves of the Cheyennes, whose relatives were among the missing, and who announced their determination of rescuing their people or dying in the attempt.

Respectfully forwarded in accordance with orders from the commanding officer, district Indian Territory, based upon instructions from headquarters department of the Missouri, in the field, dated Fort Hays, Kansas, October 28, 1868.

HENRY E. ALVORD,
Captain Tenth Reg't Can., A. A. I. G., District I. T.

Respectfully forwarded to Lieutenant General Sherman for his information.

W. B. HAZEN,
Brevet Major General.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Cobb, Indian Territory, December 19, 1868.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Lieutenant General, my arrival at this place yesterday evening, with the command of Brevet Major General George A. Custer, composed of the Seventh Cavalry, and ten companies of the Nineteenth Kansas, the Osage and Kaw scouts, numbering in all about fifteen hundred.

We crossed the North Canadian from Camp Supply, proceeding in a southerly direction across the main Canadian, striking the Washita about eight miles south of Custer's battle-ground, and distant from Fort Cobb one hundred and thirteen miles.

Here we rested one day, and searched for the body of Major Elliott, which we found, and sixteen soldiers killed in the battle. They followed in pursuit of some fleeing Indians, and warriors coming up from the river below surrounded them in large numbers and killed them and mutilated them in the most horrible manner. We also found the bodies of Mrs. Blinn and her child in one of the camps about six miles down the river; Mrs. Blinn shot through the forehead, and the child with its head crushed by a blow against a tree.

All the Indians heretofore enumerated were encamped from a point about three miles below the battle-ground for a distance of about six or
eight miles. They abandoned their camps and fled in the greatest consternation, leaving their cooking utensils, mats, axes, lodge-poles, and provisions. As much of this property as we could spare time to destroy was burned.

We then took up the trail of the Indians, and followed it down the Washita for a distance of seventy-six miles, and thirty-six from Fort Cobb, when we came near the camp of the Kiowas, who were unconscious of our presence, but discovered it late in the evening, and hastened to Fort Cobb, and next morning presented a letter from General Hazen, declaring them friendly. I hesitated to attack them, but directed them to proceed with their families to Fort Cobb. This they assented to, and nearly all the warriors came over, and accompanied the column for the purpose of deceiving me while their families were being hurried toward the Wichita Mountains; but suspecting that they were attempting to deceive me, as they commenced slipping away one by one, I arrested the head chiefs, Lone Wolf and Satanta, and on my arrival at Fort Cobb, as I suspected, there was not a Kiowa; so I notified Lone Wolf and Satanta that I would hang them to-morrow if their families were not brought in to-day, and I will do so. They have been engaged in the war all the time, and have been playing fast and loose; there are over fifty lodges with the Cheyennes now. They have attempted to browbeat General Hazen since he came here, and went out and ordered the two companies from Arbuckle for protection of General Hazen to return. I will take some of the starch out of them before I get through with them.

The Cheyennes, Arapahoes, one band of Comanches, and the fifty lodges of the Kiowas, are at the western base of the Wichita Mountains. The following is what I propose to do, and I have submitted it to General Hazen, who approves: I will first punish the Kiowas if they come in; if not, I will hang Lone Wolf and Satanta. I will send out Black Kettle's sister to-morrow, ordering the Cheyennes and Arapahoes to come in and receive their punishment, which will be severe. She says they will come in, as they are now willing to beg for peace, and have done so already since Custer's fight. If they do not come in I will employ the Caddoes, the Wichitas, and Asahabetes's band of Comanches against them with my own forces, and will compel the other Comanches to go out against them, or I will declare them hostile. They have all been working together, as one man, encamping together and holding intercourse and trading in captured stock, and they must assist in driving them out of the country or compel their surrender. I will then leave a sufficient force with General Hazen to keep him from being brow-beaten; he is helpless as he is.

The Comanches are now under my thumb, and the Kiowas will be, I hope, and I hope that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes may soon be in the same condition. In the trip down here, the distance was one hundred and eighty-seven miles; snow was on the ground most of the way, and the cold on the high table-lands and the crossings of the rivers was intense. The country traveled over was terrible; the surface of the earth was defaced by cactus, hummocks, scooped-out basins, making constant labor for the men. I lost some horses, but in this beautiful valley, with splendid grass, will soon have the command in good trim. The Indians, for the first time, begin to realize that winter will not compel us to make a truce with them. I am a little sorry I did not hit the Kiowas, but I did not like to disregard General Hazen's letter, and perhaps we can do as well by other modes. Only two men are sick in the Seventh Cavalry, and six in the Nineteenth Kansas. The whole com-
mand is in shelter-tents, as we could not spare transportation for others, but the men now prefer the "shelter" even at this season of the year. Everybody is feeling well and enthusiastic.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, St. Louis, Missouri.

Official copy respectfully furnished for the information of the Adjutant General of the Army.

By order of Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman.

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS TROOPS OPERATING SOUTH OF THE ARKANSAS, IN THE FIELD,
Indian Territory, December 22, 1868.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command, from the 7th instant up to the present date:

Acting under the instructions of the major general commanding the department, who, though not exercising command of the troops, accompanied the expedition, I moved from the supply depot on Beaver Creek on the morning of the 7th instant. The expedition was composed of eleven companies of the Seventh United States Cavalry, ten companies of the Nineteenth Kansas volunteer cavalry, Colonel S. J. Crawford, commanding a detachment of scouts under Lieutenant Pepoon, Tenth Cavalry, and twenty or thirty whites, Osage and Kaw Indians, as guides and trailers. I aimed by a new route to strike the Washita below and near to the scene of the late battle between the Seventh Cavalry and the combined bands of the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Sioux, Apaches, and Comanches. On the evening of the 10th my command reached camp, on the Washita, six miles below the battle-ground. A halt of one day was made at this point to rest and graze the animals, and to afford an opportunity of visiting the battle-field to learn, if possible, the exact fate of Major Elliott and his party of seventeen men, who, on the opening of the attack on Black Kettle's village, had pursued a party of fleeing Indians beyond our lines, and had never returned. So confident was I of their fate, however, that in my official report of the battle I numbered them in my list of killed. With one hundred men of the Seventh Cavalry, under command of Captain Yates, I proceeded to the battle-field early on the morning of the 11th. Indians had evidently paid a hurried visit to the scene of the late conflict.

The bodies of nearly all the warriors killed in the fight had been concealed or removed; while those of the squaws and children, who had been slain in the excitement and confusion of the first charge, as well as in self-defence, were wrapped in blankets, and bound with lariats preparatory to removal and burial. Many of the Indian dogs were still found in the vicinity lately occupied by the lodges of their owners; they probably subsisting on the bodies of the ponies that had been killed, and then covered several acres of ground near by. As ten days had elapsed since the battle, and scores of Indian bodies still remained unburied or unconcealed, some idea may be had of the precipitate haste with which the Indians had abandoned that section of country.
A thorough examination of the immediate battle-ground failed to discover anything worthy of special report, except that the Indian bodies were found which had not previously been reported in my first dispatch, and which went to prove, what we are all well aware of now, that the enemy's loss in killed warriors far exceeded the number (one hundred and three) first reported by me.

In setting out upon our return to camp, Captain Yates was directed to deploy his men in search of the bodies of Major Elliott and his party. After marching a distance of two miles in the direction in which Major Elliott and his little party were last seen, we suddenly came upon the stark, stiff, naked, and horribly mutilated bodies of our dead comrades! No words were needed to tell how desperate the struggle which ensued before they were finally overpowered.

At a short distance here and there from the spot where the bodies lay could be seen the carcasses of some of the horses of the party, which had been probably killed early in the fight. Seeing the hopelessness of breaking through the lines which surrounded them, and which undoubtedly numbered more than one hundred to one, Elliott dismounted his men, tied their horses together, and prepared to sell their lives as dearly as possible. It may not be improper to add that, in describing as far as possible the details of Elliott's fight, I rely not only upon a critical and personal examination of the ground and attendant circumstances, but am sustained by the statements of Indian chiefs and warriors who witnessed and participated in the fight, and who have since been forced to enter our lines and surrender themselves up, under circumstances which will be made to appear in other portions of this report.

The bodies of Elliott and his little band, with but a single exception, were all found lying within a circle not exceeding twenty yards in diameter. We found them exactly as they fell, except that their barbarous foes had stripped and mutilated the bodies in the most savage manner.

All the bodies were carried to camp, and there (reached after dark, it being the intention to resume the march before daylight the following day) a grave was hastily prepared on a little knoll, near our camp, and with the exception of that of Major Elliott, whose remains were carried with us for interment at Fort Arbuckle, the bodies of the entire party, under the dim light of a few torches held in the hands of sorrowing comrades, were consigned to one common resting-place. No funeral note sounded to make their passage to the grave; no volley was fired to tell us a comrade was receiving the last sad rites of burial; yet not one of the living but felt that the fresh earth had closed over some of their truest and most daring soldiers.

Before interment I caused a complete examination of each body to be made by Dr. Lippincott, chief medical officer of the expedition, with directions to report on the character and number of wounds received by each, as well as to mutilations to which they have been subjected. The following extracts are taken from Dr. Lippincott's report:

**Major Joel H. Elliott:** Two bullet holes in head; one in left cheek; right hand cut off; left foot almost cut off; deep gash in right groin; deep gashes in calves of both legs; little finger of left hand cut off, and throat cut.

**Sergeant Major Walter Kennedy:** Bullet hole in right temple; head partly cut off; seventeen bullet holes in back, and two in legs.

**Corporal Harry Mercer, Troop E:** Bullet hole in right axilla, one in region of heart, three in back; eight arrow wounds in back; right ear cut off; head scalped, and skull fractured; deep gashes in both legs, and throat cut.

**Private Thomas Christie, Troop E:** Bullet hole in head; right foot cut off; bullet hole in abdomen, and throat cut.

**Corporal William Carrick, Troop H:** Bullet hole in right parietal bone; both feet cut off; throat cut; left arm broken.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Private Eugene Clover, Troop H: Head cut off; arrow wound in right side; both legs terribly mutilated.

Private William Milligan, Troop H: Bullet hole in left side of head; deep gashes in right leg; left arm deeply gashed; head scalped, and throat cut.

Corporal James F. Williams, Troop I: Bullet hole in back; head and both arms cut off; many and deep gashes in back. *

Private Thomas Dooney, Troop I: Arrow hole in region of stomach; throat cut open; head cut off, and right shoulder cut by a tomahawk.

Carrier Thomas Fitzpatrick, Troop M: Scalped; Two arrow and several bullet holes in back; deep gashes in face; throat cut.

Private Carsten D. J. Meyers, Troop M: Several bullet holes in head; scalped; nineteen bullet holes in body; * * * throat cut.

Private Cal. Sharp, Troop M: Two bullet holes in right side; throat cut; one bullet hole in left side of head; one arrow hole in left side; * * * left arm broken.

Unknown: Head cut off; body partially destroyed by wolves.

Unknown: Head and right hand cut off; three bullet holes and nine arrow holes in back. *

Unknown: Scalped; skull fractured; six bullet and thirteen arrow holes in back, three bullet holes in chest.

In addition to the wounds and barbarities reported by Dr. Lippincott, I saw a portion of the stock of a Lancaster rifle protruding from the side of one of the men; the stock had been broken off near the barrel, and the butt of it, probably twelve inches in length, had been driven into the man's side a distance of eight inches.

The forest along the banks of the Washita from the battle-ground to a distance of twelve miles was found to have been one continuous Indian village.

Black Kettle's band being above, then came other hostile tribes, camped in the following order: Arapahoes under Little Raven, Kiowas under Satanta and Lone Wolf, and the remaining bands of Cheyennes, Comanches, and Apaches. Nothing could exceed the disorder and haste with which these tribes had fled from their camping grounds. They had abandoned thousands of lodge poles, some of which were still standing as when last used; immense numbers of camp kettles, cooking utensils, coffee-mills, axes, and several hundred buffalo robes were found in the abandoned camps adjacent to that of Black Kettle's village, but which had not been visited before by our troops.

By actual examination and estimate it was computed that over six hundred lodges had been standing along the Washita during the battle and within five miles of the battle-ground; and it was from these villages, and others still lower down the stream, that the immense number of warriors came, who, after my route and destruction of Black Kettle and his band, surrounded my command, and fought until defeated by the Seventh Cavalry, about 3 p. m., on the 27th ultimo. It is safe to say that the warriors from these tribes that attempted the relief of Black Kettle and his band outnumbered my force at least three to one. On returning from the battle-ground to the camp of my command, and when in the deserted camp, which, according to the statement of some of my Cheyenne prisoners who were brought along with me, was lately occupied by Satanta with the Kiowas, my men discovered the bodies of a young white woman and child, the former apparently about twenty-three years of age, and the latter probably eighteen months old. They were evidently mother and child and had not long been in captivity, as the woman still retained several articles of her wardrobe about her person; among others a pair of cloth gaiters but little worn; everything indicated that she had been but recently captured, and upon our attacking and routing Black Kettle's camp, her captors, fearing she might be recaptured by us, and her testimony used against them, had deliberately murdered her and her child in cold blood.
The woman had received a shot in the forehead, her entire scalp was removed and her skull horribly crushed. The child also bore numerous marks of violence.

At daylight on the following morning the entire command started on the trail of the Indian villages, nearly all of which had moved down the Washita toward Fort Cobb, where they had reason to believe they would receive protection. The Arapahoes and remaining band of Cheyennes left the Washita valley and moved across in the direction of Red River. After following the trail of the Kiowas and other hostile Indians for seven days, over an almost impassable country, where it was necessary to keep two or three hundred men almost constantly at work with picks, axes, and spades before being able to advance with our train, my Osage scouts, on the morning of the 17th, reported a party of Indians in our front bearing a flag of truce. At the same time a scout came from the same direction, stating that he was from Fort Cobb, and delivered to me a dispatch, which read as follows:

**Headquarters Southern Indian District, Fort Cobb, December 16, 1868—9 p. m.**

To the Commanding Officer Troops in the field:

Indians have just brought in word that our troops to-day reached the Washita, some twenty miles above here. I send this to say that all the camps this side of the point reported to have been reached are friendly, and have not been on the war path this season. If this reaches you, it would be well to communicate with Satanta or Black Eagle, chiefs of the Kiowas, near where now you are, who will readily inform you of the position of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, also of my camp.

Respectfully,

W. B. Hazen,
Brevet Major General.

The scout at the same time informed me that a large party of Kiowa warriors, under Lone Wolf, Satanta, and other leading chiefs, were within less than a mile of my advance, and notwithstanding the above certificate regarding their friendly character, had seized a scout who accompanied the bearer of the dispatch, disarmed him, and held him a prisoner of war. Taking a small party with me, I proceeded beyond our lines to meet the flag of truce. I was met by several of the leading chiefs of the Kiowas; including those above named.

Large parties of their warriors could be seen posted in the neighboring ravines and upon the surrounding hill-tops. All were painted and plumed for war, and nearly all were armed with one rifle, two revolvers, bow and arrow, and lance. Their bows were strung. Their whole appearance and conduct plainly indicated that they had come for war. Their declaration to some of my guides and friendly Indians proved the same thing, and they were only deterred from hostile acts by discovering our strength to be far greater than they had imagined, and our scouts on the alert. Some twenty of the principal chiefs of the Kiowas, Apaches, and Comanches then approached and proposed to accompany us to Fort Cobb, the Kiowas assuring me that their village was already near that point and moving in to the post. Yet at the time these chiefs were giving me these assurances, their entire village, with the exception of the war party which accompanied them, was hastening away toward the Washita Mountains with no intention of proceeding to Fort Cobb, and the proposition of the chiefs to accompany my column was intended as a mere ruse to cover the escape of the village. On reaching camp I gave rations to the entire party of chiefs and warriors who accompanied my column, intending to do no act that might be con
strued as unfriendly. They all promised to proceed to Fort Cobb with us the following day, except two or three, who were to rejoin the village and conduct it to the fort; but upon resuming the march the next morning it was found that but three Kiowas and two Apache chiefs remained; the rest had taken their departure.

Before proceeding far, the few who remained intimated their intention and desire to proceed to their village and change their horses, as well as to give directions about the movement of the former to Fort Cobb. This they repeated several times along the line of march. I finally permitted the Kiowa chief lowest in rank to set out for his village, with the distinct understanding that it was for the purpose of hastening the march of his people to Fort Cobb. They were then represented as being within less than ten miles of the post. I then placed Lone Wolf and Satanta, the head chiefs of the Kiowas, and two head chiefs of the Apaches, under guard, determined to hold them as hostages for the faithful fulfillment of the promise which they and their people had been under for several months, and which was one of the stipulations of the last treaty made with them.

At the same time I knew it was the intention of the department commander to assemble all the hostile tribes in the vicinity of Fort Cobb, by force, if necessary, in order that they might learn the decision of the government regarding past offenses, and the treatment they might expect in future. The communication received through scouts from Brevet Major General Hazen, United States Army, superintendent of the Southern Indian agency, in which it was stated that “all the camps this side of the point reported to have been reached are friendly, and have not been on the war path this season,” occasioned no little surprise upon the part of those who knew the hostile character of the Indians referred to. We had followed day by day the trail of the Kiowas and other tribes, leading us directly from the dead bodies of our comrades, slain by them, within the past few days, until we overtook them about forty miles from Fort Cobb. This of itself was conclusive evidence of the character of the tribes we were dealing with; but aside from these incontrovertible facts, had we needed additional evidence of the openly hostile conduct of the Kiowas and Comanches, and of their active participation in the late battle of the Washita, we have only to rely on the collected testimony of Black Eagle and other leading chiefs. This testimony is now written, and in the hands of the agents of the Indian Bureau. It was given voluntarily by the Indian chiefs referred to, and was taken down at the time by the Indian agents, not for the army, or with a view of furnishing it to officers of the army, but simply for the benefit and information of the Indian Bureau. This testimony, making due allowance for the concealment of much that would be prejudicial to the interests of the Indians, plainly states that the Kiowas and Comanches took part in the battle of the Washita; that the former constituted a portion of the war party whose trail I followed with my command into Black Kettle’s village, and that some of the Kiowas remained in Black Kettle’s village until the morning of the battle.

This evidence is all contained in a report made to one Thomas Murphy, superintendent of Indian affairs, by Philip McCusker, United States interpreter for Kiowas and Comanches. This report is dated Fort Cobb, December 3, while the communication from General Hazen, vouching for the peaceable character of the Kiowas and other tribes, is dated at the same place thirteen days later. It cannot be explained by supposing General Hazen ignorant of the information contained in the report, as I obtained
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a copy of the report from him. It only proves what the Indian Bureau regards as "friendly" Indians.

In addition to all the above evidence and facts, a personal conversation with Lone Wolf, Satanta, Black Eagle, and other prominent chiefs, convinces me, even had we no other information to rely upon, that a large number of Kiowas, led by Kicking Bird and other Kiowa chiefs, voluntarily participated in the battle of the Washita, and that they formed a considerable portion of the hundreds who surrounded and killed Major Elliott and his party. The horse ridden by one of my men who was killed in that battle has since been recognized in the hands of a Kiowa. All this testimony is more than confirmed by the statements of a very intelligent Cheyenne squaw, sister of Black Kettle, who is among my prisoners, and who, on account of her intelligence and character, I dispatched a few days ago as bearer of a message to the hostile Cheyennes. She pointed out to me, when in the vicinity of the late battle ground, the location of Satanta's village at the time of the battle. She, as well as others of my prisoners, are confident as well as positive that Satanta and his tribe were there, and that they participated in the engagement. It was from her, too, that I learned that it was in Satanta's village that the bodies of the white woman and child were found. I have not intimated to Lone Wolf or Satanta that all this evidence is in our possession, nor do I propose doing so until the last Kiowa has come in.

Soon after reaching this point it became evident that these chiefs were attempting their usual game of duplicity and falsehood. Under the pretense that their village was coming to this post to renew friendly relations with the government, they visited my headquarters and professed the most peaceable intentions.

It was only after receiving information that their village was attempting to escape to the mountains it was deemed necessary to resort to summary measures to compel these refractory chiefs to fulfill their promise. They were placed under a strong guard the moment we reached this point. Even this failed to produce the desired effect. All evidence went to show that their village was still moving further away. Then it was that I announced to Lone Wolf and Satanta the decision which had been arrived at regarding them. I gave them until sunrise the following morning to cause their people to come in, or to give satisfactory evidence that they were hastening to come in. If no such evidence appeared, both these chiefs were to be hung at sunrise to the nearest tree. At the same time I afforded them every facility to send runners and communicate their desires to their tribe. This produced the desired effect. By sunrise several of the leading Kiowas came to my camp and reported the entire village on the move, hastening to place themselves under our control.

At this date I have the satisfaction to report that all the Apaches, nearly all of the Comanches, and the principal chiefs and bands of the Kiowas, have come in and placed themselves under our control; not to make a treaty and propose terms of settlement, but begging us to pronounce the terms upon which they can be allowed to resume peaceful relations with the government.

Of the five tribes which were hostile at the opening of this campaign three were already in our power, being virtually prisoners of war.

The remaining two, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, were the principal sufferers in the battle of the Washita, and are no doubt the most anxious of all to abandon the war-path. They are supposed to be concealed in the mountains forty or fifty miles from this point, awaiting the result of the present negotiations with the three tribes now assembled here.
On the 20th instant I sent one of my prisoners, (a Cheyenne squaw, sister of Black Kettle,) and a leading Apache chief, as bearers of a message to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes.

As in the case of the tribes now here, no promise or inducement has been held out. I have made no pretence to be friendly disposed. Whatever I have asked the tribes to do, or accede to, has been in the form of a demand.

They have from the commencement of this campaign been treated, not as independent nations, but as refractory subjects of a common government.

I have every reason to believe that within a few days, or weeks at furthest, the two remaining hostile tribes, Cheyennes and Arapahoes, smarting under their heavy losses in the battle of Washita, will unconditionally come in and place themselves under the control of this command, willing to accede to any terms that may be proposed to them. The tribes now here have discarded the arrogant ideas, in the indulgence of which the numerous treaties recently entered into have encouraged them. They now seem to realize that the government, and not a few thieving, treacherous chiefs of predatory bands of savages, backed up and encouraged by unprincipled and designing Indian agents, is the source of all authority.

The chiefs now here have repeatedly informed me that they no longer claim the right to propose terms regarding the future course of the government toward them, but are not only ready but anxious to accede to any rule marked down for their control and guidance.

The above, I believe, contains a brief statement of the operations of this command, and the results thereof, up to this date. Everything indicates a speedy, satisfactory, and permanent solution of the Indian difficulties, so far as the tribes referred to are concerned.

It is not proposed that they be permitted to resume peaceful relations with the government until proper atonement be made for past offenses, and sufficient guarantee for future good conduct be given.

I take pleasure in adding that, although I am in command of the forces composing this expedition, the major general commanding the department has accompanied it in person; and all negotiations and official action on my part regarding the Indian question has been in accordance with his previously expressed desire, or has received his subsequent approval. In relation to the battle of the Washita, I find, by taking the admissions of the Indians who are now here, and who participated in the battle, that the enemy's loss far exceeded that reported by me in my first dispatch concerning the fight.

I reported one hundred and three warriors left dead in our possession. The Indians admit a loss of one hundred and forty killed, besides a heavy loss in wounded. This, with the prisoners we have in our possession, makes the entire loss of the Indians, in killed, wounded, and missing, not far from three hundred. The report of the Indians regarding their heavy losses is confirmed by the fact that on the march, and when revisiting the battle-ground, we found dead Indians six miles from the scene of the battle, where they had probably crawled and died after receiving their wounds. Those, of course, were not reported in my first dispatch. The leading chiefs now here admit that the Indians have never suffered so overwhelming a defeat, with such terrible losses.

Upon referring to the terms of the treaty defining the limits of the reservation upon which these hostile tribes were to locate themselves, and upon which they were to remain, it is found that the battle of the
Washita took place nearly one hundred miles outside the limits of the reservation.

Respectfully submitted.

G. A. CUSTER,
Brevet Major General U. S. A., Commanding Expedition.
Brevet Lieut. Col. J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
A. A. A. General, Department of the Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Illinois, March 18, 1870.

Official copy:
J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Copy of order in relation to the treatment of the Cheyenne prisoners.

[Special Field Order No. 64.—Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Depot on the North Canadian River,
At the junction of Beaver Creek, I. T., December 6, 1868.

10. Brevet Major Henry Inman, assistant quartermaster United States Army, will assume charge of all Indian prisoners now at this point, and take them to Fort Dodge, Kansas, by first wagon train, turning them over to the commanding officer of that post, who will give receipts for them.

11. Brevet Major Andrew Sheridan, captain Third Infantry, commanding Fort Dodge, will send to Fort Hays, under care of an officer, with sufficient guard, all Indian prisoners turned over to him by Major Inman.

The commanding officer at Fort Hays will receipt to Major Sheridan for these prisoners, and will retain them at his post, giving them proper attention, rations, and medical care, and take such precautions as will prevent, beyond question, the escape of all or any one of them.

By command of Major General Sheridan:
J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,

Official copy:
J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.


HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY,
In the Field, on Washita River, November 28, 1868.

GENERAL: On the morning of the 26th instant this command, comprising eleven troops of the Seventh Cavalry, struck a trail of an Indian
war-party numbering about one hundred warriors. The trail was not quite twenty-four hours old, and was first discovered near the point where the Texas boundary line crosses the Canadian River. The direction was toward the southeast; the ground being covered by over twelve inches of snow, no difficulty was to be experienced in following the trail. A rigorous pursuit was at once instituted; wagons, tents, and all other impediments to a rapid march were abandoned. From daylight until 9 o'clock at night the pursuit was unchecked; horses and men were then allowed one hour for refreshment, and at 10 p.m. the march was resumed and continued until 1:30 a.m., when our Osage trailers reported a village within less than a mile from our advance. The column was countermarched and withdrawn to a retired point to prevent discovery.

After reconnoitering, with all the officers of the command, the location of the village, which was situated in a strip of heavy timber, I divided the command into four columns of nearly equal strength. The first, consisting of three companies under Major Elliott, was to attack in the timber from before the village. The second column, under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Meyers, was to move down the Washita and attack in the timber from above. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, in command of the third column, was to attack from the crest, north of the village; while the fourth column was to charge the village from the crest overlooking it on the left bank of the Washita. The hour at which the four columns were to charge simultaneously was the first dawn of day, and notwithstanding the fact that two of the columns were compelled to march several miles to reach their positions, three of them made the assault so near together as to make it appear like one charge; the other column was only a few moments late. There never was a more complete surprise; my men charged the village and reached the lodges before the Indians were aware of our presence. The moment the charge was ordered the band struck up "Garry Owen," and with cheers that strongly reminded one of scenes during the war, every trooper, led by his officer, rushed towards the village. The Indians were caught napping for once; the warriors rushed from their lodges and posted themselves behind trees and in the deep ravines, from which they began a most determined defense. The lodges and all their contents were in our possession within ten minutes after the charge was ordered, but the real fighting, such as has rarely, if ever, been equalled in Indian warfare, began when attempting to clear out or kill the warriors posted in ravines or underbrush. Charge after charge was made, and most gallantly too, but the Indians had resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible. After a desperate conflict of several hours, our efforts were crowned with the most complete and gratifying success. The entire village, numbering forty-seven lodges of Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes, two lodges of Arapahoes, two lodges of Sioux; fifty-one lodges in all, under command of their principal chief, Black Kettle, who fell into our hands. By actual and careful examination after the battle, the following figures give some of the fruits of our victory: The Indians left on the ground and in our possession the bodies of one hundred and three of their warriors, including Black Kettle himself, whose scalp is now in possession of one of our Osage guides. We captured in good condition eight hundred and seventy-five horses, ponies, and mules; two hundred and forty-one saddles, some of very fine and costly workmanship; five hundred and seventy-three buffalo robes, three hundred and ninety buffalo skins for lodges, one hundred and sixty untanned robes, two hundred and ten axes, one hundred and forty hatchets, thirty-five revolvers, forty-seven
riffles, five hundred and thirty-five pounds of powder, one thousand and fifty pounds of lead, four thousand arrows and arrow-heads, seventy-five spears, ninety bullet molds, thirty-five bows and quivers, twelve shields, three hundred pounds of bullets, seven hundred and seventy-five lariats, nine hundred and forty buckskin saddle bags, four hundred and seventy-five blankets, ninety-three coats, seven hundred pounds of tobacco. In addition, we captured all their winter supply of dried buffalo meat; all their meal, flour, and other provisions; and, in fact, everything they possessed; even driving the warriors from the village with little or no clothing. We destroyed everything of value to the Indians, and have now in our possession, as prisoners of war, fifty-three squaws and their children. Among the prisoners are the survivors of Black Kettle and the family of Little Rock. We also secured two white children held captive by the Indians. One white woman who was in their possession was murdered by her captors the moment we attacked. A white boy held captive, about ten years old, when about to be rescued, was brutally murdered by a squaw, who ripped out his entrails with a knife. The Kiowas under Satanta, and Arapahoes under Little Raven, were encamped six miles below Black Kettle's village; the warriors from these two villages came to attempt the rescue of the Cheyennes. They attacked my command from all sides by about noon, hoping to recover the squaws and herd of the Cheyennes. In their attack they displayed great boldness, and compelled me to use all my force to repel them, but the counter charges of the cavalry were more than they could stand; by 3 o'clock we drove them in all directions, pursuing them several miles. I then moved my entire command in search of the villages of the Kiowas and Arapahoes, but after a march of eight miles discovered they had taken alarm at the fate of the Cheyenne village and had fled. I was then three days' march from where I had left my train of supplies, and knew that wagons could not follow me, as the trail had led me over a section of country so cut up by ravines and other obstructions that cavalry could with difficulty move over it. The supplies carried from the train upon the persons of the men were exhausted. My men, from loss of sleep and hard service, were wearied out; my horses were in the same condition for want of forage; I therefore began my return march about 8 p. m., and found my train of supplies at this point, (only having accomplished sixteen miles since I left it.) In the excitement of the fight, as well as in self-defense, it so happened that some of the squaws and a few children were killed and wounded. The latter I have brought with me, and they receive all the medical attendance the circumstances of the case permits. Many of the squaws were taken with arms in their hands, and several of my command are known to have been wounded by them. The desperate character of the combat may be inferred from the fact that, after the battle, the bodies of thirty-eight dead warriors were found in a small ravine near the village, in which they had posted themselves.

I now have to report the loss suffered by my command. I regret to mention among the killed Major Joel H. Elliott and Captain Louis M. Hamilton, and nineteen enlisted men; the wounded includes three officers and eleven enlisted men, in all thirty-five. Of the officers, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Alpért Barnitz, captain seventh cavalry, is seriously if not mortally wounded; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Custer and Second Lieutenant I. J. Marsh, Seventh Cavalry, are slightly wounded; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel F. W. Benteen had his horse shot under him by a son of Black Kettle, whom he afterward killed. Colonel Barnitz, before receiving his wounds, killed two warriors.
I cannot sufficiently commend the admirable conduct of the officers and men. This command has marched constantly five days, amidst terrible snow-storms, and over a rough country covered by more than twelve inches of snow. Officers and men have slept in the snow without tents. The night preceding the attack, officers and men stood at their horses heads for hours, awaiting the moment of attack, this, too, when the temperature was far below the freezing point. They have endured every privation and fought with unsurpassed gallantry against a powerful and well armed foe; and from first to last I have not heard a single murmur; but on the contrary, the officers and men of the several squadrons and companies seemed to vie with each other in their attention to duty, and their patience and perseverance under difficulties. Every officer, man, scout, and Indian guide did their full duty. I duly regret the loss of the gallant spirits who fell in the battle of the Washita. Those whose loss we are called upon to deplore were among our bravest and best.

Respectfully submitted.

G. A. CUSTER,

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Department of the Missouri.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Extract from letter of Major General P. H. Sheridan, addressed to Brevet Major General W. A. Nichols, Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Depot on Beaver Creek, November 20, 1868.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Lieutenant General, the following operations of General Custer's command:

On November 23d I ordered him to proceed with eleven companies of his regiment, the Seventh Cavalry, in a southerly direction toward the Antelope Hills, in search of hostile Indians.

On the 26th he struck the trail of a war party of Black Kettle's band returning from the north near where the eastern line of the Pan-Handle of Texas crosses the main Canadian. He at once corralled his wagons and followed in pursuit over to the headwaters of the Washita, thence down that stream, and on the morning of the 27th surprised the camp of Black Kettle, and after a desperate fight, in which Black Kettle was assisted by the Arapahoes, under Little Raven, and the Kiowas, under Satanta, captured the entire camp, killing the chief, Black Kettle, and one hundred and two Indian warriors, whose bodies were left on the field. All their stock, ammunition, arms, lodges, robes, and fifty-three women and their children were captured.

Our loss was Major Elliott, Captain Hamilton, and nineteen enlisted men killed; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Barnitz, (badly,) Brevet Lieutenant Colonel T. W. Ouster, Second Lieutenant J. B. Marsh, and eleven enlisted men wounded.

Little Raven's band of Arapahoes, and Satanta's band of Kiowas were encamped six miles below Black Kettle's camp. About eight or nine hundred of the animals captured were shot, the balance kept for military purposes.
The highest credit is due to General Custer and his command. They started in a furious snow-storm, and traveled all the while in snow twelve inches deep. Black Kettle's and Little Rock's families are among the prisoners.

It was Black Kettle's band who committed the first depredations on the Saline and Solomon Rivers, in Kansas.

Two white children were recaptured. One white woman and one boy ten years old were brutally murdered by the Indian women when the attack commenced.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, St. Louis, Missouri.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Cobb, January 1, 1869.

GENERAL: * * * * * * * * * *
I see it alleged by the Indian agents that Black Kettle's band was on their reservation at the time attacked. This is but thirty miles up the Washita from Fort Cobb. The battle took place one hundred and twenty-one miles up the river from Fort Cobb.

It is also alleged the band was friendly. No one could make such an assertion who had any regard for truth. The young men of this band commenced the war. I can give their names. Some of Black Kettle's young men were out depredating at Dodge when the village was wiped out. Mules taken from Carpenter's train, mail matter carried by our murdered couriers, photographs stolen from the scenes of outrages on the Solomon and Saline, were found in the captured camp; and, in addition, I have their own illustrated history, found in their captured camps, showing the different fights or murders this band was engaged in; the trains attacked, the hay parties attacked about Fort Wallace; the women, citizens, and soldiers killed. It is at the service of any one desiring information on the subject.

It should be known, also, that I invited Black Kettle and his family to come in, through the Arapaho chief, Little Raven, in my interview with that chief at Fort Dodge, in September, and that I would take care of him. He did not come.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, St. Louis, Missouri.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Copy of affidavit of Edmund Guerrier, in reference to the hostility of the Cheyennes.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,

Medicine Bluff Creek, Washita Mountains, February 9, 1869.

Personally appeared before me, Edmund Guerrier, who resides on the Purgatory River, Colorado Territory, who, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

I was with the Cheyenne Indians at the time of the massacre on the Solomon and Saline Rivers, in Kansas, the early part or middle of last August, and I was living at this time with Little Rock’s band. The war party who started for the Solomon and Saline was composed of young men of Little Rock’s, Black Kettle’s, Medicine Arrow’s, and Bull-Bear’s bands, and as near as I can remember, nearly all the different bands of Cheyennes had some of their young men in this war party, which committed the outrages and murders on the Solomon and Saline. Red Nose, and the Man who Breaks the Marrow Bones, (Ho-eh-a-mo-a-ha,) were the two leaders in this massacre; the former belonged to the Dog Soldiers, and the latter to Black Kettle’s band. As soon as we heard the news by runners, who came on ahead to Black Kettle, saying that they had already commenced fighting, we moved from our camp on Buckner’s Fork of the Pawnee, near its headwaters, down to North Fork, where we met Big Joke’s band, and then moved south across the Arkansas River, and when we got to the Cimarron, George Bent and I left them and went to our homes on the Purgatory.

EDMUND GUERRIER.

Witness:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY, Bvt. Lieutenant Colonel U. S. A., Aide-de-Camp.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Copy of letter from Captain John H. Page, in reference to return of the Osage Indians to their homes.

CAMP SUPPLY, INDIAN TERRITORY, February 20, 1869.

COLONEL: Old Beaver wants me to say that he wants to go home, and wants his young men sent up to him here. He says he only came out for three months, and that he wants to see his family. He says he will, perhaps, come back when the grass is six inches high. He wants Colonel McGonnigle to turn over to his Osages his two ponies that Mr. Cogswell left there. He also wants to know when he will get paid off. He wants the Osage Hanroha (Veinsikey) to have a letter from General Sheridan, and say how much money his young men have got. Veinsikey is the name of the Osage. Bearer wants to have the letter.

Respectfully,


Colonel SCHUYLER CROSBY, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
Extract from letter of Brevet Brigadier General Alfred Sully to Major General P. H. Sheridan.

FORT DODGE, October 26, 1868.

GENERAL:
I am sorry you did not get the Osage nation. I should not wonder if they, the Kaws and the Caddoes, and other friendly Indians, will make a profitable trade, selling the other Indians' ammunition. That is their old game.

Yours, with respect,

ALFRED SULLY,

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Fort Hays.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Extract from letter sent to Brevet Brigadier General A. Sully, in reference to Osage scouts.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, October 24, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL: The Osages won't join at present. They sent up with Bradley eleven scouts.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Brevet Brig. Gen. ALFRED SULLY,
Commanding District Upper Arkansas, Fort Dodge.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel.

Extract from letter sent to Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman, in reference to employing Osage Indians.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, October 21, 1868.

GENERAL: I have sent to accept two hundred of the Osages, who sent me word that they wished to take a hand.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Lieut. General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division Missouri, St. Louis, Missouri.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
Difficulties with Indian Tribes.

Headquarters Dept' of the Missouri, in the Field,
October 19, 1868.

My dear General Sully:

I do not know exactly when the Osages will be able to join Custer.

Yours truly,

P. H. Sheridan, Major General.

Brevet Brigadier General A. Sully,
Commanding District Upper Arkansas,
Fort Dodge, Kansas.

Official copy:

J. Schuyler Crosby,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

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Extract from letter received from L. P. Chauteau, United States Interpreter for Osages.

Osage Agency, October 16, 1868.

Dear Sir: I done as the general requested. I was some time getting up the ten men and an interpreter. The Osages were some ten days later than they expected to be out on their buffalo hunt.

I hope you will treat my men kindly, and tell the general commanding I hope he will treat those men kind and friendly.

I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

Louis P. Chauteau,
United States Interpreter.

Colonel J. S. Crosby,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Official copy:

J. Schuyler Crosby,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

Letter of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. Schuyler Crosby, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Department Missouri, in the field.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, October 16, 1868.

GENERAL: The major general commanding directs me to inform you that he has sent Colonel Sheridan, aide-de-camp, to the Osage Indians for the purpose of getting that tribe to join in the war against hostile tribes. (See inclosed letter:) These Indians, should they join against the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Comanches, will be sent to General Custer's column, and will have a red band of cloth on their arm to allow our troops to distinguish them as friendly Indians.

I am, general, &c.,

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Bvt. Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

General ALFRED SULLY, Fort Dodge.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

[Special Field Orders No. 27.—Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, October 14, 1868.

* * * * * * * *

4. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel M. V. Sheridan, aide-de-camp, will proceed to the Osage Indian reservation, under special instructions from the major general commanding.

By command of Major General Sheridan:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
A. A. A. General.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Extract from letter of Major General P. H. Sheridan to Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman, from Medicine Bluff Creek, Indian Territory, February 12, 1869.

The Osages have been behaving very badly since we commenced feeding them, by making raids on the Caddoes and affiliated bands in their vicinity, and have stolen two hundred and fifty head of horses from them, or from their hunting parties, while out near the North Canadian. I will send an officer up to the Osage reservation and make them return the animals or stop their rations.

Extract from letter of Major General P. H. Sheridan to Lieutenant Walter Howe, in charge of subsistence for Osage Indians.

The Osage Indians have within the last month stolen a great many horses from the friendly Caddoes, Kichees, and Wichita Indians on
their reservation. I cannot tell the exact number, but I send one of my scouts, with one of the Osage trailers, with this and a party of six Caddoes, Kichees, and Wichitas to receive the horses. I want you to exercise your authority in procuring the horses, and if they are not delivered up you may discontinue feeding the Osages until they make the proper restitution.

Official extracts:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

[Special Field Orders No. 63.]

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Depot on the North Canadian River,
*At the Junction of Beaver Creek, Indian Territory, Dec. 5, 1868.*

I. The depot quartermaster will issue, for the use of the Indian prisoners at this point, forty blankets.

By command of Major General Sheridan:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Bvt. Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Extract from letter of Brevet Major General G. A. Custer to General Sully, requesting authority to start out after the Cheyenne Indians.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY,
Near Mouth of Wolf Creek, November 19, 1868.

Lieutenant: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I trust I may be authorized to set out within twenty-four hours, and that the Osage Indians and scouts may be ordered to accompany me.

Respectfully submitted.

G. A. CUSTER,
Lieut. Col. Seventh Cavalry, Brevet Major General U. S. A.

Lieutenant JOHN F. WESTON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
District of the Upper Arkansas.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, October 28, 1868.

Sir: The major general commanding directs that you place upon
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

your rolls the Osage Indian scouts now at this post. A list of their names will be furnished you.

Very respectfully, &c.,

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Bvt. Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

Captain A. S. KIMBALL,
Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A., Fort Hays, Kan.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Extract from letter of Brevet Major General W. B. Hazen to Major General Sheridan.

AMERICUS, KANSAS, October 18, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I camped among the Kaws last night. They were anxious to go into the war, and say they can furnish seventy or eighty good men, and that the Osages, their friends, can and will furnish from one hundred to two hundred more. I am decidedly of opinion that this force, properly fed and cared for, would be of twice the service to you in actually making war than an entire regiment of equipped cavalry; I would not hesitate, if desired, for a moment in taking full control of these, with the Caddoes, Wichitas, Shawnees, and Delawares, probably in all four hundred or five hundred. They ought to be given all they take from the Indians. They will also want arms, rations, and some pay.

Very truly,

W. B. HAZEN.

Major General SHERIDAN.

Extract from letter to Brevet Major General G. A. Custer.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD, Fort Hays, Kansas, October 31, 1868.

MY DEAR CUSTER: I send down to-morrow thirteen Indians (Osages) as guides: Little Beaver knows the whole country south of the Arkansas.

Yours truly,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General.

Brevet Major General G. A. CUSTER,
Commanding Seventh Cavalry.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, October 31, 1868.

SIR: The major general commanding directs that you provide the necessary forage and transportation for the Indian scouts that are ordered to proceed to Fort Dodge to report to General Custer. They will go with the wagon train that leaves to-morrow.

Very respectfully, &c.,

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Brevet Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

Brevet Lieut. Col. A. J. McGONIGLE,
Assistant Quartermaster, Fort Hays, Kansas.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Camp Supply, March 2, 1869.

GENERAL: The major general commanding directs that you order all the Indian scouts now with your command to Fort Hays for discharge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Brevet Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

Brevet Major General CUSTER,
In the Field.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Letter of instructions to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel M. V. Sheridan to proceed to the Osage Indian reservation and to inquire into their condition.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, November 7, 1868.

COLONEL: Inclosed please find a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, in reference to the starving condition of the Osage Indians, with an indorsement from the Lieutenant General, requiring an inspection, and, if they are in the condition reported, authorizing the issue of beef and corn-meal and salt. I desire you to proceed to the Osage nation, and if, after inspection, you find these Indians in the condition reported, you are authorized to make the necessary purchase of beef, corn-meal, and salt, to satisfy their wants until an officer is sent to take charge of the issues. In the mean time you can authorize Father Thompson at the Mission to issue the articles above named.

Find out the number of the Indians, men, women, and children, as nearly as you can, and report to the Lieutenant General in person after
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

the performance of this duty. Consult the chief commissary in reference to the temporary purchases mentioned in these instructions.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Brevet Lieut. Col. M. V. SHERIDAN,
Captain Seventh Cavalry and Aide-de-Camp.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

Extract from letter sent to General Sherman, St. Louis, Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, November 5, 1868.

GENERAL: I am this day in receipt of the communication from the Secretary of the Interior in relation to the Osage Indians. I will make the necessary inspection, and issue in accordance with the endorsement of the lieutenant general, should it be necessary. I respectfully bring to the notice of the Lieutenant General that the agent for these Indians does not reside with them, but at Baldwin City, one hundred and fifty miles from the agency, and that he but seldom visits the tribe; that the last time he visited it was when the treaty was made last summer; and the citizens report that he only visits the tribe at such times as the government makes payments; in fact, general, the whole Indian management is a notorious fraud.

* * * * *

I do not exactly know how many Osage Indians there are, but think they number seven thousand, men, women, and children.

Little Beaver, the second chief, with twelve of his best men, are now with me as guides for the country south of the Arkansas.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General United States Army.

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.

Official copy:

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT UPPER ARKANSAS, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Dodge, Kansas, November 6, 1868.

I would respectfully request that you transfer all scouts and Osage Indians now at this post, that are on your rolls at Hays, to Brevet Major J. M. Bell, regimental quartermaster Seventh United States Cavalry; also, their horses and equipments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY INMAN,
Brevet Major and A. Q. M. U. S. A., Chief Quartermaster.

Brevet Lieut. Col. A. J. McGONIGLE,
Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A., Fort Hays, Kansas.
Respectfully submitted to headquarters Department of Missouri (in the field), with recommendation that Captain Kimball, assistant quartermaster, be ordered to transfer the scouts and Osages, with their horses and equipments, as herein requested.

A. J. McGONIGLE,
Brevet Lieut. Col. and Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A.

The transfer of Osage scouts, as herein requested, is hereby ordered.

By command of Major General Sheridan.

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
A. A. A. A. General.

Respectfully referred to Captain A. S. Kimball, assistant quartermaster, for his action, in accordance with the orders from headquarters indorsed hereon. The transfers should be forwarded by courier on or before the 10th instant.

A. J. McGONIGLE,
Brevet Lieut. Col. and Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A.

A true copy of letter and indorsements:

G. COLLINS,
Chaplain U. S. A.

CAPTAIN: The major general commanding directs that you place upon your rolls the Osage Indian scouts now at this post.

A list of their names will be furnished you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Brevet Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

Captain A. S. Kimball,
Assistant Quartermaster, Fort Hays, Kansas.

Respectfully returned to Colonel Crosby, acting assistant adjutant general, for information as to the rate of pay the Osage Indian scouts are to receive, and date from which they are to be taken up.

A. S. KIMBALL,
Captain, Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A.

Respectfully returned. The interpreter is to receive $100, Little Bea-
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

ver and the head war chief $75, and the others $50 per month. The compensation to commence from the 20th of this month.

By command of Major General Sheridan.

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Brevet Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

A true copy of letter and indorsements: G. COLLINS,
Chaplain U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, IN THE FIELD,
Fort Hays, Kansas, October 29, 1868.

The major general commanding directs that you furnish one suit of clothing each to thirteen Osage Indian scouts in the service of the government and now at this post.
This clothing is not to be charged to them nor deducted from their accounts.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Brevet Lieut. Col., Aide-de-Camp, A. A. A. General.

Captain A. S. KIMBALL,
Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A., Fort Hays, Kansas.

FORT HAYS, KANSAS, October 29, 1868.

I certify that one uniform coat, one pair mounted trousers, one shirt, one pair stockings, and one mounted great coat, were issued to each of the thirteen Osage Indian scouts referred to in the within order.

A. S. KIMBALL,
Captain, Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A.

A true copy:
G. COLLINS,
Chaplain U. S. A.


FORT HAYS, KANSAS, October 12, 1868.

GENERAL:

I have ordered General Getty to send as large a command as he can get together at Fort Bascom to advance down the Canadian, and have invited the Utes to take a hand. The Osages want a hand also, and I will turn on the hostiles everything I can. I have written by to-day's mail to you on the subject of the dispatch of the 9th. With the forces from Bascom, Lyon, Dodge, Topeka, and with Utes and Osages, and a command moving from Arbuckle, we will, I hope, be able to settle this question before the winter is over.

Yours respectfully,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major General U. S. A.

Lieut. General W. T. SHERMAN,
Saint Louis, Missouri.

Official copy:
J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Lieut. Colonel, A. D. C.
DEAR GENERAL: My last date from General Sheridan is December 7, at Camp Supply, on the point of starting for Fort Cobb. My last from General Hazen is November 30, at Fort Cobb, giving the localities of the various camps of the Indians, and the first account of the battle of November 27; and the last from General Grierson is of December 7, at Fort Gibson, when he was on the point of going to Fort Cobb, with the two companies called for by General Hazen.

I have promptly furnished copies of these to the War Department, to meet the cry raised by Tappan, Taylor & Co., to the effect that Black Kettle's was a friendly camp, and that Custer's battle was a second Sand Creek affair.

I have also furnished parts to the press, to counteract the effects of their bald and naked assertions. This you know is a free country, and people have the lawful right to misrepresent as much as they please, and to print them, but the great mass of our people cannot be humbugged into the belief that Black Kettle's was friendly, with its captive women and children, its herds of stolen horses, its stolen mail, arms, powder, &c., trophies of war. I am well satisfied with Custer's attack, and would not have wept if he could have served Satanta's and Bull Bear's bands in the same style. I want you all to go ahead, kill and punish the hostile, rescue the captive white women and children, capture and destroy the ponies, lances, carbines, &c., of the Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Kiowas. Mark out the spots where they must stay, and then systematize the whole (friendly and hostile) into camps, with a view to economical support, until we can try and get them to be self-supporting, like the Cherokees and Choctaws. They must clearly understand that they must never again hunt outside the limits of the territory defined as General Hazen's district, and that they must not enter Texas at all, much less for the purpose of stealing horses, and capturing women and children. If the game of the Indian Territory do not suffice for their support, the United States must feed them till they can raise tame cattle, sheep, and hogs, and until they can raise patches of corn, potatoes, pumpkins, &c.

Bearing these general principles in view, I will be responsible for your acts, and risk all consequences.

The House of Representatives promptly passed the bill transferring the Indian Bureau from the Interior to the War Department; but the bill is held in committee of the Senate. I believe still it will pass; but even if it do not, the course I have indicated must be followed before Indian agents can pretend to manage the four bands now construed to be at war, viz: Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches. I believe that Generals Sheridan and Hazen will, when they meet at Fort Cobb, fully accomplish this, but I would like that Bull Bear and Satanta should be killed before the tribes are allowed any favors at our hands.

General Harney is here, and says he is making good progress with the Sioux above, and he believes he can keep them at peace. We hear of no Indians at all between the two railroads.

Our army reunion at Chicago was a grand affair; more enthusiasm than had characterized any former meeting. The absence of each of you was noted and regretted, and all felt that it was hard that while we were enjoying the fruits of peace, you were still hard at work in the hardest kind of war.

I hope this winter's work will bring peace on the plains, so that we
will not again be harassed by the endless murders and depredations that made this Indian war indispensable.

I await further news with much interest. I saw General Grant at Chicago, and there will be no necessity of my going east till March. You may therefore take it for granted that I will be at these headquarters till then.

With great respect, your obedient servant.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant General.

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN, Brevet Major General W. B. HAZEN, Brevet Major General B. H. GRIESON, one or all, Care Commanding Officer, Fort Gibson, C. N.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, January 29, 1869.

GENERAL: By direction of the Lieutenant General commanding, I have the honor to inclose for the information of the commanding general department of the Missouri the accompanying copies of papers, to wit:

Letter from E. W. Wynkoop to Hon. N. G. Taylor, January 11, 1869.
Letter from Department of the Interior, Washington, January 15, 1869, signed N. G. Taylor, Commissioner.
Letter from Department of the Interior, Washington, January 16, 1869, signed O. H. Browning, Secretary.
Letter from Lieutenant General Sherman to Brevet Major General E. D. Townsend, assistant adjutant general, dated St. Louis, Missouri, January 28, 1869, relative to the widow of Black Kettle, late chief of the Cheyennes, and to say that, under instructions as herewith, the Lieutenant General directs that she be released and delivered over to George Bent, with the provision as contained in the letter of the Lieutenant General to the Adjutant General of the army herewith. You will please report the department action in the case.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Brig. Gen. CHAUNCY McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters
Department of the Missouri, Fort Hays, Kansas.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Hays, Kansas, February 13, 1869.

GENERAL: In reply to your communication of the 20th ultimo, in reference to the squaw of Black Kettle, late chief of the Cheyennes, I have the honor to state that she is not in confinement at Fort Hays, and cannot, therefore, be delivered to George Bent. I am informed by the
DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.

interpreter that the Cheyenne women, now prisoners at Fort Hays, state that Black Kettle's squaw was killed at the battle of Washita, November 27, 1868.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAUNCEY McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Major General W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Military
Division of the Missouri, St. Louis, Missouri.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, April 4, 1870.

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant General.